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SUMMARY
This research examines how social workers view the use of guardianship to meet the 
needs of clients with mental illness. It is the first empirical study of social work 
perspectives on guardianship and of social workers’ decisions to select particular clients 
as appropriately placed on guardianship.
An historical review confirms current relevance of ‘tutor’ and ‘curator’, forms of 
guardianship for this care group since Roman times, in contrast with the commonly held 
view that guardianship was introduced by the Mental Health Act, 1959. The nature of 
‘committee’, as English equivalent to the Scottish tutors, is given particular attention.
The survey part of the research employed a standard questionnaire which explored key 
guardianship concepts, sought to compare the role of social worker with that of guardian, 
and looked to future possibilities for the development of guardianship. The fieldwork 
took place in two adjacent London local authority social services departments. The 
profile of guardianship clients indicated that guardianship was used mainly for clients 
living alone in socially isolated circumstances, particularly women. It was used to help 
to gain access to the client to provide care and services, or to enable the person to move 
into residential care, often direct from hospital. For the most part, the present research 
confirms previously available data on clients. However it contests the view that 
guardianship is mainly used for people suffering from dementia, as clients with 
schizophrenia were in the majority in the survey sample.
Different models of guardianship were used to assist in the analysis of data: the 
‘legal/substituted judgement’ or ‘advocacy’ model; the ‘parent/child’ or ‘social casework’ 
model; and the ‘therapeutic welfare’ or ‘case management’ model. There was clear 
support for these and for core guardianship concepts, including authority, continuity, 
personalised care and surrogacy - irrespective of the model considered. Arguably, the 
idea of trust (as in trusteeship) was endorsed as being at the heart of guardianship.
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The position of social services departments as ‘host* agencies for providing guardianship 
was seen as equivocal in that directors of social services have few incentives (and a 
number of disincentives) for taking on the responsibility. If social workers themselves 
have to shoulder the responsibility in the new community care climate, the absence of 
management back-up could seriously undermine the care given to clients and limit 
possibilities for effective adaptation of the guardianship concept.
Social workers’ ‘verdict’ on guardianship was that it has potential which so far has not 
been realised. There was general agreement that guardianship needs to change so as to 
be more adaptable and enforceable to meet clients’ individual needs. It is anticipated that 
a revised guardianship formulation on this basis would be widely supported.
3
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION 
THE NEED FOR THIS RESEARCH
Information on guardianship for mentally ill people is surprisingly sparse. Apart from 
a limited statistical profile annually assembled by the Department of Health from returns 
from local authorities, monitoring of actions under Section 7 of the Mental Health Act, 
1983, is delegated to individual social services departments and the data might be 
assumed to reside alongside that of other cases assessed by approved social workers 
(ASWs). By definition, information on assessments which did not conclude with a 
decision to pursue guardianship will be difficult to access. The Mental Health Act 
Commission, (MHAC), often assumed to fulfil a monitoring role regarding use of 
guardianship, have less information than the individual local authorities they visit.
Lack of monitoring on differential use of guardianship, or on the factors which 
predispose social services/social workers to choose for and against guardianship, means 
that information is not available on some critical matters, for example, on whether the 
initial six months period of a guardianship order gives sufficient time for social services 
to provide the necessary care and treatment which would enable statutory guardianship 
to give way to more informal arrangements; or how often longer term statutory 
enforcement of guardianship is required in order to achieve given objectives. Indeed, 
there is lack of clarity about the objectives involved, who determines these and who 
decides whether (or when) they have been achieved. This vitally effects interpretation 
of the significance of lapsed (expired) cases when considering original need measured 
against achieved gains.
Some important areas where information is either unavailable or limited are indicated 
below. Such data that is available from previous research - mainly on characteristics of 
clients selected for guardianship - is contained in Appendix A.
Perhaps the most surprising gap in knowledge, problematic throughout any discussion of 
guardianship, is the empirical basis for the relevance of the three essential powers.
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Changes brought about by the 1983 Act were introduced with the broad intention of 
bringing guardianship up-to-date and making it more relevant; and it was apparently 
assumed that the ‘essential’ powers conferred on guardians were the ones required and 
that others were either not required or were ‘inessential’. In the absence of the evidence 
it is impossible to tell:
(a) whether these powers taken together meet the needs of more or less people 
than would have applied under the 1959 Act;
(b) whether one power (or a combination of powers) has proved more 
necessary than the others and, consequently;
(c) whether more (or fewer) powers are required.
There is a dearth of information on why guardianship is or is not used, alongside frequent 
assertions of under-use. Studies focusing attention on existing guardianship cases help 
to clarify reasons for use but not for non-use. Conceivably, studies of social services 
departments to review their policy making, procedures for sanctioning decisions, culture 
and attitude towards guardianship, alongside the dependency needs of their clients with 
serious mental health difficulties, might shed further light on these questions yet remain 
speculative in its approach towards specific decisions on actual clients.
It is therefore argued below that to focus the investigation on social workers targets the 
key actors whose task it is to consider use and non-use within the realistic context of 
local authority social services departments, thereby taking account of the organisational 
milieu within which the statutory process unfolds.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Social Workers’ Professional Identity and Commitment
It is assumed in this research that the social worker subjects are drawn from a 
professional group with a sense of commitment and accountability towards clients who 
suffer from mental illness, and who accept and exercise a level of responsibility - both
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as professionals and as employees of social services departments and local authorities. 
The acquisition of this disposition comes from social work training and/or experience of 
social work, particularly in social services departments. Thus social workers’ perceptions 
of the value of guardianship for people with mental illness would not be expected to be 
limited by the terms of formal statements contained in the Mental Health Act, 
Memorandum of Guidance, or Codes of Practice. Social workers are also assumed to 
have formed a view of the most appropriate mode of care for this group of people as 
being psycho-social rather than medical, either in the broad (psycho-therapeutic) sense 
or narrower (chemo-therapeutic) sense.
Social workers are also seen to have acquired a professional value-base and ethos which 
predisposes them to value a certain kind of relationship with their clients as the most 
effective way of assisting them, whether or not clients also require help, including 
medical help, from other sources.
Received wisdom as to the efficacy of relationships with these clients may stem from 
generally accepted notions of what constitutes meaningful relationships - continuity, 
persistence, consistency - while others stem from a perception of the nature of mental 
illness and the most appropriate ways of reacting to people suffering from mental illness,
i.e. attitudes of supportiveness, acceptance and practical encouragement. This research 
tends to the view that social work attitudes and values are often acquired through 
considerations of what constitutes ‘appropriateness’; consequently the way in which social 
workers relate to people with mental illness in practice is more to do with whether this 
relationship is acceptable within the professional culture than whether it is effective in 
helping people with mental illness.
In particular, there is an apparent conflict between the guardianship relationship 
requirements as regards assertiveness and the social work preference for non- 
authoritative approaches. Also, the emphasis in social work on self-determination of 
clients appears to conflict with the restricting nature of a statutory relationship. 
However, the paper hopefully shows that this is more due to a confusion of intent than 
a real contradiction, in that all professionals in the field of mental health service 
provision acclaim the notion of self-determination as the ultimate goal for therapeutic
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endeavour. The real question, therefore, is whether such self-determination has to be 
assumed to exist, albeit partially, from the outset or whether it is more realistic to admit 
to the fact that some people with mental illness at times (and in some cases most of the 
time) display clear inability to shape their lives or determine their futures.
Different Levels of Decision-Making in Social Services
Formally designated decision-makers within the terms of the Mental Health Act, 1983, 
are the prospective applicants, termed ‘approved social workers’, and directors of social 
services who have to agree such applications under Section 7(5) of the Act. Only the 
first group of decision-makers receives detailed attention in this research. However, as 
these are social workers employed by social services departments they are inevitably 
influenced by management perspectives and expectations. This is a two-way influence 
to the extent that directors of social services look to social workers to advise them as to 
the correct decision on professional grounds. It is therefore necessary to consider social 
work decision-making in the organisational and cultural context of social services as well 
as that of their professional values and ethos.
The Significance of Decision-Making
Subject to the qualifications spelt out in the preceding paragraph, social workers 
deciding for and against guardianship are seen as accepting or declining an enhanced 
level of responsibility on behalf of their agency for an individual person with mental 
illness, which in turn relates to certain assumptions about mental illness and the 
degree and extent of justifiable surrogacy, i.e. the level of responsibility which other 
people should accept on such a person’s behalf. In other words, guardianship and 
surrogacy are seen as inextricably linked even though no definition of surrogacy is 
offered in law or practice guidance. The issues discussed, based on different 
interpretations of the law and of different legal expressions of the guardianship concept in 
recent history, are described as centring on whether it is necessary for surrogacy to be 
complete, i.e. total, or whether it is more appropriate to address degrees of, and limits 
to, the surrogate function.
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The Nature of Guardianship Responsibility
The nature of the surrogate responsibility towards people with mental illness is described 
as having a historical root in the trust relationship exercised by the Crown over infants 
and certain elderly people, as well as mentally handicapped/mentally ill people where 
they are unable to look after themselves. In other words, trusteeship and guardianship 
are seen as having a very close relationship, with clear implications in the nature of that 
relationship, i.e. that the guardian exercises care in a continuing, consistent and above 
all individualised way appropriate to people in these circumstances. Therefore, help 
offered to these people which is sporadic, inconsistent and impersonal (e.g. through 
excessive delegation) is seen as a contradiction in terms.
It is furthermore argued that the surrogate trust relationship is the most appropriate way 
to describe the nature of guardianship. Arguably, the foundation of guardianship on 
trusteeship is the basis for evaluating the models considered, i.e. substituted judgement, 
therapeutic or parental, so that provided each contains a trust element they remain valid 
and useful analytical tools.
Recent Empirical Basis for the Efficacy of the Trust Relationship
References to contemporary research on the components of effective mental health 
services,(1/2) show a consistent pattern advocating that relationships of service providers 
to people with mental illness in the community should contain the elements of continuity 
and consistency linked with the individualisation of care. A further finding consistent 
with the guardianship idea is that such relationships should be as assertively offered as 
is necessary to engage the person with mental illness in care programmes appropriate for 
their need. Such people should not be left to decide for themselves whether to ‘opt in’ 
to such services, since this is a denial of our knowledge of problems of motivation among 
people with mental illness. It also vitally affects take up and maintenance of services, 
even when these have been carefully assessed between the client and the professionals 
involved before hand.
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Recent research in this area has not generally linked these requirements with the 
legal/social institutional framework referred to as guardianship, and it is a vital argument 
of this thesis that provision of services in the most appropriate way should also be linked 
with the authority and accountability base of the person with key responsibility in this 
area. A conceptual link is identified between guardianship and case management, raising 
the question of whether the latter is to be seen as an updated version of guardianship or 
a separate strand of service providing activity.
Accountability
In parallel with the issue of responsibility for people with mental illness referred to 
above, is the question of which persons and agencies are obligated to exercise that 
responsibility. The key legal provision in this area, the Mental Health Act, 1983, clearly 
indicates that social services departments of local authorities are the ones obligated to 
both decide for or against guardianship and generally to provide the guardianship function 
themselves. Social workers at the centre of this study operate in a context which is at 
the same time organisational/legal/political. No decision in this area is ‘neutral’ from 
these points of view and in particular in the commitment of the agencies’ resources to 
sustain a guardianship arrangement. The question of the extent and cost of resources 
which are inevitably linked to the guardianship commitment is a contentious area and one 
which receives specific discussion.
Perspective Limitations of Care Group and Legal Framework
Guardianship is both a general and a generic concept with a long, historical pedigree. 
In some ways it is artificial to discuss guardianship only in relation to a certain group of 
clients: people with mental illness. It is nevertheless essential for the research in hand 
for limitations of focus to be identified. Besides being concerned with one particular care 
group, the research is also concerned essentially with only one legal system, that applying 
in England and Wales, and, unless otherwise stated, with the contemporary law applying 
in England and Wales, the Mental Health Act, 1983. References to laws applying 
elsewhere and at different times, which will be found at various points in the study, 
usually illustrate differences of approach or alternative ways of operating guardianship
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arrangements. They therefore mainly receive attention where suggestions for possible 
future developments and changes in guardianship law and practice are discussed. A 
comparative study of guardianship arrangements in other countries is not attempted.
In practice the research focus is confined to adults since guardianship for children is 
based on different assumptions and legislative requirements. Guardianships for mentally 
ill offenders provided for under other sections of the Mental Health Act, 1983, are not 
considered.
The Legal View of Guardianship and Possible Alternatives
The legal view of guardianship conveys the idea that guardianship is linked totally with 
legal provision: the rights of individual people with mental illness and the powers of 
people functioning as guardians. Whilst this aspect of guardianship requires considerable 
attention, the argument in this paper is that to focus on clients’ rights and guardians’ 
powers by reference to legal provision and terminology, is to fail to appreciate the wider 
social role and significance of guardianship.
Viewed as a social rather than purely legal institution, guardianship is open to criticism 
as being overdue for reformulation in tune with modem concepts and views as to the 
needs of people with mental illness. The question at issue in this thesis, however, is less 
to do with whether change is appropriate to bring guardianship in line with current 
thinking on the nature of relationships in society and the power base of such 
relationships, than whether the problems associated with people with mental illness 
require fundamentally different approaches now than in the past.
One illustration of this latter viewpoint will suffice. It could be said that a ‘power 
relationship’ is at the heart of guardianship where the options open to the mentally ill 
client are few and unattractive, i.e. where the exercise of volition and choice by that 
client provides the client with very little scope in achieving a satisfactory lifestyle at least 
approximating to a normal life. If, on the other hand, the services and facilities which 
can be made available to such people are attractive and efficient, and were offered 
without stigma or deterrent, would this tend to reduce the need for the exercise of
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authority by guardians? Arguably, the need for such authority would not disappear since 
there will remain some people with mental illness who would seem to be unable to 
appreciate the nature of services available to them and may not therefore be in a position 
to exercise informed or rational choice.
Guardianship. Compulsion and Restrictiveness
This paper does not set out to provide a thorough discussion of the philosophical, political 
or practical issues involved in the use of compulsion in psychiatry or in the provision of 
mental health services. Although guardianship provided for under the Mental Health Act, 
1983, is a compulsory measure in the technical sense of being imposed on clients whether 
they wish it or not, this does not inevitably involve coercion. And it certainly does not 
mean using guardianship against the client. There are informal forms of guardianship 
which, though seldom regarded as such, are equally valid in expressing the essential 
nature of guardianship in its focus on a relationship in which the key ingredients are trust 
and care, and which is neither coercive nor imposed.
It is acknowledged nevertheless that there is an aspect of statutory guardianship concerned 
with the use of the law to impose care arrangements on clients which, even though it has 
clients’ best interests at heart, may be in conflict with clients’ wishes. Mention will be 
made, in passing, of commentators who feel this is justified and others who feel 
fundamentally opposed to this use of the law. This writer’s position is best summarised 
by Katz as follows:
"It is always easier to cut than untie Gordian Knots. Without coercion, society 
will abandon many people to their self-destruction and uncared-for state. Such 
an approach is as insensitive as the abuse of power that leads to indefinite 
incarceration without treatment.. . . " (3)
Cavadino, re-examining the issues in the context of current proposals to introduce 
compulsory treatment in the community, argues, inter alia, that: "Most psychiatrists 
have succeeded in managing well enough without [this form of compulsion] until now - 
by using persuasion and negotiation.. . . " (4) However, relying for success on persuasion 
and negotiation can present considerable difficulties in working successfully with all
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groups of people in society who require help. How much more problematic to depend 
entirely on persuasion and negotiation in assisting people with mental illness? If mental 
illness could satisfactorily be treated or managed by these means, there would be very 
little need for hospitals, community mental health centres or any of the other 
‘institutionalised’ forms of care which form the bulk of the nation’s expenditure on this 
care group. Even less would it then be necessary to resort to the use of compulsion and 
the law.
The debate on the introduction of compulsory treatment in the community proceeds in 
parallel with suggestions for expanding the use of guardianship, and some of the research 
findings shed light on the connection. The main thrust of the argument most favoured 
by the research subjects is that compulsory treatment in the community is necessary and 
would be most appropriately introduced within a revised and extended guardianship 
framework.
For those who regard guardianship as actually or potentially a ‘least restrictive 
alternative’ to hospital (which, by implication, is also less coercive) it is comparatively 
easy to locate guardianship within social policies connected with de-institutionalisation 
and the development of community care strategies for people with mental health 
problems. For this writer, guardianship does not fit easily into these descriptions and 
therefore cannot be likened to any other strand of social policy development, actual or 
hoped-for. The relationship of guardianship to movements and changes in psychiatry and 
the development of community mental health services hopefully emerges during the 
discussion. Suffice it to say that the relationship is complex.
APPROACHES TO LITERATURE REVIEW, THE HISTORICAL ACCOUNT AND 
TO DEFINITION OF SUBJECT AREAS
Approach to Literature Review
The whole of this dissertation contains elements of literature review, and references to 
written material related to the subject of the research are shown in the usual way. There 
is no single chapter reviewing the literature for the reason that each section and chapter
12
is supported by its own literature review. In short, literature review is applied as a 
method for assembling the dissertation rather than as a separate element in its own right.
Approach to Guardianship History
Apart from demonstrating long-standing concern for the welfare of those suffering from 
mental illness with particular attention to the trust relationship, Chapter III examines the 
influence of the Roman concepts of ‘tutor’ and ‘curator’ on modem solutions to dilemmas 
arising from the need for total guardianship to provide complete surrogate powers. The 
chapter also includes an outline of the historical development of guardianship for people 
with mental illness sufficiently detailed to demonstrate a continuity of concept and intent 
behind the various laws operating from Roman to present times.
This view is in direct contrast to the traditional approach to the history of guardianship 
within the field of mental health and mental disorder which often suggests that 
guardianship originated with statutory measures applicable to people with learning 
disability (Mental Deficiency Act, 1913) or that the Mental Health Acts of 1959 and 1983 
were the only legal bases for providing guardianship for people with mental illness. 
Indeed, Gunn suggests that guardianship for mentally ill people was ‘bom’ with the 1959 
Act.(5) A further purpose of this dissertation therefore is to demonstrate that this 
proposition stems from a misreading of guardianship history.
In addition, this thesis seeks to show a separate and discrete history of the legal and 
social institution of guardianship. In particular, it is argued that guardianship is quite 
distinct from the Poor Law arrangements instituted in the 17th century for the indigent 
and from commitment arrangements for dangerous and/or offender patients.
The Approach to Definition
This section commencing on the following page deals with the nature of definition and 
looks at different types of definition.
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The Defining Task
The Oxford English Dictionary* highlights two aspects of the defining task:
1. stating precisely or exactly what something is; setting forth to explain the 
central nature of something;
2. setting bounds to; limiting, restricting, confining; determining; i.e. fixing 
or deciding; laying down definitely.
These interrelated tasks are thus concerned with determining the nature of something and 
how the nature of that thing is distinguished or distinguishable from other things - i.e. to 
convey boundaries of differentiation.
A similar distinction is conveyed by Quinton in his explanation of the notion of 
essence,** as:
1. "The set of properties or instances of a kind of a thing which that thing 
must possess if it is to be of that particular thing, or instances of that particular 
kind...which can be said to be the defining properties of a thing.
2. This is distinguished from the contingent properties of the thing which are 
accidental, i.e. not peculiar to or essential to the nature of the thing being defined, 
and, by implication, could be shared by a number of other related items. "(6)
Definition thus provides us with:
(1) a concise description of the nature of something; and
(2) a way of enabling us to distinguish this ‘something’ from others whose 
features may be similar.
The 1989 Oxford English Dictionary is used throughout as a reference for dictionary definitions.
The term ‘essence’ confusingly coincides with a description from the official literature of guardianship 
powers as being ‘essential’ in the sense of the ‘minimum necessary’ operationally, rather than in 
reference to the basic nature of guardianship.
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Types of Definition
1. Formal Definition: dictionary, statute, etc
2. Operational Definition: how the subject defined actually operates; its impact or 
consequences and general effect on key parties; what would happen if it did not operate 
in that way or did not exist.
3. Definition by Perspective: i.e. considering whose view of the definition is being 
taken into account, asking who the key parties are and how they perceive the thing being 
defined. There are clear relationships with other types of definition: for example, the 
historical definition refers to a variety of perspectives at given points in time.
Two particular perspectives are involved in this research, i.e.:
(1) that of social workers, upon which the empirical research is based.
(2) the researcher’s own perspective - referred to below as a working 
definition.
4. Definition by Comparison and Context: i.e. how the thing being defined compares 
with similar subjects or areas and how guardianship is seen in context. Thus 
guardianship can be defmed in relationship to advocacy, in its most general or in its 
specifically legal sense, or could be defmed by its relationship to social work - using 
social work to represent an area overlapping with guardianship or overlapping with 
advocacy. Guardianship can also be compared with other statutory measures related to 
the care, protection and control of people with mental illness. A particularly contentious 
area is the comparison between guardianship and hospital, discussed on pages 48 to 54, 
which needs to be seen in this context as well as in broader social policy contexts.
5. Definition by Typology: i.e. by the various categories and differences of form or 
type. This approach to definition would assume that the differences overlay core 
similarities of the essential nature of the item. The dictionary definition of guardianship,
15
for example, uses a typological approach to clarify the legal definition of guardianship 
but succeeds only in portraying it as an out-moded and obsolete concept. Currently 
applicable typologies could have been used instead.
6. Historical Definition: i.e. how the subject being defined evolved or developed 
over a given period, possibly changing emphasis from one characteristic to another, 
updating and adapting (or not, as the case may be) to other changes (social/legal/ 
political/economic) and eventually producing the current version or variation on the item. 
Obviously this form of definition will be more important when the term in question has 
a long historical pedigree, and may be less important where it is of more recent origin.
7. Definition by Concept Analysis: i.e. consideration of theories, models, etc.
8. Working Definition: i.e. a particular category of a perspective definition, namely 
the perspective of the researcher, or more generally the point of view brought to bear on 
the subject by the writer. This also includes a selective interpretation of underlying 
concepts, summarised to enable the definition to serve as a reference point or bench mark 
throughout the research.
SUBJECT AREAS DEFINED
The subjects of definition are confined to guardianship (Chapters II, III and IV) and 
social work (Chapter IV). The task of defining ‘mental illness’ is not undertaken.
Definition of mental illness is a complex area and arguably one which would not throw 
additional light on this particular use of guardianship. Mental illness is not defmed in the 
key legislation up to and including the Mental Health Act, 1983, though possibly a 
medical model is implicit in the statutory framework. Clearly, perspectives on mental 
illness will be one of the factors influencing the approach to guardianship and vice versa, 
but rather than discussing mental illness in general, the particular mental illness problems 
of actual clients are the main focus of attention. Additionally some questions about the 
definition of and attitudes towards mental illness in history are referred to in Chapter III, 
particularly those concerning differences and apparent similarities between mental illness
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and learning disability. Also some attention is given to the difference between generic 
guardianship and guardianship which is particularly geared to the needs of mentally ill 
people. The former term refers to forms of guardianship applying in other countries, 
such as the USA, where criteria for use are sometimes on the broader basis of social 
vulnerability, i.e. applicable to other sorts of disabilities and problems as well as mental 
illness.
Different perspectives on mental illness are discussed as applying to the different models 
of guardianship (see page 61 for an outline of these three different approaches). These 
influenced the researcher’s working definition of guardianship as well as interpretation 
of findings. The idea of the need for a trust relationship as a foundation for any model 
or approach to mental illness and the use of guardianship is also discussed.
TERMINOLOGY
Client/Ward/Patient/Case
Patients subject to guardianship are referred to as ‘patients’ in the Mental Health Act, 
1983, whereas the historically more accurate term for such a person is a ‘ward’. 
Classical writings have always referred to the person being looked after by a guardian 
as a ward. The historical link between wardship and guardianship is discussed in 
Appendix D, pages 375/6.
Users of mental health services who receive help from social workers are often referred 
to as clients, especially when it is necessary to convey that the user has a particular 
relationship with a social worker. (See definitions of ‘social worker’ and ‘client’ on 
page: 164).
Four terms are used in this dissertation, depending on circumstances. Where a person 
with mental illness is being assessed by or cared for by a social worker, the term ‘client’ 
is generally used. However, for a social worker’s client who becomes part of the 
research sample, the term ‘case’, is used. It is accepted that many people with mental 
illness resent being referred to as a ‘case’ and no pejorative implication is intended. It
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is the configuration of social worker and client in the guardianship relationship within 
these research populations which justifies the use of the term ‘case’ for this particular 
purpose.
Mental Illness and the Reference to Clients
During the time that this research has been undertaken, the researcher has been made 
aware that people with mental illness prefer to be referred to as ‘people with mental 
illness’ rather than ‘the mentally ill’ or ‘mentally ill people’. In response to this 
sensitivity, the researcher generally uses the term ‘people with mental illness’; however, 
in headings and when the use of the term ‘people with mental illness’ tends to render the 
discussion cumbersome or verbose, the phrase ‘mentally ill people’ is used.
The main legislation distinguishes only between the following categories of ‘patient*: the 
mentally ill, mentally impaired and severely mentally impaired, in addition to those 
suffering from psychopathy. Only people described as ‘mentally ill* are the subject of 
this dissertation though it is accepted that some of the discussion, and indeed some of the 
key arguments, have been rehearsed in the context of care and treatment of people 
suffering from mental impairment. A note on the connection between mental impairment 
and mental illness, is contained at the beginning of the historical chapter (Chapter III).
Pre-1959 legislation referred to mental illness as ‘lunacy’ or ‘insanity’ and these terms 
are used where appropriate.
The Terms ‘Order* and ‘Application’
The terminology of the 1983 Act would suggest that the term ‘order* is technically only 
applicable to guardianships under Section 37 of the Act, i.e. court orders. However, the 
alternative term, ‘application’, is unhelpful in reference to guardianships that have been 
formally agreed by a social services department, since reference to an application 
suggests a stage in the process prior to acceptance by the authority. Consequently ‘order’ 
is used throughout this dissertation to refer to guardianships in force.
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Use/Under-Use/Usaee
The operational definition of guardianship discusses the term ‘usage’ in reference to 
factors which cause directors of social services to endorse actual guardianships, to 
maintain cases in force under given conditions, and to create policy and practice guidance 
understanding as to how social workers should view the need to submit guardianship 
applications.
On the other hand, the term ‘under-use’ refers to the frequently asserted position that 
guardianship is not sufficiently used. The whole question of the amount of guardianship 
use is discussed at pages 216 to 218 and again on pages 351 to 352.
It is questionable, nevertheless, whether the terms ‘use’ or ‘usage’ are appropriate for a 
concept such as guardianship, and it may be that the terms are more applicable when 
considering the narrower question of resort to use of certain sections of the Mental Health 
Act. In other words, ‘use’ and ‘usage’ refer to the resort to statutory guardianship rather 
than to the idea of guardianship in the wider sense. It is also arguable that guardianship 
is not something one uses but is a description of certain conditions and assumptions 
applying to the individual care of people with mental illness.
Legal/Formal-Informal/Personal/Statutorv Guardianship
The term ‘legal guardianship’ is unsatisfactory in that it could convey the sense of 
guardianship being legal as distinct from illegal, or even unlawful. All guardianships 
discussed in this dissertation are lawful in the sense of being recognised and upheld by 
the legal system, directly or indirectly, and no questions of illegality arise. A better 
term, but one which is seldom used, is ‘formal guardianship’ as distinct from informal 
arrangements which are not the subject of legal rulings or of statutory requirements.
The term ‘informal guardianship’ is used to cover the latter situation as distinct both 
from ‘statutory guardianship’, as laid down in the relevant legislation and ‘personal 
guardianship', which is the term used by Ward(7) to describe legally constituted 
guardianship in Scotland, based on civil (Roman) law concepts rather than statute.
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Guardian Social Workers
At any one time some social workers will be acting as guardians for mentally ill people 
while others will not be undertaking this task. The dissertation sometimes refers to 
‘guardian social workers’ to distinguish those social workers who have assumed 
guardianship responsibilities for individual clients, either formally or informally, though 
in the empirical research formal guardianship is the usual criterion. Occasionally, the 
untidy term ‘non-guardian social worker’ is used to indicate social workers who were not 
assuming (formal or informal) guardianship responsibilities at the time of the research 
fieldwork.
Mental Deficiencv/Subnormalitv/Handicap/Impairment/Leaming Disability
Official sanction for a change of terminology from ‘mental impairment* to ‘learning 
disability’ occurred during the period of this research, but the term ‘mental impairment’ 
has generally been retained. There is some justification for continuing this usage where 
references are explicitly concerned with statutory definition, as this is the term adopted 
in the Mental Health Act, 1983.
Prior to the 1983 Act, the terms ‘mental handicap’ and ‘mental subnormality’ were used. 
Occasionally these terms are used where referring to definitions applicable to previous 
legislation, and likewise to the term ‘mental deficiency’ used in pre 1959 legislation, and 
‘idiocy’ when referring to pre-1913 legislation.
In addition to the revised term ‘learning disability’, the expression ‘learning difficulties’ 
has gained favour, particularly in educational circles, but this term is not used in this 
dissertation.
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONDUCTING THE SURVEY AND EFFECT ON 
RESEARCH DESIGN
Chapter V details the survey of social workers’ views and guardianship cases and 
interprets the findings. The following outlines some of the practical arrangements and 
difficulties associated with a survey of this kind.
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The researcher was faced with a substantial lack of information on guardianship usage 
across the social services departments in England and Wales and a survey of all social 
workers involved in guardianship was impracticable. Selecting agencies within which to 
undertake this survey therefore posed considerable problems with the only confident 
assumption that those agencies that use guardianship most are probably demonstrating 
some enthusiasm for its use.
Of more practical and telling concern was the question of which agencies would provide 
ready access to social workers involved with guardianship cases, as well as access to the 
management viewpoint, practice and policy guidelines, and ready availability of clients’ 
records.
These considerations combined enabled the researcher to gain access to: the Isle of 
Wight Social Services Department, whose known enthusiasm for the use of guardianship 
is measured in an unusually high number of guardianships per head of population, and 
who agreed to allow the researcher to pilot the documentation and field work in that 
agency; to Kensington and Chelsea Social Services Department (as an average agency in 
terms of guardianship numbers); and Westminster Social Services Department (slightly 
above average of guardianship numbers). The latter two agencies agreed to be parties 
to the research field work proper and to provide the required data.
Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster share borough boundaries near the centre of 
London and are Conservative controlled authorities with some similarities in terms of 
demographic profile. In other respects, they are in considerable contrast: a different style 
of Conservative administration prevails, with Kensington and Chelsea being in the 
traditional Conservative mode and Westminster moving much closer towards a pragmatic 
and business-orientated approach.
The researcher had no control over choice of social workers and the guardianship cases 
were self selected as being on the case loads of social workers involved in guardianship. 
Managers of the agencies chose these social workers as the means of identifying the cases 
and representative managers to speak for the agencies’ views of guardianship, as well as
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to participate in the survey. Information on agency policies about guardianship made 
available to the researcher was uneven and piecemeal; this proved so inconsistent as to 
be best discounted from inclusion in the research data.
Research of this kind is inevitably faced with a very wide range of variables over which 
the researcher has no control. For example, social workers’ motivation and interest in 
guardianship varies considerably and their attitudes to their cases likewise. Some social 
workers see their position as an independent professional advocating use of guardianship 
as an important factor in its own right whereas others wait for ‘green lights’ from 
management before even giving consideration to guardianship for a given client. Also, 
as is discussed later in the analysis of findings, the relationship and influence as between 
practitioners and management is different in the two agencies which has important effects 
on the decision-making process.
Finally, no adequate account is taken of the different level of resources that could be 
made available by managers to practitioners to carry through guardianship decisions in 
the respective agencies. In theory this could have been measured and described but, in 
practice, new developments in budgeting and purchasing of services mean that an agency 
could decide to purchase the necessary services to make guardianship viable whether or 
not these resources were readily available or easily accessed. It has to be acknowledged, 
however, that consideration of guardianship by most social workers was often in practice 
dominated by the last two factors, i.e. whether a given resource is readily available and 
whether access will be endorsed by management.
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CHAPTER II
DEFINITIONS OF GUARDIANSHIP
AREAS OF DEFINITION ATTEMPTED
This chapter covers formal definition, most aspects of operational, perspective, 
comparative/contextual and typology definitions, and the researcher’s own working 
definition.
The next chapter deals with historical definition, i.e. how the concept of guardianship has 
evolved. Historical and history-related typologies are outlined in the typology definitions 
and discussed in Appendix D.
The chapter on Guardianship and Social Work is essentially comparative both in 
relationship to the definition of guardianship and in the definition of social work. That 
chapter also contains discussion of guardianship definition by concept analysis in the form 
of the review of models of guardianship and their relationship to social work.
Finally, the empirical study is itself concerned very closely with definition, i.e. that of 
guardianship and social workers' perspectives. It is also definitional in a developmental 
sense in that social workers deciding for or against the use of guardianship can be said 
through this process to be taking opportunities (or failing to take opportunities) to develop 
the guardianship concept through use.
FORMAL DEFINITIONS
The Dictionary Definition
The dictionary definition of guardianship is:
"The condition or fact of being a guardian; the office or position of guardian".
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This is seen as having a specialist legal meaning referred to as ‘tutelage’ and a general 
meaning of "keeping, protecting, guarding".
The term ‘guardian’ is defined (again referring both to a specialist legal meaning and to 
a more general sense) as:
"One who has or is by law entitled to the custody of the person or property (or 
both) of an infant, an idiot, or other person legally incapable of managing his own 
affairs; a tutor. (The correlative of ward)".
"One who guards, protects, or preserves; a keeper, defender."
The dictionary definition of guardianship does not include reference to the alternative 
term ‘mund’. The dictionary definition of ‘mund* equates the term with guardianship 
and protection, indicates that the term is of ancient origin, and cites references from 1064 
and 1205.
The dictionary definition of guardianship does not, in this writer’s submission, give 
adequate recognition to guardianship as implying a relationship, other than an oblique 
reference to the correlative position of the ward.* The fact that the relationship is 
transparently an ‘unequal’ one, being based on the dominant or power position of the 
guardian towards the person being protected, should not be cause for minimising the 
reciprocity components. The relationship aspect of guardianship forms a major part of 
the researcher’s working definition discussed on pages 64 to 67.
There are other fairly obvious limitations to the dictionary definition related to 
comprehensiveness, especially as no contemporary references, legal or otherwise, are
*  Dictionary Definition o f  *Ward  ’
The definition of ward referred to implicitly provides three basic contexts:
1. General ("guardianship, keeping control");
2. Specialist ("guardianship of a person legally incapable of conducting his affairs");
3. Feudal Law ("The control and use of the land of a deceased tenant by knight-service, and the
guardianship of the infant heir, which belong to the superior until the heir attained his majority").
The dictionary reference to wards links this with the role of the Court of Wards and Liveries discussed in the 
historical chapter.
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cited to support the meanings conveyed. There are no references to contemporary 
statutory guardianship for children, or for people with mental disorder (learning 
disabilities or mental illness).
The fact that the dictionary definition goes on to use outdated legal terminology (the use 
of the word ‘idiot’, for example) and its disposition towards considering legal 
guardianship only in historical language, must give rise to questions about its 
contemporary relevance. On the other hand, the dictionary definition distinguishes 
between ‘legal’ and ‘general’ meanings of guardianship. Although not especially helpful 
at first sight, the omnibus title ‘general’ is a useful base-point for considering non-legal 
definitions of guardianship, especially the institutional (socio-psychological) view. In 
short, the fact that the dictionary definition avoids portraying the subject as purely a legal 
entity is a strength in itself, and clearly indicative of alternative ways of seeing the 
subject.
The Statutory Definition
The contemporary legislation applying to England and Wales, the Mental Health Act, 
1983, provides no explicit definition of guardianship. The accompanying Memorandum 
of Guidance to some extent makes up for this and the two need to be considered together. 
The relevant statutory requirements are outlined in detail below. Basically, statutory 
guardianship consists of a limited range of ‘powers’, of questionable enforceability, 
acquired through procedures laid down in the Act, known as a guardianship application, 
made by an ASW and supported by medical recommendations. The operational definition 
(see page 31) describes how this works. The background to the Act is discussed in the 
historical chapter (pages 115 onwards) while comparisons between this Act and other 
measurers related to provision of protective care or services will be found in the section 
on comparative definitions, commencing on page 44, in which other sections of the 1983 
Act are discussed.
The relationship between the statutory basis for guardianship and a wider view of the 
concept is discussed in the sections below on statutory and non-statutory guardianship 
and personal guardianship and committee.
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THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT, 1983
The relevant clauses of the 1983 Act are outlined below. These follow the interim 
changes brought about by the Mental Health (Amendment) Act, 1982.
"7 (2) A guardianship application may be made in respect of a patient on the
grounds that -
(a) he is suffering from mental disorder, being mental illness, severe 
mental impairment, psychopathic disorder or mental impairment 
and his mental disorder is of a nature or degree which warrants his 
reception into guardianship under this section; and
(b) it is necessary in the interests of the welfare of the patient or for 
the protection of other persons that the patient should be 
so received.
(3) A guardianship application shall be founded on the written 
recommendations in the prescribed form of two registered medical 
practitioners, including in each case a statement that in the opinion of the 
practitioner the conditions set out in subsection (2) above are complied 
with; and each such recommendation shall include -
(a) such particulars as may be prescribed of the grounds for that 
opinion so far as it relates to the conditions set out in paragraph (a) 
of that subsection; and
(b) a statement of the reasons for that opinion in so far as it relates to 
the conditions set out in paragraph (b) of that subsection.
(5) The person named as guardian in a guardianship application may be either 
a local social services authority or any other person (including the 
applicant himself); but a guardianship application in which a person other 
than a local social services authority is named as guardian shall be of no 
effect unless it is accepted on behalf of that person by the local social 
services authority for the area in which he resides, and shall be 
accompanied by a statement in writing by that person that he is willing to 
act as guardian.
8. (1) ...the application...shall confer on the authority or person named in the
application as guardian, to the exclusion of any other person -
(a) the power to require the patient to reside at a place specified by the
authority or person named as guardian;
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(b) the power to require the patient to attend at places and times so 
specified for the purpose of medical treatment, occupation, 
education or training;
(c) the power to require access to the patient to be given at any place 
where the patient is residing, to any registered medical 
practitioner, approved social worker or other person so specified."
THE MEMORANDUM OF GUIDANCE TO PARTS I TO VI, VIII AND X OF THE 
MENTAL HEALTH ACT, 1983
The Memorandum contains brief but explicit indications of a statutory definition of 
guardianship providing a fuller account than the Mental Health (Hospital, Guardianship 
and Consent to Treatment) Regulations, 1983.
The following sections of the Memorandum justify quoting in full as main reference 
points for social workers making key decisions:
"43. Placing a mentally disordered person under guardianship enables the 
guardian to exercise certain powers which are set out in Section 8. The guardian 
may be the local social services authority, or an individual approved by the local 
social services authority, such as a relative of the patient. In almost all cases it 
should be possible for patients for whom care in the community is appropriate to 
receive that care without being subjected to the control of guardianship. 
However, in a small minority of cases guardianship enables a relative or social 
worker to help a mentally disordered person to manage in his own home or a 
hostel, where the alternative would be admission to hospital.
45. The grounds for guardianship are that the patient is suffering from mental 
illness, mental impairment, severe mental impairment or psychopathic disorder 
and guardianship must be necessary in the interests of the welfare of the patient 
or for the protection of other persons. The purpose of guardianship is therefore 
primarily to ensure that the patient receives care and protection rather than 
medical treatment, although the guardian does have powers to require the patient 
to attend for medical treatment (but not to make him accept treatment)." (This 
writer’s emphasis)
A guardianship application must be founded on two medical recommendations, the 
procedure being similar to an application for admission to hospital for treatment. As to 
guardians’ powers, section 46 provides:
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46. The effect of a guardianship application ... is to give the guardian three 
specific powers....The first power is to require the patient to live at the place 
specified by the guardian. This may be used to discourage the patient from 
sleeping rough or living with people who may exploit or mistreat him, or to 
ensure that he resides in a particular hostel or other facility. The second power 
enables the guardian to require the patient to attend specified places at specified 
times for medical treatment, occupation, education or training. These might 
include local authority day centres, an adult training centre, or a hospital, surgery 
or clinic. The third power enables the guardian to require access to the patient 
to be given at the place where the patient is living, to any doctor, approved social 
worker, or other person specified by the guardian. This power could be used, for 
example, to ensure that the patient did not neglect himself...[I]f without his 
guardian’s consent, a patient leaves the place where he is required by his guardian 
to live, he may be taken into custody and returned within 28 days of leaving. A 
patient under guardianship may also be transferred to hospital..."
Sections 47 and 48 of the Memorandum lay down procedures regarding applications and 
recommendations for the appointment of private guardians, and Section 47 says that 
social services authorities retain "duties of visiting and supervision under Regulation 13". 
It also mentions that "...it will no doubt be usual for the patient to live with or near to 
[the private guardian]".
Section 48 includes the fullest description of the expected role and credentials of 
guardians:
"....Any guardian should be a person who can appreciate the special disabilities 
and needs of a mentally disordered person and who will look after the patient in 
an appropriate and sympathetic way. The guardian should display an interest in 
promoting the patient’s physical and mental health and in providing for his 
occupation, training, employment, recreation and general welfare in a suitable 
way. The local social services authority must satisfy itself that the proposed 
guardian is capable of carrying out his functions and should assist the guardian 
with advice and other facilities. Regulation 12 provides that they can call for 
reports and information from the guardian, as they may require; the Guardian also 
has a duty to inform them of his address, the address of the patient and of the 
nominated medical attendant, and if the patient should die."
29
Responsibilities of Social Services Departments Towards Guardianship Clients
Supervision
The word ‘supervision’ is not to be found in the 1983 Act itself, and the nearest 
connection with supervision is the requirement to visit clients. Section 9(2) of the Act 
says only that "regulations.. .may.. .make provision for requiring the patients to be visited, 
on such occasions or at such intervals as may be prescribed...." while Section 250 of the 
Memorandum explains that "local authorities continue to have a duty to arrange visits to 
certain patients in hospital or nursing homes...[including those] subject to 
guardianship...." The definitive statement is left to the Regulations, Section 13 of which 
says that:
"The responsible local social services authority shall arrange for every patient 
receiving guardianship under Part II of the Act to be visited at such intervals as the 
authority may decide, but in any case at intervals not more than 3 months...."
Confusingly, Section 47 of the Memorandum refers to duties of private guardians as 
including "visiting and supervision". (This writer’s emphasis)
Provision of Services
The 1983 Act is silent on the question of obligations to provide services specifically to 
guardianship clients, but the 1960 Memorandum states clearly that:
"Placing a patient under guardianship does not confer extra powers to provide 
[community health or social] services..." (Section 75)
Nothing in the 1983 Act, Memorandum or Regulations countermands this, and the 
presumption must be that the guidance still applies.
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OPERATIONAL DEFINITION
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF OPERATIONAL AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 
Introduction
This section discusses contemporary guardianship ‘usage’ (as defined below) and related 
issues. It is not possible to treat these entirely objectively since perspectives of key 
actors are inevitably influencing experience and developments. Nevertheless, an attempt 
is made to describe the situation rather than to comment on it and to provide ‘signposts’ 
to the wider subject area, including the basis for this research.
The following material asks: ‘How does guardianship operate?’ and suggests a framework 
for dividing the question into more manageable components so as to present an 
operational profile. This profile, or pen picture, looks at: why guardianship is used, by 
whom and for whom; its social policy and legal basis (including regulation and 
monitoring); the pattern and quality of usage; and the key areas of decision-making 
involved, including a preliminary consideration of main problem areas.
Guardianship Usage and Objective
The term ‘usage* is used here to refer to three interrelated aspects of guardianship use: 
Extent of Use
This is the quantitative measure from which we are able to judge whether guardianship 
is used too little, too much or at an optimum level, provided we also have a basis for 
comparison - i.e. a reference point.
Functions of Use
These are the various means by which guardianship attempts to fulfil its objective - 
e.g. by promoting clients’ welfare.
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Type of Client Use
This refers to clients with various kinds and degrees of mental illness and identifies how 
such differences render them more or less suitable for guardianship. Demographic 
differences are also considered under this heading, as are social factors such as family 
circumstances.
Relationship Between Object of Guardianship and Extent of Use
The official literature from 1954 (Section 399, Royal Commission Report) to 1983 is 
consistent in indicating that the object of guardianship for mentally ill people is to provide 
an alternative to inappropriate compulsory admission to or detention in hospital. The 
changes brought about by the 1983 Act are thus seen as an update in the application of 
the concept to make it more effective, rather than a fundamental revision of intention.
The official literature has also consistently advocated and/or anticipated small scale use 
of guardianship for mentally ill people. The implication would seem to be that the 
number should remain constant compared with the numbers of compulsory hospital 
admissions.
The relationship between extent and type of use is not clear. Possibly the underlying 
assumption is that those suitable for guardianship will always be a small minority. The 
Royal Commission’s view that guardianship use would increase as community services 
expanded, may imply that more people would become suitable for guardianship as and 
when tangible and clearly identifiable means existed to provide comparable levels of care 
outside hospital.
Those who advocate greater use for guardianship may have a wider objective in mind 
than that stated in the official literature, namely the intention to make community services 
available to mentally ill people who are unwilling to receive them. Although these 
services could stave off compulsory admission to hospital in some cases, there may also 
be the implication that the clients concerned would not meet the criteria for compulsory 
admission into hospital.
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As yet no scale of measurement exists for quantifying the types of service provision that 
could serve as alternatives to hospital. If the scale existed, there would be a case for 
judging the extent of guardianship use against this quotient. Arguably, this task should 
have been undertaken in ‘Better Services, ,(1) which discussed the need for growth in 
services but referred to an impending review of the legislation without comment on 
guardianship.
Official numbers of guardianships and observed trends are shown in the Department of 
Health Statistical Bulletin, the first official account of guardianship usage.(2) A Dorset- 
based survey of 18 shire counties in the south of England and one in Wales(3) confirms 
the national picture of an increasing number of guardianships for mentally ill people 
overall and an increasing percentage of guardianships for mentally ill people over other 
guardianships under the Mental Health Act.
From 1975 to 1992 (the last year for which official figures are available) there was a 
10-fold increase (from 24 to 248) in continuing guardianships for mentally ill people and 
a 25-fold increase (from 8 to 198) in new cases. Over the same period, continuing 
guardianship cases for other clients subject to the Mental Health Act declined by nearly 
a half (from 144 to 78). Numbers of new cases for these groups have fluctuated around 
30 and stand at 35 for 1992. (See Appendix B)
The Social Science Research Group (SSRG) have analysed figures up to 1978 and, due 
to the unavailability (to them) of data for later years, estimated 1990 numbers of 
guardianships for all groups as 200. The actual figure was 286 and the 1992 figure was 
332. SSRG relate their total of 200 to numbers of compulsory hospital admissions, 
expressed as a ratio of 1:100. Quantification of community service availability is not 
brought into the SSRG equation while the view of guardianship as an alternative to 
hospital is forcefully challenged. Wide variation of numbers between authorities is 
commented upon by the SSRG.(4)
Only one study(5) discusses the relationship between the kinds of clients social workers 
consider for guardianship and those finally approved by social services management.
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This study indicates a ratio of 11:2 between cases considered to those agreed, which 
compares with 7:1 in one of this research subject agencies.
Functions of Guardianship
Guardianship functions are frequently equated with guardianship powers, as for example 
when referring to arranging residential care placements/6^ However at least three 
specific functions (not dependent on the powers) are referred to in the literature: 
supervision; promoting welfare; and surrogacy. They apply to non-statutory guardianship 
as well as statutory; and to guardianship for other care groups as well as those provided 
for under mental health legislation.
Supervision
Though not favoured by the Royal Commission (because of the association with previous 
arrangements for ‘statutory supervision’) this function has clearly featured in the official 
literature with the declared purpose "of protecting] the person from exploitation and 
harm."*
The statutory requirement to visit the client on guardianship clearly links with the 
supervision function, which some practitioners refer to as monitoring, maintaining 
surveillance, or by other euphemisms.
Promoting Welfare
Taking the promotion of ‘welfare’ to embrace meeting both ‘care needs’ and 
‘developmental needs’, ** the ‘welfare criteria’ for use of guardianship (to quote the 
Scottish terminology) was possibly brought into sharper focus in the 1983 Act than in the 
1959 Act. Specific examples in the official literature descriptions concentrate on 
encouraging ‘activities’ (such as helping with employment) but, by implication at least,
* 1978 White Paper, ‘Review of the Mental Health Act 1959’, P. 40, Para.4.14.
** Section 48, 1983 Memorandum of Guidance.
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promoting the client’s welfare in his/her own home is clearly part of guardianship. 
Though the wider literature does not dwell on these functions, there are suggestions that 
helping clients to continue living at home places guardianship within some social 
workers’ ‘normalisation’ strategies. Promoting clients’ welfare through advocacy is seen 
by some social workers as more effectively undertaken within statutory guardianship for 
certain clients.
Surrogacy
Surrogacy refers to the idea of one person deciding and/or acting for another person who 
is unable to decide or act for him/herself. Under the 1959 Act, guardians’ quasi-parental 
powers implied a paternalistic approach to surrogacy in the application of the ‘best 
interests’ criterion; the ‘welfare approach’ of the 1983 Act conveys a more service- 
specific ‘best interests’ basis for surrogacy.
The residential/attendance/access requirements (using convenient shorthand) could also 
be viewed as services for the client, i.e. promotion of welfare through surrogacy in these 
areas. From this standpoint, the 1983 Act provides fewer opportunities for guardians to 
serve their clients.
Much of the literature dwells on the exercise of guardians’ power to determine placement 
in residential care, and comments on the link between this and attempts to facilitate 
discharges from hospital. It is suggested that sometimes there may be less concern for 
best interests or welfare criteria than administrative convenience, especially regarding 
elderly people placed in old people’s homes. However, the following section considers 
other views of this situation.
Type of Client Use
The Royal Commission approved the use of guardianship for people with "mild or 
chronic forms of mental illness or infirmity ",(7) and the Mental Health Act Commission 
(MHAC) have suggested that, among other groups, guardianship is particularly useful for
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elderly people in order to enable them to live outside hospital,(8) a sentiment following 
closely that expressed by the Royal Commission.
The MHAC also commend use of guardianship for "young people leaving care who are 
at risk of becoming homeless, exploited or a danger to themselves"; but there is no 
evidence of this usage being pursued. Age range of clients on guardianship gives a 
variable picture but most available data shows that people over 60 comprise more than 
50% of the total. Approximately two-thirds of guardianship clients are women.
Some studies show that guardianships are mostly used for people suffering from 
dementia*. For example, the Social Services Research Group Survey found that dementia 
is the single most common diagnosis of those referred for guardianship (38% of referrals, 
compared with 11% of all referrals under the Act), followed by mental handicap (27% 
of referrals compared with 6% of all referrals) and schizophrenia (11% of referrals, 
compared with 40% of all referrals).(10) Other studies, including this research, show that 
most people referred for guardianship are people suffering from schizophrenia. Actual 
balance of numbers from local authorities’ returns to Department of Health bears out this 
latter finding.
A general picture of social isolation and lack of family support applies in most 
guardianship cases. Circumstances of guardianship clients living in the community 
before guardianship commenced indicate severe management problems and health 
hazards.
More information on guardianship clients from research findings is provided in 
Appendix A.
* This writer has resisted the tendency to see guardianship as applicable to two different groups: younger 
people suffering with schizophrenia and older people diagnosed as having dementia. Although the research 
data discussed in Chapter V could be viewed to some extent as justifying such a formulation, it must be 
borne in mind that such data is only a ‘snapshot’ of peoples’ situations and the nature of their mental 
distress. In reality, people with schizophrenia grow older and there are now a number of forms of 
‘pre-senile’ dementia, including Alzheimer’s Disease and AIDS-related dementia. Furthermore a blurring 
of symptom differences between schizophrenia and dementia apparently often accompanies the aging 
(9)process.v /
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Problematic Policy Issues Associated with Guardianship Usage 
Use o f Compulsion
Misgivings persist about the place of compulsion in the care and treatment of mentally 
ill people. Particular expressions of these concerns in relationship to guardianship are 
indicated below. Compulsion is sometimes seen as less appropriate or acceptable when 
used in a community care context and the view is still expressed that different ‘ground 
rules’ should apply to control mentally ill people while in hospital than outside.
This has been most recently expressed by Fisher who asserts that the concept of 
compulsory powers in the community is fundamentally flawed since "the use of 
compulsion cannot be divorced from its institutional base; the compulsorily detained 
hospital patient cannot be translated into the compulsorily controlled community 
r e s i d e n t S i m i l a r  arguments were advanced during the inter-departmental review of 
the 1959 Act and led to the rejection of the BASW proposals for a community care order.
A further concern arises from the prospect of ‘net-widening’^ 1^  i.e. more people being 
brought within the ambit of statutory control than would otherwise be the case. From 
this viewpoint, use of guardianship would take the place of voluntary care or informal 
admission to hospital, but there is no evidence from the UK of a trend in this direction.
From the social services’ point of view, the compulsory element in individual 
guardianships may be seen as more of a continuing concern than in arranging admissions 
to hospital under Sections 2, 3 or 4 of the Act. However it is an open question as to 
whether, in practice, the compulsory element in guardianship is applied on a continuing 
basis during the currency of the order. There may be a tendency to use initial placements 
arranged through guardianship to demonstrate, for example, that the experience of 
residential care is both viable and acceptable to certain clients.
Concern can nevertheless arise where residential care staff are uncertain as to whether 
they are being called upon to apply a dual standard of restraint in preventing people
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leaving care - and to exercise this on a continuing rather than a ‘one-off basis - between 
residents on guardianship and other residents.
Credibility
There are two main aspects to the credibility of guardianship measures: the resource 
aspect and the question of guardians’ powers.
This writer’s assumption is that guardianship presupposes a sufficient level of resource 
availability to give guardians access to appropriate services for their clients. 
Nevertheless discussion proceeds as to whether clients on guardianship should have 
priority access(l3) to these services and whether social services should be legally 
responsible for providing specific services for these individuals; the absence of a specific 
resource requirement clause in guardianship orders to link powers needed by the guardian 
with services required by the client is widely missed.(14)
Despite the lack of a clear link between guardianship and provision of social services, 
and the absence of a mandatory responsibility upon social services to accept guardianship 
orders, there is persistent reference to guardianship as, at root, a social services order.(15) 
Even without the requirements mentioned, there are suggestions that social services 
should specifically budget for guardianship and, at the very least, underwrite individual 
guardianship orders which carry a clear resource assumption. There is an interesting 
debate as to whether guardianship itself should be regarded as a service,(16) (needing itself 
to be financed) or is more appropriately viewed as an enabling arrangement, i.e. a means 
of providing access to services - but even the latter view is not without its own cost 
implications.
Most commentators agree with the Royal Commission assumption that the numbers of 
guardianships cannot reach a realistic and appropriate level until services have grown 
commensurately. Against this view, is the argument that the wider the range of good 
quality alternative services in the community, the less likely would be a need to use 
authority, legal or professional, to seek to ensure that a person takes advantage of these 
services.
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One or two commentators observe that use of guardianship arises from pre-agreement 
between social services and health services about the appropriate use of community 
facilities and this appears to link with the MHAC assumption that wider use of 
guardianship will result from, or be an expression of, greater degrees of co-operation 
between social services and health authorities. Certainly a good working relationship 
between social services and the health service is seen as pre-condition of appropriate 
guardianship usage.(17)
There is a debate concerning whether a private guardian would, other things being equal, 
have the same level of access to services to meet the needs of a client as would a social 
services social worker. Clearly, the latter could be expected to be more ‘tuned in’ to the 
local authority systems of resource allocation, though may be more influenced by 
management pressures and from demands of other clients. The private guardian, on the 
other hand, may know less about appropriate services but be better motivated to establish 
what is available, possibly via the client’s social worker, and could then be in a more 
independent position to advocate for the client and press social services management to 
deliver the particular services required. Lack of empirical evidence on how these 
differences apply in practice is noted.
There are resource questions linked to the specific guardianship powers, and these are 
discussed below.
The problems o f guardians in enforcing the three powers vested in them under the 1983 
Act is widely discussed and the legal limitations on the enforceability of the three 
‘essential’ powers are widely noted. These are briefly summarised below:
The Residential Requirement clauses in the Act are silent on whether the person can be 
compelled to enter the desired place of residence or on whether he or she can be detained 
on these premises, though most authorities advise that such instrumental powers do not 
exist. The inconsistency arising from the guardian’s legal power to return an absconding 
client to the place of residency is widely mentioned and frequently implies a credibility 
issue.
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The Attendance Requirement of the Act is likewise silent on whether, for example, 
clients can be taken to day centres against their wishes and, likewise, whether care and 
control can be imposed on the person whilst at that place. The absence of the power to 
compel treatment^, g. at an out-patient clinic,under this requirement is widely missed.
The Access Requirement lacks clarity as to whether it extends to include any one who 
the guardian social worker asks to gain access - e.g. home help. There is also 
uncertainty about how the access condition can be enforced against clients’ wishes, 
though forceful entry is generally proscribed. Nevertheless there remains doubt as to 
whether the guardian social worker would need to use other sections of the Mental Health 
Act to gain physical entry (e.g.Section 135) or whether guardianship powers include this 
authority.
Lack o f ‘sanctions’ to enforce guardianship orders is widely commented upon, but 
sometimes resort to the ‘more restrictive’ option of detention in hospital is portrayed as 
an ultimate sanction, thereby giving a punitive connotation both to sanctions and to 
hospitalization.
The argument is frequently advanced that if guardianship is only ‘workable’ for people 
for whom such ‘fall back’ sanctions are not required, the guardianship concept is thereby 
demonstrated as redundant. Comparison with a probation order which enables the 
probationer to be brought back to court should he/she fail to comply with the terms of 
the order has often been made.(18)
Not all references to the sanctions issue are problematic. Examples are given of clients 
who accept the authority of the guardian to fulfil surrogate roles, having previously 
conveyed to the social worker that this acceptability stems from the officer’s legal 
standing rather than his or her professional capabilities as a social worker, whose 
authority no longer needs to be ‘tested out’.(19)
There are also examples of guardianships being satisfactorily used to ‘re-negotiate’ the 
terms under which social services, such as home help and meals on wheels, are provided 
for the client. This is sometimes explained as a quasi-contractual arrangement by which
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the client’s objections are legally recognised and the social worker’s (and/or others’) need 
to over-rule them accepted. Added to this is the view that arriving at these 
‘understandings’ is preferable on all counts to situations in which social services are 
simply imposed on clients without any legal safeguards - on ethical and professional, as 
well as legal grounds.(20)
LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS
A number of practical difficulties are referred to in discussions of the management of 
guardianship and these are summarised below:
Supply of Guardians
Clearly guardianship cannot operate without people appropriately disposed to fulfil 
guardianship functions. The absence of private guardians (however qualified or pre­
disposed) is frequently mentioned, often alongside the point that no training or 
professional background is presumed for private guardians, making it more difficult to 
approach recruitment questions realistically. The supply of social workers willing to 
fulfil this role is an unknown quantity, but it is known not to be an area of work regarded 
as attractive or of high prestige.
Training of Guardians
With regard to social work guardians, there are noted examples of specific training 
requirements which may or may not be met in practice and of some fairly obvious gaps 
in the knowledge of some social workers which would be likely to make them consider 
guardianship only as the last possible way forward. The Mental Health Act Commission 
particularly note that social workers need to understand the "subtle mixture of 
compulsion, persuasion and fully agreed co-operation" involved in guardianship work.(2I)
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Administration and Procedural Problems
Particular mention is made of delays in processing guardianship applications within social 
services departments, with the implication that social services are more cautious in 
considering guardianship proposals than the health service is in considering compulsory 
admissions to hospital for treatment. In other words, there is a built-in administrative 
‘inertia’ militating against the prompt and appropriate use of guardianship. Gunn spells 
out this inertia factor as including lack of understanding of guardianship by social 
services management due to the absence of any training prescription on their part.(22)
Clearly, a social worker considering a guardianship proposal remains in a state of 
uncertainty coping with the problem of the client in the community while awaiting some 
form of service provision or enhanced care; with a hospital order, on the other hand, the 
client is usually precipitately moved into a situation where care and treatment are readily 
made available.
SOCIAL WORKERS’ ATTITUDES
Some of the problems associated with the use of compulsion (see above) are particularly 
the concern of social workers. In addition, some commentators feel that the degree or 
kind of authority they are expected to exercise, still referred to occasionally as 
‘quasi-parental control’,(23) clashes with social work values related to respect for client 
self-determination. On the other hand, social workers who view guardianship as a form 
of ‘re-negotiation’ of the terms under which social services are provided to clients, point 
to the fact that assumptions about mentally ill people remaining fully autonomous, 
self-directing adults need to be periodically tested by way of objective assessment.
Some social workers nevertheless argue that use of guardianship is tantamount to an 
admission of a ‘failure’ or of a limitation of skills on their part within the social 
worker-client relationship, and have this idea linked in their minds with a moral 
imperative only to use guardianship as a last resort.
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THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCESS: CASE STUDIES AND INSIGHTS FROM PRACTICE 
EXPERIENCE
Case material provided to the researcher in the course of the survey is offered in Chapter 
V, pages 300 to 313. The limited amount of background information available on clients 
was frequently an issue and the cases are presented in the form of illustrative outline 
notes.
Appendix C is therefore set aside to present five cases in a fuller and more complete 
form. Two are ‘fictionalised* accounts from the researcher seeking to show the thinking 
and actions one might expect to occur when looking at the changing course of care for 
people suffering from schizophrenia and dementia. The three other cases are profiles of 
actual cases brought to the researcher’s attention during the pilot study.
PERSPECTIVE DEFINITIONS
The main perspective definition to receive attention in this dissertation is that of social 
workers and to a lesser extent social work managers. The researcher’s own perspective, 
or working definition, will also be presented.
Two perspectives on guardianship are not taken into account in this research, namely the 
perspective of the client on guardianship and that of the person’s family or nearest 
relative. The views of non social worker guardians are similarly poorly represented.
No attempt to reference these perspectives would be adequate in the context of the 
objectives of this research. It is, however, pertinent to refer to the descriptive approach 
of Moore, who provides a forceful personal account of her position as guardian, advocate 
and ‘supporter’ of her own mentally ill brother. She describes how she protects his 
interests while defending her right to make demands on professionals and statutory 
agencies on her brother’s behalf and to ensure they fulfil their obligations towards 
him.<24>-
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COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXTUAL DEFINITIONS
GUARDIANSHIP AND OTHER STATUTORY CARE RESPONSIBILITIES 
TOWARDS PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS
Slater has argued that it is misleading to equate ‘mental health law’ with specific mental 
health legislation since local authorities have a wide range of powers to provide what are 
sometimes referred to as ‘protective services’ for a range of vulnerable adult care groups, 
including those suffering from mental illness (25)-
Arguably, it is reasonable to assume that social workers considering the use of 
guardianship for people with mental illness will be aware of the range of services 
available to their clients, whether or not on guardianship, and of the statutory basis for 
such provision. They might therefore be expected to know that the main reference point 
is a Local Authority Circular 19/74(26) which identified local authorities’ requirements 
to provide services as being
"the provision...of residential accommodation (including residential homes, 
hostels, group homes, minimum support facilities etc) for persons [living within 
that local authority’s boundary or who are homeless] and the care of those persons;
- "[similar provision for people coming from other areas] following discharge from 
hospital;
"[provision of day care centres] for training or occupation of persons suffering 
from or who have been suffering from mental disorder, [including meals, 
remuneration and other] facilities for social and recreational activities;
- "the appointment of officers (normally social workers) to act as mental welfare 
officers for the purposes of the Mental Health Act 1959 - [now superseded by 
arrangements to appoint Approved Social Workers under the Mental Health Act, 
1983];
- "the provision of social work and related services to help in the identification, 
diagnosis, assessment and social treatment of mental disorder and to provide social 
work support and other domiciliary and care services to people living in their 
homes and elsewhere."
The Circular went on to confirm that local authorities could provide residential,day and 
social work services to people suffering from mental illness.
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Another important reference is the National Health Service Act. 1977. in which 
Section 2(1) of Schedule 8 provides that: "the local authority social services authority 
may... make arrangements for the purposes of the prevention of illness and for the care 
of the person suffering from illness and for the aftercare of persons who have been so 
suffering".
In addition to the sections on guardianship, the Mental Health Act. 1983 made important 
statements as to obligations to provide: a sufficient number of ASWs (Section 114(1)); 
statutory aftercare, but not applicable to those on Guardianship (Section 117); and to 
provide authority for ASWs to obtain access to a person’s home when they believe that 
a person suffering from mental illness is being seriously neglected (Section 135) - see 
also under ‘Compulsory removal from Home’, page 46.
The Disabled Persons (Services. Consultation and Representation) Act, 1986, sought to 
improve coordination, effectiveness and access to services for people with mental illness 
(among others) and to establish the principle of an ‘authorised representative’ who could 
speak for the person’s needs as an advocate, but this latter section has yet to be 
implemented.
Also still to be implemented is Section 7 of the Act which would have strengthened local 
authority responsibility for providing after-care to psychiatric patients who had been in 
hospital longer than six months. The Social Services Select Committee Report for 
Session 1989/90(27) argued that this section of the Act should be implemented as soon as 
possible (Recommendation 23), to which the Government’s response has been that the 
Care Programme Approach, as promoted in Circular HC(90)22/LASSL(90)11, 
"operationalises good practice" in this area, so that statutory obligations will only need 
to be imposed on health and social services authorities "in the event of failure to meet 
voluntarily the required standards".(28)
National Health Service and Community Care Act. 1990
The Government’s response to the Griffith’s R eport/29 the White Paper, Caring for 
People/30 is implemented within Sections 46 and 47 of this Act, viz.:
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Section 46 requires each local authority to "prepare and publish a plan for 
the provision of community care services in their area"; to keep this plan 
under review; and to prepare and publish modifications of the plan, or to 
prepare a new plan, as and when required.
Section 46(2) requires local authorities to consult District Health 
Authorities, Family Health Service Authorities, housing authorities and 
voluntary organisations in the construction of this plan.
Section 46(3) defines ‘community care services’ as those "which a local 
authority may provide or arrange to be provided under any of the 
following provisions:
a. Part III of the National Assistance Act, 1948;
b. Section 45 of the Health Services and Public Health Act, 1968;
c. Section 21 and Schedule 8 of the National Health Service Act, 
1977; and
d. Section 117 of the Mental Health Act, 1983."
Section 47(1) requires local authorities to carry out assessments of those 
who appear to be in need of these services to decide whether these call for 
provision of the services.
COMPULSORY REMOVAL FROM HOME, AND IMPOSITION OF CARE AND 
TREATMENT
Alongside powers under statutory guardianship, two other sets of compulsory powers 
need to be taken into account:
National Assistance Act. 1948. Section 47
This Act provides for the removal from home of persons thought to be living in 
unacceptably unhealthy conditions, whether due to mental illness or other reasons. For
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example, a recluse who has shut him/herself away and avoided contact with the outside 
world over a long period may be neglecting themselves and their dwelling to a point 
where they become a health hazard. In these circumstances (with elderly people mainly 
in mind) arrangements can be made to enforce access to the premises and remove 
the person to a suitable care situation - normally a home for the elderly but not 
necessarily so.
Although the emphasis has tended to be on a set of circumstances which gives rise to 
public concern, together with an unacceptable health risk, there is also the implication 
that the alternative arrangement for the person concerned must be appropriate to their 
needs and this does not necessarily signal the end of independent living. Sometimes it 
results in arrangements being made to clear and clean the premises to make them more 
comfortable and acceptable for the person and their immediate neighbours. From a civil 
rights point of view, it has to be borne in mind that neighbours and would-be helpers will 
be greatly deterred from assisting a person if the health hazard element cannot be tackled 
by official sanction and effective intervention. Obviously, this has particular relevance 
for people in multi-occupied premises.
This section of the National Assistance Act is rarely used, yet has generated controversy 
over the years.(31/32) In comparison with guardianship, the missing link is obviously an 
individual representative of care agencies to take necessary steps to advocate for the client 
as well as to intervene. The quid pro quo principle is also poorly developed - though 
possibly implicit.
The Law Commission have recently expressed views (not supported by clearly referenced 
evidence) which jthey suggest>apply both to these arrangements and to those pertaining 
to Section 135 of the Mental Health Act, 1983 (see above) to the effect that they provide 
powers which:
"are generally regarded as draconian and stigmatising and are rarely used...[It is 
difficult] to achieve the correct balance between the individual’s right to live as 
he (sic) wishes, even if such wishes are delusionary or in most people’s view 
extremely eccentric, and the need for protection from unnecessary suffering or 
danger." (33)
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Mental Health Act. 1983. Sections 2. 3. 4
The 1983 Act is largely concerned with the terms and conditions for the removal of a 
person from a dwelling or public place, and their admission to a psychiatric hospital, 
detention there, and possibly subject to compulsory treatment. Although the relevant 
criteria relate both to the needs of the person and to the needs of others, there are a 
number of elements missing from the point of view of a guardianship concept. Again, 
there is no individual professional to accept care responsibility for the client as part of 
the compulsory admission arrangement other than the ASW. Legally, responsibilities of 
ASWs cease at the time the person enters hospital, unless he/she chooses as an individual 
professional to find means to stay in contact with the client and exercise de facto care 
responsibility.
On the other hand, a compulsory admission to hospital may be part of a long-term care 
programme with a designated social worker arranging for the admission to take place at 
a particular time. Arrangements would ideally be determined in conjunction with other 
professionals and agencies providing necessary care and treatment for this person as 
he/she becomes too psychiatrically ill to remain at home. In other words, the manner 
of the hospital admission may distinguish the effect of this procedure, from being a 
contingency dominated event to one which is a part of individual care and continuity of 
intention. In this latter sense, therefore, the procedures may carry a guardianship 
connotation, and indeed may be used in conjunction with existing guardianship 
arrangements.
GUARDIANSHIP AND HOSPITAL COMPARED
This section identifies the key distinctions between hospitalisation and guardianship, 
especially necessary since the official literature and other influential commentaries 
continually refer to guardianship and to care and treatment within hospitals as 
alternatives.
The historical definition in Chapter III will set out to demonstrate that guardianship has 
a history independent of the rise and fall of psychiatric hospitals, and that the only
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dependent relationship between guardianship and hospital is when hospitals are viewed 
as social services to which guardianship clients gain access as and when appropriate. In 
other words, rather than these institutions being seen as alternatives, it would be more 
appropriate to see them as interdependent, interrelated, but essentially as separate and 
distinct, institutions with different legal, social and practical implications.
Dictionary Definition of ‘Hospital’
A suitably adapted dictionary definition of a psychiatric hospital is "an institution for the 
receipt and containment of people with mental illness".
Clearly this definition does little justice to the wider functions of hospitals. For example, 
Bachrach describes the social function of psychiatric hospitals as providing or promoting:
"Personal and social care 
Containment
Independence (assisting in the development of individual 
and social functioning)
Social relationships".(34)
Aside from ‘hotel’ elements (food/heating/lighting/bed/shelter/physicalcomfort), hospitals 
could be said to provide the following:
1. Fixed Physical Boundaries - This is linked to the degree of security 
required, and in some cases internal and external boundaries will be firmly 
fixed by physical restraint.
2. Proximity and Location - Obviously, hospitals occupy a fixed physical 
position, either more or less integrated into the community or, as in the 
case of a number of the older psychiatric hospitals, some distance from 
centres of urban population. The implications of this factor, besides the 
physical distance of the patient from his community of origin, concerns
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visiting and communication aspects of hospital life vis-a-vis the patient’s 
family. Travelling time and expense for families of patients are very 
important factors, interrelated with both treatment and rehabilitation 
prospects and have a great affect on whether families to stay in contact 
with, and are sympathetic to, the treatment requirements of their family 
member.
3. Organisation and Staffing - Hospitals are run by medical and lay 
hierarchies and maintained by a range of different groups of staff, usually 
offering specialist skills and functions, and usually in a more or less fixed 
ratio to the number of patients in the hospital.
4. Regime - Most psychiatric hospitals provide a routine, including a 
programme of activity supporting the treatment programmes of individual 
patients. Sometimes the activity and treatment programmes coincide, as, 
for example, with arrangements for group psychotherapy or individual 
counselling.
5. Statutory Recognition and Authority fo r  use o f Compulsion - Clearly 
hospitals need to have a statutory basis for their lawful functions, 
especially when they are required to detain people and to impose 
compulsory treatment. The fact that hospitals have such legal status is 
often taken for granted, possibly because most medical care and treatment 
is seen as a service to the patient rather than an imposition. However, in 
the case of psychiatric patients who are resistant to care and treatment in 
hospital, the status and standing of a hospital as a lawful place to contain 
and detain patients is of critical importance. This in turn is linked with 
logistical factors related to physical capacity to detain and contain.
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Kev Distinctions
By contrast to hospital, guardianship could be seen as a freestanding framework for the 
care and control of mentally ill people independent of physical establishments or 
institutional care. On the other hand, many guardianship arrangements will depend for 
their maintenance on the availability of social services, including hospital care, all of 
which contain some degree of institutional restriction. Under guardianship, the 
guardian’s role is to ensure that the patient/client/ward receives the most appropriate care 
and medical treatment, and this may include hospital or other institutional care.
Guardianship in itself presupposes no fixed physical situation within which care and 
protection are administered - this will depend on individual needs. Hospital care, on the 
other hand, assumes some containment or restriction within the hospital environment - 
although increasingly hospital care is also assumed to include long leave and 
rehabilitation periods in the community, as well as the confinement imposed through the 
physical constraints of secure units and fixed boundary wards.
Guardianship and hospital care are often viewed as fundamentally distinguished by their 
different authority and accountability bases as between local authority and the health 
service respectively. This might be seen to be the key reference point for understanding 
the respective roles and responsibilities of guardians and consultant psychiatrists. 
Nevertheless, few of the other hospital characteristics listed above apply to the institution 
of guardianship, in that the latter presupposes no fixed staff ratios, no predetermined 
daily routine or regime, and no fixed relationship to treatment arrangements, compulsory 
or otherwise. It might therefore be assumed that these are concepts which do not bear 
more than superficial comparison.
One way of testing this proposition is to consider the areas where the two concepts 
interrelate, namely in the situation of people on guardianship who are also patients in 
hospital. This could apply to informal psychiatric patients as well as to those admitted 
to hospital under Sections 2 and 3 of the Mental Health Act, 1983. It is assumed for the 
purposes of this discussion that the medical needs of these people are unexceptional and
51
that the hospital regime would thus be imposed in a similar way to other patients with 
comparable conditions. Given the position of a person for whom both statutory 
authorities share concurrent responsibility (while in hospital), how are the respective 
contributions to care, treatment and rehabilitation affected?
An initial pragmatic assumption might be that the authority position of the guardian 
would diminish on admission and be resumed progressively as discharge nears, since the 
authority of the medical hierarchy prevails over all hospital patients. The position of the 
guardian would not therefore be a central feature of hospital treatment arrangements, but 
would be expected to be brought into the clinical case conference to help determine the 
pattern of treatment as well as future rehabilitation arrangements.
The above does not, however, take into account the statutory authority of the guardian, 
and he/she should be recognised as a person with a statutory as well as a moral interest 
in the welfare of the client without necessarily directly influencing patterns of care and 
treatment within the hospital. The fact that the client was on guardianship could 
therefore critically affect preparation for rehabilitation and discharge timing because the 
support systems offered by the hospital would presumably be progressively withdrawn 
as a person moves from institutional care into normal community care. The assumption 
may well be that the guardian would be the formal means (as advocate and facilitator) 
through which alternative arrangements in the community would be arranged.
Realistically the position would seem to be that a guardian effectively delegates authority 
to medical staff during the period of hospital care. This compares with the situation of 
a person not under guardianship, where decisions about care and treatment will typically 
be a matter between social workers and general practitioners on the one hand and nurses 
and consultant psychiatrists on the other, who will share some degree of guardian-like 
responsibilities without the explicit obligation to safeguard the position of the individual 
in a social care sense. Conversely the situation would be reversed were it to become 
legal to administer compulsory treatment in the community with the consultant 
psychiatrist accountable to a guardian.
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Finally, the most fundamental difference between guardianship and hospital is seen by 
Fisher as derived from different ‘ground rules’ regarding the use of compulsion, whereby 
detention and containment is logistically and morally acceptable in hospital but not 
elsewhere. Again, this does not recognise the situation of guardianship patients in 
hospital but Fisher has also pointed out that the SSRG survey results indicated that 
guardianship was not in fact being used as an alternative to hospital.(35)
A key distinction between hospital and any form of non-hospital care is often assumed 
to lie in the extent to which hospitals inevitably restrict patients’ freedom, whether or not 
this is needful for patients at any given time. Clearly, when a guardianship patient is in 
hospital the level of restrictiveness (other things being equal) would be the same as for 
other patients.
A guardianship patient who is outside hospital will obviously not be subject to the 
restrictiveness of hospital life, though this says nothing of other restrictions which may 
apply instead - i.e. those imposed by the patient him/herself, by his/her family, or by a 
highly restricted way of life, with family or in a residential care home.
It is nevertheless self-evidently true that all institutions impose their own rules and that 
residents have to comply with these rules whether they meet the needs of the individual 
or not. In this sense, institutional life is inevitably more restrictive overall than normal 
life in the community.
The doctrine (or principle) of the least restrictive alternative is discussed in Chapter IV 
in the context of the proposition that guardianship is better able to fulfil these less 
restrictive expectations than hospital care, or possibly other forms of care. (See pages 
193 to 197).
This paper does not seek to enter the debate over whether hospitals are still needed to 
provide asylum or whether, as suggested by Renshaw,(36) following Bachrach(37) and the 
1985 Social Services Select Committee Report,(38) asylum for certain people with mental 
illness can be provided for equally well in the community, given certain pre-conditions. 
However, guardianship may well be one of the less tangible means of creating and
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maintaining such conditions as a possible alternative to hospital for particular individuals 
in certain circumstances.
GUARDIANSHIP TYPOLOGIES
KEY DISTINCTIONS AND GUIDE TO LATER REFERENCES
The sections below provides a resume of the forms of guardianship applicable to people 
with mental illness which have current relevance to the situation in England and Wales, 
and clarifies key distinctions. This is followed by an outline guide to other guardianship 
categories discussed in more detail in Appendix D.
Guardianship of the Person and Guardianship of the Estate
Discussion in the historical chapter indicates that distinct concerns over the welfare of the 
person and the security of the person’s estate have been differentially provided for 
throughout guardianship history. The current relevance of the divide is to be found in 
the 1983 Act where guardianship of the estate is clearly located within the province of 
the Court of Protection. This paper is essentially concerned with guardianship of the 
person, though some references to the role of the Court of Protection and the possibilities 
of bringing these two forms of guardianship together as a possible way forward for 
guardianship, are indicated at various stages.
It is interesting to note that Scotland has retained forms of guardianship which can cover 
both person and estate - i.e. tutors dative and tutors-at-law (see page 58). It is also of 
note that two North American terms for guardianship of the estate are ‘trusteeship’ and 
‘conservatorship’, though this is subject to variations between different states and between 
the USA and Canada.
Generic and ‘Specialist’ Guardianship
The forms of guardianship referred to in this paper apply only to people with mental 
illness unless otherwise indicated. However a discussion is offered in Chapter IV on the 
connection between this form of ‘specialist’ guardianship and ‘generic’ guardianship
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(i.e. Guardianship in legal systems which provides protective care on the same basis for 
people from different care groups), when considering the therapeutic model of 
guardianship. Generic guardianship has no current relevance under the legal system 
applying in England and Wales, but is referred to as an important development in the 
USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, where generic terms, such as ‘dependent 
persons’, have been coined to cover mentally ill people alongside other people with some 
apparently similar care and protection needs.
Limited and Total Guardianship
Guardianship for people with mental illness in England and Wales up to 1983 was usually 
thought of as ‘total’ guardianship, in that the powers of the guardian have been defined 
as those of a parent over a 14-year-old child and were not specifically limited, other than 
by the divide between person and estate. In some ways all guardianship which does not 
combine person and estate could be described as a form of limited guardianship, but this 
usage is not adopted in this paper.
Limited guardianship applies to systems operating with variations in the USA, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, whereby petitions are brought before a court asking for a 
guardian to be granted powers in relation to a ward, leaving the court to decide the nature 
and extent of such powers. No such system applies in England and Wales, where 
guardianship powers are predetermined by the legislation. However, in another sense of 
the term, the 1983 Act can be described as prescribing a form of limited guardianship in 
that it refers to the guardian having limited powers, i.e. the minimum essential, rather 
than a full range.
The possibility of semantic confusion in this explanation is compounded by the fact that 
‘total’ powers is a misnomer. Equating total powers with the powers of a parent over 
a child is seriously misleading because of the strict limits which apply to the powers 
parents may exercise over children, depending on circumstances, age of child, etc.
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Likelihood of confusion may be partly lessened by the following form of categorisation:
Plenary : This is a term to describe situations in which the guardian has 
‘total’ powers, as defined in legislation or as prescribed by a court. 
It should be noted, however, that ‘total’ conveys a different 
concept to ‘complete’, and no legal system allows a guardian to 
have complete control over a ward, while few systems (none in 
England and Wales) allow a guardian to exercise power and control 
over both person and estate.
Limited/Fixed: This is the situation where guardians have specific powers assigned 
to them. In England and Wales this is defined by mental health 
legislation. In other words, the specific powers are statutorily 
defined and in this sense pre-empted.
Limited/Variable: This also refers to a guardian with specific powers assigned, but 
indicates a situation where a court can vary these powers and tailor 
them to the particular needs of the individual. This applies to a 
number of countries outside England and Wales, but has been put 
forward as a possible way forward in developing guardianship in 
this country.
Guardianship Authority and Agency
In England and Wales, the authority of the guardian stems from the legislation, but 
in practice this is enforced through the position of the director of social services 
and delegated to an employee, usually a social worker. In other countries guardians 
may be anyone that a court considers is suitable to exercise powers in relation to an 
individual mentally ill person. Sometimes the guardian may be individually chosen, 
possibly by the ward him/herself, and can represent any agency or profession. 
Alternatively, the guardian might be a representative of a specifically designated 
guardianship agency, especially applicable if the person is in the residential care of 
the prospective guardian. None of these considerations apply directly to the situation in
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England and Wales,* though the idea of discrete guardianship agencies, recommended 
by the San Sebastian conference on guardianship in 1969,** is still discussed from time 
to time.
The above distinction remains important to understand because the social work 
background of guardians in England and Wales is defined by the authority base and 
legislative framework, whereas the professional background of guardians elsewhere is not 
so defined. Furthermore, the professional background of private guardians under the 
legislation applying in England and Wales has a similarly indefinite characteristic.
Guardianship and Institutional Care
A very broad definition of guardianship might convey that any form of formalised care 
could be described as guardianship, whether offered in hospitals, institutions or in the 
community and by whomsoever it was offered. Under the law applying in England and 
Wales, guardianship might be seen as a care arrangement operating outside institutions. 
However this view is by no means universal and is not historically true in Britain. 
Guardians in other countries continue to do what guardians were allowed to do under the 
law in England and Wales in earlier times, namely to provide for the care of their wards 
in institutions, including hospitals, when the situation requires this.
Two residual remnants of this situation currently apply in England and Wales: (i) in the 
statutory arrangements whereby guardianship powers can continue in certain 
circumstances while the mentally ill person is informally residing or compulsorily 
detained in hospital; and (ii) the residential placement aspect of guardianship powers 
which enables a residential care home to be the designated place of residence for a client 
under guardianship.
An apparent exception is the Brighton Guardianship Society (renamed the Grace Eyre Foundation in 
1988), which seeks to provide an environment to create learning and life experience opportunities for 
people with mental handicap placed by local authorities. Although the Society was particularly hoping 
to receive clients under guardianship as per the Mental Deficiency Act, 1913, it now concentrates on 
helping clients as a placement agency, whether or not they are under statutory guardianship.
International League of Societies for the Mentally Handicapped, ‘Symposium on Guardianship for the 
Mentally Retarded’, at San Sebastian, Spain.
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The connection between institutional and non-institutional care under guardianship is 
further pursued in the discussion of the therapeutic model of guardianship - apropos 
residential care, commencing page 188.
Statutory and Non-Statutorv (Informal! Guardianship
Statutory guardianship in England and Wales is guardianship provided for under the 
terms of the Mental Health Act, 1983. ‘Non-Statutory’ guardianship could therefore be 
a term used to describe situations where social workers, for example, provide a 
relationship with a client which carries one or more guardianship characteristics 
(e.g a degree of surrogacy) but where the social worker has not sought statutory powers. 
A more apt term for these situations, and the one that is used in this paper is informal 
guardianship. However, another form of non-statutory guardianship, presently only 
applicable in Scotland, is described by Ward as personal guardianship(39) - see below.
Personal Guardianship and Committee
Ward’s use of the term ‘personal guardianship’ describes the Scottish situation in which 
other forms of legally prescribed guardianship exist alongside a statutory version (which 
latter is very similar in effect to its English counterpart). These alternative forms of legal 
guardianship are tutors dative and tutors-at-law, derived from Roman (Scottish) civil law. 
Tutors are guardians who can be given total powers or a range of powers by the court.
There is clear likeness between this Scottish form of personal guardianship and the 
English counter-part, committee. Past and present significance of committee as an 
English form of personal guardianship is discussed in the chapter covering the history of 
guardianship, from page 90 onwards and further information on committee is contained 
in Appendix D.
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Private and Public Guardianship
The Law Commission are currently proposing a range of supplements to statutory 
guardianship, which could formalise powers of family and carers to determine aspects of 
a mentally ill person’s life, and provide a basis for the introduction of ‘personal 
managers’. They also suggest, following Section 5(1) of the Children Act, 1989, 
provision for a range of specific orders to determine, for example, where a person shall 
reside. These are collectively referred to as ‘private law bases for substituted judgement’ 
and, if adopted, would entail removal of so-called ‘private guardians’ from the mental 
health legislation, i.e. the ‘public’ law provision in this area.(40/41/42)
HISTORICAL TYPOLOGIES (See Appendix D for more detailed discussion)
In the historical account (Chapter III, page 96) reference is made to a review of 
guardianship arrangements undertaken by the Royal Commission on the Care o f the 
Feeble-minded, 1904/8, the only official analysis of the scope and significance of types 
of guardianship. The Commission mainly considered and described:
Collective (‘Colony’') Guardianship, with special reference to the family colonies 
at Gheel, Belgium.
Boarding Out/Familv Placements, i.e residential care arrangements arising from 
guardianships, especially associated with the Scottish system.
Curator Bonis, the Scottish equivalent of the Court of Protection, as distinct from 
Scottish guardianship of the person (tutors dative and tutors-at-law).
Council de Famille and Curatelle. i.e. guardianship arrangements operating in 
France and in the Channel Islands respectively.
Wardship: the Commission also provided an illuminating comparison between 
guardianship and wardship for children.
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‘Legal* Guardianship. Finally the Commission examined so-called ‘legal 
guardianship’, apparently looking for an equivalent to committee which would 
not require inquisition proceedings. The Commission made no reference to 
previously legislated guardianship fulfilling this role.
Also of historical relevance to people with mental illness can be noted:
Feudal Guardianship, a ‘Generic’ form of guardianship linked to land law up to 
1660;
Chancery/Civil Law Guardianship, a ‘shorthand’ term for the pattern of 
guardianship from 1660 onwards, particularly expressed via the form of 
committee;
Canon Law and Borough Guardianship, obsolete forms of guardianship 
specifically intended to meet the needs of mentally ill people (but outside the 
‘mainstream’ of historical development) which also illustrate ‘derivative’ forms 
arising from canon law and delegated Royal Prerogative powers respectively;
Quasi-Guardianship. arrangements arising from guardianship which could be 
referred to as quasi-or secondary guardianship. The former term (discussed in the 
section on the historical perspective of the Percy Commission, page 98) 
emphasises arrangements such as ‘single care’ which might have arisen from 
formal guardianship.
HISTORICAL DEFINITION
Historical perspectives on guardianship are contained in Chapter ID and these include 
discussion of the context within which the history of guardianship needs to be seen.
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DEFINITION BY CONCEPT ANALYSIS - THE USE OF MODELS
Models of Guardianship have been put forward in an attempt to define the subject by 
highlighting different, and sometimes contrasting, underlying assumptions. Detailed 
consideration of various models, and their relationship to social work is a main part of 
Chapter IV, page 173 onwards.
In anticipation of this discussion, reference can be made to the three model framework 
adopted by Frolick considering the:
1. Substituted Judgment, legalistic, or advocacy model;
2. Parent/Child, developmental or case-work model; and
3. Therapeutic, welfare or case management model.(43)
An alternative formulation offered by McLaughlin(43) distinguishes the legalistic (broadly 
as above) from a ‘social work-istic’ model, which latter combines Frolick’s models (2) 
and (3).
SUMMARY AND WORKING DEFINITION
SUMMARY OF DEFINITIONS
The following draws out the salient features of the definitions discussed above, identifies 
points of convergence and contrast and employs this framework as a basis for formulating 
the researcher’s working definition.
The Dictionary Definition clearly distinguishes between the legal basis for guardianship 
and guardianship in the general sense. This is taken to be a distinction between the law 
of guardianship and the social institution of guardianship.
The Perspective Definitions considered are those of social workers - the main subject 
of this research - and that of the researcher - see working definition below.
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The Statutory Definition emphasises guardian’s powers and their limits, conveying that 
such powers should rarely be needed, so that guardianship itself will seldom be 
necessary. Although the purposes of guardianship are identified, e.g. to prevent neglect, 
actual obligations to clients in clearly identified duties and responsibilities are limited to 
stating that guardians must visit their clients, and that clients must have the services of 
a registered medical practitioner.
The Operational Definition commences from different qualitative and quantitative 
assumptions, being concerned with the actual pattern of ‘usage’ in terms of: 
‘supervision’ (assuming that statutory visiting is the basis for supervision); promoting 
welfare; and exercising surrogacy, as an implied function.
The problematic side of guardianship usage identifies the limited enforceability of 
powers; ethical issues over the use of compulsion in the community; and the credibility 
of the institution overall, especially without statutory authority to provide guardianship 
clients with services by virtue of the guardianship order itself.
The Process Definition emphasises through presentation of case studies that guardianship 
is not primarily a measure which will induce radical and sudden change, but that it 
provides a basis for gradual renegotiation of positions between the authority base of the 
guardian/provider and that of the client. It presumes that the appropriate use of authority 
within guardianship is potentially of positive benefit and does not inherently contradict 
good professional practice.
The Comparative/Context Definition looked at guardianship in relationship to a range 
of service-providing obligations on local authorities - services which might be alternatives 
to or complementary to guardianship, and to which guardians could be in the best 
position to require access on behalf of clients. This definition also explores the link with 
other compulsory measures, mainly related to removal from home and hospital 
admission. The definition helps to establish that hospital and guardianship are not 
alternatives in the general sense as distinct from possible options for clients in certain 
circumstances.
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Finally, this definition locates guardianship within the new community care policies in 
relation to:
Client choice, self-determination and needs assessment;
Case management;
The care programme approach and care management.
The Typologies Definition makes key distinctions particularly between limited and total 
guardianship and between informal and formal (personal/statutory) guardianship.
The Historical Definition defines guardianship in terms of the evolvement of a particular 
form of trusteeship, seeing the ideas behind tutorship and curatorship as having a 
continuing influence on contemporary guardianship developments.
This view of the history of guardianship sees it as a claim for recognition of the need for 
enhanced levels of care and accountability towards individual people with mental illness - 
as distinct from collective, or care group responsibilities latterly defined within welfare 
legislation. No such individual recognition of need or accountability in meeting that need 
can be exercised without the presumption that the guardian role carries authority - both 
authority towards the client and in making claims on services.
The idea of the guardian as a committee, i.e. someone to whom a mentally ill person is 
‘committed’, has provided another historical route towards understanding the guardianship 
idea in practice. Although the idea of commitment in the literal sense appears 
anachronistic, there are also grounds for arguing for the reactivation of committee in 
modem form.
The Concept Analysis Definition relates to models of guardianship discussed 
in Chapter IV. This provides perhaps the most distinctive identification of 
guardianship characteristics by linking the exercise of surrogacy in practice to advocacy,
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casework and case management roles and tasks of social workers, as a differential 
response to particular needs of people with mental illness.
Consideration of guardianship models goes wider than a basis for definition under 
‘concept analysis’. Not only are the models used to make comparisons with the social 
work functions of advocacy, casework and case management, but the models are also 
used to provide a framework for interpreting results of the survey related to social 
workers’ attitudes.
The models are also the most influential concept in shaping the researcher’s working 
definition (see below).
WORKING DEFINITION
The researcher’s working definition provided below draws eclectically on the above 
definitions as well as expressing its own perspective. It commences with a particular 
view of mental illness influencing views on use of guardianship to meet the needs of 
mentally ill people.
The researcher’s assumption is that mental illness is often associated with:
(1) Difficulties with decision-making and choice, i.e. in being able to
decide, and in making choices in the client’s own best interests. This
is seen to be the basis for the substituted judgment model of
guardianship, expressed as surrogate advocacy.
(2) Disturbed relationships, affecting availability of support and 
understanding from relatives, friends etc.* In the face of this 
guardianship reveals a ‘parent/child’ model comparable to casework.
These problems are not peculiar to people with mental illness but tend to be more obvious, 
longstanding and socially destructive, e.g. with problems in connecting with services, neglect of self 
or in causing harm to others.
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(3) Specific care and treatment needs, particularly those requiring 
consistency and persistence by service providers to compensate for 
limited volition. This requires case managers to adopt the surrogate 
role in imposing services when necessary.
Guardianship offers a means of recognising these difficulties in their specific individual 
contexts, bridging the tasks of assessing, purchasing, commissioning and providing - 
related to client need rather than service availability.
The guardian is one who uses authority beneficially through advocacy to compensate for 
lack of capacity in the individual mentally ill person to deal with these problems without 
taking over the individual’s affairs any more than is absolutely essential. Conversely, the 
guardian is also aiming to restore the ward to his original (pre-illness) position, with full 
civil rights and the ability to make appropriate decisions or to work towards achieving 
this situation for the first time, where this applies.
While guardianship is in force the legal system supports the guardian’s surrogate 
decision-making and expects guardians to act in the client’s best interests. The guardian 
is therefore given the responsibility of influencing the client’s life style either in a general 
(total) sense or in a specific (limited) sense. The researcher’s assumption is that 
guardians should ideally be able to require and to obtain a range of powers between total 
and limited powers in order to deal with the particular situation of the client, as has 
recently been shown to be the way forward in the Scottish case of Morris. * This would 
seem to be the most rational, ethical and parsimonious basis for surrogacy.
The authority of the guardian to act as surrogate includes his/her standing and credibility; 
this in turn includes the capacity to gain access to services and resources which will meet 
the needs of the ward. This will sometimes entail prioritising the ward’s needs against 
those of other service recipients with apparently similar needs. The justification for this 
is twofold:-
See page 147
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1. The client may already have undergone a total or partial suspension of civil 
rights. To this extent he/she requires compensation in the form of ease of access 
to required services, usually referred to as the quid pro quo principle.
2. The authority and standing of the guardian is important to the credibility of 
the institution itself. If the guardian cannot command access to appropriate 
services to meet the needs of the client, his/her position will be untenable.
In brief, therefore, guardianship should be viewed as a social institution, rather than a 
statutory arrangement, through which the special care and protection needs of mentally 
ill people are met by the exercise of authority of the guardian. The ethical basis for this 
use of authority is that of trust - both in the moral sense and in its historical connection 
with trusteeship. Arguably, the legal basis of guardianship for mentally ill people is 
more closely related to trusteeship, wardship (or even custodianship) than with statutory 
provisions such as the Mental Health Act. As will be discussed at a number of points 
during this paper, it is misleading and possibly incorrect to equate the nature of 
guardianship with powers provided for under the legislation.
Defining the nature of the guardian-client relationship is difficult since one may assume 
that it has evolved pragmatically without a theoretical base. This writer considers that 
the nearest prescription of the guardianship relationship can be derived from an analysis 
of research by Stein and Test(45) on what constitutes the most effective form of care for 
people with mental illness - i.e. effective in the sense of preventing the need for 
unnecessary admission or re-admission to hospital and providing the best possible chance 
of a person living a normal life outside an institution. These attributes, discussed in more 
detail later, consist of:
* A reliable person, able (through experience and training) to provide or 
organise good quality care.
* Skilled interventions which are as persistent and assertive as need be given the 
situation of the individual. This could include the use of compulsion in the 
imposition of care or treatment.
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* Services made available continuously or as often as is necessary to optimise 
their effectiveness; and not left to chance or the vagaries associated with 
variable motivation of client or providers.
Though referring mainly to making effective services available, the research clearly 
indicates that access is not simply or mainly an administrative matter; rather it is a 
function of a personalised form of care which will continue to respond to the needs and 
difficulties of the person over as long a period as is necessary to stabilise them into as 
normal a form of living as can be achieved for that person in terms of daily activity, 
friendships and relationships, contacts with family etc,, all of which would take place 
under the least restrictive conditions practicable.
’Restrictiveness’ as a key variable within guardianship relates to different needs of 
individuals, and guardians are advantageously placed to ensure that this is not applied 
unnecessarily or punitively. In other respects guardianship is not inherently more or less 
restrictive than other care frameworks - especially since guardianship patients may need 
to spend periods of time in the restrictive care of hospital.
In summary, guardianship for mentally ill people implies a special form of accountability 
to answer for, and meet the needs of, individual mentally ill people. It is clearly 
distinguishable from collective solutions to meeting care needs of which hospitals are the 
most obvious examples. No collective care arrangements can adequately meet individual 
needs for consistent, persistent and assertive care with the firm assurance that only an 
advocate acting in the capacity of surrogate can provide. The surrogate element stems 
from the presumption that people with mental illness look to others to speak, act and 
decide for them while ill, as under condition of illness their own ability to articulate their 
needs cannot be presumed.
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CHAPTER IH
GUARDIANSHIP HISTORY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
This chapter covers the following areas:-
ISSUES OF HISTORICAL DEFINITION AND CONTEXT
SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS NOT GIVEN FURTHER 
ATTENTION
OUTLINE NARRATIVE TO 1983
GUARDIANSHIP UNDER THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT, 1983 
THE CODES OF PRACTICE, 1985-1993
THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT COMMISSION, THE BIENNIAL REPORTS, 
(1983-1991) AND SPECIAL GUARDIANSHIP
SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
MAIN GUIDING PRINCIPLES
RESTATEMENT OF HISTORICAL DEFINITION ISSUES AND THE QUESTION OF 
CONTEXT
The idea of a historical definition, referred to on page 16, emphasised the importance of 
considering whether the subject being defined has changed in important ways over a 
given period; so that not only does one look to history for a narrative of events with their 
causes and effects but to be able to identify how the series of changes have cumulatively 
determined the present form of the subject.
The first question to arise from this formulation is the period of time over which 
development is traced. In the case of guardianship, most authorities suggest that Roman 
law and culture is the most important starting point for understanding how guardianship 
came about and how it has evolved. This is not to say that earlier cultures did not show
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clear signs of recognising the guardianship concept (see page 81 - footnote). However, 
the importance of starting guardianship history from Roman times rests on the need to 
understand Roman guardianship and its immediate as well as indirect impact on 
contemporary guardianship considerations. The indirect nature of this connection is 
explained at the commencement of the narrative, page 80.
Although, in theory, one could jump straight from a discussion of Roman law through 
to tracing its influence on the contemporary situation, a narrative of developments in 
between is necessary in the absence of a standard reference work in order to understand 
how thinking about the relevance of Roman guardianship concepts to England has 
changed at various stages.
This researcher’s working definition places the guardianship concept within a framework 
wider than the law towards a social institution for the care, control and welfare of people 
with mental illness. It is therefore necessary to understand how the reality of providing 
such a care framework varied from time to time. The idea of maintaining such a 
framework in contemporary circumstances is seen largely as dependent on the availability 
of services to which the guardian has access and which effectively provide a support 
system both to the client and to the guardian. Many of the ideas about guardianship in 
earlier times did not carry such assumptions in terms of tangible service provision but did 
carry other supportive assumptions about the nature and behaviour of other people, 
especially in terms of the client’s family and their responsibility for care of the person.
The following account traces guardianship as an evolvement of individual care 
responsibilities for people with mental illness by guardians, the legal authority 
required and the practical means available to support these arrangements. The latter 
part of the history identifies these means more specifically as social services and for some 
purposes includes hospital care as a social service in this context. As has been carefully 
shown in the section comparing guardianship with hospital (pages 48 to 54) it is 
inappropriate to see guardianship as an alternative to hospital. It is therefore equally 
inappropriate to see the history of guardianship as the history of ‘non-institutional’ (or 
simply ‘non-hospital’) care of mentally ill people other than in particularly defined 
circumstances, which are discussed below. It is interesting to note, however, that the
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origins of guardianship go much further back than the origins of hospitals and that the 
present run-down of hospital care suggests that their demise may be fairly close. 
Consequently, the rise and fall of hospital care could be said to have taken place in 
parallel with the much less spectacular but more long lasting developmental path for the 
guardianship concept.
This researcher adopts Kittrie’s broader historical perspective, in distinguishing 
guardianship both (a) from commitment arrangements for those mentally ill people who 
offend or whose behaviour is dangerous; and, (b) from the Poor Law which provided so- 
called ‘guardianship’ for impoverished mentally ill people, usually by means of the 
Workhouse.* Both these latter involve institutional, segregated, collective and 
impersonal solutions to the problems of mental illness which, though arguably necessary 
in a given context, actually run counter to the guardianship concept identified by the 
researcher.
For the sake of clarity, listed below are historical contexts and developments which are 
not expressly addressed in the historical narrative offered below. They are not included 
because they do not constitute the historical definition of guardianship per se but are 
referred to in passing as more or less relevant at various times. For the most part, also, 
they are already well documented and referenced, whereas the history of guardianship as 
a social institution for mentally ill people in England has not been adequately covered 
anywhere in the literature.
* "The authority for the State’s exercise of great power over the person of the insane may be traced to 
three distinct conceptual sources fundamental to the Anglo-American political system:-
1. The State as protector of the peace may exercise its general policing powers in all cases where 
public order is disturbed or threatened...[including] the right to restrain the violent...[and] confining of 
‘furiously mad’ individuals in order to stop or prevent acts of violence. [These powers have been] 
subsequently amplified by specific commitment laws.....
2. A second source for the State’s authority was contained in the recognition of the Sovereign’s 
position as parens patriae, [i.e.] guardianship of the person and control of the property of the legally 
disabled....
3. The power asserted by the Crown over the indigent insane as members of the pauper community 
is the third source of State authority [imposed] by the famous Poor Law of Queen Elizabeth [under 
which] the destitute insane were generally accorded the same treatment as paupers and both were exposed 
to the same experiments in public welfare, [such as ‘out-relief, the failure of which meant that] well- 
regulated workhouses were finally recognised as the only proper form of care for the poor [and 
eventually as inappropriate places for the care of mentally ill people]." ^
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS NOT GIVEN FURTHER DETAILED 
ATTENTION IN THIS DISSERTATION
1. History of Asylums, i.e. the development of hospitals for the care of mentally ill 
people from the previous leprocias, and the consolidation of remotely located large 
institutions to confine mentally ill people away from centres of population, and to provide 
such security as was necessary for the level of disturbance or violence among such 
people. A particular characteristic of this movement has been a parallel move towards 
developing a range of medical specialists to staff such institutions (see below). Likewise, 
the social policy considerations of the roles of such institutions and movements towards 
relocating groups of patients in the community receives relatively little attention in the 
following material other than as a possible reason for the growth in the use of 
guardianship of recent origins.
2. Legalism. Victorian England was notable for a wealth of statutory provision 
aimed, with varying degrees of effectiveness, at eradicating some of the social ills thrown 
up by the Industrial Revolution. In the mental health sphere, much legislation was of a 
highly legalistic kind, providing for every conceivable contingency in the containment, 
care and provision (i.e. hospital provision) for people with mental illness.
3. Changes in attitude towards mental illness. From a relatively enlightened 
position in Roman times, most authorities suggest much more primitive attitudes towards 
mentally ill people prevailed in early and medieval England with only a slowly emerging 
more compassionate attitude towards the end of the Victorian era. As against this, 
guardianship history suggests that the special needs of people with mental illness may 
have been better recognised than conventional history suggests. This is discussed on 
pages 87 to 89. Of more recent origin, more liberal attitudes towards accepting mentally 
ill people into the community, and avoiding wherever possible inappropriate institutional 
care, has gained increasing weight. In fact the demise of psychiatric hospitals would 
seem to be closely bound up with a reluctance to see mentally ill people placed in isolated 
restricted environments unless absolutely essential.
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4. Changes in Treatments. Historical narratives are rich in descriptions of barbaric 
and usually totally ineffective physical treatments for people with mental illness, many 
of which could only have been carried out in hospital settings. More recently, the 
development of more sophisticated physical treatments, from ECT to chemotherapy, has 
raised questions about the use of treatment as primarily a controlling device rather than 
in a therapeutic, i.e. curative, sense. The relationship between imposition of physical 
treatments in the hospital environment and the maintenance of people in the community 
on a minimum level of medication is also of very considerable importance. The net 
effect of these changes is that more people can be medically treated outside institutions 
than was the case 50 years ago and that greater expertise in administering minimum 
dosages of medication has reduced some of the worst side effects of the major 
tranquillisers and anti-psychotic drugs.
5. The Rise of the Medical Profession. Although the development of psychiatry has 
been characterised by a ‘poor relation’ position vis-a-vis general medicine, psychiatrists 
have gradually asserted a full range of control over treatment regimes whether 
administered in hospitals or in community settings. Their influence and control in 
psychiatric hospitals has been particularly notable and it is arguable that separate legal 
commitment arrangements related to compulsory admission, detention and treatment 
within hospitals has turned on the assertion of medical autonomy.
For these reasons, the question of authority over clients/patients as to their welfare and 
care needs has largely been assumed by the medical profession, including medical 
auxiliaries, at the expense of people acting in the role of guardian. Whether this is 
viewed as a natural division of labour or as a fundamental challenge to the authority and 
influence of guardians is open to question. Obviously this issue is touched on at various 
stages during the dissertation (particularly pages 52 and 53), but the broader question of 
medical authority and their control of hospitals and related institutions is not discussed 
further.
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One exception to the above rule relates to the imposition of compulsory treatment in the 
community. As the history of guardianship will show, it was not seen as appropriate to 
distinguish between the powers and authority of guardians apropos medical treatment, in 
or outside institutions, until the mid-1970s so it would seem that on a purely practical 
level the evolvement of hospitals to fulfil such functions effectively took control away 
from guardians. The recent suggestion that treatment in the community should, in certain 
circumstances, be compulsorily administered clearly raises the question of whether 
medical authority outside the institution is being asserted in this particular context. 
Again, this factor is referred to in the discussion, although without further elaboration.
6. The Growth of Social Services. Donnison identifies five factors influencing the 
development of social services in Britain during the 19th and 20th centuries:-
i. ’’The continuing endeavour to provide the environment required for 
industrial progress.
ii. The defence of the nation against economic and military rivals.
iii. The continually rising aspirations of ordinary people.
iv. . The recruitment and training of a growing number and variety of workers,
who in turn play a major part in extending and shaping the services 
themselves.
v. Continuous endeavour to prevent or contain disruption of the social 
order. "(2)
Clearly it would be naive to identify the growth of social services with better meeting the 
individual care needs of mentally ill people. However, Donnison begins his discussion 
with a definition of social services which puts the individual first, e.g. in citing Penelope 
Hall: "The generally accepted hallmark of social services is that of direct concern with 
the personal well-being of the individual [and its] basis.. .is.. .to be found in the obligation 
that a person feels to help another in distress." Donnison moves from this position only 
after examining the history, to identify the concern as "a development of collective action 
for the advancement of social welfare". In other words, because of the nature of social 
services, their organisation and motivation, they could well have moved from the basis
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of meeting individual need to meeting collective/social control needs in a much more 
explicit fashion.(3) Current moves to return to a needs-based impetus for social services 
arrangements could be seen as a long-term counter trend.
In this context guardianship is seen as a relative constant, in the sense that individual care 
needs are the starting, continuing and final criteria upon which successful guardianship 
is based, whilst collective solutions only assist in particular circumstances. Furthermore, 
for the purposes of this dissertation, hospitals could be included within social services 
provision, only distinguished by the dominant role of the medical professions. However, 
the conventional distinction as between the health service and social services is adhered 
to being seen as statutory services operating under different statutory bases, as well as 
within distinctive managerial and organisational constraints.
The growth of social services has also to be seen against the broader backcloth of the 
increasing range of responsibilities assigned to local government. However, it is 
interesting to note one move in the opposite direction arising from the loss of local 
authority responsibility for hospitals in 1946 (National Health Service Act).
OUTLINE HISTORY OF GUARDIANSHIP FOR MENTALLY ILL PEOPLE IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES TO 1983
Introduction
Arguably, the history of guardianship can only be told through the history of legal 
arrangements, i.e. the various statutes which provide for and modify guardianship 
arrangements over the centuries. This researcher does not equate the background 
information thus provided as being the history of guardianship in the fullest sense since 
this would exclude the social institutional dimension. No doubt many of the causes and 
effects of changes are more closely bound up with economic and social causes which do 
not impinge directly on the legal framework.
The commencement of the historical narrative from a discussion of Roman law could be 
criticised on the grounds that there are few obvious connections between the Roman
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society and a Great Britain approaching the 21st Century. The broad contention, 
however, is that Roman concepts of guardianship, particularly tutor and curator, have had 
a key influence in shaping of modem guardianship for mentally ill people and that this 
could only be understood historically. This is particularly so since the pattern of 
development is not straightforward and because the influences are indirect: the direct 
impact of tutor and curator are to be found in Scottish law, and it is only by application 
that we see committee as their English equivalent and as the only element of guardianship 
remaining in England and Wales with full developmental potential.
Note on the Identification and Perception of Mental Illness in History
It is not considered appropriate for the purposes of this dissertation to present a 
discussion of the recognition, identification, social significance, or treatment of mental 
illness in history. Much of the literature referred to discusses whether certain archaic 
terminology describes what we now call mental illness, or is referring to other related 
conditions - especially mental handicap - or even to alcoholism and its social 
manifestation. The material presented by the researcher is selected because the 
authorities quoted present some evidence that they refer specifically to mental illness. 
It is, however, necessary to bear in mind that at various times and periods in history 
mental illness and mental handicap were similarly described, and it is not always clear 
whether similarities between terms used in description reflect or mask an appreciation of 
well understood major differences. There were also circumstances for example in 
medieval England in which it was sound economic sense for parents bringing their 
offsprings to court to present them as being mentally ill rather than mentally 
handicapped.
Real or apparent confusion between the two is not confined to early history, and key 
legislation in England which appears to differentiate between the two groups - e.g the 
mental deficiency legislation and the Lunacy Act, 1890 - is in fact deceptive in that the 
language used does not refer to mentally handicapped people and mentally ill people as 
discrete groups. Many people could be classed as either or both, not only through 
ignorance but because of similarities in behaviour and social consequences.
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Roman* Guardianship
Maine, in his Study of Law in Primitive Society, states that:
"The child before years of discretion, the orphan under guardianship, the adjudged 
lunatic, have all their capacities and incapacities regulated by the Law of Persons. 
But why?...The great majority of Jurists are constant to the principle that the 
classes of persons just mentioned are subject to extrinsic control on a single 
ground in that they do not possess the faculty of forming a judgement on their 
own interests.... "(6)
The position of mentally ill people is clearly recognised here with the need to protect 
their interests cast within the context both of law and of codes of ethics governing 
personal relationships generally and family relationships in particular.
Guardianship in early Roman culture appears to have emerged from the need to specify 
the subordinate position of wives to husbands and children to parents, particularly sons 
to fathers, as a reinforcement or recognition of the paternal authority referred to by the 
Romans as Patria Potestas.
Maine, here, discussing a later period, says that:
"All the Germanic immigrants seem to have recognised a corporate union of the 
family and the mund, [i.e. Guardianship] or authority of a patriarcial chief; but 
his powers are obviously only the relics of a decayed patria potestas, and fell far 
short of those enjoyed by the Roman father."
Roman influence on the development of the law of guardianship in England (and even more so in 
Scotland) is well accepted and documented. However other cultures and traditions evidence a law or 
code of Guardianship applicable to mentally ill people:-
For example, Harrison refers to a lawsuit which came before the Archon (Athenian 
Head of State, circa 8th Century be) as including an "action for...insanity [and] for 
the establishment of a Guardianship".
A further example can be found in Islamic law which, according to Nasir, has 
always shown clear recognition of the impact of mental illness on a person’s 
capacity to decide and act in his/her own best interests. Its history demonstrates a 
well established and clear-cut role for Guardians in acting as legal surrogates for 
such people for as long as their disability persists/5)
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Included among such powers were:
"...a peculiar contrivance of archaic jurisprudence for retaining a woman in the 
bondage of the family for life. This is the institution known to the oldest Roman 
law as the Perpetual Tutelage of Woman under which a Female though relieved 
from her Parents’ authority by her husband’s decease, continues subject through 
her life to her nearest male relations as Guardians. Perpetual Guardianship is 
obviously neither more nor less than the artificial prolongation of the Patria 
Potestas...."(7).
According to Maine, writing in 1861, this excessive subservience demanded of women 
in the guise of guardianship gradually died in the West, but survived "in absolute 
completeness" in India where a "Hindoo (sic) Mother frequently becomes the ward of her 
own sons.(8) A background of complex functions derived from the imposition of authority 
and subservience can be said to characterise early guardianship history.
In contrast to the "various forms of archaic Guardianship" referred to above can be 
contrasted the emergence of curatio, here explained by Maine:
"one of the very oldest monuments of Roman legislation...the Lex Laetora or 
Plaetoria which placed all females who were of full years and rights under the 
temporary control of a new class of guardian, called Curators, whose sanction 
was required to validate their acts or contracts. [Thus]...for protection against 
physical weakness and for protection against intellectual incapacity, the Romans 
looked to two different institutions [tutores and curators] distinct both in theory 
and designs. The ideas attendant on both are combined in the modem idea of 
guardianship. "(9)
One may perhaps criticise this 19th century suggestion that modem guardianship is a 
combination of tutela and curatio since the distinctions have been meaningfully preserved 
in Scottish law, discussed on page 58.
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Tutelage applied to children and orphans while guardianship for mentally ill people was 
provided by curators.* By the main Roman legal code, the XII Tables, Buckland tells 
us that lunatics conceived of as capable of lucid intervals were placed in the cura of their 
families or family substitutes (agnates or gentiles).**
"The praetors extended similar protection to all cases of mental incapacitation and 
even permanently incapacitating disease. In cases clearly not within the XII 
Tables, the magistrate appointed the curator, [though usually only where] there 
were not agnates.. .or [for the] exclusion of unworthy relatives... .The curator had 
the care of the person of the furiosus: apart from this, his functions were similar 
to those of tutor infantis [the other form of guardianship as applied to care of 
children]. The XII Tables gave him the power of alienation for administrative 
purposes of the lunatics’ property....The furiosus regained capacity in lucid 
intervals and the curator ceased to act, but, though there have been doubts in later 
law, he needed no reappointment on relapse. The law as to removal [etc] was 
similar to that in tutela [as were remedies for maladministration]....A furiosus 
minor*** had a curator, qua minor." (12)
As Neaman explains:-
"When the child reached majority, guardianship remained in force in those cases
where it was needed...[such as for] the legally insane The title of the
guardianship was then changed from ‘guardian’ or ‘tutor’ to ‘curator’. [When the 
need for guardianship] was apparent in cases of insanity which began in adulthood 
[a curator furiosa was appointed - being either one of the person’s family,] a 
curator legitimus, [or] a curator dativas [appointed by a magistrate].,,(13)
In Epistles, Horace observes:-
"If, when some uneven barber has cropped my hair, I come your way, you laugh; if haply 
I have a tattered shirt beneath a new tunic, or if my gown sits badly and askew, you laugh. What, 
when my judgement is at strife with itself, scorns what it craved, asks again for what it lately cast 
aside; when it shifts like a tide, and in the whole system of life is out of joint, pulling down, building 
up, and changing square to round? You think my madness is the usual thing, and neither laugh at 
me nor deem that I  need a physician or a guardian (curator) assigned by the court, though you are 
keeper of my fortunes, and flare up at an ill-pared nail of the friend who hangs upon you and looks 
to you in all.M(10)
Horace observes in Satires:-
"He who conceives ideas that are other than true, and confused by the turmoil due to sin, will be held 
distraught and, whether he go astray from folly or from rage, it will not matter. Ajax, when he slays 
harmless lambs, is insane. When you purposely commit a crime for empty glory, are you sound of 
mind, and is your heart, when swollen with pride, free from fault? Suppose one chose to carry about 
in a litter a pretty lamb, and, treating it as a daughter, provided it with clothes, maids, gold, called it 
‘Goldie’ or ‘Teenie’, and planned to have it wed a gallant husband; the praetor by injunction would 
take from  him all control, and the care o f him would pass to his sane relations.n(U)
Under later Roman law puberty was fixed at 14 for males and 12 for females.
83
Some further reflections by Buckland on the Law of Persons clarify the position, viz.
"Persons are considered sui iuris only so far as they were under disabilities. 
Owing to defects of various kinds they might be under guardianship, either tutela 
or cura (curatio). Tutela of children ended at puberty, was retained but 
supplemented by such devices as.. .curatio, which gave similar but less effective 
protection. "(14)
Buckland describes both tutela and curatio in general terms as ‘care and control’, 
conveying the idea that the tutor/curator took responsibility for decision-making from the 
ward. However, he acknowledges that at various times during the development of 
Roman law, wards were allowed and expected to exert greater autonomy and arrive at 
some consensus with their tutores.(15) The motivation for the appointment of 
tutors/curators seemed often to be to do with preventing loss of property from the family. 
How much of the actions of tutors/curators was protective in a more general ‘best 
interests’ sense is difficult to say. Tutor and curator were sometimes used together. 
Thus, if a person under tutela was mentally ill at the time when the tutela was due to 
terminate, an appointment of a curator could be considered - i.e. to run in parallel for 
the time being with that of the tutor. They could be the same person or another person, 
and a tutor could enlist the help of a curator to undertake functions which he was unable 
to accomplish.*
Earlv English Law
The limited amount of available information about guardianship in England prior to 1324 
is summarised by McLaughlin thus:
"In very early English law, guardianship of the mentally disabled was called 
tutorship [rather than the logically and semantically more consistent ‘curatorship’] 
and was the responsibility of the Lord of the Manor. It was a protective 
responsibility that related to both property and the person, but the chief reason for 
its existence was proprietary. "(l9)
Little is known of how curators were chosen, but Buckland notes that mental illness was not a bar to 
being a tutor: "lunacy (furor) seems to have been always regarded as curable, and thus was not a 
disqualification but a ground of temporary excuse. In classical law it was no bar at all in legitima 
t u t e l a " . H o w e v e r  Pope notes that by 1791 an English court found that "A lunatic cannot be govern 
himself will be unable to manage another or his concerns."^7)
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De Prerogativa Regis. 1324
The passing of the Act may have been aimed at reducing abuses or failures to carry 
through guardianship duties by Lords of the Manor or was possibly due to attempts on 
the part of the Crown to extend and consolidate the King’s powers. * However it is from 
this point that commentators see more clearly the King as "father of all his subjects" and 
in particular as "guardian over those people that a jury of 12 found to be idiots or 
lunatics. "(21)
The Act clearly acknowledged the distinction between mentally handicapped people and 
mentally ill people and provided for forms of guardianship under different terms for these 
groups. A common objective remained in identifying Royal powers for protecting the 
interests of people unable to fend for themselves. Section 10 of the Statute reads as 
follows:-
"Lunatics:- Also the King shall provide when any, that before time hath had his 
wit and memory happen to fail of his wit as there are many (with lucid intervals) 
that their lands and tenements shall be safely kept without waste and 
destruction, and that they and their household shall live and be maintained 
competently with the property of the same, and the residue besides their 
sustentation shall be kept for their use to be delivered unto him when they come 
to right mind, so that such lands and hereditaments shall in no wise be alienated; 
and the king shall take nothing to his own use. And if the party die in such 
estate, then the residue shall be distributed for his soul by the advice of the 
ordinary."
Maitland considers the Prerogative Regis to be the oldest English document to provide 
us with:
"...any clear information about a wardship of lunatics [through which] we see 
prerogatival rights growing, while feudal claims fall into the background; and in 
the case of lunacy we see a guardianship, a mund, which is not profitable to the 
guardian, and this at present is a novel and a noteworthy thing. "(22)
Maitland suggests another possibility: "Robert Walerand, a minister of justice and favourite of the 
King, procured this ordinance foreseeing that he must leave an idiot as his heir and desirous that his 
land should fall rather into the King’s hand than into the hand of his lords.
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The effect of this (contrasting with the situation of people with mental handicap, whose 
lands were seized and rights in the land denied, with no duty on the King to maintain 
them) is explained by McLaughlin as follows
"The King was not allowed to profit from the lands and was under a duty to 
maintain mentally disordered persons and their households out of the profits of the 
lands, had to make full account of profits, and had to return the property upon 
return to lucidity. However, when mentally disordered persons died while still 
mentally disordered, their property did not pass to their heirs but is distributed by 
the King...."(23)
Neugebauer confirms that mentally ill people were dealt with by the Crown more 
generously than mentally handicapped people and also that the latter gained the Crown 
greater revenues. The King could not profit from his own custody of lunatics, so could 
not require fines or rents from guardians, as was the practice with mentally handicapped 
people. As a consequence many cases brought before the Court of Wards were referred 
to as ‘idiots’ when in fact they were probably more accurately referred to as mentally 
disturbed. Tests were administered to find any lack of intellectual capacity on the part 
of the plaintiff. Mentally ill people were subjected to a different set of tests aimed at 
establishing that the person’s disordered behaviour was precipitated by physical illness, 
injury or shock, which were considered the most frequent ‘causes’ of mental disorder 
according to contemporary views.
Neugebauer goes on to confirm from his researches that:-
”... guardians of lunatics were accountable for more extensive stewardship [than 
was the case with mentally handicapped people]. A lunatic’s guardian was 
obligated to maintain the lunatic and his family at a level commensurate with his 
social rank, not simply the necessities, and to preserve and protect the estate. "(24)
Although Royal protection was now statutorily assured, "actual care of the individual and 
his estate devolved to friends or relatives".(25) Lindman, here discussing American 
interpretation of the law of this period, maintains that it follows closely the approach 
observed by Blackstone, namely that commitment to the care of relatives was a common 
measure "on the first attack of lunacy" and that only violent people will necessarily need 
to leave the care of their family. On the other hand, the court was more likely to commit
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a person to the care of a friend, leaving family members, other than his heir, responsible 
for managing his property. Giving custody of a person to the heir was discouraged, 
Blackstone tells us, "to prevent sinister practices ".(26)
The Court of Wards and Liveries
The King’s powers, exercised by the King’s Governors, were vested in the Court of 
Wards and Liveries in 1540. The Court recognised that the position of the Crown 
vis a vis mentally ill people was similar to that of a trustee. Much discussion in the 
literature concerns the similarity and differences between guardianship and trusteeship, 
on one hand, and guardianship and wardship on the other.*
Although the Court of Wards had proprietary interests in the outcome of cases concerning 
mentally ill people, including transactions under feudal laws for the sale of guardianship, 
Custer considers that it was "largely motivated by humanitarian rather than financial 
concerns". He cites the continuing practice of committing mentally ill to the individual’s 
closest friend for care as illustrative of this and adds:
"...The Court itself serves in this instance principally as a protective institution, 
one that exemplified the spirit of the later articulated Parens Patria doctrine. "(30)
Bell maintained throughout his study of the role of the Court that it was generally more 
concerned with the humanitarian needs of mentally ill people than to exploit them for 
financial gain(31) and this view is supported by MacDonald and Neugebauer.
McLaughlin observes: "The position of mentally disordered persons was more akin to that of
beneficiaries of a trust".(27)
Pope says: "...[In 1324]...,by the terms of the Act of [17 Edw. 2, cc 9, 10,] the King became the 
owner of an idiot’s lands...while of the lunatics estate he was merely a trustee....Gradually [however, 
the position of the former was assimilated into that of the latter] and the relation of the Crown to both 
classes approached more nearly the relation of trustee to beneficiary....The Lord Chancellor, chief 
judge in matters of trust,... acquired immediate jurisdiction in respect of these classes, and administered 
the trust on behalf of the Crown [after the abolition of the Court of Wards] ".(28)
According to Bell: "In the person of a lunatic...the King had no certain interest, but only the duty of 
exercising a sort of trusteeship over his lands. "(29)
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MacDonald says that:
"...towards lunatics the court behaved with uncharacteristic delicacy...[seeking 
principally]...to help families bear the burden of harbouring a mad man."
and goes on to explain, citing a Royal Commission Report of 1617/18, that:-
"King James instructed the court to ensure that lunatics be freely committed to 
their best and nearest friends that can receive no benefit by their death, and the 
committees, bound to answer for...the very value of their estates upon account, 
for the benefit of the lunatic....The order was obeyed." (This writer’s 
emphasis)(32)
In addition to its jurisdiction over mentally handicapped and mentally ill people, the 
Court of Wards had a wider concern to administer revenues accruing to the Crown 
through the operation of feudal land law, so that although:
"a guardian was expected to look after the lunatic’s entire family and was held 
responsible for his expenditures and income, [and the grants of lunatics, including 
covenants obliging committees to account annually for their receipts and 
disbursements] the analogy between the legal status of wards and of the mentally
ill...should not obscure very real and important differences. Wardship was a 
direct product of feudal land law and the King’s rights in this area were 
circumscribed by the nature of feudal tenure. In contrast, the Crown’s authority 
over idiots and lunatics was in no way linked to land law. It derived from the 
Crown’s general right and duty, as pater patrae, to protect the persons and, where 
necessary, the properties of individuals unable to care for themselves. "(33)
Neugebauer maintains that:
"...disturbed persons with real estate...could be brought to official 
notice.. .through the Court of Wards and Liveries.. .and offered protection and, to 
some degree, a monitored Guardianship system [which becomes available to] 
persons across the English social spectrum [indicating] a small but nonetheless 
real, social welfare dimension of this royal jurisdiction. "(34)
Guardianship/wardship for wards who were neither mentally ill nor mentally handicapped 
did not, according to Neugebauer, evidence the same tendency towards humane and 
caring handling as did the jurisdiction towards people with mental disorder and there was 
growing exploitation of wards’ estates by guardians and the Crown:
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"In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the fiscal dimension [in respect of 
mentally disordered people] gradually disappeared while the welfare aspects were 
significantly expanded. In this respect, the Crown’s attitude was far more humane 
and benevolent toward the mentally ill than it was towards wards. "(35)
The Parens Patriae doctrine has been highly influential in maintaining the notion of Royal 
responsibility for the care of mentally ill people and as a basis for the later development 
of ‘welfare’ legislation. In the USA, accordingly to Curtis, the doctrine has been adapted 
further for this purpose, whereby the state "as Quasi-Sovereign" acts "as a guardian of 
the well-being of its general populus and economy. "*36)
Fitzherbert is also referred to by Staunford as authority for the broad assertion that:
"[t]he king is the protectour of all hys subiectes and of all theire goods, landes 
and tenements, and therefore of suche as cannot goueme them selues nor order 
their lands and tenements his grace (as a father) must take vppon him to prouyde 
for them, that they them selues and their things may bee presented. "(37)
Custer suggests that this 1567 reference is the first time that the Crown is described as 
a parent and says that this may well have been the origin of the doctrine of Parens 
Patriae.(38)
Lindman discusses the Beverley case (1603), which apparently provided Lord Coke with 
the opportunity to expound the "law of insanity as it had developed in England", focusing 
in particular on those who were included within the umbrella term "noncompos mentis". 
Including ‘lunatics’ within this category, he observed that such people were responsible 
for acts done by them during lucid moments, but that acts performed during non-lucid 
moments were of the same effect as those performed by an ‘idiot’ (a mentally 
handicapped person) who could not be found guilty of serious offences. Continuing his 
discussion of this case, Lindman goes on:
"Lord Coke then gives an interesting comparison of the civil [i.e Roman] and 
common [i.e. Anglo-Saxon] law....He notes that all acts performed by one non 
compos mentis without the accord of his tutor are void in the civil law. The lack 
of a similar requirement in common law is cited as a defect in the common law 
system. [However] Lord Coke points out that the Law of England could in fact 
provide a tutor in the form of the King...the King is accountable to the Lunatic
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when the latter again becomes normal. [Whilst] the English law of 17th century 
established many methods to protect the property of the insane...Lord Coke also 
relates that the King was given custody of the person of the afflicted individual 
as well as his lands. "(39)
By the seventeenth century, Neugebauer maintains, the Court was providing:
"an informal system of monitored Guardianship [by which] protection was made 
accessible to nearly property-less persons. Thus a small social welfare dimension 
emerged [and] a more consistently benevolent jurisdiction was developed that 
sheltered a wider social class range of English subjects."
Under these arrangements, he continues, "private subjects, usually the petitioner, received 
custody of the incompetent individual. These guardians supervised the mentally
ill...[and] defended them and their property against exploitation."(40)
Although the Court was "unable to mandate goodwill" it:
"selected guardians bound to the insane by affection or identity of economic 
interests...the nearest of kin...sound in religion, of good governance in their own 
families, without disillusion, without distemper, no greedy persons, no 
stepmothers; wherever possible avoiding giving the disabled person over to the 
mercy and power of a stranger. "(41)
Land Tenures Act. 1660
This statute, 12 CAR.2.C.24, at 176, abolished the Court of Wards, formalised 
guardianship arrangements for children and defined a particular aspect of guardianship 
for adults.
For mentally ill people, guardianship in the form of committee of the person could follow 
a Chancery Court finding of lunacy by inquisition, preceded by a writ de lunatico 
inquirendo.
Custer, reviewing developments in the doctrine of the Crown as guardian of mentally ill 
people, refers to the 1669 case of Falkland v Bertie in which the Lord Chancellor 
Somers pronounced:
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"In this Court there were several things that belonged to the King as a pater 
patria, and fell under the care and direction of this Court as lunatics etc, 
afterwards such of them as were of profit and advantage to the King, were 
removed to the Court of Wards [in 1540]; but upon the dissolution of that court, 
came back again to the Chancery. "(42)
The relationship between Chancery and guardianship functions following the demise of 
the Court of Wards is summarised by Lindman, thus:
"The King’s guardianship was exercised through the Lord Chancellor. This was 
accomplished by virtue of a special commission issued to him by the Crown rather 
than by the general authority of the Chancery Court. In exercising the power, the 
Chancellor held an inquisition to enquire into the condition of the mentally 
disabled person and to appoint a committee for her person and property if he was 
adjudged an ‘idiot’ or a ‘lunatic’. It was the further duty of the Chancery Court 
to supervise and control the conduct of such a committee. "(43)
One way of stating the implications of the 1660 measure for guardianship of mentally ill 
people is to say that whilst the Crown remained the ultimate guardian, i.e the ‘guardian 
of guardians’, responsibility now delegated to the Chancellor, served by the Chancery 
Court, rather than the previous arrangement whereby the Court of Wards were involved 
in sales and transfers of feudal guardianship rights. The Chancery Court, in mm, chose 
a person whom they would supervise and to whom the mentally ill person could be 
committed (i.e. as a ‘committee’) to exercise de facto guardian’s protective and 
controlling responsibilities following a finding of incompetence to manage person or 
affairs by the Chancellor’s Inquisition. Further detail on the role of committee is 
provided in Appendix D.
A committee, according to Theobold, "has complete control over the person of the lunatic 
and it is his duty to make all necessary arrangements for his care and treatment".(44) 
Probably, this followed previous practice of including all forms of care and treatment 
wheresoever provided. Neugebauer, for example, mentions that:
"On July 19th 1631 the Court ordered that the guardian of Robert Banckworth 
‘shall take care...and cause the said [lunatic] with...convenient speed and 
privacie.. .to bee removed.. .to the howse of Dr Bartlett to bee with him placed for 
the recoverye of his health’."(45)
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In being responsible for a whole range of what would now be referred to as domiciliary, 
day care and residential (including hospital) services, the committee required the 
assistance of others, which led to a further delegation of responsibility. For example, 
Neugebauer mentions that:-
" Physical supervision and care of the disabled party were commonly handled by 
retaining a live-in servant, the so called ‘lunatic’s keeper’. For example: Jane 
‘was sometimes...very unruly whereby the [Guardian] was enforced to have 
sometimes two sometimes more [servants] a whole week together to be with [Jane] 
and attend her day and night’."(46)
Though a limited care responsibility and function judged by modem terms, this does bear 
relationship to guardianship in showing a sensitivity* to need and in specifying a 
continuing responsibility of one individual over another.
A major implication of the 1660 Act was that these ‘total* powers of guardians were 
exclusively vested in practice in committees (acting on guardians’ behalf) and could only
Historical instances showing such sensitivity to the position of the mentally ill person in being subject 
to guardianship or committee are difficult to reference but the following give an inkling of how some 
people in the 18th century apparently reacted when considering that they had been inappropriately 
placed on guardianship.
Describing guardianship arrangements in colonial Massachusetts during this period, Jimenez illustrates 
from case examples how guardianships for mentally ill people were contested, especially by wards 
themselves. Quoting the case of Henry Dove as ‘probably typical’ she refers to a court finding of the 
client: "At times he has lucid intervals, yet at other times he is so wild and ungovernable that we are 
of the opinion that he is in no way capable of managing his affairs". A guardian was appointed but 
the guardian and ward disputed the amount which the guardian was to be paid for his services:
"Dove [the ward] won his case for a lower payment...and was eventually released from 
Guardianship. Like others under Guardianship, Dove was rational at times. It is clear that 
persons assigned Guardianship were not presumed to be permanently incapable of handling 
their own affairs."
Jimenez quotes also the example of Benjamin Hall who appealed against his guardianship status in 1770 
"on the grounds that he was now ‘compos mentis’." The court asked ‘selectmen’ (specially appointed 
town councillors) whether the client had been seen in taverns, spending unwisely or unnecessarily and 
after receiving an assurance that this did not apply they responded that "Mr Hall was a gentleman 
[they] imagined he was capable of conducting his own affairs [based on the view that he was able to 
run his business]." The guardianship was revoked, and Jimenez observes that:
Court records indicate that the guardianship status was always revoked when the 
person in question managed to argue his case as far as the appeal court."
In a further example quoted, a ward gained revocation of guardianship by virtue of 
his argument that he was "worse for being under Guardianship".(47>
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operate following a finding from an inquisition. The question remaining, therefore, was 
whether guardians retained any independent capacity to operate, i.e. to exercise care and 
protection powers, independently of a finding of inquisition and without delegation to 
committees.
Much of the literature covering this period seems to have assumed that the only form of 
guardianship for mentally ill people operating was in the form of committee. However, 
Collinson, writing in 1812, provides a section in his treatise on lunacy law headed 
‘ Guardian’ which states that:
"If a person in the condition of a lunatic, though not found so by inquisition, be 
made a defendant, the Court, upon proper information of his incapacity, will 
direct a guardian to be appointed. In this case a special application should be 
made by motion or petition on a Affidavit, stating the particular circumstances of 
the party, and praying a commission to appoint a guardian....The order for the 
commission...in no case differs from the form of a  commission to appoint a 
guardian to an infant except in stating that the party is incapable by age or 
infirmity; and a proceeding under commission of this kind is Mutatis 
Mutandis, the same as in executing a commission to appoint the guardian to 
an infant." [This writer’s emphasis)(48)
The statutory basis for this assertion is not referred to, but it may be conjectured that 
guardians’ direct powers had never been entirely lost.
The Lunacy Act. 1845
Section 95 of this Act confirms Collinson’s understanding of the situation as follows:
"...it shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor from time to time to make orders 
for the appointment of a guardian, or otherwise for the protection, care, and 
management of any person who shall by any such report [from the Masters in 
Lunacy] be found to be a lunatic, and such guardianship has the same powers and 
authorities as a Committee of the Person of a lunatic found such by Inquisition 
now has, and also to make orders for the appointment of a Receiver, or otherwise 
for the protection, care, and management of the estates of such a lunatic, and such 
Receiver shall have the same powers and authorities as a Receiver of the Estate 
the lunatic found such by an Inquisition now has...."(49)
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Furthermore, there were some interesting observations forthcoming from the 1891 
Report of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland on Lunacy Administration, Section 34 of 
which referred to Chancery lunatics and observed:
"The statutory Prerogative of the Crown, delegated by Special Warrant is the 
foundation of the authority which is exercised in regard to lunatics by the Lord 
Chancellor, who stands in.this matter as Pater Patriae.”
For Chancery lunatics, the appointment of committee of the person and committee of the 
estate upon a commission of inquisition could take place but, the Irish report said,
"it may be correctly said that it is with reference to the care of property rather 
than care of persons of lunatics, that the powers of the Lord Chancellor, acting 
for the Crown, are called into operation".
This offered little or nothing for lunatics with small properties who also needed to be 
provided for and whose possessions were "just as important to the possessor". The 
Committee’s Report argued furthermore that the person of the lunatic with small 
properties should also be protected and suggested:
"If the Lord Chancellor’s care of the person is needed and is good...this also 
should be taken on [by the country for these less well off people]."
In this respect the Report considered that practice in Ireland was ahead of England in that 
it allowed the Lord Chancellor:-
"When satisfied that any person has a weak mind and is temporarily incapable of 
managing his affairs...in a summary way and without directing any inquiry 
under a commission of lunacy, [to] appoint a guardian of the person and 
property.. .specifying the nature and extent of the powers to be exercised by such 
guardian. "(This writer’s emphasis)
The Committee’s Report observed that this provision, which was for 6 months only 
and could not be renewed more than once, "in our opinion is of practical value" 
(Section 34 (c)).(50)
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Finally, according to Pope, (1890) "the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice 
has jurisdiction to give directions for the maintenance of a person of unsound mind not 
so found [by inquisition] as part of its general jurisdiction over the administration of 
trusts". However, he could find only one case* as precedent for the Chancery Court to 
"appoint a person to act in the nature of a guardian" and regarded this ruling as without 
authority.(51)
Hoggett has detailed the reluctance of Courts to follow this precedent and concludes that 
Chancery guardianship was confined in effect to committees of the person appointed 
following inquisition.(52)
Although the 1845 Act was repealed by the Lunacy Act, 1890, no explicit reference was 
made forbidding or avoiding this form of guardianship by the 1890 measure, and it might 
therefore be assumed that it was little used or had fallen into disuse, possibly through 
disinterest of Chancery in assisting mentally ill people with limited wealth and few 
possessions.
The Lunacy Act. 1890
Repealing earlier legislation, this Act made detailed provision for the care and control of 
people with mental illness inside and outside hospitals (but particularly the former) 
defining the role of committee as key to facilitating provision of all care and treatment. 
McLaughlin seems to assume that any distinquishable guardianship function was 
subsumed under these provisions, and he applauds the measure as the first consolidation 
of guardianship law since De Prerogativa Regis to contend with "the hodge-podge nature 
of the development of guardianship law over the centuries".(53)
Against this view it could be maintained that by apparently excluding a role for guardians 
independent of inquisition arrangements, the Act further reinforced the place of 
inquisition proceedings in determining the care and treatment needs of people with
Vane v Vane, L.R. 2Ch.D.124 (1876)
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mental illness. In practice, as the Irish Committee had noted, this meant that the needs 
of people with limited means would not have access to this assessment or the care and 
treatment that would arise from it.
It is also important to note that inquisition procedures were already showing signs of 
being regarded as anachronisms judged by the amount of use. The Royal Commission 
on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency noted that by 1957 the 
procedures were only occasionally used, involving in the region of 30 people in the whole 
of England and Wales.
The Roval Commission on the Care of the Feeble Minded. 1904-1908 (54)
The findings and deliberations of this Commission were significant for guardianship in 
two ways. Firstly, the recommendations to the Commission relate to the first revision 
of statutory guardianship under English law and, although this was intended primarily for 
people with a mental handicap, the distinction between mental handicap and mental illness 
was sufficiently blurred by the official language of the time to insure that at least some 
mentally ill people were included within its provision. These may have resembled the 
so-called "highgrade defectives” who were "neglected, abandoned, cruelly treated, or 
without visible means of support”, or who were to be found in a "lunatic asylum" but 
who could live outside provided they were enabled to live a protected life in the 
community (p.342).
The second major significance of the Royal Commission was the fact that it presented a 
wide-ranging discussion of use of guardianship in order to examine whether this form of 
care could be further advanced, thereby reducing the need for institutional care. In 
discussing guardianship arrangements in other countries, and for other care groups, the 
Commission also reflected on the different types of guardianship as they perceived them 
as being largely determined by the different legal systems within which they operated. 
A summary of the Commission’s important review of various types of guardianship was 
offered in Chapter II, pages 59 and 60, and further detailed in Appendix D.
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From the discussion offered by the Commission, it was clear, once again, that although 
the focus was on people with mental handicap the alternative forms of guardianship 
presented were equally applicable to people with mental illness, with perhaps a bias 
towards those people whose mental health problems made them a social problem and/or 
who were likely to come within provision of the Poor Law unless some alternative was 
offered - i.e. a clear indication of guardianship being seen within a preventative role,
i.e preventing people with mental illness being made subject to the Poor Law, and 
therefore illustrating the clear distinction between guardianship for mentally ill people and 
Poor Law guardianship.
The Mental Deficiency Act. 1913
By Section 10(2) of this Act:
"an order that a defective be placed under Guardianship shall, subject to regulations 
made by the Secretary of State, confer a person named in the order as guardian such 
powers as would have been exercisable if he had been the father of the defective and 
the defective had been under the age of 14...."
This legislation resulted in part from the recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
the Care of the Feeble Minded, 1904-1908, (see above) but departed in a number of ways 
from those of the Commission’s recommendations, which were against the consolidation 
of statutory guardianship.
Roval Commission On The Law Relating To Mental Illness And Mental Deficiency - 
1954/1957(55)
The report of the Royal Commission is discussed below under five headings: The
Commission's Historical Perspective; Main Statements on Changes in Guardianship; 
Recommendations Not Pursued; Philosophy: Implications for Guardianship and Social 
Work; Passage of the Bill in Parliament.
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The Commission’s Historical Perspective
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Commission’s view of guardianship was their 
apparent assumption that no appropriate statutory provision for people with mental illness 
outside hospital was in force at the time of their review, with the implication that other 
arrangements were insufficiently formulated or too outdated to be effective. Their 
commitment to bring legislation for mentally handicapped people and mentally ill people 
together may also have influenced their decision to model future statutory guardianship 
for mentally ill people on existing mental deficiency laws, though the Commission would 
no doubt have appreciated that a number of people with mental illness were in fact 
regulated under mental deficiency legislation.
The picture conveyed in the Commission’s discussion of existing guardianship 
arrangements for mentally ill people as at 1954 can best be described as a review of 
‘quasi-guardianship’. This term is used as a convenient shorthand to describe a variety 
of arrangements for care and control of mentally ill people in the community 
arising from provision under previous legislation. The Commission summarised (Sections 
796-798) the situation as follows:
’’The Lunacy and Mental Treatment Acts allow ‘persons of unsound mind’ to be 
taken into the care of, or reside with, private individuals as certified, temporary 
or voluntary patients in certain specific circumstances. These include certifiable 
temporary patients who have been in a hospital or licensed house and who have 
left it either to be ‘boarded out’ in the care of relatives or friends or ‘on leave’ or 
‘on trial’; these patients remain under the general supervision of the hospital and 
may be recalled to the hospital if necessary. ‘Persons of unsound mind’ may also 
live as certified, temporary or voluntary patients as ‘single patients’ in the care 
of private individuals."
The Report indicated an estimated 100 people in England and Wales who were boarded 
out or in single care (undifferentiated) but adds: "On December 31 1956, there were 44 
certified patients and 4 voluntary patients in single care. The majority of these were 
patients who had been previously in a hospital; only a few had gone direct into single 
care." The Commission summarised the position as follows:
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"Patients may be admitted to [hospitals etc] or received into the care of private 
individuals as ‘single patients or as voluntary, temporary or certified patients 
only’."
A notable omission from the Commission’s discussion was any indication of the 
effectiveness of quasi-guardianship, since the Commission apparently did not investigate 
existing arrangements or known problem areas. A possible presumption therefore is that 
the Commission sought only to tidy up and formalise these arrangements. It would seem 
unlikely that they were concerned by the small numbers involved since (as later 
discussion will show) they apparently only envisaged guardianship for mentally ill people 
being required in the future for a small minority of people.
There was certainly some imprecision in the use of the term ‘single care’, as is confirmed 
by Jones.
"This term is used, as it was used in the 19th century, to indicate all who were 
confined alone. The state of single lunatic varied enormously, since it depended 
entirely on the arrangements made by relatives and friends for their 
confinement. "(56)
It does seem fairly certain, however, that single care was not guardianship as such but 
a care arrangement arising from guardianship which had the effect of linking the actual 
arrangements - what would now be generally referred to as foster family care - with 
guardianship law, as applied in other countries and particularly in Scotland.
Aside from quasi-guardianship, the Commission gave attention to the role and function 
of a committee, indicating that:-
"...the procedure of legal inquisition for determining the control of the property 
or of the person of the patient, or both, remains in existence and is still 
occasionally used...."
and emphasising the point that:-
"The person appointed as ‘Committee of the Person’ following an inquisition 
can determine the patient’s place of residence and can order his admission to
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and detention in hospital without using the certification or other admission 
procedures which are now used for other patients...."
Resort to use of committee of the person and committee of the estate seems to have 
become infrequent* to the extent to which inquistion proceedings became obsolete. 
Alternative arrangements for committee of the estate, which became the responsibility of 
the Court of Protection, were clearly required and enacted (Mental Health Act, 1959). 
However, no reference can be found to the winding up or translation of committee of the 
person - an issue which strangely appeared not to have concerned the Commission. 
Possibly the fact that committee of the person involved so few people in England and 
Wales at the time of the Commission may have led them to conclude that this was a 
purely residual or token form of guardianship.
The Commission appears not to have taken into account the other existing statutory 
guardianship arrangements for mentally ill people contained in the Lunacy Act, 1845. 
Neither do they comment on borough guardianship or canon law guardianship for this 
care group** from which it might be assumed that these arrangements had fallen into 
disuse. If the Commission thought that there was an alternative model of guardianship 
operating under the Lunacy and Mental Treatment Acts, this was not made explicit and 
the overall impression gained from the Commission’s report and from evidence supplied 
to the Commission is that they did not recognise a form of guardianship per se as 
applicable to mentally ill people at that time. Instead they could be said to have 
recognised and reviewed the forms of quasi-guardianship for mentally ill people discussed 
above.
The Commission report noted:-
"On 1st January, 1957, there were 37 patients... found...of unsound mind by inquisition... [20 of which 
were resident in England and Wales. There] were 17 in which the Committee of the Estate was also 
Committee of the Person [and] 2 persons in which the Committee of the Person and Committee of the 
Estate were different individuals".
Hoggett estimates that at this time there "were 16 people who were under the jurisdiction of a 
committee of the person"/57^
Discussed under Historical Typologies, Appendix D.
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The Commission may be criticised for not having looked more fully at guardianship 
historically or at arrangements in other countries, which latter had been undertaken by 
the Royal Commission on the Care of the Feeble Minded, 1904-1908. Whilst it may 
have seemed inappropriate to have retraced the steps taken by the earlier Commission, 
especially since this had produced very little by way of useful development, there was 
certainly a case for looking at guardianship arrangements in countries whose legal 
systems have a close correspondence to those of England and Wales. For example, 
Scottish guardianship arrangements, which would in any case need to be recognised under 
English law for practical purposes, were not discussed, even though there were well 
known connections with the idea of guardianship and ‘curatorship and tutorship’ 
(i.e. curators bonis and tutors dative) which applied under the Scottish legal system.
Main Statement on Changes in Guardianship Law Sought
The Royal Commission had been given the following terms of reference
"to enquire...into the existing law and administrative machinery governing the 
certification, detention, care...absence on trial or licence, discharge and 
supervision, of persons [who are mentally ill or mentally defective and] to 
consider...the extent to which it is now, or should be made, statutorily possible 
for such persons to be treated, as voluntary patients, without certification; and to 
make recommendations".
It was therefore to be expected that the main task facing the Commission was to examine 
the possibility of providing mentally handicapped and mentally ill people with the same 
access to care and treatment, particularly in hospital but also in the community, with 
minimum resort to compulsion. Previous arrangements under the Lunacy and Mental 
Treatment Acts and under mental deficiency legislation generally required that those 
needing care and treatment in hospital could only receive this on a compulsory basis. 
The position about care and treatment outside hospital was much more complicated and 
is discussed further below.
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Apart from minimalising the use of compulsion, the Commission also wished to:
i. reduce the legalistic requirements for compulsory orders to be agreed by 
magistrates. Instead doctors should be empowered to determine not only 
a person’s ‘state of mind’ but also their ‘care needs’. (Sections 42(iv) 
and 40)
ii. reinforce earlier official pronouncements (e.g. 1926 Report of the Royal 
Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder) that mental illness should be 
treated and viewed in the same way as other illnesses. (Section 5)
iii. endorse the increasingly accepted view that community care services 
should be developed and used wherever possible in place of institutional 
care. (Sections 294 and 601, in particular)
The attitude of the Commission to guardianship was complicated by their adherence to 
the resolutions referred to above. In particular their determination to unify mental 
deficiency and lunacy legislation meant that they had to decide the future of ‘mental 
deficiency guardianship’, while at the same time weighing up the needs of mentally ill 
people for guardianship under the same terms and conditions for its successor. Their view 
of guardianship was basically paternalistic and the implications of this are further 
discussed below, see pages 109 and 110.
The Commission’s main statements on guardianship are contained in Sections 399/400 
and 832 of their Report. The following key sentences apply to guardianship for mentally 
ill people:
"399. Community care can be given only if the patient can be persuaded to co­
operate with the officers of the local authority and to accept the help and advice 
which they have to offer and the arrangements which are made for employment, 
occupation or training. It should therefore usually be given without using 
compulsory powers. Sometimes, however, the possession of legal authority may 
make it possible to obtain a patient’s co-operation which would not be given 
otherwise; in such cases compulsory powers may justifiably be used to place the 
patient under the legal control of guardianship...."
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"....Powers of guardianship may also sometimes be needed to ensure proper 
care for people with mild or chronic forms of mental illness or infirmity who 
do not need to be in hospital; in the great majority of such cases, care could 
be provided without compulsion; but there may be occasions on which 
community care under guardianship would be more appropriate than 
compulsory admission to or continued detention in hospital, especially when 
facilities for community care are expanded as recommended in Part V of our 
report. In such cases guardianship would replace the present powers of control 
over certified patients ‘in single care’ or ‘boarded out’; it could be used as a 
method of arranging suitable residential care, in local authority homes or 
elsewhere, for some elderly people in circumstances not covered by the powers 
of removal contained in Section 47, National Assistance Act, 1948."
Section 832 indicates that ‘private guardianship’ (guardianship provided by an individual 
not employed by a local authority) would be equally applicable to the prescriptions 
referred to above and to "exercise control over the patient equivalent to that of a parent 
over a child...." In the above (Section 399) reference to the possibility of 
guardianship being used "as a method of arranging suitable residential care...for some 
elderly p e o p l e . i t  has to be a matter of conjecture whether these elderly people would 
be classed as mentally ill. In one sense, strict diagnosis is perhaps unimportant; on the 
other hand, the Mental Health Act insists that a mental disorder is present before people 
are subject to compulsory powers, so presumably this overarching criterion was in the 
minds of the Commission when this section was drafted. Similarly, the Commission 
report dwells at some length (Sections 654 onwards) on the situation of school leavers 
and the services available for young people who may be ‘maladjusted or mentally 
backward’, but by inference were also considering young people showing signs of 
behaviour disturbances and psychological problems at home which called for additional 
help on leaving school, such as specialist residential care. The Commission explain their 
perspective thus:
"When the need for residential accommodation of this sort arises from 
unsatisfactory home conditions, it may be necessary for young persons to be 
placed under the guardianship of the local health authority or of a suitable 
individual. Guardianship in the community should be more widely used so that 
the young person is not removed from the general community and the chances of 
normal employment and sent into hospital....[After-care for these young people 
is very important and should be initiated by a Mental Welfare Officer of the local 
authority while they are on licence] before the approved school order expires, thus 
providing the maximimum continuity of individual care. If a longer period of 
compulsory control is needed for the patient’s own welfare or for the protection 
of others, admission to guardianship would be possible using the procedures 
recommended...."
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It is plain from the above extracts that the Commission were only considering one form 
of guardianship - the compulsory statutory guardianship applicable to people with mental 
handicap, psychopathy and mental illness - and felt that these groups should be similarly 
provided for legally and administratively. This seems to have influenced their decision 
to follow mental deficiency legislation in making the criteria for the use of compulsory 
powers (hospital or guardianship) the same, viz.:
"We recommend, that subject to the use of the new procedures [referred to 
elsewhere in this report] the law should in future allow mentally ill patients to be 
admitted compulsorily to hospital or to be placed under guardianship in the 
community ‘when the use of compulsion is necessary for the patient’s own welfare 
or for the protection of others’." (Section 325) (This writer’s emphasis)
These were substantially similar criteria to those applicable under previous legislation, 
though using different terminology. The somewhat elliptical phraseology of the ‘welfare 
criterion’ is expanded upon in Section 317 of the report where the grounds for the use 
of compulsory powers for people with mental disorder (i.e. with mental handicap, 
psychopathy or mental illness) are indicated thus:
"a. there is a reasonable certainty that the patient is suffering from a 
pathological mental disorder and requires hospital or community care; and
b. suitable care cannot be provided without using compulsory powers; and
c. if the patient himself is unwilling to receive the form of care which is 
considered necessary, there is at least a strong likelihood that his unwillingness 
is due to lack of appreciation of his own condition deriving from the mental 
disorder itself; and there is also either
i. good prospect of benefit to the patient from the treatment proposed 
- an expectation that it will either cure or alleviate his mental disorder or 
strengthen his ability to regulate his social behaviour in spite of the 
underlying disorder, or bring him substantial benefit in the form of 
protection from neglect or exploitation by others; or
ii. a strong need to protect others from antisocial behaviour by the 
patient."
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From the above, one may ‘profile’ the groups of mentally ill people envisaged by the 
Commission as suitable for guardianship as " people with mild or chronic forms of mental 
illness and [mental] infirmity” who are prone to "neglect or exploitation by others” and 
who may display "anti-social behaviour”. The criterion for the need for compulsory 
control in the community therefore is that the person is unwilling to receive community 
care on a voluntary basis "due to a lack of appreciation of his own condition deriving 
from the mental disorder itself”. The person does not need to be in hospital and 
consequently guardianship is more appropriate than compulsory admission to or continued 
detention in a hospital.
Royal Commission’s Recommendations not accepted or pursued
1. The 28 Day Guardianship Order.
The Commission recommended an ‘emergency’ guardianship order, based on the view 
that:-
"...if powers of control are necessary [to arrange community care] it should be 
possible for the local health authority to assume powers of guardianship in an 
emergency by the use of a simpler procedure than normal, [ie. a mental welfare 
officer’s initiative accompanied by one medical recommendation.. .By these means] 
the powers of guardianship should be exercisable for a period of up to 28 days 
[extendable if required]."
No explanation can be found as to why this proposal was not pursued and it is interesting 
to speculate as to whether the Commission’s view expressed in Section 411 of the Report, 
that guardianship arrangements could become effective in providing an alternative to 
hospital care within such a short period of time, had been greeted with some degree of 
scepticism.
2. Guardianship for Young Mentally Disturbed People Upon Leaving Approved 
Schools.
This view of guardianship use was not pursued and would therefore only be applicable 
on an individual basis, i.e. where the person was found to be mentally ill, 
and ‘sectionable’ within formal procedures.
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3. Local Authority Duty to Accept Guardianship.
Section 387 of the Report refers to the duty of local authorities "to arrange for the 
provision of community care to include a duty to accept the responsibility of guardianship 
whenever guardianship is appropriate and cannot otherwise be arranged". On the other 
hand, in Section 381 of the report, the Commission argued that compulsory powers over 
a patient "should be regarded as authorising the hospital authorities to admit and detain 
him, not as ordering them to do so" and in a footnote added that "similar principles 
should apply when the patient is placed under guardianship in the community". In other 
words, the Commission argued, local authorities should not be legally obliged to accept 
all bona fide guardianship proposals but should maintain a general ‘fall-back’ 
responsibility to assume guardianship responsibilities where no other satisfactory 
arrangement could be made.
4. Development of Community Care.
The Commission recommended an expansion of community care services, by which they 
mainly meant local authority residential, day care and social work services. Indeed, they 
saw as appropriate an increasing use of guardianship taking place "when facilities for 
community care are expanded". (Section 399). It is generally accepted that this growth 
is not occurring within the time scale envisaged by the Commission and is still only 
slowly taking place. Barbara Castle writing in her Fore ward to Better Services for the 
Mentally 111 in 1975 gave an unambiguous acknowledgement of the problem: -
"...it is 16 years since the Mental Health Act of 1959 gave legislative recognition 
to the importance of community care, but supported facilities in a non-medical, 
non-hospital setting are still a comparative rarity." (Para.3)
The main body of the report (para 2.8) reiterates this admission, saying that:-
".. .by and large the non-hospital community resources are still minimal, though 
where facilities have been developed they have in general proved successful. The 
failure, for which central government as much as local government is responsible, 
to develop anything approaching adequate social services is perhaps the greatest 
disappointment of the last 15 years."
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However Better Services makes no reference to guardianship or to the assumption of 
developing services upon which the future of guardianship was seen to depend. 
References to the working of the Mental Health Act, 1959, expressed general satisfaction, 
indicating only that there was a "need to look critically at the detailed working of the 
Act", and referred to a consultative document shortly due to be published 
(Section 2.16).(58)
The Commission’s Philosophy and Implications for Guardianship and Social Work
1. Aversion to use of Compulsion. This view is expressed at every conceivable 
opportunity in the report, reinforced by way of a normative use of the words ‘could’ and 
‘should’. For instance, Section 399, (quoted above), provides two typical comments by 
the Commission:-
(a) "It [community care] should therefore usually be given without using 
compulsory powers";
(b) "...in the great majority of [cases of mild or chronic forms of mental 
illness or infirmity that do not need to be in hospital] care could be 
provided without compulsion.
Thus, despite other comments indicating an anticipated increase in use of guardianship, 
the sentiments more often point to an appeal for people to consider guardianship as a last 
resort, and certainly not as an option of choice.
2. Guardianship must inevitably entail Compulsion. Following closely on point 
(1), but apparently contradictorily, is the reinforcement given to this idea and no 
reference is made in the Report to a voluntary basis for guardianship, despite the 
Commission’s expressed intentions to limit use of compulsion as much as possible.
3. Service Provision without Compulsion. The Commission refer at a number of 
points to their concern to reverse the previous pattern by which services, i.e. care and 
treatment inside or outside hospital, were normally only available to people who are 
subject to certification, i.e. compulsion. In particular in Section 603 there is reference 
to the fact that: "after-care should be provided by the local authorities as long as is
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needed, and should not be dependent on the continuation of compulsory powers such as 
licence or guardianship”. Section 306 contains a similar sentiment, that: "there should 
be no question in future of compulsory powers being prolonged simply to give authority 
for the provision of after-care or in case the patient may need re-admission to hospital 
later in life...."Thus, the Commission may have inadvertently laid the basis for later 
official interpretations of the principles here enunciated to ensure that the idea of 
guardianship was not connected with particular entitlements to services.
4. Rejection of ‘Supervision’. Having apparently detached the idea of guardianship 
(intended to form the basis for new legislation) from service provision, the Commission 
also (possibly unwittingly) shut the door on another relatively clear function of 
guardianship, i.e. to provide an effective monitoring system to ensure the person was not 
neglected or exploited, by its rejection of the term ‘supervision’. The expressions 
‘voluntary supervision’ and ‘statutory supervision’ had been used within the mental 
deficiency legislation and the Commission wished again to break from some of the 
language and terminology of that approach.
While it is true that the Commission mainly had in mind the disassociation of formal 
supervision with the care of mentally handicapped people in the community, it is also true 
that the term ‘supervision* does not appear in any of the Commission’s functional 
descriptions of guardianship. In other words, the Commission could see that control in 
the community could be one means of ensuring a person received community care but 
were reluctant to specify what control should be exercised as a means of achieving this 
end. Although the issue has remained a concern ever since, the term ‘supervision’ was 
soon rehabilitated - see discussion on the following page, and the 1978 White Paper 
interpretation of the Commission’s view referred to on page 124.)
The Commission’s main dislike of the term (supervision) seems to have stemmed from 
their belief that it "suggests enforcement of control, so that it is preferable to use the term 
*community care'." (sic) (Section 606) [This writer’s emphasis]. The reference here to 
community care is ambiguous but Bean considers that the Commission were hoping 
guardianship would 11.. .be used as a form of compulsion to guarantee community care for 
those who would choose otherwise", so as to become the "fulcrum of the community care
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system".(59) Such a proposition is difficult to reconcile with the discussion offered in (3) 
above on entitlement to services. Arguably, guardianship could become essential in 
implementing community care policies only if it were also to be recognised as the means 
(i.e. as a vehicle in the widest sense or more narrowly as a ‘trigger’) for providing 
services to those who would otherwise refuse them.
5. The Quid Pro Quo Principle. In their general consideration of the future basis 
for compulsory powers (Section 312) the Commission state that:
"restriction of liberty is usually accompanied by the provision of special forms 
of care, treatment, training or occupation for the person who is placed under 
detention or control. Sometimes need for special forms of treatment or training 
is itself an essential element in the grounds on which compulsory restriction of 
liberty is accepted as justified."
The Commission then go on to examine the wider basis for the use of compulsion in 
society drawing a parallel with compulsion applied to children of school age as a means 
of ensuring that they receive necessary education. Thus the Commission appear to 
occupy an ambiguous position. On one hand they state the quid pro quo principle but at 
the same time do not wish the use of compulsion to be linked with entitlements per se. 
Possibly a fair statement of their view would be that whereas compulsion is justified in 
facilitating care and treatment for mentally ill people when it cannot otherwise be 
provided, the converse should not apply, i.e. compulsion should not be used, and 
certainly not justified, as a means of obtaining these ends.
6. A Paternalist Basis for Guardianship. In general, the Commission avoided 
conceptualising guardianship and it is difficult at some points in the report to identify how 
the term is being used. In the absence of conceptualisation, the report nevertheless 
clearly conveys that the guardian’s role is to exercise parental functions in the way 
described under previous mental deficiency legislation. Thus, within Section 400 of the 
report, the Commission say:
"When the procedures are used to place a person under guardianship, the local 
health authority would exercise control equivalent to that of a parent over a child. 
The patient would usually continue to live in the general community but the local
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authority acting through its medical officers and social workers would be able to 
control his place of residence or employment and his use of his earnings and to 
ensure that he is provided with training or occupation or other forms of care."
The Commission’s approach even extended to their view of how a local health authority 
should respond towards a person previously on guardianship who is admitted to hospital 
in circumstances where the local health authority would have "relinquished formal control 
over the patient ... [but who should continue to] have a duty to keep in touch with the 
patient and act towards him as a good parentn. (This writer’s emphasis).
At no point in the report is there an examination of whether a paternalistic basis for 
guardianship would be appropriate for people with mental illness, and the only likely 
explanation for this is that the mentally ill people envisaged by the Commission as 
included within the extended guardianship framework would be likely to have similar 
personalities and social situations as people previously subject to guardianship under 
mental deficiency legislation.*
7. The Social Work Connection The Royal Commission Report provides no 
discussion of the effectiveness of the key parties in the operation of Guardianship and 
therefore an opportunity to understand the extent to which social workers were involved 
in making guardianship applications or in becoming guardians was lost. No other 
literature can be found to shed light on this area.
An important strand in the development of statutory social work can be traced through 
developments of functions from those of relieving officers, duly authorised officers, to 
the title preferred by the Commission, namely mental welfare officers. However, in 
contrast to their successors (ASWs under the 1983 Act) no prescription was laid down 
as to whether these officers of local authorities would be social workers, either by 
background or by professional training. Nevertheless, the expectation that mental welfare 
officers would be drawn from the social workers employed by local authorities has been 
generally regarded as a recognition of a formal link forged between guardianship and 
social work, in that social workers (as mental welfare officers) were given responsibilities
Kathleen Jones in a personal communication confirmed that this was the Commission’s basic 
assumption.
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to make applications for guardianship and would be expected to act as de facto guardians 
by delegated responsibility from medical officers of health.
Only one contemporary journal article concerned itself with the social work aspect of the 
change in legislation, considering increased local authority responsibilities through the 
extended guardianship approach, but even here the role of social workers as de facto 
guardians is not explicitly alluded to. This single reference to guardianship by Heap said 
that:
"The general duties of preventive social work [including] the supervision (sic) of 
patients under guardianship are not new...but this type of work may be very 
greatly increased under the new proposals whereby guardianship is to be extended 
to all classes of patients as may seem appropriate."
The article added:
"It is important to distinguish between compulsory detention in hospital and 
compulsory guardianship. The latter provision, which can be applied to any of 
the three categories of patients (mentally handicapped, psychopaths and mentally 
ill) raises the question of the introduction of compulsion into social work. One 
might question whether or not compulsion can in fact be applied in this way 
without some sort of sanction. The probation officer has the sanction of the court 
and of the prison behind him. Is the mental hospital to be the sanction behind the 
mental welfare officer or the psychiatric social worker? One would think the 
Royal Commission does not intend this, yet otherwise what meaning can the 
measure have? Again, how would such arrangements affect the casework 
relationship with casework techniques. This might be usefully considered with 
reference to the experience of the workers already in the field (sic)..." (This 
writer’s emphasis).(60)
Passage of the Bill in Parliament
Guardianship was not debated during the passage of the Bill through either House of 
Parliament but received some attention in the Standing Committee where Dr Donald 
Johnson (Member for Carlisle) argued that the inclusion of mental illness as a category 
within guardianship was open to abuse. He thought that the definition of mental illness 
was too wide and that people who were eccentric rather than mentally ill would be liable 
to be drawn into this provision by people who wanted to obtain their property and sought 
to control them. He said that there was:
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"An incentive to unscrupulous people to take action in which...they may gain 
power over relatives of inconvenient people".
In response, the then Minister of Health, Derek Walker-Smith, claimed that there were 
adequate safeguards to prevent such abuse, namely the same stringent definition and 
criteria arrived at for hospital admissions and the scope for appeal to the Mental Health 
Review Tribunal. He went on to say that there was already:
"Some provision for the equivalent of Guardianship under the present law: and it 
is capable, I think, of useful expansion in the future, in particular in these two 
ways:
1. To prevent people needing to become inpatients who could be outpatients 
or day patients instead, or because they would be living with somebody 
who would be able to exercise a general control over their living 
conditions and so on;
2. (a) After care for patients who have not yet been fully rehabilitated;
and for
(b) Chronic patients [unable to be further helped by hospital treatment 
who] could live in the community if, but only if, he (sic) is under some 
appropriate degree of control over his general living conditions".
For these groups, the Minister thought, Guardianship was "tailor made".(61)
The Mental Health Act. 1959
This section of the Review deals with the Act itself, the Memorandum of Guidance which 
accompanied the Act, and to the regulations governing guardianship issued by Statutory 
Instrument No 1241 in 1960.
The main section of the Act relating to Guardianship of the Person are Section 33 and 
34 which laid down procedures and grounds for reception into guardianship.
Section 33(2) says that:
"A guardianship application may be made in respect of a patient on the grounds:
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(a) that he is suffering from mental disorder... [specifically mental illness or 
severe subnormality]...and that his disorder is of a nature or degree which 
warrants the reception of the patient into guardianship under this section; and
(b) that it is necessary in the interests of the patient or for the protection of 
other persons that the patient should be so received."
Section 34 (1):
’’conferred on the authority or person therein named as guardian, to the exclusion 
of any other person, all such powers as would be exercisable by them or him in 
relation to the patient if they or he were the father of the patient and the patient 
were under the age of fourteen years. ”
The 1960 Memorandum of Guidance gives clear and articulate expression to the scope 
and intention behind the new guardianship framework specified under Section 33 of the 
Act, and the following brief notes indicate the areas covered. Section numbers of the 
Memorandum are referred to in the left hand margin:
(74) The new guardianship replaces guardianship under the Mental Deficiency 
Act and:-
’’may also be used as a form of control over mentally ill patients 
who do not need to be in hospital" (replacing single patient and 
boarding out arrangements).
(75) Guardianship should be unnecessary "in almost all cases" as services and 
help from family and the local authority should be sufficient. 
Furthermore,
"placing a patient under guardianship does not confer extra powers 
to provide services...it merely (sic) provides powers of 
control...necessary in a small minority of cases for the sake of 
their own welfare or for protection of others."
(76) "The powers of guardians are... .equivalent to the powers of a father over 
a child under the age of 14"
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(81) The local authority will have "duties of visitation and supervision" and 
remains responsible for this wherever the patient resides while under the 
guardianship.
"When the guardian is a private individual it will no doubt be usual 
for the patient to live with or near him, but if the patient resides 
temporarily or permanently in another area, eg. in residential 
employment, the responsible local health authority is the authority 
in whose area the guardian resides."
(83) "The Minister does not think it necessary or appropriate, in present
conditions, to specify such prohibitions as mechanical restraint or 
corporal punishment [prescribed under mental deficiency laws]. 
He expects local authorities to satisfy themselves that for [private] 
guardians - no less than the person put in charge of patients - who 
are directly under the authority’s own care, whether under 
guardianship or not - are persons who understand the need always 
to bear in mind the special disabilities and special needs of...a 
mental patient placed in their care and who will look after the 
patient with proper knowledge and sympathy".
Also guardians had a "positive duty to act as a good parent would do" and 
particularly:
"To promote the patient’s physical or mental health and to provide 
for his occupation, training or employment and general welfare and 
recreation, in a manner suitable to the individual patient".
The Mental Health (Hospital and Guardianship) Regulations, 1960, refer 
among other things to "General powers and duties of guardians" at Section 6 in 
the following terms
"(1) The guardian shall, so far as is practicable, make arrangements for the 
occupation, training or employment of the patient and for his recreation 
and general welfare and shall ensure that everything practicable is done for 
the promotion of his physical and mental health.
(2) ...the guardian may restrict to such extent as he thinks necessary the 
making of visits to the patient and may prohibit visits by any person who 
the guardian has reason to believe may have an adverse effect on the 
patient.
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(3) Nothing in this regulation shall operate to restrict the visits of any person 
authorised on their behalf by the responsible local health authority or the 
Minister."
THE GOVERNMENT’S REVIEW OF THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT. 1959
This part of the literative review considers the 1976 Green Paper, the responses by 
BASW, MIND, the Butler Committee and the Royal College of Psychiatrists; the 1978 
White Paper ‘Review of the Mental Health Act 1959’ and the 1981 White Paper.
Apart from some discussion of the inappropriateness of statutory guardianship for some 
groups of people with mental handicap, the literature is silent between 1959 and 1976 on 
the subject of possible changes in law or practice in guardianship which would affect the 
situation of mentally ill people. With numbers around 20 mentally ill people per annum, 
it is surprising not to find comment indicating a ‘failure’ of the measure for this care 
group or the need for constructive practice guidance on its use. No Code of Practice 
followed the 1959 Act and the professional literature seemed not to see a need to make 
up for its absence.
The overwhelming consideration in the Government’s decision to review the legislation 
was concern over civil liberties and possibilities of abuse under existing powers. 
However, none of the recorded concerns related specifically to guardianship.
The 1976 Green Paper makes no specific comment on guardianship for mentally ill 
people and only discusses guardianship in general terms in a brief six paragraph chapter 
(No. 5). The Review, after pointing out that the number of guardianship cases has 
decreased considerably and steadily since 1959, points out that:
"Guardianship provides the only effective form of control for those mentally 
disordered adults in the community for whom some form of compulsory powers 
are required... [and offers] a useful half-way measure between detention in hospital 
and complete freedom in the community. "(62)
The Review felt it was important to ascertain the reasons for limited use of guardianship 
before following the Royal College of Psychiatrists, MIND and the Butler Committee in 
recommending greater usage for the future.
115
In many ways the response of BASW to the White Paper, Mental Health Crisis Services 
- A New Philosophy(63), obscured its thinking on guardianship by its arguments for the 
introduction of ‘community care orders’ (CCOs), intended "to provide care within the 
community for use when the individual person refuses or is unable to agree with the 
recommendation that he is in need of such care", without at the same time being clear 
as to the need for guardianship to continue to parallel with the CCO. At one point 
(Section 4.2) the CCO is claimed "to a large extent supersede the existing powers under 
Guardianship" whilst elsewhere (Section 19.3) it is said that "even if CCOs were 
introduced we think it would be necessary to retain Guardianship".
BASW made recommendations for modifications of guardianship (which might be 
presumed to mean that they saw a continuing role for it in addition to CCOs), but their 
recommendations that guardianship needed "simplifying in terms of streamlining its 
administration so that it is locally based and easily accessible and accountable to the 
patient and interested parties" is unspecific and imprecise.
The main differences between the proposed CCO and guardianship would seem to have 
been as follows
1. The CCO is seen strictly speaking as an alternative form of care to hospital 
care, whereas guardianship can continue whilst a person is in hospital and, 
indeed, a guardian could be instrumental in facilitating hospital care as part 
of his or her role.
2. The compulsory element and the responsibility for exercising it would 
reside with the local authority in a much more explicit way than with 
guardianship, in that a social worker would have responsibility for deciding 
whether a CCO was appropriate or not, exercising the necessary 
compulsion; and, in carrying through the order. The social worker would 
"have power to commit his authority to act as care agent..." and the local 
authority’s responsibility would be "to provide treatment, care and control 
for a person subject to a CCO".
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3. The compulsory powers are exercised by social workers who would be 
"approved", i.e. not only authorised as qualified to exercise their powers 
(as was basically to be the rationale for the introduction of ASWs under 
the 1983 Act), but carrying a level of responsibility on behalf of the local 
authority, comparable to that of a medical practitioner in relation to health 
service facilities for hospital admissions, which would give them access as 
of right to social services facilities.
In other respects there were obvious similarities between CCOs and guardianship and 
BASW refer to the powers under CCOs as including:
"To determine the place of residence, require attendance at specified places for 
specified purposes, and require that persons receive visits at this residence or 
elsewhere."
CCOs were described by BASW in a way as to suggest that they were mainly considering 
the needs of mentally ill people, having said (Section 7) that people with mental handicap 
should be excluded from the operation of the Mental Health Act. They argued 
(curiously) that since "the present powers of guardianship are rarely used, we can see 
little purpose in retaining them for the mentally handicapped" (ignoring the fact that most 
usage of guardianship at that time related to people with mental handicap). BASW 
argued that preferable arrangements for people with mental handicap would be "some 
form of non-statutory guardianship provision with the accent on advice and guidance 
rather than compulsion". The guardian "should be independent of any person or agency 
which is professionally involved with the mentally handicapped person" along the lines 
advocated by the (then) National Association for Mentally Handicapped Children,(63) and 
more specifically by Mason.(64) The BASW paper did not explain whether this non- 
statutory guardianship could also serve the needs of people with mental illness or whether 
it was assumed that the latter already received voluntary and informal kinds of 
guardianship.
If statutory guardianship for people with mental handicap had been removed from the 
Mental Health Act, this would have left both a (revised) guardianship and CCOs to run
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in parallel to meet the needs of people with mental illness with an indistinct difference 
between the way these two forms of statutory provision would meet clients’ needs. 
However, whilst it can be said that these proposals did not assist in clarifying the 
guardianship concept or in furthering its use, BASW’s views seems to have stimulated 
thought around the need for guardianship measures. Possibly, this is because their 
approach emphasised the following important arguments which advocated
"Concentrating resources upon the individual and his living group rather 
than upon hospital based-services."
"Developing a legislation which aims at relieving the stress within the 
living situation rather than concentrating upon removing the individual to 
hospital."
"Recognising that alternatives to compulsory hospital admission are to a 
certain extent dependent upon the provision of appropriate facilities and 
services."
"The importance of searching for alternatives to compulsory admission, 
and of making an assessment of the ability of the family or the community 
to cope with the patient at home."
"Care for a patient [should be provided] in the least restrictive conditions 
possible and within their own living environment."
BASW considered that developments of mental health services and changes in the 
legislative framework should be looked at together and their comments on the White 
Paper therefore also included a critique of Better Services concluding that "the overall 
aims should be to promote a system which stresses ‘growth and development’ rather than 
‘illness and treatment’."(66)
The Report of the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, 1975(67) was 
mainly considering Guardianship from the point of view of use by the courts for offender 
patients. They compared guardianship with probation orders in terms of their 
effectiveness and concluded:
"Guardianship orders impose certain obligations which are not involved in 
psychiatric probation orders, and they are imposed compulsorily whereas 
probation orders are accepted by the offender on a voluntary basis. Guardianship
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is a valuable form of disposal which is at present very little used...explained in 
part by general lack of understanding of what is involved...[and also by] 
reluctance of the social services departments to accept the addition to their already 
substantial burden of the heavy demands that the law makes in these 
cases...[However] as regards the comparison with the probation order there is an 
important difference between the effect of the two orders. The probation officer 
can bring back to court an offender under his supervision who does not cooperate, 
but with the adult under guardianship there is no sanction for breach of the 
order."
Representation from MIND, associated with a campaign for the enhancement of civil 
rights within revised mental health legislation, expressed crticism of the position taken 
by BASW in advocating a wider range of powers to provide care in the community.
However, Gostin, at that time legal adviser to MIND, has offered two important but 
rather different views of guardianship. In 1977, he was writing that: -
"Guardianship is a powerful tool, which can be a viable and effective alternative 
to hospital admissions. It would obviate some of the need for expanding tribunal 
powers.. .a use of guardianship orders which is in practice quite rare. They could 
in many more instances be a viable and beneficial alternative to admission for 
treatment, and should be used more frequently by the medical profession (sic) as 
a means of assuring community-based treatment. ”(68)
On the other hand, by 1983, Gostin had decided that guardianship of the person (as 
distinct from guardianship of the estate) needed to contain two distinct elements:-
1. "[recognition of the fact of] incompetency of an individual to make certain 
decisions"; and
2. "the authority delegated to another person to make decisions on behalf of 
the Ward."
Notably, however, Gostin goes on from this latter analysis to argue for the introduction 
of limited forms of guardianship in which the extent of the client’s capacities are valued 
and weighed against the need to act on his/her behalf. He also argues strongly for the 
introduction of facilitative guardianship which would place on the guardian:-
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"positive duties to support, assist and encourage the patient towards greater 
independence ".(69)
The wider significance of Gostin’s analysis is in support of a proposal for combining 
guardianship of the person with guardianship of the estate.
Representation from the Royal College of Psychiatrists as part of their formal response 
to the Review of the Mental Health Act, 1959, looked at the Act section-by-section and 
observed of guardianship that it has:
"rarely been used in relation to mental disorder by the Local Authorities...[and 
we note that] there is uncertainty at the moment as to who will be responsible for 
making the recommendation for Guardianship [- health or social services... 
Nevertheless...] the need for Guardianship will increase and [we] therefore 
recommend retention of these Sections [of the Act] ”(70).
The College did not support the setting up of a parallel scheme of advocacy or ‘patients’ 
advisers’.
THE 1978 WHITE PAPER<71>
This White Paper contained a ‘green’ element at Chapter 4 where some far-reaching 
considerations regarding guardianship and compulsory powers in the community were 
discussed. The Government looked at the views of MIND, the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, the Butler Committee and in particular at the above mentioned views of 
BASW in favour of introducing CCOs. The Government was impressed by BASW’s 
argument that it is "undesirable to admit people to hospital simply because of a lack of 
services in the community" and that in the absence of appropriate compulsory powers in 
the community "persons needing care and control may be faced with perhaps unnecessary 
detention in a hospital". On the other hand they raised the familiar question about the 
sufficiency of "sanctions in the event of the patient’s failure to comply with the 
requirements laid on him" and questioned whether "social services staff might be 
unwilling to take on the responsibilities involved in new compulsory powers, or might 
be unable to take on the burden of extra commitments".
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The White Paper also expressed concern about ‘net widening’, i.e. the possibility of more 
people being subject to compulsory powers through the introduction of CCOs, and 
doubted whether doctors would be happy with social workers exercising such powers in 
respect of people who, the doctors might argue, would probably be more appropriately 
admitted to hospital in any case. Partly countering their own arguments, they thought 
that social services’ reluctance to take up the use of guardianship would effectively 
prevent any significant increase in use of compulsory powers generally and also 
acknowledged that "the lack of an effective sanction can be said to apply to most forms 
of compulsory detention in hospital at present, particularly where open door policies are 
fully operative". The White Paper’s proposals were the now famous "three main 
options", which were really five options of which only three were seriously considered. 
The five options were as follows:
1. Guardianship in a Revised Form (Sections 4.14 and 4.15)
The White Paper considered that one of the reasons for comparative lack of use 
of guardianship was a view that the powers of the guardian were too wide, to the 
extent possibly of including a ban on marriage and of being unable to make a 
valid legal contract. Most of all, however, the White Paper felt that the ‘parental’ 
powers were out of place and inappropriate other than for severely mentally 
handicapped people who need total protection ("where there is a need to protect 
the individual from neglect and exploitation and to make more, if not all, of his 
decisions"). In short, guardianship had failed to be used for the mentally 
disordered in general (but particularly the mentally ill) as "a real alternative to 
detention in hospital" for these reasons - see option (4) below.
As far as the White Paper was concerned, the excessive breadth of the powers 
were encapsulated in the phrase "necessary in the interests o f the patient or for the 
protection of other persons" and the formula "patient’s welfare" was put forward 
as an alternative. Other changes proposed were to reduce the periods of 
guardianship in line with those of admission to hospital for treatment under 
Section 26 of the 1959 Act - i.e. to six months.
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The White Paper said that: "the Guardian would continue to have power to 
consent to treatment on the patient’s behalf”, a surprising statement considering 
the disputed nature of this power - but see the White Paper proposal and the 
essential powers’ approach outlined below.
2. Community Care Orders.
This proposal, as outlined in the BASW document, was for "a range of 
community care orders paralleling compulsory hospital powers" in which the 
Government were interested particularly as means of avoiding unnecessary 
hospital admissions. However, the 1978 White Paper’s response was that:-
"...the extent of control which community care orders will entail is so 
wide that this option might well suffer from the same disadvantages as 
Guardianship has in the past". (Section 4.16)
3. The ‘Essential Powers’ Approach: Introduction o f *New Specific Powers’
This option would limit "restricting the liberty of the individual only to the extent 
necessary to ensure that various forms of medical treatment, social support, 
training or occupation are undertaken", i.e. powers:-
i. To require residence in a specified place;
ii. To require attendance at specified places for treatment, occupation 
or training;
iii. To require access to be given to a particular person (for instance 
a doctor or a social worker) in the patient’s home or elsewhere. 
(Section 4.17).
The White Paper left it as an open question (Section 4.18) as to whether it was 
"desirable to have a power to impose treatment on people subject to such an order
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under the same arrangements as those for people detained compulsorily in 
hospital".
4. The co-existence o f the Essential Powers and Traditional
Guardianship arrangements,
This would involve the availability of "two different powers for two different 
groups of people", namely: guardianship for those with "little or no 
understanding, empowering guardians to consent to or refuse treatment, arrange 
admission to hospital etc. where necessary on his behalf"; while the ‘Essential 
Powers’ would, by implication, deal with mentally ill people and those with some 
understanding who yet needed a framework of control which would minimally 
consist of the three powers referred to above. (Section 4.20)
The significance of this suggestion in the White Paper was that it was in practice 
suggesting a two-tier approach to guardianship: plenary or total guardianship for 
those whose overall life style required supervision and control, and a form of 
limited guardianship for those who did not require complete control. 
By implication, the latter would be people suffering from mental illness.
5. CCOs and Guardianship coexisting
It is not clear whether it would have been practicable or desirable for these two 
forms of order to coexist since the scope of the powers was broadly similar and 
the CCO was not the equivalent to limited guardianship in the same way as the 
essential powers would have been. The advantage of the two coexisting was said 
to be to provide "flexibility". (Section 4.20)
The White Paper also raised again the issue discussed by the Royal Commission of the 
need for a short term emergency guardianship order and suggested that it could still be 
introduced. However it rejected again the Royal Commission’s proposal that local 
authorities should have a duty to assume the responsibility of guardianship "whenever 
there are no other suitable guardians", considering that local authorities "must be free to
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assess the desirability of their assuming compulsory powers in the light of their 
knowledge of each individual case" and proposed no change (see comments on this Royal 
Commission recommendation in the BASW document).
Contrary to the Royal Commission’s actual choice of words about the relationship 
between guardianship and supervision, the 1978 White Paper says (Section 4.11) "The 
Royal Commission saw [compulsory supervision in the community] as one of the 
appropriate uses of guardianship" and announced the Government’s view at that stage as 
seeking "a single power for compulsory supervision intended to prevent unnecessary 
admission to hospital and for compulsory after care following discharge from hospital".
Elsewhere (Section 4.9), the 1978 White Paper asserts that the Commission had hoped 
that guardianship would be considered "as a way of reducing unwillingness to accept help 
and as a way of providing supervision, guidance and control which would be a real 
alternative to detention in hospital".
Under the heading ‘Practice since 1959’, at Section 4.7, the 1978 White Paper says that:-
"The use of guardianship powers has declined steadily since their introduction and 
practice varies considerably between local authorities. The Royal Commission 
expected that as community psychiatric services developed, guardianship would 
become more frequent but this hope has not been borne out. Nor has their hope 
that guardianship would be used for the mentally ill and psychopaths. In practice, 
guardianship has been used predominantly for the mentally handicapped and the 
severely mentally handicapped and only rarely for the mentally ill."
This statement is problematic in a number of ways. The first sentence implies that 
guardianship powers were introduced in the Mental Health Act, 1959, whereas modem 
statutory guardianship dates from 1913 (for mentally handicapped people); and the 
predominant use for this group, though diminishing, dates from the 1920s and 1930s. 
By comparison, use for mentally ill people is small, but has been (and is) increasing 
as a percentage of use as between mental illness and mental handicap since 1959. 
(See Appendix B).
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1981 WHITE PAPER<72>
The 1981 White Paper said that guardianship was intended for:-
" A very small number of mentally disordered people who do not require treatment 
in hospital, either informally or formally, [but] nevertheless need close supervision 
and some control in the community as a consequence of their mental disorder. 
These include people who are able to cope provided that they take their 
medication regularly, but fail to do so, and those who neglect themselves to the 
point of seriously endangering their health."
The White Paper does not make plain whether the mentally disordered people referred 
to are mainly those with mental illness but this seems to be confirmed by their further 
assertion that existing powers:
"[i.e. those of] a father over a child under 14.. .are very wide as well as somewhat 
ill defined, and out of keeping, in their paternalistic approach, with modem 
attitudes to the care of the mentally disordered".
Also suggestive of a focus on mental illness is reference to people who "fail to take their 
medication regularly", and the 1981 White Paper identifies the essential powers approach 
(the third option identified by the 1976 White Paper) as including the power to ensure 
that the person on guardianship "receives medical treatment...." However, without 
further reference to the ‘open question’ left in the 1976 White Paper as to the desirability 
of imposing treatment on those under guardianship, the 1981 White Paper announces in 
Section 45 that:-
"One of the effects of the proposed change in guardianship powers [towards 
option 3, the essential powers approach] is that the guardian will clearly not (sic) 
have implicit power to consent to treatment on behalf of the patient."
The 1981 White Paper acknowledged the wide range of responses to the 1978 White 
Paper proposals but stated that the view most widely supported was that "guardianship 
powers should be retained, but...the guardian should have only the ‘essential powers’ 
rather than all the powers of a father over a child under 14 has at present." The essential 
powers were identified as the:
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(a) power to require the patient to live at a place specified by the guardian;
(b) power to require the patient to attend places specified by the guardian for
medical treatment, occupational training;
(c) power to ensure the doctor, social work or other person specified by the
guardian can see the patient at his home.
The 1981 White Paper also adopted the change of wording in the criteria suggested by 
the 1978 White Paper, substituting "in the interests of the welfare of the patient" in place 
of "in the interests of the patient" as "this will clarify (sic) the purpose of guardianship 
and ensure that the power is not so wide".
Finally, the 1981 White Paper, in summarising the main improvements which would be 
achieved by the impending Bill, refers to guardianship thus:
"Guardianship powers are made to fit current good practice" (page 2)
Notably, however, there is no indication of: (a) what constitutes good practice; (b) the 
connection between the statutory procedures and the facilitation (or otherwise) of good 
practice; or (c) the identification of the practitioners referred to, as between social 
services managers, social workers, general practitioners, consultant psychiatrists or 
others.
The Passage of the Bill in Parliament
As with the 1959 Act, it was only at the Committee stage that issues related to 
guardianship received attention. In their discussion of Clause 7, the Special Standing 
Committee(73) were addressed by Mr Terry Davies who proposed that the guardianship 
arrangements provided for under Clause 7 should be supplemented by a 28-day 
guardianship order. He maintained:
"The suggestion was put forward by the British Association of Social Workers. 
It would make possible short-term Guardianship where the facilities are available 
and, in a sense, it is a paving power".
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In response, the Minister, Mr Kenneth Clarke, voiced his interpretation of BASW’s 
proposals as follows:
"During the relatively restricted period [of 28 days] the guardian - either the local 
authority or someone nominated - will be able to direct a person to various places 
of residence...particularly...to go to a crisis intervention centre rather than to a 
hospital. That would be a startling change in the nature of Guardianship 
compared with that contemplated before and would perhaps not be an altogether 
welcome improvement.
Guardianship has always been regarded as a long-term arrangement to enable a 
patient suffering from mental impairment or mental illness to cope in the 
community".
The Minister added that he saw the traditional role for guardianship as providing 
protection against exploitation, and considered the new proposal as a restriction on 
peoples’ civil liberties. In any case, the notion that crisis intervention centres could 
provide alternative care on a compulsory basis seemed to him unrealistic, as there was 
no evidence of them being able or willing to function in this way. The move was "going 
in the opposite direction to the Bill" and would add to the amount of compulsion being 
used rather than to limit it. Even though the Royal Commission, the 1978 White Paper 
and BASW had supported such a proposal, in fact their intentions varied; there were 
inconsistencies between them, and the BASW current proposals were unrealistic and 
unsupported by others, including MIND.
Terry Davies counter-argued that the measure should be viewed as an experiment in 
providing a flexible alternative to hospital care, one of the original objectives of 
guardianship as defined by the 1959 Act. The Minister retorted that the short-term power 
was open to abuse by relatives, doctors and social workers. He was opposed to the idea 
of a ‘cooling off period in which the patient was placed in a hostel or in some other 
setting as an alternative to hospital admission and the notion of flexibility did not appeal 
to him. Even if the measure was renamed a ‘community care order’ (with or without 
some of the definitions offered by BASW of CCOs), the Minister saw no greater virtue.
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In short the Minister articulated the prevailing ethos, namely that changes in the mental 
health legislation should be seen to identify clearly with enhancement of civil liberties and 
firm intentions to reduce aspects of compulsory care and treatment which unduly 
restricted civil liberties. He therefore chose to view the 28-day proposal as a form of 
‘net-widening’, i.e. additional compulsion being invoked rather than a different or 
alternative form of intervention.
The Mental Health (Amendment) Act. 1982
The review of the 1959 Act culminated in amending legislation. This provided for 
Guardianship in terms explicitly linked back to those of the 1959 Act (the principal Act), 
but redefined guardianship grounds and powers as the revised ‘essential’ minimum 
necessary. The wording is otherwise identical to the 1983 Act (see Statutory Definition, 
pages 27/28).
GUARDIANSHIP UNDER THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT, 1983
Introduction
The remaining material in this chapter refers to contemporary guardianship law under 
Sections 7 and 8 of the Act and the Memorandum of Guidance and is complementary to 
the statutory definition offered from page 27 onwards as applicable to people with mental 
illness. After discussing the Act and the Memorandum of Guidance, main attention is 
given to the various Codes of Practice and to the Biennial Reports from the Mental 
Health Act Commission. The most recent of these latter (1989/91) is judged to provide 
authoritative contemporary comment.
Mental Health Act. 1983 Sections 7/8
Sections 7/8 of the Mental Health Act 1983 followed the terms of the previous interim 
legislation, the Mental Health (Amendment) Act, 1982 and are regarded as essential 
reference points for social workers making decisions about the use of guardianship. For 
instance, the latest Code of Practice specifically enjoins practitioners to eliminate the use 
of guardianship from their thinking if one or more of the three powers referred to in
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Section 8(1) are not required. The following concentrates on key aspects of the Act,
i.e. criteria for use of guardianship powers, such as they are.
Section 7 says that guardianship is applicable to people with mental illness over the age 
of 16 provided the "mental disorder is of a nature or degree which warrants his (sic) 
reception into Guardianship...."; and that "it is necessary in the interests of the welfare 
of the patient or for the protection of other persons...."Two medical recommendations 
are required and the guardian may either be social services or a private guardian, 
provided social services accept the guardianship on behalf of that person. Section 8 
contains the three ‘essential powers’: the residential requirement; the attendance
requirement; and the access requirement. Section 8(4) effectively provides the nearest 
relative with a veto on a guardianship application and requires social services to consult 
him or her unless this is impracticable.
Making a comparison between guardianship arrangements for mentally ill people under 
the 1959 Act and the 1983 Act, enables us to say that the 1983 Act:
Reduced the periods over which the order is in force from 12 months to 
6 months with pro rata changes in the renewal provisions.
Done away with the age limits apropos persons suffering from 
"psychopathic disorder or subnormality".
Changed the criteria from "necessary in the interests of the patient" to 
"necessary in the interests of the welfare of the patient".
Narrowed the scope of the guardians’ powers, though without indicating 
how a guardian would go about enforcing these powers.
Increased the lower age limit of applicability from 14 to 16 so that there 
is no longer any overlap between child care legislation and mental health 
legislation.
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The 1983 Memorandum of Guidance, an official pronouncement on guardianship and a 
key reference point for social workers in making decisions, is quoted extensively on 
pages 28/29. The Memorandum reverts to earlier normative language in saying that 
guardianship is suitable only for "a small minority of...mentally disordered persons...to 
enable relatives or social workers...to manage [to provide care] in his (sic) own home or 
in a hostel, where the alternative would be admission to hospital". Apparently 
anticipating discussion about the connection between guardianship and consent to 
treatment, the Memorandum goes on to say that:
"the purpose of Guardianship is therefore primarily to ensure that the patient 
receives care and protection rather than medical treatment, although the Guardian 
does have powers to require the patient to attend for medical treatment (but not 
to make him accept treatment)". (Section 45)
Of the essential powers, the Memorandum comments that the residential requirement 
could "be used to discourage the patient from sleeping rough or living with people who 
may exploit or mistreat him, or to ensure that he resides in a particular hostel or other 
facility”. Of the access requirement, the Memorandum explains that this is available "to 
any doctor, approved social worker, or other person specified by the Guardian ... [in 
order] for example, to ensure that the patient did not neglect himself". Although the 
client cannot be prevented from leaving his place of residence within the terms of a 
guardianship order, "he may be taken into custody and returned within 28 days of 
leaving" these premises (Section 138 of the Act).
Of the credentials of a guardian (i.e. of a private guardian explicitly, but by inference 
anyone acting as de facto guardian) the Memorandum says that this should be:
"a person who can appreciate the special disabilities and needs of a mentally 
disordered person and who will look after the patient in an appropriate and 
sympathetic way. A Guardian should display an interest in promoting the 
patient’s physical and mental health and in providing for his occupation, training, 
employment, recreation and general welfare in a suitable way." (Section 48)
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There are two surprising and interesting elements in these notes, namely the comments 
in Sections 43 and 48.
In Section 43 there is a reversal of approach to a reiteration of the position that the 
"control of guardianship" should generally not be necessary, as if to imply again that 
guardianship is a last resort or an admission of failure. Also in the last line of this 
section is the reference to guardianship as an alternative to hospital, a highly questionable 
assumption, given the definition discussion, on pages 48 to 54. This is confirmed 
elsewhere in the regulations, in the same way as was the case for the 1959 Act, where 
it is said (Section 91) that patients under guardianship may be admitted to hospital. 
Guardianship can remain in force whilst a patient is admitted under Sections 2 or 4 but 
does not remain in force when the patient is admitted under Section 3 for treatment 
(Section 6(4)).
Section 48 of the Memorandum gives some insight into how the guardian as a person 
with specific attributes is regarded, although it is notable that despite the apparent change 
in style brought about by the move to limited guardianship and away from total 
guardianship, the kind of response expected from the guardian himself or herself retains 
a good deal of the paternalistic values/attitudes that one might have expected from 
guardians operating under the old model.
THE CODES OF PRACTICE, 1985-1993*
Four attempts have been made to provide a Code of Practice regarding the 
implementation of the Mental Health Act, 1983: the 1985 draft prepared by the Mental 
Health Act Commission; the 1987 draft prepared by the Department of Health; the 1989 
revised draft provided by the Department of Health together with a steering group drawn 
from representatives of the professions and other interested parties; and the finalised 
version of this document published as the 1990 Code of Practice. In view of the long 
time lag between the first draft and the final publication, it is assumed (with some 
verification from scrutiny of committee papers of individual social services departments)
A revision of the 1990 code has recently (June 1993) been produced by the Department of Health, but 
is unchanged in respect of guidance on Guardianship.
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that each draft was studied and used as a de facto code on an interim basis to varying 
degrees by social services in general and ASWs in particular.* For this reason, each 
draft is referred to below for its particular features with regard to guardianship.
The 1985 Code
By far the most expansive and descriptive of the four versions, the Mental Health Act 
Commission’s draft sought to create an imaginative profile of guardianship, its uses and 
ways of developing the concept professionally and organisationally.
In terms of concept, the Code offers no less than six definitions of guardianship, as 
follows:
1. Section 3.3 Synopsis: "Guardianship is the least restrictive [and most 
humane] mode of compulsion with the minimum imposition on patients."
2. Section 3.2 (ii): "A degree of real authority to supervise and control but 
at a level less restrictive than that available in hospital."
3. Section 3.5 (i): "Either the immediate alternative to admission or the mode 
of transfer to the patient detained in hospital who shows stable improvement but 
still needs some degree of control; or to provide some degree of supervised care 
and protection of patients."
4. Section 3.6 (ii): "A means to promote the welfare of the patient by 
providing such physical, social, emotional recreational and spiritual conditions as 
are conducive to his well being."
5. Section 3.8 (ii): "[An arrangement conferring on] the Guardian a
particular responsibility to motivate, persuade and encourage the patient to 
participate in the plan of treatment and to accept the treatment prescribed by the 
doctor."
6. Section 3.10 (v): "A subtle mixture of compulsion, persuasion and freely 
agreed co-operation [between Guardian and Client]", the nature of which the Code 
of Practice does not explain.
It has to be borne in mind that the codes are intended to guide all professional groups involved in 
implementing the Act - not just social workers.
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The Code provides criteria for the ‘success’ of guardianship but does not define the end 
product or ultimate objective in a way which would clarify whether success has been 
realised or not. The Code says that "the success of Guardianship depends on at least 
seven factors":
1. "The competent and willing guardian".
2. "Professional support and advice for the guardian as necessary"
3. "An acceptable place of residence for the patient which facilitates care and
treatment, and ensures the protection of others".
4. "The services for day care, for education, training and occupation 
accessible to the patient".
5. "A mutually-co-operative relationship between the patient, the approved 
social worker, the nominated medical attendant or responsible medical officer, the 
nurses in the community, and the guardian and the persons responsible for the day 
to day needs and care of the patient".
6. "An endorsement of the arrangement by all concerned for the welfare of 
the patient, and, where appropriate, the support of the patient’s family and 
relatives.
7. "The patient’s condition being such that care in the community is the most
appropriate arrangement".
The Code does not refer directly to the amount/quantity of guardianship usage, nor to the 
idea that the present amount of usage is insufficient. Instead the Code refers to positive 
benefits which would be gained by "an increase in the use of guardianship" as follows
"A committed interest by professionals to provide good care in the 
community".
"An effective relationship between the National Health Service and the 
local authority Social Services departments at both the clinical and planning 
level..."
"...a willingness to take practicable steps to maintain and protect civil 
rights when considering the needs of patients".
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These comments are significant in their three respective references, viz.:
1. This is the first time that the use of guardianship has been equated with 
quality of care to clients per se.
2. The Code at this point demonstrates a willingness to bridge the gap 
between individual decision-making about guardianship and the stances and 
intentions of the respective statutory authorities, thereby implying the need for 
agency commitments or policies in the area of guardianship which are generally 
seen to be conspicuous by their absence.
3. The linking of the use of guardianship with the promotion of civil rights 
in this way contrasts with commentary in the UK and the USA suggesting that 
guardianship should be viewed as a threat to civil liberties - (see, for example, 
Mitchell(74)).
The idea of a promotional document on proper use of guardianship is advanced (Sections 
3.6.5) and its contents indicated as follows:
"The arrangements for considering applications; the criteria for acceptance by the 
local Social Services authority; the powers and duties of a guardian; the 
arrangements for maintaining contact during the department and the guardian and 
other persons responsible for the day-to-day care of the patients;
"The procedures for discharge, transfer and appeals; the arrangements for regular 
professional review of the circumstances of each particular person under 
guardianship including the plans for his care and control of medical treatment; the 
practices involved in the instruction and supervision of those who have day-to-day 
responsibility for caring for the person under guardianship; the criteria for places 
specified which a patient under guardianship can reside".
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The Code also says that local authority social services departments should devise "a plan 
of care and treatment for clients for whom guardianship is intended" (Section 3.10.1) 
which would include
suitable arrangements for day attendance for occupation or treatment;
clear arrangements for providing the guardian with access to the client;
provide a clear indication of specific medical treatments required;
clear understanding that medical treatment can only be provided by 
voluntary agreement in the absence of "legal authority to compel the 
patient to accept it". (Section 3.10 2/4)
By inference, discharge arrangements from guardianship should also be part of the plan, 
i.e. as "a positive act taken with regard to the patient’s condition and needs, [as distinct 
from] the consequence of merely allowing a guardianship order to run out".
The Code also offers a wider range of comment on the groups of clients for whom 
guardianship is "particularly appropriate", viz.:
for "old people with mental disorder [who] may be unable to live outside 
hospital .. .guardianship should be considered more frequently as treatment 
of choice...as a real option";
for young people over 16 leaving care of local authorities and (previously 
under child care legislation) " to provide a better means of meeting needs, 
particularly where [they] are liable to become homeless, exploited or a 
danger to others";
"...young offenders, when resident in hospital and treatment is not 
essential";
"brain damaged people presenting serious problems in care, thus providing 
for their care and for protection of others from their behavioural 
difficulties".
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Finally, the Code offers a view on the service-providing assumptions upon which 
guardianship might be expected to be based, to a pre-condition of "appropriate and 
adequate facilities and resources [being] available" (Section 3.1); while duties of local 
authorities are listed as including those of endeavouring to secure sufficient facilities and 
co-operation to enable those patients who would benefit from being received into 
guardianship to be thus received. Furthermore, in a section headed "rights conferred on 
a patient", the Code says that "guardianship confers on the patient the right to have his 
or her welfare maintained and promoted [by the local authority social services 
department]".
In other respects, the Code is largely a re-statement, somewhat expanded, of the Act 
itself and of the Memorandum of Guidance, in some instances changing the wording but 
without explaining the significance of these differences. This is particularly important 
in Section 3.8.1, which refers to the duties of a guardian (as ‘duties’ rather than 
‘powers’) listed as three ways of "ensuring that...” rather than as the three powers 
defined in the Act.
Seemingly the Code was at some stage intending to discuss more fully the role of social 
worker vis-a-vis guardianship but became involved in some internal dissension on the 
subject. This was concluded without further explanation by brief reference to the matter 
in a ‘side letter* to the Draft Code:-
"Is an individual social worker a desirable (sic) person to be appointed as 
guardian? The inference from the specific tasks of the guardian is that a social 
worker should act in support rather than at first hand” (this writer’s emphasis)
It can only be deduced from this comment that some members of the MHAC identified 
with arguments discussed in Chapter IV (pages 201/202) supporting the idea of the 
guardian as someone acting independently of the agencies concerned with service 
provision.
The 1987 Draft Code of Practice
This draft concentrated on making its observations as brief as possible and therefore 
followed the legislation more closely than the 1985 Code and without expansion.
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The main distinctive points made in the Code refer to powers of confining the person 
under guardianship within a place of residence, namely that:
"Guardianship does not allow detention of a patient in hospital or other 
accommodation. It may only be used for securing the admission of an unwilling 
person into Part III accommodation if this is part of an overall care and treatment 
plan for his mental disorder."
In relation to general guidance for the appropriate use of guardianship and possibilities 
for greater use, the Code reverts to the sentiments of the earlier draft by arguing that:
"...an approved social worker or any social worker...[should] be able to help a 
patient in the community without needing any particular powers under the Mental 
Health Act. Only if this is not possible over an extended period is it likely that 
guardianship may be necessary."
Guidance as to the significance or anticipated length of an 'extended period’ was not 
offered.
Finally, this Draft Code attempted to expand somewhat on the welfare criteria for the use 
of guardianship under the Act, viz.:
"In considering the patient’s welfare all factors which might affect the patient’s 
future well-being have to be taken into account to ensure the patient receives care 
and protection."
The 1987 Draft Code has a substantial section on ‘Monitoring’ but the content is largely 
related to a re-statement of the duties of local authorities to keep themselves informed 
about guardianship arrangements, particularly when these are being undertaken by a 
private guardian. No notion of a role for central Government, or any other over-arching 
body is seen for monitoring guardianship practice developments or to comment on 
changes in the pattern of guardianship usage.
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The 1989 Draft Code of Practice and the 1990 Code of Practice
The 1990 Code is substantially the same as the 1989 Draft Code and the two are 
discussed together below. It is the most up-to-date statement of recommended practice 
in operating statutory guardianship, and the most salient points in the 1990 Code are 
indicated below.
In the first place (Section 13.1), guardianship is here arguably viewed in two contrasting 
ways: both as "an authoritative framework"; and essentially as "part of the patient’s 
overall care and treatment plan". In the latter light, practitioners should view 
guardianship "as a positive alternative...to admission to hospital and continuing hospital 
care". Discussion about the appropriateness of guardianship should take place within a 
multi-disciplinary framework, making use of the case conference format unless time 
constraints preclude this.
Most important of all, the Code spells out the need for, and the nature of, 
"a comprehensive care plan...which identifies the services needed by the patient, 
including as necessary his care arrangements, appropriate accommodation, his treatment 
and personal support". The component parts of the plan are identified thus:
a. an acceptance of the authority of the guardian by the client;
b. the guardian’s advocacy role with regard to services required by the client;
c. local authority support to the guardian;
d. an appropriate place of residence;
e. access to appropriate day care facilities;
f. co-operation and communication between all those involved;
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g. commitment from those involved that care should take place in the
community.
The Code goes on to state the duties of social services departments, largely reiterating 
the legislative requirements, but also stressing the following
* arrangements to process applications should be undertaken speedily:
* progress of guardianship should be monitored (including maintaining 
detailed records and ensuring that a review takes places towards the end 
of the guardianship period);
* ensuring that guardianshp clients receive information on their rights, 
especially entitlement to apply to an MHRT;
* ensuring that guardianship orders are discharged rather than being allowed 
to lapse.
The Code emphasises that guardianship does not provide powers to forcibly detain or 
remove a person, so that if a client consistently declines to accept the guardian’s 
directions, this (in the view of the Code’s authors) indicates that guardianship is 
inappropriate.
Finally, the Code stresses that, whilst guardianship can operate legally whilst a person 
is in hospital (e.g. to receive treatment as an informal patient or to be detained under 
Sections 2 or 4), guardianship clients should not remain in hospital longer than is 
absolutely necessary in order to arrange another place of residence. While guardianship 
may have a part to play in providing the authority base for moving a person from hospital 
care into an alternative place of residence, such as a residential care home, it should not 
be used exclusively to facilitate transfer of unwilling persons. The question of whether 
a hospital patient under guardianship who was without a home address effectively resided 
in hospital as his or her ‘place of residence’ is not tackled.
139
THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT COMMISSION, THE BIENNIAL REPORTS 
(1983-1991) AND SPECIAL GUARDIANSHIP
The MHAC have a monitoring role related to persons subject to compulsory measures 
under the Mental Health Act. Their formal remit is confined to people placed in hospital 
care and does not extend to compulsory powers under guardianship for people cared for 
by local authority social services departments. On the other hand the MHAC were 
charged with providing the Secretary of State with the first draft Code of Practice on the 
1983 Act, and this included guidance in the use of guardianship.
Their position would therefore appear to be that they take an interest in use of 
guardianship in relationship to other compulsory powers under the Act, and indeed visit 
social services departments to discuss guardianship alongside other actions and practices 
involved in the running of an ASW service.
The MHAC are clear in their pronouncements about their lack of remit for existing 
guardianship arrangements but suggest that their responsibility towards guardianship 
would change with the introduction of'special*guardianship as this would, in their view, 
involve the admission and detention in hospital of persons under guardianship in order 
for treatment to be administered. The MHAC do not indicate whether they see 
themselves having a particular responsibility for guardianship clients who, for whatever 
reason, are presently in hospital - whether this involves compulsory treatment or not.
The MHAC do not maintain data on guardianship clients and therefore do not boast a
£comprehensive picture of numbers or types of guardianship clients. More surprisingly, 
the MHAC do not appear to be well briefed on the statistics on guardianship use, publicly 
available from the Department of Health, since at various points in their reports they 
refer to a small amount of guardianship use unsupported by the actual figures.
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MHAC have produced four Biennial Reports. Emphases haw* varied but consistent 
themes in respect of guardianship have been as follows:
1. Guardianship is being insufficiently used because of fears of social services 
managers about the demand on resources.
2. Guardianship is seen as ineffective particularly in the area of treatment but 
also in the absence of the power to convey patients to a required place of 
residence.
3. There are few resources in the community that could adequately be 
regarded as an alternative to hospital with or without use of guardianship.
4. Social services departments tend to create "internal procedural difficulties" 
which make guardianship procedures "unduly lengthy". (Second Biennial 
Report)
The Third Biennial Report (1987/1989) additionally discusses the relationship between 
guardianship and compulsory treatment in the community and the possible introduction 
of special guardianship or community treatment orders (CTOs). The whole issue of 
guardianship and consent to treatment is a difficult one which was obscured by the 1983 
changes. (These effectively outlawed compulsory treatment; arrangements under the 
1959 Act, though never tested in the courts, appeared to provide powers for compulsory 
treatment.) Potentially the most far reaching set of changes to affect community care of 
people with mental illness, the MHAC’s original (1986) draft paper Compulsory 
Treatment In The Community is contained in Appendix C in summary form.
Basically, the argument offered by the MHAC favoured the introduction of compulsory 
treatment in the community within the framework of guardianship to effectively create 
a fourth ‘essential’ power for certain clients. This view distinguished the MHAC’s 
position from that taken by the Royal College of Psychiatrists in their 1987 discussion 
paper on ‘Community Treatment Orders’, which made comparable proposals which 
would operate independently of any relationship with guardianship.
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The MHAC were particularly concerned about people whose mental health deteriorates 
outside hospital through failure to take medication. However, this proposed additional 
power would not provide an authority base for compulsory treatment outside hospital but 
merely a rationale for removing a person on guardianship from the community into 
hospital for the specific purpose of commencing or recommencing treatment. In other 
words, the Commission proposed different (less stringent) conditions for imposing 
compulsory treatment on a person entering hospital in these circumstances than the ones 
applied to people admitted on other compulsory orders. A clear parallel exists here 
between concern as to the likelihood of circumventing due processes which has been 
experienced in the USA, discussed in Chapter IV, page 195.
However, the Commission do not tackle the most important argument raised by 
Section III of their analysis, namely the rationale for the distinction between how 
treatment would be enforced in the community compared with how it is in practice 
enforced in hospitals. Possibly over-familiar with the legal distinctions formalised in the 
1959 and 1983 Acts, where compulsory powers are, on the whole, bound up with the role 
of the hospital, their paper seems to assume that totally different standards of patient 
freedom and self-determination must inevitably apply to anyone detained in hospital.
It would arguably therefore be essential before launching special guardianship to clarify 
for whom the three existing guardianship powers are in fact ‘essential’, in order first to 
answer the question: do the powers arrived at in the 1983 Act actually coincide with 
requirements of people for structured support in the community? It would otherwise be 
difficult to predict whether, and for whom, compulsory treatment in the community 
would become another ‘essential’ ingredient within a guardianship package.
Major hurdles on the way to launching special guardianship could include lack of 
available data on the pattern of use of ‘ordinary’ guardianship. Official recognition of 
a need for such an investigation dates back to the 1976 Green Paper (Section 5) but has 
so far not been acted upon. There is also a marked lack of monitoring of developments 
in Guardianship practice which could place the need for CTOs in context.
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Ordinary guardianship itself could be said to raise unresolved questions about the 
willingness and ability of social services to provide effective community care for those 
mentally ill people who do not need to be in hospital. Special guardianship, on the other 
hand, would introduce a new authority base for the viability of the order. Not only 
would medical recommendations have to be made to initiate the order, but medical 
authority would need to be invoked in order that the treatment programme could be 
maintained. Thus, the net effect of special guardianship would be to combine 
responsibilities of SSDs and DHAs. This could be viewed as a major break-through were 
it soundly based, but it is questionable whether the medical lobby would allow themselves 
to be placed in a subordinate position to the main authorising agency, i.e. social services. 
As Rhode has said:
"Guardianship puts the responsibility and power in the hands of local authority 
social workers, while the power and responsibility to prescribe medicines is in the 
hands of an NHS doctor. "(75)
The Third Biennial Report goes on to discuss the reception given to the MHAC 
discussion paper on compulsory treatment in the community and explains that a revised 
paper to be submitted to the Secretary of State would include reassurance that:
"non-compliance with medical treatment would not result in its forceful 
administration in the patient’s home. The patient would be re-admitted to 
hospital".
The Commission’s main recommendation to the Secretary of State was for the:
"creation of an enhanced form of Mental Health Act Guardianship, where the 
guardian in particular circumstances would have the power to require the patient 
to receive medication...accompanied by specific safeguards".
The Fourth Biennial Report (1989-91) continued to press for a power to convey patients 
under guardianship to hospital but adopted a more pessimistic stance as to the prospects 
of stimulating more active consideration of guardianship use:
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"...the statistics for Guardianship give the impression that it is little used [sic]. 
Few Departments have a written policy, and where they do, express continuing 
reservations about the usefulness and effectiveness of this provision in the Act. 
Many social workers feel that the three specific powers given by the Act to 
Guardians are unenforceable without the co-operation of the client, and there are 
no sanctions for non-compliance. They argue that if clients are willing to co­
operate, Guardianship is not necessary, or may indeed be an unethical restraint on 
individual freedom. ”
The Fourth Biennial Report does not comment further on the development of special 
guardianship but instead discusses compulsory treatment in the context of proposed 
developments of CTOs. Their views on CTOs are discussed below.
SUMMARY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND DEBATES
Compulsory Treatment in the Community
As above noted, the MHAC would appear to have moved away from a position which 
advocated a form of special guardianship as a means of providing compulsory treatment 
for certain guardian clients and have instead concentrated recently on the feasibility of 
the compulsory treatment order.* Discussion in their most recent (fourth) Biennial 
Report does not indicate whether their vision of CTOs includes application to clients on 
guardianship, and therefore leaves it as an open question as to whether the two means of 
providing compulsory treatment in the community are now seen as similar or as in fact 
merged proposals.
There is also a detectable move to a critical review of CTO feasibility and the MHAC 
report indicates this as follows:-
"Concern has continued to centre on.. .whether a CTO would promote the welfare 
of patients. The increasing changes in the development of the pattern of care 
from large institutions to small community settings has prompted the Commission 
to review the issues in the period under review.
Current proposals from the Royal College of Psychiatrists to introduce Community Supervision Orders 
(CSOs) are not discussed in detail here. They are clearly exclusive of (i.e separate from) Guardianship 
and seem to involve legal powers which would be exercised by medical authority rather than social 
services. The definitions of ‘Supervision’ is limited, contingent and does not contain the main 
guardianship concepts or safe-guards discussed in this dissertation. (Community Supervision Orders, 
Royal College of Psychiatrists Report, January 1993).
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The Commission decided...[at its Conference in York in April 1991] that there is 
not enough evidence to indicate that CTO is needed, but it will monitor future 
developments and encourage research."
Other commentators on CTOs, in particular Cavadino (1989),(76) and Bean and Mounser 
(1993),(77) have criticised the CTO in concept and application and in so doing have seen 
ideas of special, enhanced or ‘beefed up’ guardianship as included within these criticisms. 
The basic arguments advanced by these commentators are extensions of those indicated 
in Appendix E, where the MHAC outlined their arguments for and against this 
development, but they offer much greater detail on the moral and practical 
problems involved in introducing CTOs. The Law Commission Review has also 
discussed the issues and suggests that compulsory treatment should be confined to 
hospital, (78) although they make no comment on the fact that all proposals for 
compulsory treatment in the community actually involve the removal of the person from 
the community before compulsory treatment is administered. It is an open question as 
to whether this element of the proposals actually contradicts the idea behind them of 
compulsory treatment actually taking place in the community.
There would seem to be five linked arguments advanced against CTOs, and by 
implication compulsory treatment within guardianship
1. Unwarranted change o f 'Ground Rules a development from the argument
of Fisher whose basic assumption was that different ground rules apply 
(and should continue to apply) in hospital than to the community regarding any 
form of compulsion or coercion, as it was neither practically or morally justified 
to attempt to impose care or treatment outside hospitals. Cavadino and Bean and 
Mounser strengthen this argument specifically referring to compulsory treatment 
by elaborating on the inappropriateness of extending this form of coercion and 
control into the community ostensibly as a support to the Government’s policy on 
expanding community care. Coercive psychiatry, i.e. enforced treatment, should 
be reduced or phased out altogether rather than extended.
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2. Net-widening: the effect of introducing CTOs is seen as actually or 
potentially extending the amount of coercion and compulsion used to administer 
treatment, and as bringing more people within the ambit of social control. There 
was also concern that this would occur on a less regulated basis than in hospital 
with the possibility of indeterminate lengths of time over which compulsory 
treatment would be administered.
3. Poor tar getting: i.e. imprecise information on who would benefit from 
CTOs in terms of specific treatment needs. Without disputing the fact that some 
people with long term psychiatric disabilities, particularly schizophrenia, do 
poorly in the community as their resolve to take medication weakens, thereby 
creating a pattern of recurrent admissions without corresponding benefits or 
improvements in their general lifestyle, for only a comparatively small number of 
patients could enforced treatment be expected to reverse the pattern. Indeed the 
very nature of these groups, in terms of personality and disposition towards 
psychiatry, probably makes them less likely to respond positively to the treatment 
once administered.
4. The inefficacy of drug treatment: the uncertainty and concern as to the 
benefits to be gained from drug administration specially on a long term basis and 
of actual risks to health through continuous administration of certain drugs. There 
is specific reference to the risks of tardive dyskinaesia as an outcome from 
continuous inappropriate administration of phenothiazines.
5. Encroachment on civil liberties: by which CTOs are seen as a further 
invasion of civil liberties and as an unjustified assumption of the need for 
paternalistic interventions in people’s lives. The broad argument is that the need 
for such interventions should be confined to where evidence is undeniable, which 
broadly coincides with the criteria applied to the need for compulsory hospital 
admission.
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The Morris Case
A recent case from Scotland has involved parents asking the Court for tutor’s powers of 
guardianship over their learning disabled son rather than the guardianship available under 
the Mental Health Act, 1960 (as applies to Scotland).*
* The Morris Case (1986) is cited by Ward^79  ^as important for demonstrating the following
1. Tutors dative can operate alongside the curator bonis (guardian of the estate in Scotland) or 
can assume powers of guardian of the estate. They can also operate alongside Statutory Guardianship.
2. Tutors dative are assumed to acquire total powers (as a parent over a child) but in this instance 
the Court limited these to the particular needs of the client.
3. Duration of powers was also limited by the Court (subject to review) whereas unlimited 
duration was the old assumption.
4. The selection of appropriate powers was undertaken by reference to the list of powers 
provided for guardian under Alberta’s Dependent Adults Act, 1978, below. Of these following powers 
a., d., e., f., and h. were granted.
a. The right to decide where the dependent adult is to live, whether permanently or 
temporarily;
b. the right to decide with whom the dependent adult is to live and with whom the 
dependent adult is to consort;
c. the right to decide whether the dependent adult should (or should be permitted to) 
engage in social activities and, if so, the nature and extent thereof and matters related thereto;
d. the right to decide whether the dependent adult should (or should be permitted to) 
work and, if so, the nature or type of work, for whom he is to work and matters related 
thereto;
e. the right to decide whether the dependent adult should (or should be permitted to) 
take or participate in any educational, vocational or other training and if so, the nature and 
extent thereof and matters related thereto;
f. the power and authority to decide whether the dependent adult should apply or 
should be permitted to apply for any licence, permit, approval or other consent or 
authorization required by law;
g. the right of commence, compromise or settle any legal proceeding that does not 
relate to the estate of the dependent adult and to compromise or settle any proceeding taken 
against the dependent adult that does not relate to his estate;
h. the right to consent to any health care that is in the best interests of the dependent 
adult;
i. the right to make normal day to day decisions on behalf of the dependent adult 
including the diet and dress of the dependent adult.
The Alberta Statute is referred to again on page 198 in the context of attempts to reconcile guardianship 
measures with principles of normalisation.
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Their request was granted and the effect of this was to bring back into operation what 
Ward refers to as personal guardianship as distinct from the statutory version. The 
personal guardian has in theory a total range of powers available to him or her in respect 
of both the property and the person of a client. However the particular significance of 
the Morris case was that the court chose to follow the pattern of guardianship 
development in Canada where guardians are given specific and limited powers by the 
Court in relation to the particular needs of a client. Notably, among these powers given 
to the tutor by the court in Scotland was the power to ensure that the person receives 
treatment.
Committee
As was maintained by Pope,(80) committee is the English equivalent of Scottish tutors and 
it is interesting therefore to note that both powers of tutors and those of a committee have 
recently shown signs of revival. The Morris Case referred to above discusses recent use 
of tutor.
Revival of committee depends on the reassertion of Royal Prerogative powers, a subject 
reviewed by the recent Law Commission Report. Arguably inquisition powers 
disappeared with the 1959 Act, in which case there remain no Royal Prerogative powers. 
It is contended however by Hoggett,(81) following Gunn,(82) that although current mental 
health legislation provides an apparently complete code of powers and responsibilities 
toward incapacitated persons who are mentally disordered, covering the territory 
previously governed by Royal Prerogative powers, the Royal Prerogative could be 
‘resuscitated or restituted’ to deal with issues not explicitly covered in the legislation.
If this argument were accepted, it would require the Queen to reissue a Royal Warrant 
under a Sign Manual to enable a judge to appoint a committee of the person following 
a form of Inquisition, presumably modernised (eg.by multi-disciplinary assessment), to 
determine incapacity. Given the preceding notion that committee of the person was a 
form of ‘total’ guardianship, this would thereby provide the committee with authority to 
consent on the clients’ behalf - for example to necessary treatment/83*
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Although these suggestions might seem unlikely to be realised, current interest in them 
may indicate the depth of concern felt about the need to provide a means of substitute 
decision-making, i.e. surrogacy, on matters concerned with consent to particular actions, 
such as abortion for pregnant women with severe learning difficulties who are adjudged 
unable ever to be able to consent on their own behalf. Although these issues are less 
acute for people with mental illness, some of the same principles apply and a revival of 
Royal Prerogative powers to deal with gaps in the 1983 Act as regards guardianship 
responsibilities for people with mental illness cannot be ruled out.
Introduction o f ‘Private’ Law Guardianship
As referred to in the outline of Guardianship typologies, page 59, the Law Commission 
are suggesting introducing forms of ‘private’ guardianship which would operate alongside 
the ‘public’ form, namely the Mental Health Act, 1983. (84/85/86)
These new forms of guardianship would include formalising powers of family and carers, 
the recognition of personal managers and introduction of some specific powers over, for 
example, where a mentally ill person lives, along the lines of the Children Act, 1989, 
Section 5(1).
All these proposals are at the consultation stage (June 1993).
Case Manazement
As is discussed elsewhere (pages 168/9) proposals for introducing case management 
and/or care management are part of the expectations on local authority social services 
following the enactment of the Health Service and Social Services Act, 1990.
Discussion continues on the models (implicit or explicit) involved in care management 
implementation. Here, it is noted that one facet of case management proposals include 
that of providing assertive outreach, possibly one of the most easily identified 
connections with guardianship methods or practice. It is also of interest to note that only 
one model of care management appears to correspond with the case management
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requirements of mentally ill people noted by Research and Development for 
Psychiatry,(87) though their appeal for the inclusion of assertive outreach within care 
management is not now as clear as it was in their original pronouncements.
Review of the 1983 Act
Reference has been made (page 131) to the fact that the Department of Health is currently 
engaged in updating the Code of Practice, but that the 1993 revision does not change the 
guidance on guardianship.
The Department of Health is also considering proposals for the introduction of 
Community Supervision Orders and these discussions could lead to some wider revision 
of the legislation.
Innovative and Controversial Uses of Guardianship
Some journal articles have identified special, and in some cases, contentious uses of 
guardianship, particularly for elderly people, either on discharge from hospital or to 
maintain them at home. These are discussed elsewhere (page 204 onwards)
The special needs of elderly people under Mental Health Act guardianship is a 
contentious area in itself, but this researcher’s assumption (on page 36) is that the 
differentiation on an age-related basis is not helpful for consideration of the main issues 
of guardianship for people with mental illness.
MAIN GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Origins of Guardianship for Mentally 111 People
A recognisable form of guardianship, i.e. complying broadly speaking with the working 
definition to be found on pages 64 to 67, can clearly be identified with the approach to 
the care and control of mentally ill people evolved in Roman culture, with some elements 
of this also applying to Greek, Islamic and other cultural traditions. The idea that
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guardianship for mentally ill people was ‘bom’(88) with the Mental Health Act, 1959, is 
incorrect. There is no recognised reference work detailing guardianship history for this 
care group, hence this writer’s detailed exposition.
The Significance of the Mental Health Act. 1959.
The Mental Health Act, 1959, was significant in two key respects apropros guardianship 
for mentally ill people. This was the first piece of legislation which provided specifically 
for a combined form of guardianship for people with mental illness and people with 
learning disabilities. Prior to this, the guardianship arrangements for these two care 
groups had followed very different courses, with guardianship for people with learning 
disabilities being provided for under mental deficiency legislation and guardianship for 
mentally ill people being provided for under lunacy legislation. However, specific 
guardianship arrangements for mentally ill people, originally legislated for under the 1845 
Lunacy Act, appear to have fallen into disuse.
The second significance of the 1959 Act was to link statutory guardianship with social 
work functions - i.e. because social workers were defined as those who initiate 
guardianship proceedings and as appropriate persons to become de facto guardians of 
mentally ill people, as a delegated function from medical officers of health (arrangements 
subsequently modified by the 1983 Act to refer to ASWs acting under delegated 
responsibilities from directors of social services).
Guardianship for Mentally 111 People Compared with Guardianship for Other Care 
Groups.
The history described above clearly distinguishes guardianship for mentally ill people 
from guardianship for other care groups, though the close relationship between 
guardianship for people with learning disabilities and guardianship for people with mental 
illness is problematic, and a factor which has confused development in guardianship for 
mentally ill people since 1959. The link with guardianship for children has been 
indicated, as has the connection between guardianship and wardship - normally 
considered more applicable to children than to adults. The idea of generic guardianship
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(guardianship on the same basis for all care groups) is not discussed in this history but 
is referred to with a brief comparison with guardianship experience in other countries 
(see pages 54/55).
Guardianship of the Person and Guardianship of the Estate.
This distinction, which is discussed in further detail on page 54, received considerable 
attention historically and the indications are that guardianship of the person received as 
much attention as guardianship of the estate. A popular view that guardianship concerns 
were mainly about property and funds and that the person of mentally ill received 
relatively little attention has been shown to be false.
Specific Functions of Guardianship of the Person.
It has been shown that the needs of mentally ill people for care and protection is 
historically rooted in the trust relationship. The Crown as trustee has been shown to be 
the ultimate guardian and expression of the welfare function of guardianship.
Lunacy Law and Poor Law.
The aspect of lunacy legislation concerned with guardianship predates the Poor Law, and 
has been shown not to be related to that form of state intervention. The overlap in 
terminology is an unfortunately confusing factor but Poor Law guardianship was 
essentially a collective and impersonal solution to the social problem of poverty.
Role of Committee.
In order to understand the role of committee, it is essential to appreciate: (1) how 
Scottish tutors and curators developed from their Roman equivalents; and (2) the 
relationship of the latter to committees of the person and estate respectively.
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The history shows that committee, generally assumed to have ceased to exist through the 
terms of the 1959 Act, is capable of being reformulated as a way of providing 
guardianship for mentally ill people on a wider basis than that provided for under the 
1983 Act. Apart from effectively widening the range of guardianship powers, it could 
provide a form of personal guardianship legally recognised as operating in parallel with 
the statutory version.
Statutory Guardianship.
Although no trace exists of the provision of statutory guardianship for mentally ill people 
under the 1845 Act, as distinct from guardianships (committees) arising from inquisition, 
it is conceivable that this could also be reactivated and possibly subsumed within the 
modem version of committee, effectively re-enforcing the case for the reinstatement of 
alternative forms of legal guardianship.
Guardianship and Hospital.
These have never formally been alternatives and it is inappropriate to consider them in 
this way. They have different roles and functions with very different assumptions about 
the basis of care and protection, yet can in fact overlap when individual clients under 
guardianship require hospital care unless arranged under Section 3 of the Mental Health 
Act, 1983.
Compulsory Treatment in the Community: Roles of Guardians and Committee.
Guardians and committees have historically been able to arrange for treatment to be 
imposed on clients either at home or in hospital and this is still the position broadly 
speaking in countries other than Britain.
The effect of the 1983 Act was to limit guardians’ powers and to exclude powers related 
to enforcing treatment which are, in practice and in law, delegated to health authorities 
and the medical profession.
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Committees would be under no such legal limits and could conceivably impose a ‘higher’ 
level of authority and accountability, i.e that of the Crown, to meet particular needs of 
mentally ill people, by ensuring that treatment was imposed on clients in their best 
interests when necessary.
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CHAPTER IV
SOCIAL WORK AND GUARDIANSHIP
This chapter contains the following sections
- DEFINITION OF SOCIAL WORK AND COMPARISON WITH
GUARDIANSHIP DEFINITIONS
- GUARDIANSHIP MODELS: RELATIONSHIP TO SOCIAL WORK AND
ISSUES ARISING
- THE ‘SOCIAL WORK-ISTIC’ MODEL OF GUARDIANSHIP
- GUARDIANSHIP, SOCIAL WORK AND THE POSITION OF SOCIAL
SERVICES DEPARTMENTS
- SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
DEFINITION OF SOCIAL WORK AND COMPARISON WITH GUARDIANSHIP 
DEFINITIONS
Introduction
The approach to defining social work in these notes follows broadly the same framework 
and sequence as those adopted in defining guardianship. However, comparative/context 
definitions are discussed together with the operational definition.
I  FORMAL DEFINITIONS
The dictionary definition of social work is:
"work of benefit to those in need of help, especially professional or voluntary 
service of a specialised nature, concerned with community welfare and individual 
or social problems arising mainly from poverty, mental or physical handicap, 
maladjustment, delinquency etc!’
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A social worker is defined as:-
"one who undertakes social work, especially someone professionally trained".
The latter definition is oblique in its treatment of the social worker/client relationship,
i.e. referring in a general sense to the recipients as "those in need of help”, and these 
recipients are not identified explicitly as the clients of social workers. However, the 
dictionary definition of ‘client’ includes a specialist use of the term to mean "a person 
helped by a social worker; a case". The difference between recipients of social work as 
‘clients’ rather than as ‘cases’ is acknowledged as significant by the dictionary in citing 
C. Morris, Social Casework (1950), viz.;
"the ‘case’ has a derogatory sense when used of a person. Reluctantly, therefore 
for want of a better word, we refer to ‘the client’."
Definition Adopted by the Relevant Professional Organisation 
(British Association of Social Workers)
From among a number of attempts by professional social workers to defme their roles, 
the following extract from The Social Work Task (1977) is chosen as representative and 
authoritative, viz.:
"social work is the purposeful and ethical application of personal skills in 
professional relationships directed towards enhancing the personal and social 
functioning of an individual, family, group or neighbourhood...."(1)
This dissertation only concerns social work with individuals and their families. The 
above definition is ‘generic’, i.e. it applies to all client groups. Here, however, the 
individual clients are those suffering from mental illness, some of whom may of course 
have a range of other problems or labels - including learning disability, for certain 
‘borderline’ clients.
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Comparison with Guardianship Definitions
The respective dictionary definitions see the guardian defined in terms of having custody 
over a person albeit in a protective sense, whereas the social worker is essentially seen 
as a helper. In both there is limited reference to the recipient of guardianship and social 
work vis-a-vis the ‘correlative’ position of the ward or client respectively.
Guardianship in dictionary terminology has both a ‘legal’ and a ‘general’ meaning, 
without the general meaning being elaborated. On the other hand, social work is not 
defined in legal terms and the authority of the social worker would seem to stem from 
professional training alone.
The statutory definition of guardianship does not have its counterpart in relation to social 
work. The terms of the Mental Health Act, 1983, refer to powers conferred on a 
guardian in complying with laid down procedures, whereas the BASW definition of social 
work is considering particular skills and the ‘professional relationship’ as the hallmark 
of the activity. The interconnection rests on the fact that those who follow and comply 
with the statutory guardianship procedures may also be pursuing good social work 
practice.
The 1983 Memorandum gives some attention to the personal characteristics of guardians 
in relationship to their wards. Conceivably, this could have been dealt with more simply 
by referring to the desirability of the person being a social worker; instead the 
Memorandum discusses suitability in terms of sympathetic interest and ability to promote 
the ward’s health and welfare (Memorandum of Guidance, Section 48, outlined on 
pages 28/29).
II OPERATIONAL, COMPARATIVE AND CONTEXT DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this paper, the BASW Social Work Task analysis is adopted. This 
was based on consideration of twenty distinguishable social work roles, derived from 
research into job descriptions of generic social workers which BASW had earlier 
undertaken.
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There is acknowledgement from BASW that these roles overlap to a large degree and that 
they are not exclusive to social work. The distinguishing element which make these into 
social work roles and tasks is the context in which they are practised, and the 
professional value and skill base with which they are approached. The need for 
professional social work training is assumed in roles numbered 1, 2, 6, 8, 9 and 19.
BASW’s definition of social work as a categorisation of social work roles(2) provides the 
following (paraphrased) descriptions:
1. Diagnostician - Conceptualising and classifying the problems, needs and behaviour 
of a client.
2. Planner - Setting objectives and devising a programme with a client.
3. Adviser - Giving of factual information.
4. Clarifler - Providing the client with the necessary clarifications in order that he 
himself can decide and initiate courses of action.
5. Enabler - Help and encourage the client to devise and follow solutions to his own 
problems.
6. Counsellor - Assisting client in resolving problems of an emotional nature, often 
in connection with his personal relationships.
7. Social Educator - Teaching socially acceptable behaviour.
8. Attitude/Behaviour Changer - Modification of behaviour, values and attitudes 
which are deemed socially inappropriate or incapacitating to the client.
9. Consultant - Acting as an advisor to other social workers.
10. Mobiliser of Resources - Utilisation of any available resources in order to help the
client.
11. Agent of Social Change - Using knowledge obtained from practice to attempt to 
modify the social environment to make it more conducive to social well-being.
12. Public Educator - Seeking to increase general understanding of social attitudes and 
problems.
13. Researcher - Data collection, study and dissemination of information so that other 
social workers, other professionals, social service agencies, the public and social 
policy makers can be better informed.
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14. Advocate - Acting on behalf of a client, to represent the client, with a view to 
achieving the objectives laid down by the client usually in connection with an 
organisation or agency which is withholding services or pursuing activities which 
are harmful to the client’s perceived interests.
15. Mediator - Attempting to resolve a dispute in the most constructive way possible.
16. Care Giver - Expression of concern when the worker is unable to provide other 
immediate help.
17. Protector - Providing protection either for his client or from his client. 
Exceptionally it may involve protecting the client from himself. It is most often 
performed in relation to children, the mentally ill or in working with offenders. 
The role is implicit in social work values and has not just evolved from statutory 
responsibilities. As with care giving, ‘protection’ underpins most social work 
activity.
18. Agent of Social Regulation: "Exercising social control...discouraging undesirable 
behaviour in the interests of the client as well as of others...a logical extension of 
the ‘protector’ role.”
19. Director - Implementing a plan of action, or co-ordinating its various facets.
20. Manager - Management of the resources which are available to a social worker 
personally.
The Context Of Mental Health Social Work and Approved Social Work
The list of social work roles considers social work in a general (as well as generic) sense 
and pays little regard to context.
Identification of the context within which social work is practised both limits the number 
of roles applicable at any one time, and also provides a more realistic backdrop against 
which to consider the operational role.
The social work setting referred to throughout this dissertation is local authority social 
services, mental health social work in general and particularly arrangements by which 
ASWs operate, providing assessments of clients and making decisions as to admission to 
hospital or into guardianship.
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None of the roles explicitly refers to the executive area of decision-making which is the 
prerogative of ASWs undertaking Mental Health Act assessments as to appropriateness 
of use of guardianship or of compulsory hospital admission. However the National 
Institute for Social Work survey of roles and tasks of mental health social workers/mental 
welfare officers operating under the Mental Health Act, 1959, (3) indicated that these 
social workers saw their particular tasks as: counsellor, advocate, diagnostician
(providing ‘a broad eclectic and holistic approach to assessment’), protector (particularly 
by safeguarding civil liberties and in seeking out alternatives to hospital admission), agent 
of social regulation and social educator. Other roles, such as adviser, clarifier, enabler, 
mobiliser of resources and care giver are possibly implicit.
Advocacy. Casework and Case Management
As these are the three main reference points for the comparison of guardianship and 
social work within the concept analysis undertaken from page 173 each requires some 
comment, viz.:
Advocacy is referred to at item (14) but does not discuss the possible conflict of interest 
which may arise when a social worker needs to be advocate for a client towards his/her 
own agency. Some surrogate function is acknowledged.
Casework had become an ‘unfashionable’ term by the time this list was produced but the 
elements which go to make up casework are easily identified, namely a combination of 
items numbered, 1-12 and 16-18. However, the theoretical and methodological elements 
are missing, particularly relevant in psychotherapeutic work with mentally ill people.
Neither Case nor Care Management are to be found in the above list because these were 
not generally seen as social work roles in 1977. It might be assumed that a combination 
of roles numbered 1, 2, 10,14, 19 and 20 cover case/care management tasks - other than 
in relation to budget-holding.
For the purpose the following analysis of the therapeutic model of guardianship, a firm 
distinction is drawn between ‘case management’ and ‘care management’ (page 191).
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In many other contexts the terms are used interchangeably. Arguably, the terms should 
have retained distinct differential usage during the post-Griffiths community care debate 
but responses to the Department of Health consultation clearly indicated dislike of ‘case 
management’ and preferences for ‘care management’, so this was subsequently adopted 
as the alternative in the official literature.
Care management has been promoted by the Government as a key shift in the operational 
approach to assessing, purchasing and providing services for adult care groups, originally 
spelt out in the Griffiths Report and enacted in the Community Care and Health Service 
Act, 1990. The practical application of these ideas was at an early stage when the 
fieldwork part of this research was carried out and the meaning of the terms when used 
was often imprecise. No questions directly on care management found their way into the 
questionnaire for social workers other than in regard to budget-holding.
It is important to note that neither case nor care management are seen as the exclusive 
prerogative of social workers, and experience elsewhere (particularly in the USA) has 
confirmed that the role has been taken up by a number of professions.
Paragraph 3.3.3 of Caring for People says that:
"case management provides an effective method of targetting resources and planning 
services to meet specific needs of individual clients [if it includes]:
* identification of people in need, including the systems for referral;
* assessment of care needs;
* planning and securing the delivery of care;
* monitoring the quality of care provided;
* review of client needs."
With regard to the role of case managers as budget-holders, Section 3.3.5 discusses 
perceived advantages and adds:
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"this need not be pursued down to the level of each individual client in all cases, 
but - used flexibly - is an important way of enabling those close to the 
identification of client needs to make the best possible use of the resources 
available". (4)
Comparison with Guardianship
Discussion under the respective operational definitions of guardianship and of social work 
show clear differences with the former seeking to indicate how guardianship works in an 
overall sense while social work is described in terms of roles. The two interconnect in 
that a number of social work roles occupied by guardians can be indicated alongside some 
apparently guardian-like roles within social work.
Only the specific social work roles of advocate, caseworker and case manager are 
discussed in detail below.
Ill DEFINITION BY PERSPECTIVE
The perspective of social work considered in detail in this study is to do with how social 
workers perceive their own roles and tasks in relationship to guardianship as a basis for 
making key decisions. This is the main subject of this research.
A full discussion of a ‘perspective’ definition of social work would include consideration 
of how social work is seen by social workers and by a range of other professionals as 
well as various lay views, including those of clients, families and carers. It is not 
intended to offer such definitions in this paper and suffice it to say that the profession is 
viewed in a wide variety of ways by professionals and by the lay public. The discussion 
would, of course, need to distinguish between criticisms which are levelled at all 
professionals,especially perhaps those which are particular to the caring professions, as, 
for example Illich against the medical profession(5) as distinct from criticisms of social 
work per se, for example by Brewer and Lait.(6)
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IV DEFINITION BY TYPOLOGY
Only social work with mentally ill people is considered in this paper and social work with 
other care groups is not discussed. Distinctions between casework, group work and 
community work are not referred to further in this discussion as it is the casework 
approach that will connect social work most clearly with use of guardianship.
Guardianship as a tvne of Social Work
Guardianship, both informal and formal, could be described as a type or category of 
social work with mentally ill people. Interestingly, the social work role as guardian 
per se is not included in the list offered by BASW, and the surrogate role is only weakly 
represented, eg. in the role of Advocate. If the surrogate element is assumed to apply in 
varying degrees throughout it might be assumed that the role of guardian in practice 
covers the following from the roles listed:
Adviser Mediator
Enabler Care Giver
Counsellor Protector
Resource Mobiliser Agent of Social Regulation
Social Change Agent Director/Manager,
Advocate (i.e. Care Management)
This is a much wider range of roles than is commonly attributed to guardianship, but the 
test of the actual perception of roles is reserved for the empirical research.
V HISTORICAL DEFINITION
Historical definitions of social work in general, or specifically of social work with 
mentally ill people, are not attempted in this dissertation.
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Instead, the historical chapter has located the connection between the roles of social 
workers and guardians for this care group in the context of evolving statutory 
responsibility.
It may however be broadly asserted that the histories of guardianship and social work for 
mentally ill people proceed on very different lines. Guardianship is a much older form 
of care, predating the Poor Law before becoming effectively part of lunacy legislation. 
Social work on the other hand is derived from the Poor Law with only a fairly late 
expression of specialist interest in work with mentally ill people.
VI CONCEPT ANALYSIS
A concept analysis approach to social work definitions follows this section in the form 
of an examination of guardianship models and their relationship or applicability to social 
work.
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RELATIONSHIP OF GUARDIANSHIP ‘MODELS’ TO ADVOCACY, 
CASEWORK, CASE MANAGEMENT AND DISCUSSION OF RELATED ISSUES
The following schema indicates the subject matter of the following discussion and the 
relationship between the themes pursued.
Model Name: SubstitutedJudgement Parent-Child Therapeutic
Alternative 
name or 
description:
Legal, or Legalistic, 
Surrogacy
Parental, or
Developmental,
Authority
Welfare Services, 
Imposition of
Criteria/
Justification:
Substituted Judgement Individual Best 
Interests
Generalised Best Interests
Specific 
Functions 
shared 
with social 
work:
ADVOCACY CASEWORK CASE MANAGEMENT
‘Mental Illness’ 
perceived as:
Incapacity (inability to 
decide or evidence of 
seriously impaired 
judgement)
Vulnerability 
(harm to self or to 
others)
‘ Underfunctioning ’ 
or ‘Immaturity’
Medical view of Deviance 
(clinically diagnosed 
Disease/Pathology)
Issues raised: * Independence 
of Advocates
* Private Guardians
* Guardians’ 
Credentials
* Role of Court of 
Protection (in 
passing)
* ‘Natural’
guardianship
* Parental analogy
* Parental 
substitution
* Authority
* Normalisation
* ‘Institutional’
care
* Social control and 
Compulsion
* Least Restrictive 
Alternative/
Most Beneficial 
Alternative
* Net Widening/
More coercive 
alternative
* Therapeutic Capacity in 
Social Services
* Care Management
The models of guardianship discussed are derived from those identified by Frolick who 
uses the three model names: ‘substituted judgment’, ‘parent/child’ and ‘therapeutic’
respectively.^ An alternative formulation by McLaughlin uses a two-model analysis as
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between the ‘legalistic’ and the ‘social work-istic,(8). The legalistic model is broadly 
equivalent to Frolick’s substituted judgement while the social work-istic model could 
reasonably be seen as a combination of Frolick’s parent/child and therapeutic models.
Important issues raised by McLaughlin’s analysis of the social work-istic model of 
guardianship are discussed from page 199, serving as a bridge between social work 
practice issues and concerns related to the organisational base of social work and 
guardianship.
THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGEMENT MODEL AND ADVOCACY
According to Gostin’s (1983) view, mainly influenced by experience in the USA, 
guardianship consists of two key components: formal recognition of the fact of a client’s 
incompetency to make important personal decisions, determined by formal assessment; 
and delegated authority to another person to make decisions on that person’s behalf.(9) 
The delegated authority of the guardian is the legal basis for the assumption of two roles: 
surrogate and advocate.
These three elements - incapacity, surrogacy and advocacy - are considered in turn 
below.
Incapacity
The term ‘incapacity’ has different meanings under English law according to context, but 
has a clear descriptive implication, namely that the person is unable to act or decide for 
him/herself.
English law is not clear on the question of whether the powers available to the guardian 
under Section 7 of the Mental Health Act, 1983, are, actually or notionally, related to 
the incapacity per se of the patient. Certainly, the medical recommendations and the 
application made by the ASW do not contain statements to that effect, and therefore the 
presumption would seem to be that the person suffering from mental illness and needful 
of interventions within the terms of the Mental Health Act are not thereby deemed
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incapable. A question then arises, however, as to why the powers of guardians are 
invoked if the client is not demonstrably incapable in one or more of the key areas 
referred to in Section 8 of the Act, namely in the need to determine (or maintain) place 
of residence, to ensure attendance or to gain access to a person’s home.
Arguably, the nearest to explicit findings of incapacity under English mental health law 
are actions under Section 94(2) of the 1983 Act related to the role of the Court of 
Protection which, in effect, becomes guardian of the estate on receipt of two medical 
opinions confirming that a person is suffering from mental disorder. Substituted 
judgement could be a reasonable description of the criteria applied by the court in 
managing the patient’s affairs or, more immediately, by the person appointed as receiver 
by the court to deal directly with patient’s monies etc.
In other legal systems, particularly in the USA, courts are asked to receive petitions 
asserting that a person with mental illness is incapable of managing his or her person, 
affairs or property, and the outcome of this petition is a decision by the court for or 
against the appointment of a guardian. The appointment of guardians by petition in these 
circumstances follows the pattern noted in the historical chapter as applying in England 
and Wales at least up to the 1890 Lunacy Act. The old terminology is indicative of the 
thinking about the nature of mental illness as, for instance, in the use of a phrase such 
as ‘lucid intervals’ to refer to those periods where mentally ill people cease to be (to use 
another antiquated term) ‘non compus mentis’.
Surrogacy
In contrast to the position of people with learning difficulties, the historical assumption 
in the application of the principle of surrogacy to people with mental illness has 
concerned the variability of the disability and the notion that recovery is achievable, 
i.e. that mental illness is a phase (however long) in a person’s life, not a permanent state 
of affairs. (See Chapter III, Footnote page 84.) Consequently, the issue at stake in 
determining how best to represent the needs and wishes of that person while ill is the 
extent of knowledge of his or her disposition prior to the mental illness or, if applicable, 
subsequent to a previous mental illness.
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Thus the concept of surrogacy rests firmly on the notion that the guardian substitutes 
his/her judgement for that of the person during the time the illness affects the person’s 
capacity to decide. Therefore, the justification for the surrogate role of guardian is that 
the guardian acts as advocate for the person with mental illness on a temporary basis 
during the period of incapacity.
Conceivably, guardianship understood in these terms would be seen by social workers as 
a denial of client self-determination, while the assumption of a formalised surrogate role 
by a social worker could be viewed as perpetuating the problem. It is also to be expected 
that social workers would wish to move away rapidly from an assessment which 
concentrated on a client’s incapacity on to one which stressed strengths and remaining 
abilities.
Some of these assumptions and doubts are explored in the empirical research. 
Meanwhile, anecdotal evidence suggests that social workers working with mentally ill 
clients often recognise lack of self-determination as realistically part (or the whole) of 
their client’s problem, and one which puts pressure on them to assume a surrogate role 
(without legal formality or safeguards) whether they want to or not.
Advocacy
Advocacy is well-accepted as a beneficial way of assisting those unable to speak or 
act for themselves and this is arguably one of the most important of the social work 
roles listed in the BASW definition. Wolfenberger* has argued that advocacy is more 
‘expressive’ in the way it conveys others’ needs than the more ‘instrumental’ 
guardianship.(l0) Fisher’s interpretation of the 1978 White Paper echoes this distinction, 
seeing advocacy as more ‘relevant’ than guardianship/11*
* Much has been written on the role of advocate with mentally ill people and there are a number of well- 
established forms of advocacy for mentally ill people, eg the Dutch scheme based on the idea of the 
advocate acting as intermediary between the client and officialdom in its various guises. The justification 
for containing this discussion within the Wolfenberger approach is to highlight the distinction he elucidates 
between guardianship and advocacy and its implications.
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However, Wolfenberger does not rule out the possibility of combining advocacy and 
guardianship into a tool which is both expressive and instrumental, provided these operate 
under the right conditions of independence from interference from other parties, among 
whom he would include managers of protective services.
The researcher’s working definition of guardianship (see pages 64/67) referred to the 
need for an advocacy component. It is argued here that advocacy and substituted 
judgement are logically linked by the appropriateness of, and need for, one person 
speaking or acting on behalf of another on the basis of need.
Advocacy within guardianship thus carries many of the same features as ordinary 
advocacy but is distinctive in that its rationale is wider, viz, to respond to the recognised 
and assessed incapacity of a person, as well as to exercise substituted judgement on this 
person’s behalf, so that the guardian becomes in effect a surrogate advocate.
Social Services/Social Workers as Advocates*
It may be conjectured that social workers see themselves as potentially effective advocates 
for people with mental illness without needing or wishing to be their clients’ guardians. 
Indeed, some may not associate the guardian’s role with advocating on behalf of the 
client.
Wolfenberger sees advocates as needing to be independent of agencies on which the 
client is or will be most reliant in gaining necessary help. To him, the idea of a social 
worker acting as advocate within a social services agency is contradictory, not only in 
failing to meet the independency criterion but also because a social worker cannot give 
of his/her time and effort to the client without being constrained by the needs of other 
clients or of agency management policies. Furthermore, much that passes as advocacy
It is well to note the possibilities of semantic confusion, in that ‘advocate’ can mean lawyer under other 
legal systems (eg USA), in which case there is a merger of role between advocacy and representation in 
the legal sense. Whereas a private guardian under English mental health law could be a lawyer, the 
lawyer would not be referred to as an advocate. On the other hand, social services guardians are, 
technically, directors of social services who invariably delegate the role to social workers.
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within the helping agencies is often insufficiently proactive to be counted as such, since, 
for Wolfenberger, advocacy means a definite speaking-out for the client’s situation; 
consequently: "There is no such thing as ‘silent advocacy’."(12)
From this viewpoint, social workers cannot expect to succeed as advocates because of 
their lack of independence and the insufficiency of accountability to a single client. 
According to McLaughlin, the same problem affects social workers acting as guardians, 
and the implications of this are discussed below.(13)
Mental health legislation provides for ‘private’ guardians invested with the same powers 
as social work guardians but who may be lay persons (including family members) or 
persons from another helping profession. Private guardians are a rarity but could be 
seen as able to achieve a measure of independence from statutory agencies. They have 
for some time been seen in this light within the Scottish legal system (which makes 
broadly similar provision in this respect) as being in a potentially better bargaining 
position for a client than a social work guardian. Their position is often seen to be more 
beneficial to a client insofar as they are free to exercise pressure on agencies to provide 
necessary care and services without the constraints of accountability towards the 
organisation or to their other clients, i.e. they are able to operate in very similar ways 
to those envisaged by Wolfenberger for the ideal advocate.
Rights and Entitlements
There is an interesting though troublesome debate about the connection between the use 
of guardianship and the rights of people with mental illness. Some see statutory 
interventions such as guardianship as inevitably a threat to, if not a literal suspension of, 
a person’s civil rights and therefore by definition a prejudicial deprivation, or negative 
discrimination. The argument would be that, however benign or well disposed the 
guardian, nothing compensates for the loss of dignity and integrity involved in a person 
being constrained from making their own decisions in life. The opposite point of view 
is that this argument ignores the reality of mental illness itself as disabling people to the 
point where they are not in a position to protect their interests or speak up for
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themselves, and therefore require someone to do this on their behalf. This is an 
important right which should not be denied people while ostensibly promoting civil rights 
in the broadest sense.
From the latter point of view the institution of guardianship is a counterbalancing 
measure which serves to protect rights of mentally ill people by application of the 
principle of quid pro quo.(14) Through this, the assertion of the guardian’s authority over 
a client’s actual, i.e. expressed, wish during a period of mental disturbance, is 
counterbalanced by the benefits that a guardian may obtain for the client during this 
period. There is a clear link here with anticipated beneficial or ‘therapeutic’ impact of 
care, services or treatment, and this is picked up during the discussion of the therapeutic 
model of guardianship. Meanwhile, the question of rights and entitlements of people with 
mental illness to particular help or services can be located within what Gostin refers to 
as the ideology of entitlement.*155
Considering guardianship to be a service to clients from which they could gain advantage, 
Bean argues that the failure of local authorities to provide this service in many instances 
is a denial of rights within the ideology of entitlement. Expressing some sympathy for 
client access to guardianship on an equal basis across local authorities, Bean nevertheless 
concludes that resort to Secretary of State’s default powers in an endeavour to ensure this 
would merely raise questions about variations in the quality of service rather than its 
availability - i.e. reluctant authorities would simply express their disinterest in the way 
they provided the service. Bean sees the missing connection in this discussion to be the 
professional judgement of social workers, acting as gatekeepers, while at the same time 
being able to function efficiently only when service options are available. (16)
Fisher maintains that:
"Guardianship can protect the erosion of civil rights by taking formal powers in 
circumstances where persuasion of dubious authority may otherwise be used... [as for 
example] an elderly person ‘taken’ to a Part III home might arguably be better placed 
under the protective powers of guardianship because of the danger that such actions 
infringe her or his rights. "(17)
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Finally, on a more general basis, Henkel (1985) has discussed the 1983 Act in terms of 
positive and negative freedoms, suggesting that:
"The dominant themes [in this legislation] are those of negative freedom, procedural 
justice, and enhanced rights of citizenship. The values of enhancement of choice and 
better quality care and treatment are more widely represented but there is an 
unsatisfactory commitment to entitlement of services. Nonetheless, at least implicit 
in the Act is an expectation that social workers and social services have a distinctive 
contribution to make to the enhancement of choice." 1^8)
Part of the ideology of entitlement asserts the benefits of legal formalism in providing 
safeguards against the use of substituted judgement by professionals on the grounds of 
their actual or presumed expertise rather than on the needs and wishes of the client.(19) 
However, this approach can also be criticised for making insufficient allowance for the 
impact of mental illness on a person’s judgement and decision-making capacity.
Guardians’ Credentials
A further point concerns the status and credentials of the guardian and their 
appropriateness for exercising substituted judgement. In the USA, lawyers and even 
consultant psychiatrists(20) may fulfil this role and exercise substituted judgement over a 
range of factors, including giving consent on a client’s behalf to admission to hospital and 
to receive psychiatric treatments (though usually with limitations in respect to the more 
far-reaching or controversial psychiatric treatments). Arguably, the authority position of 
social workers is uncertain and ambiguous in relation to guardianship as defined in the 
1983 Act, while being relatively clear-cut in relation to compulsory admission to 
hospital.*
The credentials of the guardian, i.e. professional qualification(s) and personal attributes, 
are clearly of paramount importance within the exercise of substituted judgement. 
However, the position in England and Wales means in practice that de facto guardians
* In some respects, the role of ASWs in arranging compulsory hospital admissions could be viewed as a form 
of substituted judgement and of a limited guardianship specifically providing sanction for the enforcement 
of these powers.
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are either social workers exercising delegated powers from the director of social services 
(who may or may not have professional qualifications or any particular personal 
attributes) or a private guardian with no specifically defined or formal qualifications.
On the face of it, therefore, this lack of clear prescription might indicate that these 
guardians are viewed as already fulfilling a defined and manageable task within which 
expectations are substantially less than where a person is expected to decide or act for 
another over the full range of personal functions. On the other hand, some personal 
attributes are mentioned in the various Memoranda of Guidance and Codes of Practice 
(Chapter III) though it is notable that these have not markedly changed between the 
arrangements under the 1959 Act and the 1983 Act.
Given the striking lack of information about how guardianship actually worked for 
mentally ill people under the 1959 Act, it may be assumed that the exercise of total 
control over clients’ lives was rarely realised; certainly there is little evidence of 
guardians consenting to treatment on behalf of clients which was, in theory at least, part 
of the expectation of the guardian acting as a good parent in respect to a youngster up to 
the age of 14 years.
THE PARENT/CHILD MODEL OF GUARDIANSHIP AND SOCIAL CASEWORK
This view of guardianship sees the guardian adopting a role analogous to that of a parent, 
with the ward viewed as vulnerable to life in ways similar to that of children and young 
people. Indeed, the assumption behind this model is that the role of parents towards 
children is appropriately described as ‘natural guardianship’.
The most common reference to the role of parent in guardianship is to be found in the 
legislation and supporting official literature which describes guardians as having the same 
powers over wards as a parent would have over a youngster. This, however, is to stress 
only one side of the parental role; whilst parents do, of course, have powers over their 
children, their responsibilities towards them are, if anything, even more important. And 
the most important responsibility of parents is to enable their offspring to grow and 
develop to their full potential. The fact that people with learning disability were assumed
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in the past to have very limited developmental potential has been influential in shaping 
criticism of guardianship as being ‘too paternalistic’. This was discussed in the historical 
context of the position of the Royal Commission in apparently not seeing the 
inappropriateness of grafting a paternalistic view of guardianship applicable (in their 
view) to people with learning difficulty, on to a form of guardianship also to be used for 
people with mental illness.
Thus from an anachronistic position, justly criticised for inappropriate paternalism, this 
model of guardianship can also be seen as applicable to the parent-child relationship. The 
guardian accepts the relationship as an ‘unequal’ one and capitalises on this to best effect 
in assisting the ward to overcome difficulties and to grow towards maturity. In many 
ways this parallels the use of the social worker-client relationship in the enabling/ 
counselling/ advising roles which together make up the activity called ‘casework’. 
Whereas at the commencement of casework, the inequality in the relationship may need 
to be understood, most casework strategies for continuing work will seek to reduce the 
elements which tend to perpetuate the social worker being seen as a parent figure, so that 
the clients will need help, for example, to modify overtly regressive behaviour towards 
a position closer to that of parity between client and worker.
Caseworkers of a psychoanalytic persuasion would no doubt criticise the above view for 
denying the transference phenomenon through which the very conditions of the 
relationship will generate and maintain a tendency for the client to project parental views 
and attitudes onto the social worker. Even here, the idea of growth and change is not 
denied but is seen basically as a far more complex process than the modelling activity of 
ordinary parenting.
The essential view incorporated in this model therefore is of guardianship in a functional 
rather than legal sense, derived from a comparison with parental roles, particularly in 
roles connected with offering a parental model or substitute parenting.
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* Natural’ Guardianship
Taking the widest view of guardianship in its social and psychological senses, sets the 
scene for a consideration of natural guardianship, in which the concept of guardianship 
commences with parenthood and with parents as the natural guardians of their offspring. 
The position in child care law as to which takes priority - role of guardian and role of 
parent - is complex and has recently been reviewed*21* but there would seem to be a 
further area requiring clarification, namely when parental or guardian functions cease in 
relation to young people emerging into adulthood whose psychological or emotional 
development has been impaired or disrupted. In which sense, do parental responsibilities 
extend throughout the maturation period, however long that may be, on the basis of 
‘extended childhood’, or are parental responsibilities confined to boundaries of 
chronological age? Certainly for the family of a young person on the threshold of 
adulthood showing clear signs of incipient mental illness, a limited range of adult 
functions and achievements, and/or with overtly disturbed behaviour, this question could 
be vital.
There is not only the question of how long parental responsibilities would apply in this 
situation but the capacity and endurance of parents to fulfil the guardian role, which could 
become more onerous as they themselves age.(22) Their position may be compared with 
those of foster families, increasingly referred to simply as carers in England, but who 
themselves are referred to as guardians in other countries, e.g. in Scotland and in 
the USA.
Parental Analogy
The parent-child model of guardianship could be said to apply the parent-child 
relationship by analogy to the needs of certain adults with mental illness problems. 
Alternatively it may be said that this goes beyond application by analogy into an actual 
expression of parent-type responses. The association of guardianship in England with 
mental handicap and mental deficiency legislation has created a view of guardianship as 
being inherently paternalistic*23* which has led to all the following being described as 
within the control of the guardian:
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to contract on behalf of the ward;
to give permission to marry or to bar marriage;
to determine place of residence;
to determine occupation and activities;
to determine relationships and the company kept; and
to decide who shall be permitted to visit the client.(24)
The inappropriateness of this view of guardianship to meet the needs of people with 
mental illness might appear self-evident unless one views all mental illness as a 
manifestation of psychological or emotional immaturity. Even from this point of view 
it is difficult to justify the blanket term ‘immaturity’ to explain the need for total 
surrogacy.
Criteria and Justification of the Parent/Child Model
The parent/child model of guardianship is normally associated with the best interests basis 
of decision-making, which by implication refers to the best interests of the individual 
client in-so-far as these are known or ascertainable. With regard to future needs, 
however, more generalised best interests criteria may apply, coinciding with the two 
primary functions of parenting, namely protection and promoting development. These 
may be said to express respectively the conservative/cautious parental attitude and the 
radical/risk-taking aspect of parenthood, both of which are necessary if youngsters are 
to be safeguarded from dangers but also enabled to take risks and to learn from these.(25) 
It might be argued that these comparisons raise again the question as to whether the 
parent-child model of guardianship is for application by analogy or whether actual 
parental functions are at the heart of the guardianship idea.
Social Casework: Informal Guardianship within Social Work
Given the family context within which the care of mentally ill people is best approached, 
including the issue of absent, defaulting or rejecting families, there are some important 
areas of similarity and difference between the role of guardian and social worker, i.e. as
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between a guardian social worker and a social worker working with this care group 
outside the statutory framework.
Authority: Guardianship and Social Work
Social workers qua social workers and guardian social workers share the characteristic 
of being authority figures, though with some important differences. As both are 
employed by social services departments, there is a line of accountability and 
responsibility as between the social worker and a social services committee which invests 
social workers with delegated authority, though in the case of guardian social workers 
this is more explicit and prescribed in relation to an individual client. Non-guardian 
social workers can acquire this prescriptive authority through statutory interventions other 
than guardianship, as for example when undertaking compulsory hospital admissions. 
Nevertheless, social workers often resist being cast in the role of an authority figure 
because they feel that this approach may be damaging to the relationship with the client 
or the client’s family in undermining constructive or enabling work which seems to 
minimalise the status difference between social worker and client. Explicitly there may 
also be attempts to avoid engendering transference phenomena and to avoid creating or 
perpetuating dependency between clients and social workers.
By contrast, the guardian is in an authority position which is both unequivocal and 
continuous, being the essential component within the structure of guardianship. Attempts 
by guardian social workers to make explicit a more limited basis of authority than the 
three ‘essential* powers enjoined on them by the legislation, may be harder to achieve 
than for non-guardian social workers. The need for a limited form of guardianship which 
is facilitative and enabling is often mentioned as a means of reducing both the dependency 
level and inappropriate paternal attitudes which may otherwise occur.(26) There is no 
explicit recognition of the role of guardianship in a developmental mode, though this 
function is clearly expected of parents.
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Parental Substitute Role: Guardians and Social Workers
Situations arise where both guardians and social workers act as family substitutes or 
facilitate access to a substitute family for the client. Both have to contend with the fact 
that clients may be prone to rejection by families because of their behaviour or attitudes 
and may need help to re-assert their position within the family, while at the other extreme 
the client’s family may be judged to be the pathological factor as whole or part cause of 
the client’s difficulty. In both examples, avoidance of further social rejection could often 
be a shared aim of guardians and social workers. Both may face the fact that their clients 
can experience rejection by their families in traumatic circumstances, as for instance 
when a client’s planned discharge from hospital cannot be taken forward because the 
family are unable or unwilling to cope with the return of the client which will upset a 
new-found equilibrium. Where family care has failed in this actually or potentially 
damaging way, guardianship might be seen as a more explicit counter-balance in its 
emphasis on continuity, structure and in making formal requirements of the client’s 
lifestyle.
Neither guardians nor social workers are likely to wish to act themselves as alternatives 
to family, other than on a short-term basis, but it may be that private guardians are 
chosen because they can provide either a substitute family themselves or are seen as a 
means of maintaining the existing family link, i.e. by strengthening the standing of the 
family member in question. No empirical data is available to verify this.
On the other hand, the Scottish family fostering arrangements, where carers are also 
guardians, provides an illustration of guardianship which can be seen both as an 
expression of good natural parenting as well as the best alternative to good natural 
parenting. These arrangements are monitored by the Mental Welfare Commission for 
Scotland (27/28/29) and it would seem that the criteria for good guardianship is the degree 
to which it resembles good family care, i.e. with as few distinctions as are practicable 
between the position of the client and those of other family members. Implicitly it would 
seem such assessments employ the concept of ‘good enough’ parenting as a bench mark 
for deciding whether or not certain behaviour on the part of a parent substitute/guardian 
requires attention.
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McLaughlin’s basic rationale for his ‘social work-istic’ model of guardianship (see 
page 199 onwards) is that:-
" Society through professional social workers should take over those functions that 
the family would perform if it were available and functioning." (30)
Normalisation: Guardianship and Social Work Valorization
Wolfenberger, as well as having developed thinking around the relationship between 
guardians and advocates, is usually credited with being the prime mover in propounding 
ideas on normalisation.(3l)
From these there are important messages for service providers and professionals, namely 
to ensure that their interventions and help are made available in a manner which draws 
their clients away from normal living as little as possible, thereby reducing the possibility 
of institutional dependence and stigmatisation.
Social workers working with mentally ill people may well include within their strategies 
attempts to convey to the client and key others in his/her environment that he/she can live 
a normal life with the minimum of changes which set the client apart from friends, 
neighbours, relatives etc. On the face of it, therefore, the form of intervention known 
as guardianship may seem to be at the opposite end of this spectrum in being formal, 
intrusive and explicitly demanding of the client’s co-operation, and many social workers 
would probably view this and all other kinds of statutory intervention in clients’ lives in 
much the same way.
It could nevertheless be argued that any form of intervention, however formalised, which 
prevents a client having to live in the artificial environment of the institution is a step 
towards normalisation and this objective could be a shared one between guardianship and 
ordinary social work strategy. In short, because guardianship can be used as an 
alternative to an institutional environment for certain clients, this in itself is a step 
towards normalisation, however many other factors need to be tended to in order to 
support this arrangement.
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The latter views have been taken particularly seriously in Alberta, Canada, where Section 
II of the Dependent Adults Act, 1978, includes the proviso that:-
"A guardian shall exercise his power and authority...in such a way as to 
encourage the dependant adult to become capable of caring for himself and of 
making reasonable judgments in respect of matters relating to the person...."
Thus, according to Christie,(32) "the principles involved in the implementation of the 
guardianship order therefore parallel those involved in normalisation".
Normalisation and Residential Care
One ‘normalisation’ assumption behind guardianship could be that any residential 
requirement on behalf of the client is intended to achieve, maintain or be a step towards 
normal family life. Looking to the legislation or statutory rules to confirm this is not 
particularly helpful, as these refer only to the need to exercise "control over patient’s 
place of residence"(33) and good practice assumptions have therefore to be made. The 
position becomes much more contentious where guardians have definite duties to place 
clients in residential care (possibly including hospital) as, for example, in America.
This issue comes to the fore for clients under guardianship placed in residential care 
where the authority of the head of the institution vis-a-vis that of the guardian is 
questioned, as for example in the maintenance of discipline or in the avoidance of 
absconding. Some heads of residential establishments see themselves as being de facto 
guardians of residents, and in the USA and elsewhere this responsibility may be 
statutorily recognised. The form of collective guardianship operating in Gheel, Belgium 
(see page 374) provides an example where the head of the community is defined as 
guardian of every member.
A related issue concerns clients placed in social services residential units who then 
become the responsibility of residential social workers (possibly with the implication of 
the case actually being closed by the original social worker) but in other respects the 
work of guardians and the work of social workers may proceed in parallel with the
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institutional phase. From the point of view of these arguments, it is misleading to see 
social workers and guardians as providing a service which is an alternative to institutional 
care though this may clearly be an objective in certain circumstances, e.g. where the 
client can be sustained in the community given other key supports and where the social 
worker or guardian can access those supports. The question then arises as to whether the 
guardian is in a better position to access such support, i.e. whether the statutory position 
of the guardian does or should signal a need for prioritised care (services) on the quid pro 
quo basis referred to above.
THE THERAPEUTIC MODEL OF GUARDIANSHIP AND CASE MANAGEMENT 
Introduction
This view of guardianship sees the guardian as representing society’s interests towards 
people with mental illness in two related ways: to contribute to the social control of 
mental illness, seen basically as a form of deviance; and to assume the role of agent in 
imposing therapeutic/welfare services where necessary - the impact of which is likely to 
make the client more socially acceptable. There is clearly a relationship between 
‘control’ and ‘management’ and the social work tasks of resource mobiliser combined 
with that of agent of social regulation could be described together as a particular form 
of ‘case management’.
Within the therapeutic (case management) model the imposition of hospital care and 
treatment does not logically stand outside the range of services that could be imposed 
through guardianship. There is a strong case, not pursued further in this paper, for 
seeing the tasks of ASWs in compulsorily admitting people to psychiatric hospitals as in 
many ways similar but in otherwise failing to meet other guardianship criteria derived 
from the other models, in particular the advocacy and enabling roles.
Theories of social control differ fundamentally according to political and ideological 
positions, though some common ground might be assumed to support the proposition that
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the social control of the behaviour generally referred to as mental illness is the combined 
task of families, law enforcement agencies and the medical profession.
Discussion of the interaction between people deemed to be mentally ill and their families 
has already been provided; the task of this section is to concentrate on distinctive 
features and implications of the therapeutic model of guardianship.
The difference between the therapeutic and the parent/child models might appear 
self-evident. However, although the therapeutic model is not based on substituted 
judgement it remains firmly linked with the legal basis for guardianship. This is 
expressed through what Bean refers to as ‘therapeutic law’,(34) i.e. basic codes and 
ground rules, rather than formal law, which enable the professions to effectively curtail 
people’s liberties when exercising their discretionary powers of compulsion within broad 
criteria laid down in the legislation.
Criteria for and Justification of the Therapeutic Model
Frolick infers that the therapeutic model of guardianship is based on the imposition of 
treatment, care and social services, justified by the assumption that cure may result from 
exposing the person to these forms of social control. The criterion is neither substituted 
judgement nor best interests, in-so-far as the latter applies in an individualised sense, 
since guardians will not necessarily know the relevant wishes of the person prior to their 
becoming mentally ill and cannot claim to be able to assemble the ‘package’ of treatment 
around the unique requirements of the individual. It could be said instead that this form 
of guardianship is justified on a generalised best interests criterion derived empirically,
i.e.on previous experience with certain kinds of depression or certain kinds of mental 
health problem. In short, care managers impose services/treatment because there is a 
sufficient body of knowledge suggesting that their effect is beneficial - individually, 
familially and socially. Such impositions, however, do not necessarily over-rule the 
wishes of the individual or discount client’s preferences.
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Case Management Versus Care Management
An outline of the connection between case/care management and social work has been 
offered at page 169. It is particularly important for the analysis of the therapeutic model 
of guardianship alongside a comparison of roles of social workers in social services 
departments, to underline the distinction between case management and care management. 
This is best undertaken following a brief reference to models of case management.
Various models of case management have been identified/35* It is outside the scope of 
this paper to compare these models in detail with those described as applicable to 
guardianship; or to single out case management models which attempt to cater specifically 
for the needs of people with mental illness, as has been undertaken by Onyett.(36) 
Broadly, however, it is assumed that models that emphasise the individual 
worker/individual agency basis for case management (as distinct for the joint/multi 
agency models or brokerage) conform most closely to guardianship principles.(37)
By this model criterion the case manager is seen as combining his or her other tasks with 
a definite commitment towards recognising the needs of the individual, ensuring that 
these needs are met and maintaining individual contact. The care manager, on the other 
hand, whilst not acting contrary to this intent, is more likely to be concerned with 
management systems, i.e. ensuring that assessments take place, that purchasing 
arrangements are in place and that adequate provider services are available, than in 
pursuing a direct care relationship with the client. The significance of the change of 
terminology during the post-Griffiths debate on community care is not considered in 
detail here though it is interesting to observe that three directors of social services 
discussing this issue at a conference each rejected the term ‘case manager’ as conveying 
the sense of being too concerned with the management of the individual so as to appear 
to be ‘taking over’ and restricting client authority/38* As this is frequently the position 
in which social work guardians find themselves, it seems honest and appropriate to refer 
to them as case managers, though it should be noted that the case management intention 
with regard to people with mental illness is not to exclude choice or impose on the person
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any more than is needful in terms of diagnosed (ie. assessed) mental illness on the basis 
of criteria discussed below.
The rationale for guardianship as individualised case management has its essential starting 
point in the research findings of Stein and Test. These stress, among other things, the 
need for an individualised approach, with a high level of continuity by a co-ordinator of 
some degree of standing, in order to ensure services are effectively delivered. Such a 
description could be seen to fit the credentials of the surrogate advocate who, besides his 
or her other tasks, keeps the needs of the client to the forefront and ensures that needs 
are met as best as possible without invidious comparison with the needs of other clients 
or with agency policies aimed at rationing resources.
Stein and Test’s broad conclusion was that it is the manner in which services are 
provided rather than their face value which is most important. They stress that services 
for this care group should be provided in an individualised/personalised way, assertively 
if necessary, in order to provide a firm structure and consistency in care, on an on-going 
basis if needed, rather than by one-off or episodic interventions. These approaches share 
the characteristic of being explicit strategies for the care of mentally ill people which may 
be expected to both avoid inappropriate institutional care, and rejection by family or 
wider social rejection in the community.(39)
One assumption behind the advantages of providing case management within the 
guardianship framework would be that the social work guardian would be able to 
effectively prioritise the client on behalf of the agency against competing needs of other 
clients. Other social workers may find it hard, if not impossible, to prioritise on the 
basis of need and to that extent may be constrained from providing the individualised 
service which they would no doubt prefer to offer. In theory, guardianship is nothing 
if not individualised in this sense, and private guardianship arrangements would seem to 
make this point explicitly in that there may not be other clients of the guardian with 
whom to compete.
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The ‘Least Restrictive Alternative’ and the ‘Most Beneficial Alternative*
The following brief discussion of the doctrine (or principle) of the ‘least restrictive 
alternative’ acknowledges wide-spread acceptance of the view that care and treatment of 
people with mental illness should take place in the most appropriate environment for that 
purpose (officially endorsed in S.3(2) (a) and (b) Mental Health Act, 1983); that such 
environments will not limit the person’s freedom more than is necessary to make such 
care and treatment effective.
The view of guardianship as a least restrictive alternative in this general sense is tacitly 
accepted by a number of commentators, though more often with some qualifications. 
Henkel, for example, considers this to be true only where there is real scope for client 
choice - both as a right of access to preferred services and as a goal promoted though the 
skills and motivation of social workers/40* This view is close to the original Gostin 
formulation concerned with the need for a ‘facilitative’ view of guardianship/40 as 
endorsed by Millington/42* which is seen as marking the key distinction between using 
compulsion as an aid to the client and using compulsion ‘against’ the client.
Although the idea of guardianship specifically as an alternative to hospital care is 
popularly promoted, a basic difficulty stands in the way of evaluating this when placed 
alongside the discussion of definition (pages 48 to 54) in which guardianship and hospital 
are compared. This analysis sought to establish that the two institutions are very distinct 
and comparable only in two narrowly confined contexts. Firstly, it was noted that 
guardianship and commitment laws are mutually exclusive only as regards applicability 
of Sections 7 and 3 of the Mental Health Act, 1983, so that admission of patients to 
hospital under guardianship is sustainable under all other sections as well as with 
voluntary admissions. Secondly, it was indicated that an assessment of an individual 
client might indicate that hospital and guardianship were actual alternatives either 
preventively, where guardianship arrangements could avoid the necessity for admission, 
or on an aftercare basis, where guardianship might enable a person to be discharged from 
hospital sooner than would otherwise be the case.
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The remainder of this discussion therefore considers the basis for comparing 
restrictiveness as related specifically to the situation of individuals where guardianship 
and hospital are realistic alternatives.
On the individual level, the idea of assembling a range of services around the care needs 
of a person who has previously had a long period of care in hospital, and who may well 
be unused to the idea of making an informed choice between one service and another, 
could be a formidable task in itself. Using guardianship constructively in such 
circumstances, could make an important difference. However, if used to reduce choices 
and impose services, in the name of providing an alternative to hospital, it could serve 
as a negation of good psychiatric rehabilitation. It nevertheless would be more realistic 
to think of guardianship objectives in terms of ‘an alternative to hospital* for one 
particular client, given good assessment and a wide range of available resources, than to 
think of framing a policy objective for guardianship in a social services department 
around this goal.
Agreed practice guidance between agencies locally could no doubt be assembled to make 
for a clearer understanding of the role of guardianship and the availability of resources 
(of all kinds) to make these objectives realistic. Meanwhile one way forward may be to 
create multi-disciplinary assessment panels for guardianship. American experience has 
suggested that their legal instrument for setting guardianship in motion, namely a court 
hearing, is made much more effective where the court is advised by a multi-disciplinary 
panel of professionals who have individually and collectively reached a view on which 
resources the client will need in order to remain out of hospital and what degree of 
enforcement may be necessary to make these arrangements workable.(43/44)
Critics of the underlying assumptions of the benefits of guardianship have suggested that 
though it poses in the guise of a less restrictive alternative to hospital and institutional 
care it can actually be imposed on individuals in such a way as to be more restrictive for 
the client.(45) This can happen in four ways:
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1. The allegedly restrictive environments imposed in psychiatric hospitals can, 
for particular individuals, become an environment in which the client is enabled 
to express him/herself without being constrained by family members whose 
presence is unavoidable in the community.
2. The rules set down by the guardian concerning the client’s behaviour and 
activities can be more intrusive in a personal sense than general rules governing 
behaviour on psychiatric admission units.*
3. As well as being more intrusive, the impositions within guardianship can 
be more open-ended and less sensitive about what is normally acceptable. For 
example, a guardian may work on an unfounded supposition that the client suffers 
in the company of a certain family member, and proceed to restrict or ban such 
company; nursing staff on a hospital unit are more likely to operate 
pragmatically.*
4. Guardianship measures can be used as, for example is the case in some 
parts of the USA, to circumvent the due process requirements for civil 
commitment, thus depriving clients of certain safeguards. However, the situation 
in the USA is likely to change when the law is modified to ensure that people do 
not become compulsorily admitted to hospital without indications of incompetence.
A common theme in these arguments is that while for some people, guardianship is by 
definition less restrictive than admission to hospital; for others, guardianship (potentially 
at any rate) is more restrictive, being more pernicious and open-ended. There may be 
an assumption behind this argument that all methods of social control that apply to 
deviant groups in society (but in this case focussed on the mentally ill) are unduly 
restrictive or oppressive in their treatment and care of these groups, being based on a 
punitive or semi-punitive approach. A number of arguments about the use of psychiatric 
hospitals as the ultimate ‘sanction’ for control of mentally ill people contain the notion
* The assumption in both these instances is that the authority of guardians is effectively delegated to 
medical authority while the person is in hospital as regards day-to-day case management. There is no 
evidence to support or counter this view, but see ‘Definition’ discussion on comparison between 
guardianship and hospital, pages 48 to 54.
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that compulsory psychiatric in-patient care is a form of punishment, specially when linked 
with a means of access provided through compulsory admission.
The doctrine of the least restrictive alternative has been subject to criticisms, for example 
by Bachrach.(46) One theme from these criticisms is that the doctrine assumes a 
predisposition to place mentally ill people in unduly restrictive environments when in fact 
no such assumption is justified. Restrictive environments, especially the literally 
restrictive regimes of secure units and withdrawal rooms etc, are a scarce resource and 
ones which are expensive to run and maintain for individual clients/patients. The less 
restrictive the environment, the less resource intensive it tends to be, and the ultimate in 
least restrictive environments is ordinary life in the community, with only as much access 
to medical/psychiatric care as is normally obtainable through the services of the general 
practitioner. Manifestly, for some people higher degrees of restrictiveness are required, 
but this should not be equated with negative discrimination. On the contrary, their 
requirements for restrictive care may well coincide with resource intensive inputs of 
psychiatric treatment from which the person may be expected to benefit to a far greater 
degree than in the less restrictive environment. It would therefore be more appropriate 
to view this situation as a form of positive rather than negative discrimination and 
likewise to consider the punitive view as a misplaced assumption.
It needs to be reiterated that the position of guardianship in these debates is equivocal, 
depending on its meaning and position for individual clients subject to the guardianship 
arrangements. Clearly, for some people the restrictive element relates not to particular 
forms of care but to the very open-ended or potentially constraining elements that might 
form their particular guardianship package of care. For others, the mere existence of an 
arrangement whereby a guardian as a personal carer/arranger acts in the best interests of 
the client, means that restrictiveness will be no more or less than is needful for a client 
at any one time. Neither of these alternatives excludes the possibility of the client him 
herself being involved in the negotiations, both in determining how various forms of care 
will be perceived in terms of both restrictiveness and preferred movements from one kind 
of facility to another - again assuming a personal guardian/carer acting in the client’s best 
interests.
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As a shorthand way of expressing the questioning of the thinking behind the doctrine of 
the least restrictive alternative, the alternative expression, the Most Beneficial 
Alternative,(47) has been ‘coined’ to make the point that restrictiveness may or may not 
be beneficial or needful in given circumstances and should not therefore be viewed as an 
inherently negative attribute.
‘Net-Widening’: Guardianship as a ‘More Coercive Alternative’
Guardianship is criticised for its role in extending the scope of social control because of 
an assumption that use will involve greater resort to compulsion as against other non- 
coercive measures. There is no evidence from existing data in the UK of a trend in this 
direction, i.e of guardianship being used in place of informal admission to hospital or of 
care in the community provided on a voluntary basis. The anxiety stems from the 
concept of ‘net-widening’ articulated by Van Dusen in the USA who suggests that one 
consequence of deinstitutionalisation will be to bring more people within the ambit of 
other forms of statutory control.(48)
Conceivably, a form of net-widening could occur if increased use of guardianship was 
resulting from a broadening of the criteria by which guardianship applications are based. 
If, in particular, guardianship was to be used increasingly to impose services on 
individuals, whether or not the recipients were found to be mentally ill by psychiatric 
assessment, and were deemed instead to require guardianship on basic welfare grounds 
alone, this could be the outcome. This prospect relates to the situation which some 
describe as hospitals being used inappropriately to provide necessary care and attention 
for people who would be provided for better by community services but where, in the 
absence of statutorily enforced community care, such people have to be compulsorily 
admitted to hospital. In other words, compulsory admission to hospital then arises not 
from the particular needs of the person to be in hospital, but the need to receive care and 
attention in the absence of such care and attention in the community. Compulsion is 
required because the person will not, of their own free will, agree to enter hospital. The 
person may, quite reasonably argue that they should not need to enter hospital to receive 
care or services which should be available outside.
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A further example of net-widening might occur if guardianship powers were extended to 
include compulsory treatment in the community, and questions about the desirability of 
such a development have already been discussed, see pages 144 onwards.
‘Net-widening’ can be criticised for an over-sensitive presumption that increasing use of 
compulsory powers is against the general interests of the class of people referred to as 
mentally ill. If all people defined by these means remained subject to compulsory 
powers, as generally applied prior to 1930, one would necessarily give urgent attention 
to the appropriateness of the services provided and ask whether the compulsory element 
was not related to a negative evaluation of the quality of the services by people with 
mental illness. It is possibly true, but difficult to test, that the extension of good quality 
community services would reduce the need for compulsion. * A similar argument could 
be advanced for the need to increase the quantity, range, accessibility and availability of 
all services, including hospitals, since if people with mental illness could have choice and 
ready access to such services without stigma or other difficulties, they would be more 
likely to have confidence in their efficacy and to value access to them accordingly.
Speculatively, it could nevertheless be asserted that the need for guardianship (given an 
ideal quality and quantity of services) would still remain since there will be people who 
are so uncertain or ambivalent about receiving any therapeutically intended service that 
refusal will occur at some stage, probably unrelated to the point at which a service might 
objectively be judged to have outlived its usefulness. In other words, only by asserting 
that people with mental illness should not be subjected to the social control of imposed 
services, however effective they may be, can one envisage a situation where guardianship 
would not be needed.
The Therapeutic Capacity of Social Services
Social services could be considered as having only an ancillary role compared with that 
of the health service in the care and treatment of people with mental illness. This does
It is interesting to note however that such a view would contradict the prediction of the Royal 
Commission, which was that use of guardianship would increase proportionately as the range of 
services for people with mental illness was broadened and extended.
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not imply a judgement that all health service provision is always appropriately consistent 
and continuous as against social services inputs of an episodic and uncommitted quality, 
but social services have little incentive to undertake long-term work with people in the 
community with chronic mental illness problems as against relatively clear cut statutory 
on-going responsibilities towards children and families. Possibly, newly introduced 
assessment arrangements in social services will be influencing or modifying this situation 
as and when community care policies are fully implemented.
Guardianship could be seen as challenging social services not only to provide a 
therapeutic input but also continuity and structure for as long as clients need them. 
However, taking the example of residential care staff, it may well be found that 
assessment criteria applied to selecting residents in the first place effectively excludes 
people who require therapeutic input, other than medication. It might also be true more 
generally that creating a guardianship relationship with a client immediately presupposes 
the availability of a therapeutic input, thereby acting as a further rationing device, and 
keeping guardianship numbers low.
The position of social workers operating special guardianship (guardianship which, for 
certain clients, would include compulsory treatment in the community) would fall neatly 
between the health service responsibility towards persons admitted to hospital and the 
responsibility of ASWs towards clients on guardianship, in that the sanction to enforce 
powers of compulsory treatment in the community will rest with the health service rather 
than social services, and thereby possibly challenge the idea of guardianship being a 
social services responsibility.
McLAUGHLIN’s ‘SOCIAL WORK-ISTIC’ MODEL OF GUARDIANSHIP
McLaughlin offers a critique of a ‘social work-istic’ model of Guardianship, which 
actually questions the location of guardianship within social work agencies - i.e. agencies 
who employ social workers to act as de facto guardians.(49) McLaughlin’s criticisms are 
on four main grounds:-
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1. There is an inherent conflict of interests, both between the needs of the 
client and the needs of the agency (particularly acute where funding sources are 
competing with each other); and the interests of one client (on guardianship) can 
conflict with those of other clients. Translated into social services terms within 
England and Wales, the implication would be that the social work guardian acting 
for a client in his/her best interests conflicts with agency policy or with a 
management approach to, for example, use of a particular scarce resource; 
likewise a guardian social worker providing care for one client may find that by 
prioritising the needs of this client he/she thereby puts these resources further out 
of reach of other clients whose needs may be as great.
2. Delegated guardianship authority, i.e. from heads of agencies to social 
workers, causes "substantial weakening of the accountability of guardians", the 
implication of which would be that guardian social workers see their mainline 
accountability being towards management rather than clients, whether or not the 
client is on guardianship.
3. Guardian social work is prone to discontinuity of personal relationships 
(i.e. exactly the opposite outcome to a basic guardianship assumption) which is 
predominantly due to staff turnover at social worker level in social services 
agencies. McLaughlin points out that if a due process was in place, the head of 
a social work agency would in this event have to bring his guardianship clients 
back to the court for the work to be reassigned, whereas in a social services 
department all that would happen is that the social worker’s caseload would get 
handed over to another social worker (and given the situation known to exist in 
some social services departments, individual cases may not even be reallocated in 
this way - though hopefully guardianship cases would be).
4. Guardianship clients are said to be more likely to be subjected to 
institutionalised care than other clients with similar characteristics and needs, due 
to guardian social workers’ cautious inclination towards use of protective services. 
In other words, where guardianship clients are at risk, a social worker is more 
likely to remove clients from the risk, and thereby protect him/herself from
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criticism, than to allow the client to weather the difficulty in the ordinary way. 
Such a situation is especially likely where social workers are also the "gatekeepers 
to the institutions".
At first sight it is difficult to recognise the sort of problem identified in (4) above 
applying directly to the social services situation in England and Wales, not least because 
of known difficulties in arranging admission of mentally ill guardianship clients to scarce 
residential care resources belonging to social services. However, if one took a long 
enough time-span to observe these manoeuvres, and included in them access to residential 
care provided by the independent sector and other agencies to which social workers could 
gain access,there may well be an observable trend in this direction. Furthermore, there 
is a striking parallel between this view and current criticism of social workers involved 
in child protection work, namely that they may be predisposed to remove such children 
from their homes - not because of objective evidence of child abuse but in order to ensure 
the record shows them as having observed all due precautions.
In summary, McLaughlin has caricatured the guardian social worker as one who sees 
guardianship as a form of care management by which services can be imposed on clients, 
whether they are in essential need of them or not, because of the intrusion of 
self-protective motives on the part of social workers and/or social services management.
Echoing a number of McLaughlin’s concerns from a British perspective, Millington notes 
that:
"The ASW is, however, an employee of the local social services authority and 
may find the extent to which he can exercise his independent, impartial judgement 
constrained by his employers if they operate a blanket policy of refusing to accept 
people into guardianship or if they are unable to do so [through resource 
constraints....] If there was a statutory requirement to provide resources for 
persons subject to guardianship, authorities could not refuse to accept applications 
[for such reasons....] Those authorities which are disinclined to accept people into 
guardianship are not operating in accordance with the spirit of the legislation. "(50)
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More specifically, Brown points to the number of parties and interests who need to be 
represented in the processing of guardianship within social services as conceivably 
involving:
"1. a social worker;
2. an Approved Social Worker who may or may not be the social worker
involved in the case;
3. the Director of Social Services who in accordance with the Mental Health
(Hospital, Guardianship and Consent to Treatment) Regulations 1983
represents the local social services authority and when appropriate, 
becomes [technically] the guardian;
4. a private guardian. "(5l)
Brown could have gone on to mention that elected members of social services committees 
are required to be consulted if a guardianship order is to be discharged before expiry 
date. He might also have noted that in between the ASW and the director of social 
services is usually two or three layers of management who, whether or not formally 
involved, will expect to be consulted and briefed on the nature of the application and the 
reason why the social worker is pursuing it. He does, however, pinpoint the conflict of 
interest in-so-far as the client?* needs are concerned in that "the local authority can in 
effect, be applicant, guardian and landlord [of the residential establishment within which 
the client is expected to reside]", and he compares arrangements in England and Wales 
unfavourably with those applicable in Scotland, seeing:
"benefits of having guardianship matters considered in court where the client can be 
legally represented. It could be argued that the English system, where applications 
are made to a social services department by an approved social worker, employed 
by the same department, with no client representation, does not promote natural 
justice. "(52)
Professional Social Work Values and Practice Issues
To many observers, guardianship raises serious ethical questions about the use of 
compulsion and the imposition of care in the guise of acting in the client’s ‘best 
interests’. Bedi is particularly concerned on these matters, as exemplified by the needs
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of those clients whose mental health is very variable and where their capacity to decide 
for themselves fluctuates. His specific concern is the use of statutory powers to 
anticipate a situation in which the authority of guardianship will be required. He regards 
this use of guardianship as inappropriately pre-emptive, as when considering the position 
of:
"...those clients who are stable for most of the time but who have a cyclic history 
of unstable episodes and become difficult to get hold of or handle (sic).... After all, 
is one justified in taking a Guardianship order on someone who is quite stable on the 
chance that they may not be so at some time in the future? If the answer is yes, 
then is six months [the period of the order] long enough to make such monitoring 
effective? In addition to this, what criteria for the renewal of an order will a local 
social services authority accept, as a matter of policy? "(53>
Bedi, anticipating greater use of guardianship to facilitate the placement of elderly people 
in residential accommodation, expresses misgivings as to whether this is "either 
professionally or morally justified". Grudgingly, however, he admits that "it is true, both 
historically and in the future (sic), that guardianship orders are effective in this area of 
social work".
Bedi appears to echo a general anxiety about the use of guardianship for elderly people 
(for these reasons and others) which are further discussed below under Innovative and 
Controversial Uses of Guardianship.
Basically, Bedi sees guardianship as being in conflict with certain key social work values, 
namely ‘respect for persons’ and ‘client self determination’. It is true that there is a 
notable absence of guidance or discussion from the professional association, the British 
Association of Social Workers, concerning the relationship between social work values, 
practice principles and the role and function of a social worker acting as de facto 
Guardian for a mentally ill person.
Such guidance is on record as having been requested by a group of BASW members as 
far back as July 1985 when a news item in Social Work Today(S4) reported on a 
"controversy over the use of Guardianship and social work with the mentally disordered 
[which] has prompted the British Association of Social Workers Special Interest Group
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on Mental Health Issues to seek out members’ views through an item in BASW News. 
The response identified "areas of concern among mental health practitioners" of which 
the following were the principle:
"The amount of persuasion that can be used to direct clients to live in a 
particular place if they do not wish to co-operate."
"The use of Guardianship for elderly mentally infirm people."
"The granting of powers under Guardianship with very little sanction with which 
to exercise the powers."
"Problems with time-delay between the Director of Social Services accepting 
Guardianship and the Social Services Sub-Committee endorsing it."
"The ASW may be presented with a conflict between the necessity of acting in 
the best interests of the clients, and the demands of the role of Guardian and 
Advocate."
Representation from the professional practice divisional committee of BASW to approach 
MIND, MHAC and relevant Universities was sought "to establish a group to oversee 
research [into the use of Guardianship] and to encourage the provision of funding to 
monitor this section of the Mental Health Act. "(55) No such activity has taken place.
Although BASW have held conferences and workshops on these (alongside other) practice 
aspects of the Mental Health Act, specific discussions related to guardianship have not 
been written up or reported. Contributors to BASW’s most recent relevant publication 
confine comment on guardianship to two brief observations, describing it, on the one 
hand, "as a way of commanding a degree of priority [for elderly people] for both social 
work support and the provision of services [as an alternative to hospital]" and, on the 
other, as a "little known or understood [alternative to compulsory treatment orders]",(56)
Innovative and Controversial Uses of Guardianship
A number of journal articles have focused on the particular use of guardianship for the 
care of elderly people, dividing their attention broadly between maintenance of elderly 
people at home and placement of such people into residential care straight from hospital.
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Use of guardianship to assist in the maintenance of elderly people at home has drawn 
attention to some interesting and important practical concerns, such as the authority of 
the guardian to have a key to the client’s front door in order to sustain appropriate access 
to care services. Also, discussions are offered on ways of working with clients who 
frequently endanger themselves and others by such means as leaving gas cookers turned 
on.(57) There is general endorsement for guardianship as a means of helping in work with 
clients who are demented or dementing with particular reference to lack of connection 
between guardianship and the Court of Protection in order for guardianship to be used 
as an auxiliary measure for protecting the client’s affairs and property.(58/59/60)
The placement of elderly people into Part III accommodation is criticised on ethical and 
policy grounds as being an abuse of the power and as, at least in some cases, being 
actually illegal where guardianship is used as a power to convey. It is also seen as being 
in contradiction of the Code of Practice injunction that guardianship should not be used 
in these limited ways but only as part of a total care package. There is nevertheless some 
counter-argument to the effect that guardianship has a definite place in preventing clients 
returning to uncared for situations in the community. Again, this is not peculiar to 
elderly people but is more often discussed with their needs in mind. By implication, 
there is the parallel argument that younger people, such as those suffering from 
schizophrenia, could also benefit from rehabilitation being put in hand through 
guardianship to enable more satisfactorily supervised aftercare arrangements to be 
sustained.
Perhaps the most telling reservation about use of guardianship for people who appear to 
be dementing is the one advanced by Bedi(61) with regard to pre-emptive use.. It is not 
to deny the prognostic skills of geriatricians and other professionals in the field, to 
wonder with Bedi at what point it becomes ethically justifiable to make assumptions about 
a client’s capacity to care for themselves ceasing at a given time in the future.
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Social Work Training and Skills
Following from the above, there are a number of comments in the literature about the 
absence of a particular training prescription in the use of guardianship. As Brown 
says,(62) this should necessarily avoid being separated off from skills in mental health 
work generally but should be clearly located within the range of skills required to work 
with this care group, while being firmly connected with an understanding of the 
appropriate use of authority and its relationship to a particular form of advocacy. Such 
gaps in training appear to apply both during qualifying courses and in ASW training.
Bean has pointed out that there is a vicious circle created by a lack of appropriate 
experience of guardianship by social workers, causing them to be reluctant to take on 
guardianship responsibilities.(63) Gunn observes that training deficiencies are not peculiar 
to social work practitioners but are also to be found among social work managers, giving 
rise to a generally guarded or sceptical management viewpoint.(64)
As earlier outlined, McLaughlin (considering Canadian experience), questions the 
capacity of social workers to provide the necessary continuity implicit within the 
guardianship framework.(65) With continuity could probably also be linked structure and 
individualised care, offered in as assertive a way as is necessary for the individual, thus 
connecting these points with the broader observations from the findings of Stein and 
Test.(66)
In short, there is a continuing question mark over the ability of social services in general 
and social workers in particular to function at an optimum therapeutic level to provide 
the necessary ingredients for an effective guardianship package. This may well apply 
both to specific guardianship arrangements under the Mental Health Act and casework 
with this care group which may carry some of the same elements, albeit on a less 
formalised basis - i.e. informal guardianship.
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Availability to Social Workers of Policy and Practice Guidance
The combined impact of the various Codes of Practice referred to above (Chapter III) 
suggests that policy and practice guidance in the use of guardianship is necessary to help 
prospective applicants consider both positive and negative outcomes, and that the measure 
should be part of, or an expression of, the assembly of a care package applicable to the 
particular needs of the individual. Spelling out this latter prescription is tantamount to 
discouraging would-be applicants to apply for guardianship before having given wider 
consideration to the client’s care needs and must receive universal applause. On the other 
hand, it could be seen as yet a further disincentive to put guardianship as a first option 
priority within a strategy for providing a range of services.
In short, there is lack of guidance on the essential question as to whether guardianship 
should be used to provide access to services which the client would not otherwise receive 
- either because of their own unwillingness or because of the authority’s reluctance 
to prioritise access to that client. The official literature has specified that, of 
itself, guardianship does not automatically provide for prioritised service provision or 
accessl67) However, it might be appropriate if future guidance re-stated this in positive 
terms, i.e. that guardianship arrangements could be used to prioritise service provision 
to a client where this is justifiable in terms of client need. Brown, examining a selection 
of guidance documents provided by social services departments to social workers, 
comments that their stress on the need for available resources to be in place before a 
guardianship order can be considered, leads eventually "to produce a service-led approach 
rather than a needs-led approach".(68) As matters stand, however, guardians’ statutory 
powers are framed entirely in terms of powers towards the client and are not directed 
towards gaining access to the agency’s own resource allocation system.
Although the Codes of Practice provided by the Department of Health could take social 
workers some of the way towards making appropriate use of guardianship, this can only 
be of limited value without endorsement and development by individual local authorities. 
In practice this requires social services management to make plain the terms and 
conditions related both to the process of applying for guardianship and for the sustaining
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of the order once in force. The remainder of this chapter therefore focusses on the 
interaction between social workers and social services management as the underwriters 
of guardianship, without which social workers’ decisions carry little or no weight.
GUARDIANSHIP, SOCIAL WORK AND THE POSITION OF SOCIAL 
SERVICES DEPARTMENTS
Historical/Conceptual Problems
Social services departments have been required to adjust to the differences between 
guardianship under the 1959 Act and the 1983 Act but, as has already been demonstrated, 
the conceptual definition of guardianship was by no means made clear in 1959. Added 
to this, is a demonstrated uncertainty as to what concept of guardianship was involved 
in the thinking about the relevance of guardianship for mentally ill people in 1959 or 
since. Only the limitations of applying a strict parent/child model of guardianship for 
people with mental illness under the terms of the 1959 Act would seem to have been 
accepted. For instance, the failure to implement the form of ‘two-tier’ guardianship, 
suggested in the 1978 White Paper, leaves unanswered questions as to the component 
parts of guardianship with the independent advocacy function and the protective care 
function arguably accommodated uneasily within the same framework. Keeping them 
separate would, in Fisher’s view, have enabled them to better meet the different needs 
of clients for control as against protective advocacy.(69)
Social services departments were required to implement the 1983 Act whilst the 
alternative model formulation being put forward was by no means clear. Arguably, pre­
existing notions of the role and value of guardianship for people with mental illness 
needed to have been understood through these changes in order to stimulate fresh thinking 
in applying the concept to the care of certain mentally ill people in the 1980s and 1990s. 
For instance, is approving a guardianship order tantamount to a finding of incompetency, 
as suggested by Gostin(70) (and as assumed by this researcher) whether in a plenary sense 
or in respect to the areas of life prescribable by powers specified in Section 8 of the 
1983 Act? If so, are social services departments ipso facto in a surrogate role vis-a-vis 
the client? If the surrogate role is assumed, and additional powers become necessary in
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a particular case, for example to consent to treatment on the client’s behalf, might local 
authorities’ legal advisers suggest following the untested course outlined by Hoggett(71) 
whereby a court is requested to invoke Royal Prerogative authority, via committee of the 
person, to sanction use of compulsion?
Arguably, in the absence of a clear historical/ conceptual understanding of guardianship, 
social services departments have by default been expected to comprehend its implications 
within the narrowest sense of statutory implementation providing them at best with a 
static and incomplete view of its potential. They are faced with a set of powers of 
questionable effect with official literature emphasising a position of authority for the 
guardian which is difficult to justify even in purely legal terms. They have to contend 
with elliptical language as to the need for the client to accept the authority of the guardian 
in the first instance but which is also seen as a criteria for the effectiveness of 
guardianship.
Furthermore social services have had few incentives to develop the advocacy element 
within their guardianship practice, and functions of social services guardians are difficult 
to equate with advocates in the independent sense referred to by Wolfenberger.(72) 
Consequently, no readily available guidance is usually offered by social services 
managers to approved social workers on how to offer guardianship clients particular 
priority or continuity of care - requirements which social workers readily recognise as 
at the heart of guardianship practice.
The rare use of private guardians begs the question as to whether the private guardian is 
seen to be in a position to overcome some of these problems - i.e. by being independent 
by definition and by being able to advocate for prioritising the needs of the client. There 
may well be a balance of views between those who argue that private guardians would 
find access to the social services required to support a guardianship more difficult than 
a social services social worker, or whether the independent element would enable the 
private guardian to make demands on social services management which would be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the social services social worker to sustain. Apparently, 
only in the Scottish context has this debate been fully rehearsed,(73) but even there has 
not been translated into any form of official guidance.
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At the root of these difficulties, social services are faced with the fact that social work 
has a different historical origin to guardianship, giving rise to a number of conflicting 
expectations. Social work with this care group arguably originated with the need to 
implement the Poor Law and in this respect continues to influence a social work 
perspective within local government which is aimed at reducing the level of dependency 
of mentally ill clients on these services. Guardians, on the other hand may well see 
themselves as providing a ‘service-in-itself and of continuing to carry the advocacy role 
without reference back to the needs of ratepayers to limit their financial burden.
Statutory Powers: The Legal Basis of Guardianship and Consequences of Intervention 
Under the Mental Health Act. 1983
Part of Chapter III (page 44 onwards) set out to show that local authorities are vested 
with a wide range of powers, some mandatory others permissive, to provide services and 
care for adults who suffer from limitations of care or from specific disabilities, of a 
limited or long-term time span. They have even greater obligations towards children, and 
it is generally accepted that child care law is more fully developed to require social 
services departments to intervene to protect individual children, for example to provide 
monies to prevent children coming into care, as well as to provide a range of services for 
children in need - including children with disabilities or special problems. Adult services 
are less well developed towards a basis for individual intervention, with the Mental 
Health Act providing a partial exception to this. New legislation in the form of the 
National Health Service and Community Care Act, 1990, arguably provides a mid-way 
position between an individual interventionist approach and a care group service 
providing approach, and puts its emphasis on individual assessment and case 
management.
Social services departments have a duty under the Mental Health Act, 1983, to provide 
a sufficient number of ASWs and there is a training prescription for ASWs over and 
above Diploma in Social Work (DSW). As has been indicated in various points in this 
thesis, ASWs are most frequently the de facto guardians of mentally ill people but any 
social services employee may be assigned this task, without any necessary regard to 
training qualification or experience, by virtue of the delegatory powers of the director of
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social services. Technically, therefore, the ASW role in relation to guardianship could 
be confined to their responsibility under the Act to make applications to the director of 
social services to recommend that the/she become guardian of the client or, in certain 
cases, that a private guardian be approved. There is no requirement upon the director 
of social services to accept an ASW’s recommendation and he/she may therefore decline 
any guardianship proposal. Directors of social services have only to accept the role of 
guardian in situations where a private guardianship arrangement has broken down due to 
the death or proven unsuitability of the private guardian.
In other respects the position of social services departments with regard to guardianship 
might appear analogous to the responsibility to act and intervene in the care of individual 
children. However although this level of intervention can arise with regard to mentally 
ill adults, there is no mandatory requirement on social services department to proceed in 
any particular way. A guardianship order may be declined simply because that authority 
does not have the resources to implement the order; this could mean either that it is not 
feasible to allocate the client to the guardian social worker or that the requirements of the 
client under guardianship might appear to include residential or day care facilities which 
are in short supply, or even where staff of these services have misgivings about receiving 
a person into their care whilst on a guardianship order. Even though, as Slater has 
clearly indicated,(74) the statutory framework of service provision applicable to social 
services in the care of mentally ill people is much wider than is generally appreciated, 
the actual incentive for social services to consistently provide services at an optimum 
level for any given individual, whether on guardianship or not, is very weak.
The Mental Health Act, 1983, does not lay down an expectation of service provision 
other than by inference, and follows the same framework as the 1959 Act, even though 
the latter was brought in at a time where Government policy was intended to shift 
towards the development of community care. In comparing the two Acts, it can be 
overlooked that within months of the 1959 Act a Department of Health Circular 14/60 
(Mental Health Services) was required in order to explain to local authorities and health 
authorities that the Act was in fact intended to implement the Royal Commission’s 
recommendations for the expansion of community care. Nothing comparable has 
followed the 1983 Act, and for most commentators the achievement of this Act was not
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a further enhancement of, or a greater impetus towards, the development of community 
care but a general tightening up of civil rights with a more up-to-date approach to the 
limited use of coercion and compulsory powers generally.
There are few clear guidelines to justify intervention by means of guardianship under the 
Mental Health Act, 1983. The rationale for change of criterion for use from being ‘in 
the interests of the patient’ to ‘in the interests of the welfare of the patient’ remains 
obscure and no clarification has been forthcoming on whether invoking guardianship 
under the Act is actually or tantamount to a finding of incapacity. Consequently, neither 
social services managers nor ASWs are offered a way of approaching these issues in a 
way which would enable them to satisfactorily distinguish between the inability of the 
client to make appropriate decisions (e.g. on where to live) as against the needs of the 
agency to arrange a residential placement for a client as a way of dealing with the 
problems they face, for example, in implementing a rehabilitation programme.
Following publication of the White Paper Caring For People in 1989,(75) the 
Government set forth a consultation process to examine the implications of their proposals 
for the way services for adult care groups are planned, organised and delivered. This 
included much discussion relevant in varying degrees to guardianship, and to assessment 
and case/care management. However no specific reference to guardianship or linked 
concepts such as ‘representation’ have found their way into the National Health Service 
and Community Care Act, 1990. It may thus be assumed that the collaborative 
arrangements suggested will be ‘tacked-on’ to the care planning dialogue envisaged by 
the new legislation.
Without a recognised conceptual link between guardianship and case management, 
ambiguity remains as to the significance of the distinction between ‘class’ (or care group) 
responsibility and responsibility for individual people with mental illness. In this difficult 
area the courts have generally upheld the view that local authority responsibilities for 
service provision for mentally ill people relates to the care group as a whole and does not 
imply a particular responsibility to meet individual need, if there are legitimate 
(eg. resource) reasons for not being able to do so. Is guardianship one of these ‘services’, 
which may or may not be provided for clients according to circumstances, or does the
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use of guardianship by social services departments arise from certain contingencies 
(defined by medical and social work recommendations following assessment) which 
cannot be side-stepped even when the level of demand is judged to be too high?
Guardianship and its Resource Implications
Bedi is typical of many commentators who are sceptical of the value of guardianship as 
a long-term alternative to hospital care without parallel growth in the scale and range of 
community services. The relationship between the guardianship concept and actual 
resource commitments to underwrite it is a constant source of concern.(76)
There would seem to be two related views on the matter. The first of these points to the 
illogicality of not providing guardianship clients with some priority access to services, 
as the ultimate success of guardianship is seen as turning on appropriate use of 
community alternatives to hospital. By implication, support for Gostin’s ‘ideology of 
entitlement’ is in adherence to the quid pro quo principle, whereby the availability of 
appropriate care and services to clients is assured on a reciprocal basis for restriction of 
liberty.(77)
The second view is simpler and more practical, namely that if services are not available 
to clients on guardianship, this gives rise to a contradiction in the idea of guardianship 
being helpful to clients, as well as rendering guardians impotent to fulfil their 
functions.(78) Both points of view would seem to point to the same conclusion that 
guardianship, if it is to obtain credibility, needs to be seen as a means of enhancing 
clients’ rights rather than as a threat to these rights.
On a realistic level, a number of commentators observe that there are few incentives for 
social services departments to help put appropriate community care facilities and services 
in the way of guardianship clients and a number of obvious policy reasons for not giving 
guardianship clients priority access to such services that exist.
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The Cost of Guardianship
No systematic attempt appears to have been made to cost the implementation of 
guardianship - ip. whether viewed as a small part of assessments under the Mental Health 
Act pursued by social services, or in terms of approximate individual costs of the 
guardianship for a particular client borne by these agencies.
The only self-evident cost of guardianship is the administrative expense of the processing: 
the application and its consideration; time taken to decide and the time required to sort 
and deal with necessary documentation, together with the liaison arrangements with other 
agencies which might arise from these. After this point, the cost can only be clearly 
calculated in terms of the time required by the needs of individual clients from the 
individual de facto guardian, together with the time of those colleagues who the guardian 
requests to assist him/her. Other costs would be consequential upon actual 
implementation of guardianship powers, i.e. in determining place of attendance/day 
care/access by making services available.
Apart therefore from administrative costs, similar costs will be entailed in any substantial 
arrangements to provide care for people with mental illness where service provision was 
called for. For example, any client with a history of schizophrenia and a number of 
hospital admissions, is already a ‘resource intensive’ demand on statutory agencies, both 
in terms of the time required from social workers and others, as well as in providing 
residential and/or day care as part of the community care package. This would be so 
whether the client was on guardianship or not. Also, one might add, similar costings 
would apply whether the client could be described as being supervised by social services 
departments through informal guardianship as distinct from statutory arrangements.
In other words, apart from the formalities and the processing, there is little which 
inevitably distinguishes the cost of caring for a guardianship client from others, given a 
certain level of service provision/ availability/ access. Guardianship would be a more 
costly option only if it demanded that local authorities make services available to such 
clients by application of the principle behind the CSDP Act, 1970; on the contrary,
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however, the official literature stresses the opposite interpretation, that no individual 
resource consequences flow from taking out a guardianship order.
A more precise approach to considering the cost of guardianship might be to apply the 
concept of opportunity cost, requiring a precise idea of what would or could constitute 
an alternative to guardianship. The inappropriateness of viewing hospital care in this way 
has already been established (pages 51 to 54) not least because the statutory basis for 
guardianship does not exclude application while the client is in hospital. Conceivably 
the scope of guardianship could be limited for the purpose of a costing exercise to 
community care arrangements which are statutorily formalised and structured as distinct 
from less formal care - i.e. social casework (or informal guardianship) accessing the 
required services in the ordinary way.
Detailed hypothetical costings could be attempted using this formula but these are hardly 
necessary to visualise a situation in which the cost of providing adequate community care 
for a person through informal means might actually be greater in the long run than the 
more formal requirements of guardianship, in that a more rigorous assessment of benefit 
from community care resources (residential, day care, domiciliary care) is likely to have 
been undertaken prior to the commencement of guardianship. Furthermore, much 
informal community care is offered on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis with little attempt to 
ensure that clients who become involved, for example, in a given day care programme 
actually sustain their attendance at this programme and gain some definite benefit. 
Proper monitoring and review are more likely to take place where a client is on 
guardianship.
In some ways, therefore, the true financial cost of guardianship is best seen as the cost 
of not using guardianship, and using instead some other means of providing appropriate 
care. It can therefore only be conjectured that anxieties from social services 
management about the cost of guardianship is related to the obligation to continue 
providing services during the period of the guardianship, as distinct from the more 
episodic and fragmented arrangements that may apply to those receiving informal care. 
If this is the case, the cost comparison is less to do with the cost of guardianship per se
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than to do with the cost of providing thorough systematic and appropriate community care 
arrangements related to the needs of individuals.
If, as the Law Commission are suggesting,(79) health authorities were also to take on 
responsibility for providing guardianship, the cost could be shared between health and 
social services authorities, as would presumably be the case if special guardianship was 
introduced. There would clearly remain a serious problem in viewing the alternative to 
guardianship as hospital, i.e. with costs falling on another agency without that agency 
being party to a decision in favour of hospital rather than to pursue guardianship. The 
Law Commission’s suggestions might help to balance costs across statutory agencies but 
would be unlikely to answer the question as to how realistic it is, in terms of agency 
accountability, to regard guardianship as an alternative to hospital.
The ‘Quantity’ of Guardianship Usage
The above discussions lead to the question of whether guardianship is used sufficiently 
or not. Viewed as a purely statutory intervention, the ‘sufficiency’ of usage does not 
arise, provided right procedures and practice are adopted in respect of each individual 
ASW assessment and application. However there appears to be a normative assumption 
that a certain level of use is appropriate for each local authority as well as for England 
and Wales overall.
With such an assumption in place, wide divergence between local authorities would 
appear to suggest misinterpretation or misunderstanding by the authorities in question. 
Alternatively, criticism could be targetted at authorities at respective ends of the scale, 
i& concentrating on authorities who use guardianship ‘too much’ or those who use it ‘too 
little’. Clearly without a clear concept of the optimum amount of guardianship usage, 
such criticism merely begs the question about the objective of guardianship. 
Furthermore, a given authority seen as being in the vanguard of guardianship 
development because of consistently high numbers over a given period, may be found to 
be using guardianship ‘inappropriately’ by any reasonable standard. There have been 
suggestions, for example, that some authorities have unwittingly fallen into the mould of 
using guardianship at the behest of health authorities in a narrowly defined manner
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around the task of decanting hospital populations and endeavouring to enforce alternative 
residential care placements, especially of older people into homes for the elderly. At the 
other end of the scale, an authority with a very limited record of usage, may be tentative 
in their approach for reasons which are adequately explained locally, i.e. due to tensions 
or difficulties between various groups of professionals or, more fundamentally, because 
of serious professional doubts about the efficacy or ethics of the use of compulsion 
outside hospital. Official Departmental Health guidance is arguably unhelpful to 
authorities in this position.
Conceivably in this situation there is appropriate concern to ensure that when 
guardianship is used, it does, as the MHAC suggest, demonstrate a collaborative 
approach between the respective agencies and is not a unilateral ‘stab in the dark’. 
Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence that consideration of the need for guardianship 
often focusses on clients who have evidenced a pattern of social ‘failure’ following 
successive admissions to psychiatric hospital and unsuccessful attempts at rehabilitation. 
The professionals involved in the situation feel a corresponding sense of ‘failure’ in their 
attempts to deal with the situation and a proposed use of Guardianship at this juncture 
would understandably be viewed cautiously in order to ensure that this does not in turn 
become a failure for those concerned.
The official literature contains normative statements to the effect that guardianship usage 
should apply to a small minority of people in the community who cannot receive care and 
supervision by other means, and this has been a consistent theme (except for the 1978 
White Paper) since the Percy Commission Report of 1957. When taken at the level of 
a cautionary warning to ensure that people do not use guardianship lightly, such 
comments may be appropriate, but when used as a reference point to indicate the 
optimum use of guardianship, the position is clearly pre-emptive, if not self-fulfilling.
In the absence of a clear reference point to indicate appropriate quantity of usage, the 
Social Services Research Group have referred back to the official definition of the 
objective of guardianship from a social policy point of view as being an alternative to 
hospital, and have asked whether, and to what extent, guardianship is used for this 
purpose.(80) From this point of view a calculation of the appropriate amount of
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guardianship would commence with some agreement on the appropriate ratio as between 
a given number of compulsory hospital admissions and guardianship as a ‘diversion’. 
The SSRG comment on the adequacy of guardianship usage concludes that a ratio of 
1:100 indicates that guardianship is not fulfilling the intended role.
Comment is offered elsewhere (pages 48 to 54) on the appropriateness of defining the 
guardianship objective in this way. However, the SSRG logic may be flawed in 
suggesting that guardianship in its present form is appropriate for use in the small 
minority of cases envisaged by the Government as a diversion in this sense, implying not 
that guardianship is necessarily inadequate as it stands (though there are arguments to this 
effect) but that other diversions could and should have been made available to prevent 
inappropriate hospital admissions. More to the point, all diversions share the same 
requirement, namely a level of resources which can be flexibly deployed to meet the 
needs of individual clients for whom social circumstances have become intolerable and 
for whom other forms of care and help are immediately required.
By way of recapitulation, previous discussions explored the issue of whether it is 
appropriate to define guardianship as an ‘alternative to hospital’ and concluded that 
although social workers would clearly see this as justifying use of guardianship for 
individual clients, social services management will not necessarily see this use of 
guardianship as implying that local authorities should (alone) be providing such 
alternatives. There is thus the potential for a conflict of objectives between a policy on 
use of guardianship and an individual social worker’s objective for their client which 
almost certainly determines the numbers of guardianship finally agreed.
Reasons for ‘Under-Use’
Although the meaning of ‘under-use’ is not clear, as the discussions on quantitative and 
normative aspects have shown, most commentators refer to under-use of guardianship and 
indicate that this situation requires a remedy.
The most frequently quoted reason for under-use is concerned with sanction and 
credibility, i.e. the argument that since guardianship cannot be ‘enforced’, either in terms
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of authority of the guardian or in terms of service provision, it must inevitability lack 
credibility and can only apply to clients for whom guardianship was only marginally 
appropriate in any case. Inconsistencies (apparent or real) between the degrees of 
enforceability of guardians’ powers is frequently noted, e.g. as between the power to 
return a person on guardianship to their place of residence but not legally to convey them 
there in the first place, as in the Third Biennial Report of MHAC referred to above.
From time to time guardianship has been compared unfavourably with a probation order, 
especially since the client’s unwillingness to comply with the terms of the latter can be 
sufficient ground to bring the order back to the court for reconsideration.(81/82) No 
commentator (so far as the researcher is aware) has advocated devising a way in which 
the breakdown of a guardianship order can be re-negotiated, e.g. through the assistance 
of a Mental Health Review Tribunal. Other reasons for under-usage are contained within 
Gunn’s omnibus term ‘inertia factors’ which refers to general scepticism about the value 
of guardianship, both by practitioners and social services managers, added to which the 
latter are poorly informed about guardianship.(83)
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
There would appear to be major obstacles in comparing guardianship and social work at 
a general level as these refer to different phenomena, albeit with a measure of overlap. 
Guardianship could best be defined at this general level as a social institution partly 
circumscribed by statute, whereas social work is easier to recognise as a professional 
activity whose context is organisational and managerial within social services rather than 
of the institution of professional social work in its own right.
The dictionary definitions both refer to a relationship of care but the need of the 
guardian’s ward for protection is explicit whereas social workers’ clients’ needs are 
implicit (i.e. "individual or social problems arising mainly from mental [disability]". The 
operational definition of social work implies that all clients require care and protection 
to varying degrees.
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It is hard to overestimate the special connection between guardianship and social work 
in England and Wales brought about by the statutory arrangement which requires, in 
effect, guardians to be social workers. This might imply that social work would be the 
senior of the two in being able to dominate its operation and activities. Whether or not 
social workers can and do put a firm ‘social work imprint’ on to the way guardianship 
operates in practice emerges in Chapter V.
The existence of a small number of private guardians continues to raise awkward 
questions since their professional background is not prescribed and it is not known how 
many are trained as social workers. Moreover, there is some suggestion from 
developments in Scotland that private guardians exercise greater influence independently 
of social work agencies and indeed put pressure on local authorities to provide services. 
Conceivably, a private guardian could be in a position to request social services to 
provide social work help, and in this narrow sense, the guardian could be the ‘senior 
partner’ to the social worker.
It is also necessary to acknowledge that in a loose general sense social work can be 
referred to as an informal kind of guardianship while guardianship can be referred to as 
formal (i.e. statutorily prescribed) social work. If nothing else, these references point 
towards a degree of interrelationship rather than to two quite different ways of helping 
certain people with mental health problems. Although social work and guardianship have 
been shown to have elements in common, formal connections between them other than 
statutory requirements seem to have occurred almost through historical accident: the idea 
that guardians for mentally ill people should be social workers - by training, qualification, 
experience and employment - is not universally accepted and, in any case, seems only to 
apply clearly in Great Britain, and to a lesser extent in Canada.
The level of social workers’ understanding of the degree to which the role of guardian 
is seen as appropriate and needful to meet the needs of some mentally ill people may well 
be extremely varied, and the empirical section is intended to clarify this point. 
Meanwhile the lack of incentive on the part of social services management to assist social 
workers in clarifying their views, through developing practice guidance and through clear 
articulation of the resources underwritten to make guardianship viable, does not suggest
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that social services departments of local authorities are the most satisfactory milieu within 
which guardianship can develop securely.
In developing their quality control systems, social services have not been offered a way 
forward which would enable them to reach an objective view as to whether the use of 
guardianship in given circumstances is sensitive to the needs of clients. More important, 
direct quality control of interventions under the Act by way of proposing or applying for 
guardianship on the basis of client need is difficult to envisage given an overriding 
message that the guardianship option is to be discouraged wherever possible.
Guardianship can certainly be said to be a costly enterprise but it can provisionally be 
said that all worthwhile care and assistance for people with mental illness is costly, 
especially that provided for those with continual or intractable problems and for whom 
community care solutions are at best a precarious arrangement. Well organised and 
properly timed guardianship may turn out to be more economic for all concerned than 
episodic and un-committed social work taking place in a management context which 
strives mainly to avoid allocating scarce resources unless this becomes politically 
unavoidable.
As matters stand, however, responsibility for guardianship rests squarely with social 
services and it would seem that Age Concern were correct in considering guardianship 
as basically a ‘social services order’.(84) The evidence points to the fact that social 
services have not come to terms with conceptual difficulties and conflicts within the 
guardianship idea - particularly surrogacy and advocacy - which might mean that they are 
unable to provide assurances that they are willing to offer guardianship as a service to 
clients, i.e. as a means of enhancing the level of care needed for a particular mentally 
ill person.
Social services management are, in practice, the only ones able to determine the actual 
numbers - i.e. to make the key decisions - while their responsibility for developing the 
right professional climate within which appropriate guardianship decisions are made is 
far from clear. They have not been helped by the level of guidance forthcoming from 
the Department of Health following the 1959 Act while guidance forthcoming following
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the 1983 Act has been equivocal in this respect. The quantity of guardianship is seen as 
derived both from the uncertainties of social workers and the ambiguity surrounding the 
need for it felt by social services managers and others. Again, the empirical section aims 
to test out these assumptions.
There is widespread acceptance that the redefinition of the guardianship criterion in the 
1983 Act has not clarified the situation or made for more ready or appropriate usage; in 
fact, the significance of the change of terminology (from ‘in the interests of the patient’ 
to ‘in the interests of the welfare of the patient’) is a source of continuing.doubt.(85)
Finally, a number of commentators have observed that there are frequent administrative 
delays in the take-up of guardianship caused by uncertainties, prevarication or general 
dilatoriness on the part of social services management (at various levels). This may well 
start from the situation described by Gunn, with social services managers poorly informed 
about guardianship and anxious about its significance for their budgets and policies.(86) 
Whatever the reason, as noted in the MHAC Second Biennial Report referred to above, 
there is a much longer time lag between a decision to accept or decline a guardianship 
order than a decision related to the admission to hospital of a person under 
compulsory powers, which presumably conveys further doubts about the ‘alternative to 
hospital’ concept even when applied to individual circumstances of assessed clients.
An interim conclusion is that there remains a highly ambiguous position in terms of social 
services’ responsibilities to provide services to people with mental illness when the status 
of guardianship as a service in its own right is by no means clear. Meanwhile directors 
of social services are left in the invidious position of exercising a ‘stewardship’ over 
guardianship usage, a form of ‘guardianship over guardianship’. In other words, they 
have been clearly shown to be the accountable party, but accountability goes further than 
local authority level for nationally determined policies and legislative requirements. A 
further question, therefore, arises as to whom directors of social services are accountable 
for their stewardship of guardianship and how does central Government assist directors 
of social services in accounting for that stewardship?
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The second interim conclusion is that when guardianship is subjected to close conceptual 
analysis as in the three model approach of Frolick,(87) the functions of advocacy, 
casework and case management, as shared concerns between guardianship and social 
work, stand out as promising and worthy of further attention.
Despite some pressing agendas on the research front there would seem to be no more 
important area to focus on than social workers’ attitudes to guardianship, especially as 
it effects their advocacy, case worker and case management roles, and how these are 
influenced, on one hand, by management restraints and, on the other, by the range of 
clients with mental illness problems who present themselves to social workers.
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CHAPTER V
SURVEY OF SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS 
AND GUARDIANSHIP CASES
This chapter concentrates on the empirical part of this research, namely a survey of social 
workers’ attitudes to guardianship and of details of their guardianship cases. There are 
three main parts: (1) DESIGN, which considers the research questions and methodology, 
(2) PRESENTATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, and (3) INTERPRETATION 
OF FINDINGS. The assembled data provides the basis for answering the research 
questions in the following chapter (Chapter VI - Conclusions).
PART ONE: RESEARCH DESIGN
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The first part of this section discusses the relationship between the research questions, 
the research subjects and the means chosen to address the questions.
To address the question:
‘What are social workers’ views on guardianship?*
it was decided to undertake a survey of attitudes of a group of social workers, each of 
whom had some experience as guardians of clients with mental illness. Views of social 
workers’ managers were also sought. These were drawn from two agencies for purposes 
of comparison. Consequently the first consideration was to select and gain access to 
agencies which fulfilled these conditions, on the basis explained in Chapter I, page 20.
It was then decided that the second question:
‘Which clients do social workers choose for guardianship?*
232
would be best addressed to the same social worker research subjects in order to provide 
the researcher with a selected range of data about their guardianship clients and on their 
responses to vignette cases. (See below and pages 234/5 on role of vignettes.) One 
implication of addressing the research questions in this way was to define a number of 
research population sub-groups viz.:
Social Workers .........................................
Social Workers’ M anagers......................
Clients, i.e. cases categorised on the basis 
discussed on page 235 ................................
Vignettes, i.e. proxy cases and decision-making ) 
scenarios................................................................ )
METHODOLOGY 
Data Collection
Information on social workers’ views of guardianship, on their guardianship clients and 
certain views of managers in two social services departments were obtained by interviews 
and completion of standard questionnaires. Vignette case studies were used to elicit 
information on social work decision-making to supplement the small number of clients 
in the survey population.
Design of Questionnaires
With the Social W orkers’ Questionnaire, the main consideration was to put to social 
workers a range of views which have been expressed from time to time on the 
characteristics of guardianship, grouped together under headings and themes which were 
intended to lead the social worker progressively from one proposition to another. With 
two exceptions, the questions did not advance alternative views and all could be equally 
endorsed or rebutted. In the two exceptions, social workers were warned that the 
questions were phrased in such a way as to provide alternative explanations. The pilot 
study had mainly shaped the content and structure of the questionnaire and had eliminated 
questions which social workers said were misleading or inappropriate.
in Kensington 
and Chelsea 
and in City 
of Westminster
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The questionnaire used is located in Appendix H, from which it will be seen that the 
range of questions divides into three sections:
- Objectives and uses of guardianship
- Role of social worker compared with role of guardian
- Possibilities for future development
With regard to the Social Workers’ Guardianship Clients Questionnaire, the objective 
was to trace the decision-making process and to relate this to the circumstances of the 
case. The viewpoint on the case remained essentially that of the social worker and no 
external review of data or opinions expressed was undertaken with, for instance, social 
work managers. Occasionally, alternative versions of the facts emerged during discussion 
with the social worker, in which case the questionnaire answers were modified 
accordingly. In a few cases the client turned out to be shared with another social worker 
and a composite picture was arrived at by discussing the case with both social workers. 
In one instance this produced a three-way discussion between the researcher and two 
social workers, both with different line managers, and the researcher had to be reconciled 
to having two rather different versions of the client’s story and prospects.
Guardianship Cases and Vignettes as Substitutes
Vignettes are client pen-pictures based on ‘live’ guardianship cases encountered during 
the research pilot. Fictional names were used to differentiate these cases. The value of 
the vignette presentations put to social workers was as substitute cases, particularly 
necessary in interviewing social workers with limited guardianship experience.
The three vignette cases (see Appendix C), presented social workers with a range of 
information and decision-making options and their attention was drawn to parts of the 
narrative where differences of opinion would be likely to emerge. For the task of 
collecting research data, only one key decision was recorded, namely whether, in all the
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circumstances of the case, social workers could see any place for guardianship in taking 
case management forward.
The result of this part of the survey, to which a total of 16 respondents contributed, 
registered that a place for guardianship could be found for ‘Geoff Baxter’ by 7 out of 14 
respondents, by 5 out of 16 respondents in the case of ‘Audrey Cummings’ and by 6 out 
of 12 in the case of ‘Joan Humphreys’. The quantitative aspects of this data is discussed 
under ‘Vignettes and Cases’, page 238.
Case Status Differences: Original and Revised
Case status distinctions from (I) to (VI) were intended to show how cases differed 
according to the stage of decision-making reached: from being considered by a social 
worker as a basis for a proposal to management to being endorsed by his/her Director 
of Social Services. As shown in Table 2, page 243 the basis for simplified groupings is 
that cases in old Categories (V), (IV) and (HI), joined into new category [2], share the 
characteristic of not having reached the stage of being formally agreed by a director of 
social services at the time of the research fieldwork, whereas cases in Categories (II) and
(I), joined into new Category [1], have been thus endorsed.
The main use made of the distinction between Categories [1] and [2] is to be found in 
Chapter VI (Conclusions) where Category [2] clients are judged to represent the specific 
choice of guardianship for clients by social workers as distinct from the choices of their 
managers or other parties - see page 338.
Managers’ Views
An attempt was initially made to ascertain differences in attitudes of social workers’ 
managers included in the survey population but this proved difficult to achieve. None 
of the managers in practice wanted to be seen to speak on behalf of the agency on matters 
which they regarded as largely hypothetical and instead contributed in their individual 
capacities. One manager in particular felt the need to dissociate herself from her own 
management position and offered instead to provide comments on the vignettes as if she
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were a social work practitioner. Essentially, therefore, managers approached the research 
from different stand points over which the researcher had no control, which inevitably 
produced uneven results. Given the small number involved, it was not appropriate to 
discuss individual differences in attitude with the four managers concerned, either as a 
basis of comparison with each other or with individuals or groups of social workers.
The Research Samples of Cases and Social Workers
Size of Sample: Guardianship Cases
This research concerned 41 guardianship cases divided into categories, i.e. status groups: 
Old Status Categories (I) to (V), (five stages of decision-making, from social workers’ 
initial suggestions to final management endorsement) and New Status Categories [1] and
[2], (cases agreed by management (Category HI) and those not agreed at the time of the 
research, but already decided upon by social workers (Category T2D).
The relationship between the categories and the number in each is shown in Table 3, 
page 243. The following discusses size of samples in the categories compared with such 
national figures as are available or can be approximated.
There were four guardianship cases currently in force [Old Category (I)] at the time of 
the research: three in Westminster and one in Kensington and Chelsea. This compares 
with a national average of approximately 1.1 cases per local authority. The latter figure 
has been calculated on the basis of 130 guardianship cases concerning mentally ill people 
in force (‘Continuing’) as at mid-1987 (the period during which the research field work 
was being undertaken), for a total number of local authorities in England and Wales of 
117. However, this is known to be an under-estimate since a number of local authorities 
had not sent returns to the Department of Health. This would suggest that the research 
sample of cases was between 3% and 4% of the national total.
The nine lapsed cases in the sample (Old Category (II)) were acquired on the basis of 
available data on clients for whom guardianship had been used by the two agencies in the 
past. There is no guarantee that this was an accurate figure: in some instances clients 
who had, for example, moved out of a borough could have been lost from the sample,
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who had, for example, moved out of a borough could have been lost from the sample, 
and clients whose guardianship had lapsed much earlier than the research field work 
could well have been overlooked. Approximately, one might assume that the ratio 
between live and lapsed cases overall in the sample should have been 1:3, giving a 
national total estimate of 390, of which this research considered 9 cases, ie 2.3%.
With regard to cases in New Category [2], the overall ratio of this group to Old 
Category (I) is 7:1 (28:4). By this measure the number of cases in New Category [2] 
nation wide is 910, giving a sample size of 3%. However, wide variation between the 
two social services departments must be taken into account which, if extrapolated, would 
give an estimated total number of cases ranging from 2730 (Kensington and Chelsea: 
21 New Status Category [2] cases and one Old Category (I)) to 303 (Westminster: seven 
clients in New Category [2] compared with three clients in Old Category (III)).
Size of Sample: Social Workers
Even more difficult to calculate satisfactorily is the sample size in relation to numbers of 
guardian social workers. The simplest approximation, suggests that 23 social workers 
concerned with 41 guardianship clients (of various categories) in the research populations, 
gives a social worker to case ratio of nearly two cases (of all categories) for each social 
worker. Extrapolating the 23:41 ratio nationally (the combined picture of both social 
services departments in this sample) would give a total of approximately 1346 social 
workers - approximately 6% (5.85%).
It is of note that there is an inverse ratio between numbers of social worker research 
subjects and guardianship cases as between the two agencies: Overall ratio = 27:41; 
Kensington and Chelsea = 11:24; Westminster = 16:17.
Ratio of Social Workers to Managers
It will be noted that there is an imbalance between the two agencies in the ratio of social 
workers to managers. Some allowance therefore needs to be made for the fact that the 
management voice, as reflected in the data obtained, has been over-represented in
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Kensington and Chelsea (Overall ratio of social workers to managers = 6:1; 
Kensington and Chelsea = 4.5:1; Westminster = 7:1).
Vignettes and Cases
The ratio of vignettes completed to cases also requires comment. Fewer vignettes (14) 
were completed in Kensington and Chelsea but this social services department produced 
the largest number of cases (24). On the other hand, Westminster produced fewer cases 
(17) but a relatively high number of vignettes (10). For an average of 2 cases per social 
worker in Kensington and Chelsea (24 cases for 11 social workers), the 14 vignettes 
completed bring the total of cases to 38, giving a combined social worker to case ratio 
of 1:3. Thus some parity was achieved, though this should not be understood as 
implying that the completion of vignettes was regarded as a full equivalent to making a 
decision about an actual case - discussed on pages 234/5.
Randomness
The research field-work was confined to two agencies, and numbers of guardianship 
cases and social workers was determined by the maximum available data in both 
agencies.
For guardianship cases, each available example in the various categories was collected 
to provide a total population sample from both agencies (with the exception of one case 
where details were unobtainable due to the move of a client out of borough).
For social workers, numbers were determined entirely by the numbers of cases and the 
allocation of social workers to those cases. Thus, although the collection of data about 
cases and about social workers’ attitudes related entirely to information from social 
workers, the preliminary stage was concerned with ascertaining cases and identifying the 
social workers (past or present) allocated to those cases.
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From the standpoint of populations located in 117 agencies across the country, the 
sampling of neither cases nor social workers was fully random. Within the research 
agencies, however, choice was predetermined by method of sample collection of cases 
and was ‘blind’ in respect of the social workers linked with those cases. A fair measure 
of randomness was thus achieved given the limitations of methodology and those of the 
nature of the total research populations of cases and social workers concerned.
Statistical Significance and Analysis
It was not considered appropriate to declare a given level of statistical significance as a 
bench mark upon which to judge results prior to the research fieldwork as no obvious 
basis for establishing such a reference point presented itself. Probability thresholds of 
.05, .01 and .001 are referred to where applicable.
The initial assembly of tables contained as many categories and sub-categories as seemed 
of interest or relevance to the researcher, and for the most part these have been retained 
as of interest in their own right, despite small numbers in many of the cells. Wherever 
possible, however, the data has also been reassembled into 2 x 2  tables to maximise the 
numbers in each cell and to undertake the Chi-Square tests of association. One degree 
of freedom applied to each of the tests shown in the tables in this chapter and in 
Chapter VI.
The SPSS Manual* says that "...for the Chi-square distribution to be a good 
approximation of the distribution of the statistic.. .expected values must not be too small", 
and goes on to explain that:
"While it has been recommended that all expected frequencies be at least 5, recent 
studies indicate that this is probably too stringent and can be relaxed....
In hope of improving the approximation in the case of a 2 x 2 table, Yates ’ 
correction for continuity is sometimes applied. Yates correction for continuity 
involves subtracting 0.5 from positive differences between the observed and 
expected frequencies (the residuals) and adding 0.5 to negative differences.
M J Norusis, SPSS/PC + V 2.0 Base Manual, Chicago: SPSS Inc, 1988
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An alternative test for 2 x 2 tables is based on the hipergeometric distribution. 
The exact probabilities of obtaining observed results if the two variables are 
independent and the marginals fixed are calculated. This is called Fisher’s Exact 
Test. It is most useful when the total sample size and the expected values are 
small. SPSS/PC + calculates Fisher’s Exact Test when the sample size in a 2 x 
2 table is 20 or less*”.
Each table and statistical analysis is accompanied by the Chi-Square test of association 
and the level of probability from the applicable test result(s). All hypotheses are two- 
tailed. The null hypothesis applicable to tests of association on social workers’ views was 
that the fact that they are employed by different social services departments was not 
significant for the purpose of these comparisons. For the guardianship cases, the null 
hypotheses were that there was no significant difference between them in the 
characteristics identified according to whether they were: (1) drawn from this research 
population or from that of other identified research; (2) of different diagnoses; (3) in 
Category [1] or [2]; or whether they were Kensington and Chelsea or Westminster cases.
Processing of Data
Section A: Details on Clients
1. Readily quantifiable data (e.g. ages, gender, ethnicity), was aggregated and 
reassembled in frequency tables.
2. Non-readily quantifiable data was divided into:
(i) Material susceptible to retrospective categorisation and second stage 
quantification (e.g. purposes of guardianship) which was then handled as in 
A .l above.
Because the SPSS system used to process the research data in this study confines use of Fisher’s Exact 
Test to sample sizes less than 20 and does not use this test for sample sizes over 20 which include cells 
of expected frequencies less than 5, this researcher has used Fisher’s Exact Test for all 2 x 2 tables where 
these conditions pertain: i.e. sample sizes less than 20 and/or cells with expected frequencies less than 
5. Where Fisher’s Exact Test is not used, i.e. not shown in the tables, this conveys that the sample size 
is above 20 or that there are no cells with expected frequencies less than 5. However, for information and 
comparison, Chi-square and Yates correction probability figures are retained where there are cells with 
expected frequencies of between 3.5 and 5. This is in response to the above mentioned suggestion that 
the 5 minimum is too stringent - personal communication from Ms Susanah Brown, Department of 
Statistics and Mathematical Sciences, London School of Economics.
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(ii) Material not quantifiable in this context was used to aid in completing 
client profiles (e.g. history of previous social work involvement).
3. Analyses were undertaken as follows:
Analysis I - Cross-Tabulation: Differences by Client Status Categories [1] and [2]
All variables were related by case category differences in this analysis.
Analysis II - Cross-Tabulation: Difference between the 2 Social Services
Department.
All variables were explored in relation to this distinction and the diagnostic and ‘medical 
influence’ variables produced distinguishable patterns discussed in the findings.
Analysis i n  - Cross-Tabulation: Diagnosis of Guardianship Clients
A critical distinction was assumed to apply between guardianship for people suffering 
from schizophrenia and those suffering from dementia. The diagnostic variable therefore 
received attention and this distinction was used to prepare cross-tabulations along the 
following client characteristics:
Age Range
Client Living Arrangements
Level of Family Support
Objectives of Guardianship
Problems in Achieving Guardianship Objectives
Case Status
Differences Between two Social Services Departments.
Section B, C and D: Social Workers’ Views
1. This data was in readily quantifiable form when collected and was therefore 
aggregated and reassembled into frequency tables.
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2. The five point Likert scale (giving +2, +1, 0, -1 and -2 weighting of response)
was reordered into +1, 0 and -1 categories for the purposes of providing 
frequency tables and cross-tabulations.
3. Analysis of data employed the distinction between the Two Social Services
Departments (the Agencies) as the key variable throughout.
Points on Presentation of Social Workers’ Views
* Material in the section following the statistical summary represents responses to
sections of the questionnaire directed at obtaining social workers’ attitudes to 
guardianship across the two social services departments.
* The data is presented in the form of:
Commentaries indicating the extent of agreement with the statements.
Bar charts showing the balance of opinion between pro, con and neutral 
(undecided etc) responses to the statements.
2 x 2  tables and statistical analysis of differences between social workers 
in the two agencies.
* Some of the questionnaire items have been merged where little or no difference 
of response was obtained. Conversely, some questions have been split in two 
where different meanings for part of the questions became apparent during the 
interviews.
* Reference to ‘social workers’ includes social work managers unless otherwise 
indicated.
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RESEARCH POPULATIONS AND QUANTITATIVE DATA: 
RESEARCH SUBJECTS: SOCIAL WORKERS AND MANAGERS
TABLE NO. 1
Social 'Workers
Mamagers
Totals
Kensington and Chelsea Westminster Total - both Social Services Departments
9 14 23
2 2 4
11 16 27
GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS; DECISION-MAKING CASE STATUS GROUP 
DISTINCTIONS- ORIGINAL AND REVISED
TABLE. 2
Original Case Categories Revised Case Categories
I IN FORCE
(1) CASES AGREED BY MANAGEMENT
II LAPSED
III )
IV )
AT VARIOUS STAGES OF 
OBTAINING MANAGEMENT 
AGREEMENT
(2) CASES CHOSEN BY SOCIAL WORKERS - NOT AGREED BY 
MANAGEMENT AT THE TIME OF THE RESEARCH
V SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED BY 
SOCIAL WORKERS
GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS: NUMBERS IN STATUS CATEGORY GROUPS - ORIGINAL AND REVISED
TABLE. 3
Left Hand 
Entries
Kensington and Chelsea Westminster Total/ - both Social Services Departments Right Hand 
Entries
Old
Status
Differences
by
Category
(V -I)
)
V 21 )
) 21 x [2]
)
IV 0 )
)
III 0
)
V 6 )
) 7 x [2]
)
IV 1 )
)
m  o
)
V 27 )
) 28 x [2]
)
TV/ 1 )
III )
New
Status
Differences
by
Groups [2] 
and [1]
)
II 2 )
) 3 x [1]
)
I 1 )
)
II 7 )
) 10 x [1]
)
I 3 )
)
II 9 )
) 13 x [1]
)
I 4 )
24 17 41
VIGNETTES (See Note 3, pages 234/5)
TABLE. 4
‘ Geoff Baxter*
‘Audrey Cummings’
‘Joan Humphries’
Total in each Social Services 
Department
Kensington and Chelsea Westminster Total both SSDs
5 9 14
6 10 16
3 9 12
14 28 Total Return 42
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PART TWO: PRESENTATION AND STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS ON GUARDIANSHIP - WHOLE POPULATION 
USE OF GUARDIANSHIP
Social workers (N = 27 unless otherwise indicated) were asked to respond to a number 
o f statements about the nature of guardianship, its purposes, and suitability for clients in 
particular circumstances, and the resulting data is summarised below:
GUARDIANSHIP PROVIDES:
1. Protective Care
This statement was supported 
by three-quarters (21) of 
the social workers. IAmiPro 53 Kfvh
2. Structured Care
This statement provided 96% 
favourable response - 
26 social workers.
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3. Continuity of Care
Twenty-one (78%) social workers 
supported this view of 
guardianship.
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GUARDIANSHIP PROVIDES
4. Reinforcement of Authority
This view of guardianship was 
supported by 16 (60%) 
social workers.
5. Priority Access to Services
One third of social workers (9) 
supported this view, and 10 
were against it.
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6. For Recoenition of Need
This role for guardianship was 
supported by 13 (48%) of 
social workers.
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7. A Stabilising Influence
Twenty-two (82%) social workers 
view guardianship in this way.
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GUARDIANSHIP AS SURROGACY AND THE IMPLICATIONS
A Basis for Substituted 
Judgement
Twenty-four (89%) social workers 
support this view of 
guardianship.
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9. Pre-emptive Use -
1st Example: Anticipating Need
This view was supported by 10 
(37%) of social workers and a 
third of the social workers 
were against the notion.
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10. Pre-emptive Use -
2nd Example: Onset o f Dementia
Eight (30%) of social workers 
supported this view but 13 
(48%) were against it.
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GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVES
I I .  To Facilitate Change and 
Growth in a General Sense
This view of guardianship was 
supported by 16 (60% ) o f 
social workers.
12. Specific Expectations - to
Develop (a) Emotionally and 
fb) Psychologically
Nine social workers (33%) 
supported these views and 8 
(30%) were against them.
5 5 Hear
13. Specific Expectations (c) 
to Develop Behaviourallv
In this case 18 o f social 
workers (67%) supported 
this view.
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DIFFERENTIAL USE
Suitability of Guardianship 
for Particular Kinds of 
Mentally 111 people, ie:
14. For Depressed Clients
Nine social workers (33%) 
supported this view and 10 
(37%) were against it.
15. For Clients with ‘Compliant’ 
Personalities
This view was supported by a 
9 (33%) social workers, but 
11 (41%) were against it.
DIFFERENTIAL USE
Circumstantial/Contingent
16. Use in Client Situations of 
Social Vulnerability
This view was supported by 
20 (74%) of social workers.
17. To Enforce a Particular 
Type of Authority
This produced 89% agreement 
from 24 social workers.
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18. Use for Firming Up Aftercare
Twenty-one (78%) social workers 
agreed with this statement.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
249
ESSENTIAL POWERS
Use to enforce powers for 
determining:
19. Access
Twenty (74%) social workers 
supported this use of 
guardianship.
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20. Attendance
Twenty (74%) of social workers 
supported this statement.
21. Place of Residence
This view was supported by 
23 (85%) of social workers 
and only 1 disagreed.
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CONTAINMENT AND RESTRAINT
22. Containment
This use of guardianship in 
enforcing one or more of the 
essential powers was supported 
by 17 (63%) social workers, 
with 8 (30%) disagreeing.
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23. Physical Restraint
Sixteen (60%) social workers 
accepted in principle that 
they might need to be involved 
in the physical holding or 
restraining of a person under 
guardianship, 9 social workers 
(33%) being against such 
involvement.
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GUARDIANSHIP AND RESIDENTIAL 
CARE PLACEMENTS
24. Means of Facilitating 
Residential Placement
Nineteen (70%) o f social workers saw 
the use of guardianship in 
this way and 5 (19%) were 
against this.
25. Justification for Detention
Thirteen (48%) social workers 
regarded it as ethically 
justifiable to detain people 
under guardianship in 
residential care and 6 (22%) 
disagreed.
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26. Adaptation of Regimes
Twenty-one (78%) social workers 
thought it appropriate that 
the regimes of residential 
units should be adapted to 
meet the particular needs of 
residents on guardianship, and 
only 2 (7%) were against this 
idea.
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COMPARISON OF SOCIAL WORKERS’ AND GUARDIANS’ ROLES: 
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES ON FOUR KEY DIMENSIONS AND THE 
QUESTION OF COMPATIBILITY
27. Basic Caretaking
Twenty three (85%) social workers viewed this as part of the social work role 
whereas 26 (96%) social workers saw this as part of guardianship.
AS PART OF SOCIAL WORK AS PART OF GUARDIANSHIP
28. Enabling
All social workers saw this as coming within the social work role, but only two- 
thirds of social workers saw it as part of guardianship.
AS PART OF SOCIAL WORK AS PART OF GUARDIANSHIP
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29. Advocacy
This view of social work received 100% agreement whereas 22 (85%) of social 
workers saw it as part of guardianship.
AS PART OF SOCIAL WORK AS PART OF GUARDIANSHIP
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30. Surrogacy
Only 10 (37%) of social workers support this view of social work, with the sane 
number against it. All social workers see this as pan of guardianship.
AS PART OF SOCIAL WORK AS PART OF GUARDIANSHIP
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31. Guardians’ Functions Incompatible with Social Work
Fourteen (52%) social workers stated that there was an incompatibility of function 
between guardians and social workers. The differences were seen in various ways 
but the most frequently mentioned was in the surrogate role itself.
E2Pr o
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32. Informal Guardianship
Twenty two (82%) social workers saw their work with mentally ill people as being 
appropriately described as a form of voluntary or informal guardianship, and the most 
common similarities pointed to were: client characteristic of poor motivation (15%); 
similarity of ‘contract’ between client and workers (16%); and in a high level of client 
vulnerability (26%).
33. Other Social Services Department 
Employees as Guardians
Most social workers (20) thought that guardianship could be provided by non-ASWs and 
by social workers other than level 3/4. Some thought that residential care staff could
34. G uardians O utside Social 
Services
Two-thirds of social workers thought that people outside social services could fulfil 
the guardian’s role, the majority looking to representatives o f voluntary agencies 
such as MIND as suitable.
Eleven (41 %) social workers thought that non-social services department employees 
would fmd the advocacy role easier within guardianship than would social workers, 
but a third of social workers considered that they would find this role harder.
35. Guardian as Family Member
Fifteen (56%) social workers agreed that the guardian could be a member of the 
client’s family.
Only 4 (15%) social workers considered that they should be members of the same 
household - and half the social workers definitely disagreed with this proposition.
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FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEM AREAS
36. Extended Usage
Fifteen (56%) social workers thought that guardianship should be used more often, 
but 10 social workers felt unable to give a definite answer to this question.
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REASONS FOR UNDER-USE (which would need to be addressed if optimum use were 
to be achieved):
37. Demand on Social Service Resources 
Thirteen social workers (48%) 
thought that guardianship makes 
demands on social services 
resources. Twelve social 
workers (44%) thought this was 
was not a reason for underuse.
38. Concern with the Use of Coercion 
Twenty-one social workers (78%) 
thought that this concern
exists whereas 5 (19%) 
disagreed.
39. Toothless Wonder'
(Insufficient Power)
Nineteen social workers (70%)
thought there was truth in the
statement that guardianship carries
insufficient powers to be considered
as a serious alternative to hospital.
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40. Civil Liberties
Social workers were evenly 
divided as to whether 
guardianship represents an 
unacceptable infringement of 
civil liberties with 10 social 
workers (37%) representing 
each point of view.
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41. Fear of Abuse of Authority
Sixteen social workers (59%) 
thought that guardianship 
carries with it the risk of 
abuse or misuse of authority, 
but 9 (33%) social workers 
thought otherwise.
42. Inappropriate Assumption of 
Responsibility for Adults
Thirteen social workers (58%) 
agreed that this was a feature 
o f guardianship of some 
concern, while 11 (41%) 
thought otherwise.
(N =  26 social workers)
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43. Need for Change
Sixteen social workers (59%) 
considered that changes are 
needed in guardianship to make 
it more effective, but only 8 
social workers (30%) considered 
that more powers were needed.
m?rz
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44. A djustm ent to  M eet Individual 
R equirem ents
Nineteen social workers (70%) 
felt that guardianship powers 
should be tailored to meet the 
expressed needs of individual 
clients. (N =  23 social workers)
45. Package of Care
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Twenty-four social workers 
(89%) thought that guardianship 
should include a requirement to 
develop packages o f care in the 
community based on individual 
assessment.
46. Resource Consequences
Twenty-two social workers (82%) 
consider that statutory 
agencies should fund the 
resource consequences of 
guardianship.
47. Guardianship Budget
Only one social worker agreed 
that social work guardians 
should be accountable for an 
allocated budget sufficient to 
meet the particular needs of 
his or client and 13 social 
workers (50%) disagreed with 
this proposition.
(N =  26 social workers)
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Compulsory Treatment in the Community
48. Twenty social workers (74%) believed that a power to provide compulsory 
treatment in the community was needed.
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49. Fourteen social workers (52%) considered that this should be provided for within 
‘special’ guardianship. Only 4 social workers (15%) considered that it should be 
provided outside the present guardianship framework, and 14 social workers (52%) 
clearly disagreed with the latter view.
vU7\ Pro
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50. Powers of Detention Sixteen social workers (59%) felt that these powers should 
be made explicit; 3 social workers (11 %) felt that the position should be left as it Stands; 
and only 2 social workers agreed with the view such powers should be outlawed.
2 6 0
COMPARISON OF SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS IN THE TWO SOCIAL SERVICES 
DEPARTMENTS
The following presentation draws on statistical analyses of comparisons of views between 
the two groups of social workers, in the same sequence as the presentations on pages 244 
to 260.
Tables 93 to 146 in Appendix F give the detailed results. For the purpose of statistical 
analysis, the 3 x 2 tables showing ‘con’, ‘neutral’ and ‘pro’ responses to the propositions 
have been collapsed into 2 x 2  tables with ‘con’ and ‘neutral’ responses combined. The 
tables presented below, were selected to highlight similarities and differences which 
emerged from the analyses.
Main Characteristics of Guardianship 
i.e. ‘What guardianship Provides’
Of these seven key guardianship characteristics:
PROTECTIVE CARE
STRUCTURE
CONTINUITY
REINFORCEMENT OF AUTHORITY 
PRIORITY ACCESS TO SERVICES 
RECOGNITION OF NEED 
STABILISATION
only CONTINUITY evidenced any difference between the agencies, (see Table over 
page).
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Guardianship Characteristics of Continuity
There was less certainty about the concept of CONTINUITY in Westminster, where 
68.8% of social workers supported these views compared with 90.9% of social workers 
in Kensington and Chelsea.
Continuity 
Table No. 5
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 1 5 6
Pro 10 11 21
Column Totals 11 16 27
F ishers Exact Test p =  .350
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.4
Guardianship as Surrogacy and the Implications
Surrogacy as SUBSTITUTED JUDGEMENT proved a less acceptable idea in 
Westminster, where 81.3% supported the view compared with 100% support in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Surrogacv/Substituted Judgement 
Table No. 6
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 0 3 3
Pro 11 13 24
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .248
Minimum Expected Frequency =  1.2
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The view of guardianship as APPROPRIATELY USED PRE-EMPTIVELY, i.e. 
anticipating clients’ needs, was less popular in Kensington and Chelsea, where 27.3% 
social workers supported the view, compared with 43.8% in Westminster.
Pre-Emption 
Table No. 7
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 8 9 17
Pro 3 7 10
Column Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value =
Value =
.759
.217
p =  .384 
p =  .641
p =  .448
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4 . 1  
GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVES (Items 11-13^
The view of guardianship as a FORMALISED RELATIONSHIP TO FACILITATE 
CHANGE IN THE CLIENT was more popular in Kensington and Chelsea, with 72.7% 
support compared with 50% support among Westminster social workers.
Formalised Change 
Table No. 8
Chi-Square
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 3 8 11
Pro 8 8 16
Column Totals 11 16 27
Value =  2.123
Yates* Correction Value =  1.2795
Fisher*s Exact Test
p =  .3135 
p =  .946
p =  .4015
Minimum Expected Frequency =  4.48
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Similarly, Westminster social workers gave less support (81.3%) to guardianship used 
to ENFORCE AUTHORITY for a particular purpose, compared with 100% support in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Enforce Specific Authority 
Table No. 9
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Neut 0 3 3
Pro 11 13 24
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .248
Minimum Expected Frequency =  1.2
DIFFERENTIAL USE (Items 14-181
Use of guardianship to meet needs of SOCIALLY VULNERABLE CLIENTS was less 
well supported by Westminster social workers (62.5%) compared with 90.9% support in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Social Vulnerability 
Table No. 10
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 1 6 7
Pro 10 10 20
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .183
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.9
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ESSENTIAL POWERS
Using guardianship to gain ACCESS TO CLIENTS in their place of residence was well 
accepted by social workers in Kensington and Chelsea with 100% support, compared with 
56.3% support in Westminster.
Access to Client 
Table No. 11
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Neut 0 7 7
Pro 11 9 20
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .0216
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.6
Similarly, the power to require ATTENDANCE of guardianship clients was less well 
supported by social workers in Westminster, with 62.5% compared with 90.9% support 
in Kensington and Chelsea.
Attendance Power 
Table No. 12
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 1 6 7
Pro 10 10 20
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p = .183
Minimum Expected Frequency 2.9
\
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CONTAINMENT AND RESTRAINT (Items 22 and 23)
Use of PHYSICAL RESTRAINT within guardianship was not well supported by 
Kensington and Chelsea social workers (45.5%) but more Westminster social workers 
(68.8%) accepted this idea.
Physical Restraint 
Table No. 13
K & C W'min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 6 5 11
Pro 5 11 16
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .264
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.0
SECTION C - COMPARISON OF SOCIAL WORKERS’ AND GUARDIANSHIP 
ROLES Items 27-31
The ENABLING view of guardianship received support from 81.3% social workers in 
Westminster, but from 45.5% of social workers in Kensington and Chelsea, viz.:
Guardianship as Enabling 
Table No. 14
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 6 3 9
Pro 5 13 18
Column Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Sauare Value =  3.759
Yates’ Correction Value =  2.320
Fisher’s Exact Test
p =  .053
p =  .128
p =  .0969
Minimum Expected Frequency = 3.7
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The view that guardianship involved actions INCOMPATIBLE WITH SOCIAL WORK 
(good social work practice) was supported by 62.5% of Westminster social workers but 
only by a 36.4% of Kensington and Chelsea social workers, viz.:
Incompatible with Social W ork 
Table No. 15
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 7 6 13
Pro 4 10 14
Column Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Square Value =  1.784 p =  .182
Yates* Correction Value = 0.890 p =  .345
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.3
Asked whether social work with mentally ill people could sometimes be viewed as a form 
of INFORMAL GUARDIANSHIP, 87.5% of Westminster social workers agreed, 
compared with 72.7% in Kensington and Chelsea.
Informal Guardianship 
Table No. 16
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 3 2 5
Pro 8 14 22
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher*s Exact Test p =  .370
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.0
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Questions as to whether social services department’s staff other than ASWs should be 
guardians (OTHER EMPLOYEES) indicated much greater support for the proposition 
from Westminster: 81.3% compared with 63.6% support from Kensington and Chelsea 
social workers.
Other Social Services Employees 
Table No. 17
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 4 3 7
Pro 7 13 20
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p = .391
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.9
FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEM AREAS (Items 36-491
37.5% of Westminster social workers considered guardianship should be USED MORE
while 81.8% of Kensington and Chelsea social workers supported this view, viz.:
‘Extended Use’ 
Table No. 18
K & C W’min Row
Totals
As now or more 9 8 17
Less 2 8 10
Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Square Value =  2.830 p =  .093
Yates’ Correction Value =  1.630 p =  .202
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .124
Minimum Expected Frequency =  4.1
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63.6% of Kensington and Chelsea social workers thought guardianship should be 
regarded as a CLAIM ON THE AGENCY’S RESOURCES but only 37.5% Westminster 
social workers supported this view.
Resource Demand 
Table No. 19
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Con Neut 4 10 14
Pro 7 6 13
Column Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Square 
Yates’ Correction
Value = 1.784
Value .890
p =  .182
p =  .345
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.3
Only 18.2% Kensington and Chelsea social workers thought guardianship problematic as 
necessarily an INFRINGEMENT OF CIVIL LIBERTIES, whilst Westminster social 
workers were evenly divided on this, viz.:
Infringement of Civil Liberties 
Table No. 20
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 9 8 17
Pro 2 8 10
Column Totals 11 16 27
Chi-Sauare 
Yates’ Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 2.830 p =  .093
Value =  1.630 p =  .202
______________________________ p =  .124
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4 . 1
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No Kensington and Chelsea social workers felt guardianship POWERS SHOULD 
REMAIN UNCHANGED while 18.8% Westminster social workers supported the 
status quo, viz.:
Guardianship Powers Should Stay the Same 
Table No. 21
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 11 13 24
Pro 0 3 3
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .248
Minimum Expected Frequency =  1.2
Asked whether POWERS TO DETAIN SHOULD BE OUTLAWED, no Westminster 
social workers supported this view, but two (18.2%) Kensington and Chelsea social 
workers agreed with it, viz.:
Detention Powers; * Outlaw Them’ 
Table No. 22
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 9 16 25
Pro 2 0 2
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .157
Minimum Expected Frequency =  .8
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All Kensington and Chelsea social workers supported the view that guardianship should 
imply availability of a PACKAGE OF CARE for the client, but three (18.8%) of 
Westminster social workers could not support this view, being opposed to, or uncertain 
about, guardianship being used to prioritise services for guardianship clients, viz.:
Package of Care 
Table No. 23
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Con/Neut 0 3 3
Pro 11 13 24
Column Totals 11 16 27
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .248
Minimum Expected Frequency =  1.2
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SOCIAL WORKERS’ GUARDIANSHIP CASES 
(1) AGGREGATED DATA
The following provides information from Section A of the questionnaire completed by 
social workers, which related to a total of 41 guardianship cases. The sequence of 
characteristics follows that of the original questionnaire. These attempt to draw out the 
main distinguishing features and comparisons. Detailed tables supporting the 
observations provided below are to be found at Appendix G.
Section 1 gives a brief profile of guardianship clients. This refers only to items 
susceptible to analysis and to comparison with other studies. The reference studies are 
two produced by members of the Social Services Research Group, referred to as the 
Barnes (1990) and Fisher (1991) studies respectively, and a number of small-scale 
studies. The reference studies are summarised and referenced in Appendix A.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the analysis examine results of cross-tabulations of variables 
within the present research, considering Diagnosis, Category Status Groups and the 
Two Social Services Departments (the Agencies) as reference points in the respective 
sections.
Section 1 Guardianship Clients: a Brief Profile 
Ages of Guardianship Clients
- Ages of 40 clients were obtainable, and these ranged from 18-91.
- Main age groups were 80+ with 11 clients (27.5%), and 61 - 80 with 10 clients 
(25%).
- Clients aged 60+ formed 55.3% of the total, and 65+ clients, 45% of the total. 
These latter figures compare with the Cheshire (1988) and the Fisher studies, 
with 58% and 47% respectively for these same age groups.
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Comparing the breakdown by age groups of this research population with that of the 
Barnes study, shows differences between ages of clients referred for guardianship and 
those referred for all kinds of Mental Health Act assessment. This applies to some extent 
to age group 44-54 but much more so to age group 75 + , as shown below:
Ages of Clients 
Table No. 24
Ages Other Row
44-54 Ages Totals
This Study 1 39 40
Barnes 1279 8125 9404
Column Totals 1280 8164 9444
Chi-Square Value = 4.18898 p = .0407
Yates* Correction Value = 3.29512 p =  .0695
‘Nearly’ significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency = 5.4
Ages of Clients 
Table No. 25
Ages Other Row
75 + Ages Totals
This Study 13 27 40
Barnes 976 8428 9404
Column Totals 989 8455 9444
Chi-Sauare 
Yates’ Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 20.78957
Value =  18.49704
p = .0000
p = .0000
p =  .0136
‘Nearly’ significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  4.2
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Gender
Gender 
Table No. 26
Male Female Row
Totals
This Study 14 27 41
Barnes 856 1217 2073
Column Totals 870 1244 2114
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value = 0.84787
Value = 0.57846
p = .3572
p = .4469
Minimum Expected Frequency =  16.9
Two-thirds (65.9%) of guardianship clients in the sample are female, roughly similar to 
most previous guardianship research findings (See page 355). The above table compares 
this sample finding with the ‘Alternative Care’ (i.e. alternative to hospital admission) 
group in the Barnes study in which the referral of female clients formed 58.65% of the 
total.
Marital Status
M arital Status 
Table No. 27
Single Other Row
Status Totals
This Study 27 13 40
Barnes 3599 5336 8935
Column Totals 3626 5349 8975
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value = 12.25381
Value = 11.14941
p =  .0005
p =  .0008
Significant at the .001 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  16.2
Two-thirds (65.9%) of guardianship clients were single, a very different finding to that 
of the Barnes study in respect of all referrals from mental health assessments, in which 
single clients formed 40.3% of the total.
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Ethnicity
Ethnicity of Clients 
Table No. 28
W.I./A-C. Other
Groups
Row
Totals
This Study 2 39 41
Barnes 91 1905 1996
Column Totals 93 1944 2037
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .711
Minimum Expected Frequency =  1.9
Three-quarters of guardianship clients (31 = 75.6%) were British/English. Different 
classifications make comparison with the Barnes study difficult, but concentrating on 
West Indian/Afro-Caribbean groups compared with others shows the very similar picture, 
indicated in the table above.
Diagnosis
Overall, 19 (47%) of guardianship clients in this sample were diagnosed as schizophrenic, 
12 (29%) suffered from dementia, 7 (17%) were suffering from depression or manic- 
depression, with the remaining 3 (7%) clients diagnosed as suffering from other 
conditions.
Comparison with the Barnes study using the nearest equivalent diagnostic distinctions are 
at Tables 29 and 30 on the next page. Comparing schizophrenia and dementia as between 
this research and that of the Barnes study, shows similarity in proportions of people with 
schizophrenia but marked difference in the proportion of dementia sufferers in this 
research population.
The other studies referred to in Appendix A provide a variable pattern between 
schizophrenia and dementia with a range between 65% dementia (the Leeds (1990) study) 
and 43% schizophrenia (in the Cheshire study). It is interesting to note that the figure
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for people suffering from schizophrenia in this study compares with 14% people suffering 
from schizophrenia described as ‘Alternative Care’ and with 27% described as avoidably 
admitted to hospital (‘potentially diverted’ from hospital) in the Barnes study.
Diagnosis: Schizophrenia 
Table No. 29
Schiz­ Other Row
ophrenia Diagnosis Totals
This Study 19 22 41
Barnes 2371 3041 5412
Column Totals 2390 3063 5453
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction
Value = 0.10591
Value = 0.2805
p =  .7448
p =  .8670
Minimum Expected Frequency =  18.0
Diagnosis: Dementia 
Table No. 30
Dementia Other
Diagnoses
Row
Totals
This Study 12 29 41
Barnes 359 5053 5412
Column Totals 371 5082 5453
Fisher*s Exact Test p =  .0107
‘Nearly’ significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 2.8
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Family Support
Twenty (49%) of guardianship clients experience a negligible amount of family support, 
and for only 5 (12%) of clients is such support regarded as substantial.
Living Arrangements
Twenty-nine (70%) of guardianship clients live alone, 7 (17%) with nuclear family and 
5 (12%) in residential care.
Admissions to Psychiatric Hospitals
Information on numbers of hospital admissions was available on 29 clients. Of these, 
16 (55%) have had one or more compulsory admissions and 8 (27%) have had one or 
more voluntary admissions.
Social Work Objectives
Social work strategy prior to guardianship consideration aimed at a range of psycho-social 
and service-providing objectives but insufficiency of persuasion to accept help was the 
single most frequent reason to look to guardianship.
Purposes of Guardianship (i)
Individually defined purposes divided between 23 (56%) where the authority/control is 
the main objective and 18 (44%) where the main objective is enhanced levels of care.
Purposes of Guardianship (ii)
With guardianship purposes defined in terms of residential service provision, 23 cases 
(56%) involved a residential placement - but for 5 (12%) of these clients the requirement 
consisted of regularising a pre-existing residential arrangement.
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Purposes of Guardianship (iii)
Purposes related to gaining access/arranging attendance for care form small percentages 
of the remainder, the largest group of which concerned regularising rather than arranging 
care. There were three for whom attendance for out-patient treatment was the issue.
Purposes of Guardianship (iv)
Objectives of guardianship were deemed realised or realisable in half the cases. The 
distinction between Categories [1] and [2] is obviously of particular significance here - 
see Table 43 on page 288.
Influence of Medical Colleagues
In answer to the question: ‘Was medical opinion influential in your decision about 
guardianship in this case?’ ‘Yes’ answers applied in 22 (58%) cases.
Asked whether this medical influence was for or against guardianship, social workers said 
that medical views favoured guardianship in 14 (64%) of these 22 cases.
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Section 2 Diagnoses and Other Variables
Diagnosis and Age
Ages and proportions of clients across the full range of diagnostic groups are indicated 
in Table 62. Schizophrenia is the diagnosis of 68% people who were less than 60 years 
of age while dementia is the main diagnosis of 53.3% people aged 60 or over.
Looking only at schizophrenia and dementia as in the table below provides percentages 
of 100% and 64.7% respectively for these age groups.
Diagnosis and Age 
Table No. 31
Schiz­
ophrenia
Dementia Row
Totals
0-60 13 0 13
61 + 6 11 17
Column Totals 19 11* 30
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 13.282
Value =  10.641
p = .000
p = .001
p = .0317
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.8
Looking at other age groupings is also indicative in judging respective weighting between 
schizophrenia and dementia in the sample groups.
Age of one client with dementia not known
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Clients with schizophrenia form 72.7% of the under 70 age group and 18.8% of the 
71+ age group.
Diagnosis and Age 
Table No. 32
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Schiz­ Other Row
ophrenia Diagnoses Totals
-70 16 6 22
71 + 3 13 16
Column Totals 19 19 38*
Value =  10.79545
Value = 8.74432
p =  .0010
p =  .0031
Significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 8.7
Clients with dementia form 81.8% of the over 80 age group and 13.5% of the under 80 
age group.
Diagnosis and Age 
Table No. 33
Fisher’s Exact Test
Dementia Other
Diagnoses
Row
Totals
81 + 9 2 11
- 80 2 25 27
Column Totals 11 27 38*
p =  .016
‘Nearly’ significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 3.2
Totals exclude two clients diagnosed as ‘mentally handicapped’
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Diagnosis: Living Arrangements and Family Support
Looking at different living arrangements and family support for clients in the various 
diagnostic groups in Tables 63 and 64 suggests that similar living patterns pertain as 
between people suffering from dementia and schizophrenia. For both groups, people 
living alone form about two-thirds of the samples while the proportion of those in 
residential care compared with other arrangements is about 1/6 for both groups. No 
people suffering from dementia were closely supported by family but a quarter of those 
suffering from schizophrenia obtained such support.
Diagnosis and Hospital Admissions
The overall pattern of diagnosis and compulsory hospital admissions confirms experience 
that people with schizophrenia are much more subject to compulsory admissions to 
hospital than those with dementia, as shown in the simplified table below. 72.7% of 
people suffering from schizophrenia had had three or more admissions. No clients with 
dementia had been compulsorily admitted.
Diagnosis and Compulsory Hospital Admissions 
Table No. 34
Schiz­
ophrenia
Dementia Row
Totals
2 or Less 3 12 15
3 or more 8 0 8
Column Totals 11 12 23
Chi-Square 
Yates’ Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 13.38182 p =  .0003
Value = 10.36779 p =  .0013
p =  .0337
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 3.8
281
Diagnosis: Social Work and Guardianship Objectives
The main reason for considering guardianship following unsuccessful attempts to pursue 
social work objectives was failure to persuade clients to accept help - referred to as 
Insufficiency of Persuasion. Looking at how this applied to the two main diagnostic groups 
shows similar patterns but was slightly more of an issue with people with dementia: 75% 
(Table 36) compared with 63.2% (Table 35).
Schizophrenia and Social W ork Objectives 
Table No. 35
Schiz­ Other Row
ophrenia Diagnoses Totals
Pers.Insuffic 12 12 24
Other Probs. 7 9 16
Column Totals 19 21 40
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
0.15038
0.00418
p =  .6982
p =  .9485
Minimum Expected Frequency =  7.6
Dementia and Social W ork Objectives 
Table No. 36
Dementia Other
Diagnoses
Row
Totals
Insuffic/Pers. 9 15 24
Other Probs. 3 13 16
Column Totals 12 28 40
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher*s Exact Test
Value =
Value =
1.60714
.83829
p =  .2049 
p =  .3599
p = .297
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.8
Guardianship objectives related to the implementation of one or other of the three main 
powers, as between residential placement, day care provision or obtaining access 
(i.e. various aspects of service provision in the broadest sense) are compared by diagnostic 
groups in Table 65. This indicates that the residential requirement applied to half of the 
clients suffering from schizophrenia and for three quarters of the clients suffering from 
dementia.
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Section 3 Case Status Category Groups and Other Variables
Category Status and Age of Clients
Main differences in age vis a vis category status emerge in categories 80+, and in 
the 31-50 group, as indicated below. In the former, 80+ clients formed 15.4% of the 
Category [1] group and 33.3% of Category [2].
Case Status and Age 
Table No. 37
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
80 or above 2 9 11
-80 11 18 29
Column Totals 13 27 40
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher,s Exact Test
Value = 
Value =
1.41789
0.66054
p =  .2338 
p =  .4164
p =  .286
Minimum Expected Frequency =  3.6
The 31-50 age group is made up of 38.5% of Category [1] and 18.5% of Category [2]
Cases Status and Age 
Table No. 38
Category Category Row
[1] [21 Totals
31-50 5 5 10
Other Ages 8 22 30
Column Totals 13 27 40
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .246
Minimum Expected Frequency =  3.3
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Category Group and Gender
Table 66 shows the breakdown between male/female clients in the two categories, 
indicating no appreciable difference and suggesting that there is no relationship between 
gender and the distinction between cases decided upon by social workers and those finally 
endorsed by management.
Category Group and Marital Status
Table 67 shows the different marital status groups between the two status groups. It 
indicates that the largest group from both categories are single people and that there is 
no significant difference between single status and the category distinctions.
Category Group and Ethnicity
Table 68 shows distinctions between the main ethnic groups and case status differences. 
Collapsing the ethnic group categories into ‘British’ and ‘non-British’ as in the Table 
below gives a clearer picture in which the first group form 61.5% of Category [1] clients 
and 82.1% of Category [2].
Ethnicity and Case Status 
Table No. 39
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
British 8 23 31
‘Non-British’ 5 5 10
Column Totals 13 28 41
Fisher’s Exact Test p = .241
Minimum Expected Frequency = 3.1
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Category Group: Living Arrangements and Family Support
Table 69 indicates the distinction between living alone, living with nuclear family and 
living in residential care. Two further tables (Tables 70 and 71) collapse these categories 
in order to show how ‘living alone’ and ‘living in residential care’ relate to the category 
group difference compared with other living arrangements. These indicate that people 
living alone form two-thirds of each groups, and that those living in residential care form 
a seventh of Category [1] and one tenth of Category [2] cases. Table 72 shows levels 
(i.e. the amount) of family support to clients, and that no notable difference between the 
categories is evident.
Category Group and Diagnosis
Table 73 shows the breakdown of diagnostic groups alongside the two status category 
groups. There is no statistically significant distinction between diagnostic groups and the 
categories. This remained the case even when groups were collapsed to show only 
schizophrenia and dementia compared with other diagnoses in relation to the categories, 
as indicated in Tables 74 and 75.
Category Group and Hospital Admissions
Tables 76 and 77 show the number of admissions for each client and the distinctions 
between the two status category groups, for compulsory admissions and voluntary 
admissions respectively. The following regrouped table indicates proportionately more 
compulsory admissions in Category [1], i.e. 80%, compared with 42.1 % in Category [2].
Compulsory Admissions and Case Status Categories 
Table No. 40
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
None 2 11 13
1 or More 8 8 16
Column Totals 10 19 29
Chi-Square 
Yates’ Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 
Value =
3.804
2.426
p =  0.051 
p =  0.119
p =  .114
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.5
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Category Group and Social Work Objectives
Regarding reasons prompting guardianship consideration, Insufficiency of Persuasion to 
receive help was the majority answer for both status category groups, but proportionately 
more so in Category [2] cases.
The following table shows Insufficiency of Persuasion compared with other reasons given 
for the two categories, and indicates that the factor applied in 71.4% of Category [2] 
cases and 33.3% of Category [1] cases, viz.:
Social W ork Objectives and Case Status Categories 
Table No. 41
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
Insuffic. Pers 4 20 24
Others 8 8 16
Column Totals 12 28 40
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher*s Exact Test
Value = 5.079 p =  .024
Value = 3.616 p =  .057
p =  .0367
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 4.8
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Category Group and Guardianship Objectives 
- Individually Defined
Guardianship objectives which had been defined in terms of individual client requirements 
for authority/control or enhanced care show no notable difference between the two groups 
in this respect.
Category Group and Guardianship Objectives - Service Provision
With regard to guardianship objectives defined in service provision terms, Category [1] 
clients are over-represented in the sub-group ‘Regularisation of Residential Care’ and the 
table below highlights that distinction. The percentages are 30.8% and 3.6% respectively 
between the categories in the sub-groups. Table 78 looks in detail at guardianship 
objectives between the two categories.
Guardianship Objectives and Category Status 
Table No. 42
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
Reg. Res. Care* 4 1 5
Other Objectives 9 27 36
Column Totals 13 28 41
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .0284
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency 1.6
Regularisation of residential care placements
Category Group and Realisability of Guardianship Objectives
With regard to the realisability of guardianship objectives divided between the two 
categories, there is a clear link between objective realisability and Category Status [1], 
which is clarified in the table below. Possibly social workers considered that 
‘realisability’ was actually being demonstrated in Category [1] cases. Realisability 
applied in 72.7% of category [1] cases and 33.3% of Category [2] cases.
Realisability of Guardianship Objectives and Category Status 
Table No. 43
Category Category Row
HI [2] Totals
Realisable 8 9 17
Not Clear or unlikely 3 18 21
Column Totals 11 27 38
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value =  4.906 p =  .027
Value = 3.442 p =  .064
p =  .0367
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.9
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Category Group Differences and Medical Influence
Tables 79 and 80 show answers to the two research questions in this section, namely: 
(1) Was there medical influence? (2) If so, in which direction?
The answer to question (1) was ‘yes’ for 9 Category [1] clients and 13 Category [2] 
clients. In answer to question (2), medical opinion favoured guardianship in 9 Category
[1] cases and 5 Category [2] cases. ‘Yes’ answers formed 75% of Category [1] clients 
and 50% of Category [2] clients shown in Table 44. ‘Favoured’ answers formed 100% 
of Category [1] clients and 41.7% of Category [2] clients in Table 45.
Medical Influence - ‘Was there?’ 
Table No. 44
Category
[U
Category
[2]
Row
Totals
‘No’ or ‘Not 
Clear’
3 13 16
Yes 9 13 22
Column Totals 12 26 38
Chi-Sauare 
Yates’ Correction
Value = 
Value
2.10511
1.20445
p =  .1468
p = .2724
Minimum Expected Frequency = 5.1
Medical Influence -‘Which Wav?’ 
Table No. 45
Category Category Row
[1] [2] Totals
‘No’ or ‘Not Sure’ 0 7 7
‘Favoured’ 9 5 14
Column Totals 9 12 21
Fisher’s Exact Test ______________________________ p =  .0712
‘Nearly’ significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  3.0
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Section 4 Differences Between the Two Social Services Departments (the Agencies) 
Compared with Other Variables
The Agencies and Ages of Clients
Information on ages of clients for the two agencies is presented in Table 81. This shows 
that the main distinctions arise in age categories 81 + , and in combined groups below 
50 years of age compared with 51 or above. 51 + clients form 78.2% of Kensington and 
Chelsea cases, and under 50 clients form 64.7% of Westminster cases.
The Agencies and Clients’ Ages 
Table No. 46
K & C W’min Row
Totals
-50 5 11 16
51 + 18 6 24
Column Totals 23 17 40
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
7.51918
5.83546
p =  .0061
p =  .0157
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  6.8
81+ clients form 43.4% of cases in Kensington and Chelsea. Clients under 80 form
94% of cases in Westminster.
The Agencies and Clients* Ages 
Table No. 47
K & C W’min Row
Totals
-80 13 16 11
81 + 10 1 29
Column Totals 23 17 40
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher*s Exact Test
Value =
Value =
6.930
5.172
p =  .008
p =  .023
p =  .0119
‘Nearly’ significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  4.7
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The Agencies and Gender
There is an even balance of male and female guardianship clients between the agencies. 
The Agencies and Marital Status
Distinctions between clients’ marital status is indicated in Table 82 which shows that the 
biggest single group in each agency are single clients.
The Agencies and Ethnicity
Table 83 gives the range of ethnic and racial origin groupings between the agencies and 
indicates that there are proportionately fewer guardianships from ethnic minority 
backgrounds being put forward in Kensington and Chelsea.
Collapsing these distinctions into British compared with ‘Non-British’ categories in the 
following table emphasises the distinction. ‘Non-British’ clients form 12.5% of the 
Kensington and Chelsea cases and 41.2% of the Westminster cases.
Ethnicity and Agencies 
Table No. 48
K & C W’min Row
Totals
British 21 10 31
Non-British 3 7 10
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates’ Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 4.437
Value = 3.019
p =  .035
p = .082
p =  .0632
‘Nearly’ significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency = 4.1
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The Agencies and Diagnosis
Table 84 shows the different diagnostic groups for the agencies and indicates that 
schizophrenia and dementia are both major diagnostic groups in Kensington and Chelsea. 
In Westminster, schizophrenia is the main group and there is very little sign of interest 
in the use of guardianship for people suffering from dementia in Westminster. Dementia 
sufferers form 45.8% of the Kensington and Chelsea cases and 5.9% of the Westminster 
cases. Clients with schizophrenia form 33.3% of the Kensington and Chelsea cases and 
64.7% of the Westminster cases. The following tables isolate the two main diagnostic 
groups.
Diagnosis and Agency - Dementia 
Table No. 49
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Dementia 11 1 12
Other 13 16 29
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
Value = 7.672 p =  .006
Value = 5.864 p =  .015
______________________________ p =  .0643
‘Nearly’ significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.0
Diagnosis and Agency - Schizophrenia 
Table No. 50
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Schizophrenia 8 11 19
Other 16 6 22
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square Value = 3.93883 p =  .0472
Yates* Correction Value = 2.77821 p =  .0956
Minimum Expected Frequency = 7.9
The Agencies and Liying Arrangements
Table 85 shows the main living arrangement distinctions and indicates little difference 
between the agencies. However, looking only at ‘Living Alone’ emphasises that this was 
more a factor in Kensington and Chelsea - 79.2% compared with 58.8% in Westminster.
The Agencies and Living Arrangements 
Table No. 51
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Alone 19 10 29
Other 5 7 12
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square Value = 1.989 p =  .158
Yates* Correction Value = 1.128 p =  .288
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .184
Minimum Expected Frequency 5.0
The Agencies and Family Support
Table 86 shows the amount of family support which guardianship clients are estimated 
as receiving by their social workers. This indicates that the majority of guardianship 
clients in both agencies receive a negligible amount of family support and conversely that 
those with a close family relationship form a small minority. Differences between the 
agencies are small.
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The Agencies and Hospital Admissions
The available data on guardianship clients in respect of hospital admissions was limited and 
provided information on 31 clients regarding compulsory admissions and on 29 voluntary 
admissions. Data on compulsory admissions to hospital in the agencies is provided at 
Table 87. This indicates that 64.7% of clients in Kensington and Chelsea experienced no 
compulsory admissions compared with 14.3% in Westminster, and the effect of this 
difference is emphasised in the table below comparing those who have had no hospital 
admissions with those who have had one or more.
Hospital Admissions and the Agencies - Compulsory 
Table No. 52
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
None 11 2 13
One or More 6 12 18
Column Totals 17 14 31
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
8.01551
6.07857
p = .0046
p =  .0137
Significant at the .05 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.9
A similar but less pronounced pattern of clients’ voluntary admissions is evident in the 
distribution between the agencies in Table 88. This is emphasised in the table below which 
compares those who have no admissions with those who have had one or more. The 
former represent 84.2% clients in Kensington and Chelsea and 50% of clients in 
Westminster.
Hospital Admissions and the Agencies - Voluntary 
Table No. 53
K & C W’min Row
Totals
None 16 5 21
One or More 3 5 8
Column Totals 19 10 29
Fisher*s Exact Test p =  .0834
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.8
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The Agencies and Readability of Social Work Objectives
A retrospective analysis was undertaken of social workers’ views on the limitations of 
social work in care and service providing for their clients prior to considering 
guardianship as an option. Of three broad reasons why social work alone was insufficient 
to provide care as between ‘Insufficiency of Persuasion’, ‘Inability to Enforce Care’ and 
the ‘Excessively High Level of Supervision Required’, the main reason given was that 
persuasion was insufficient. The balance of numbers is shown in the table below 
indicating that this was particularly an issue in Kensington and Chelsea (70.8%) 
compared with Westminster (43.8%).
Social W ork Objective R eadab ility  and the Agencies: 
Insufficiency of Persuasion 
Table No. 54
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Insuffic. Pers. 17 7 24
Other 7 9 16
Column Totals 24 16 40
Chi-Square Value = 2.93403 p =  .0867
Yates* Correction Value = 6.07857 p =  .1665
Minimum Expected Frequency 6.4
The Agencies and Guardianship Objectives
Objectives of guardianship were considered on two dimensions: the distinction between 
individual client focused objectives and service providing objectives.
Individual Client Focused Objectives
These divided broadly between the requirement for more authority or control as distinct 
from providing the client with an enhanced level of care. The distinctions are reflected 
in the following table, from which it will be seen that authority and control was generally 
more of an issue for social workers in Westminster - 70.6% compared with 45.8% in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Client Focused Guardianship Objectives In The Agencies 
Table No. 55
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Authority/Control 11 12 23
Enhanced Care 13 5 18
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square Value — 2.47609 p = .1156
Yates* Correction Value =  1.57295 p = .2098
Minimum Expected Frequency 7.5
Service Providing Objectives
Service providing objectives related to the three guardianship powers, i.e. determining 
place of residence, gaining access and ensuring attendance, are reflected in the 
categorised groupings in Table 89. By far the most common objective of guardianships 
in both agencies was concerned with residential care and the similarity between the two 
agencies is reflected in Table 56 below - 66.7% in Kensington and Chelsea and 70.6% 
in Westminster. Differences between the agencies emerged in respect of the 
regularisation of residential and day care placements, which was much more of an 
objective in Westminster, as indicated in Table 57 - 41.2% compared with 8.3% in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Guardianship Objectives in the Agencies - All Residential Placements
Table No. 56
K & C W ’m in Row
Totals
All Res. 
Placements
16 12 28
Other 8 5 13
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
.07067
.0000
p = .7904
p = 1.000
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.4
Guardianship Objectives in the two SSDs: Regularising 
Table No. 57
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Regularising 2 7 9
(all placements)
Other purposes 22 10 32
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher*s Exact Test
Value =
Value =
6.26528
4.49493
p = .0123 
p = .034
p = .028
Significant at the .05 level 
M in im u m  Expected Frequency = 3 .7
297
A distinction in service providing objectives was also evident between residential 
placements and the regularisation of an existing residential placement. The former 
mainly concerned Kensington and Chelsea with 66.7% compared with 41.2% in 
Westminster. Regularisation is not an objective in any Kensington and Chelsea case 
whereas these form 22% of Westminster cases.
Guardianship Objectives in the Agencies: Residential Placement
Table. No 58
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Res. Placement 16 7 23
Other Objective 8 10 18
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
2.62537
1.69237
p =  .1052
p =  .1933
Minimum Expected Frequency =  7.5
G uardianship Objectives in the Agencies Regularising Residential Placements
Table No. 59
K & C W ’m in Row
Totals
Reg. Res. Placement 0 5 5
Other Objective 24 12 36
Column Totals 24 17 41
Fisher’s Exact Test p =  .0826
Minimum Expected Frequency =  2.1
Guardianship Purpose Realisabilitv
As to how achievable (or for existing guardianship cases - actually achieved) were 
guardianship’s objectives for each of the clients concerned, Table 90 indicates the pattern 
between the agencies and shows that achievability receives a slightly higher evaluation 
in Westminster - 52.9% compared with 43.5% in Kensington and Chelsea.
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The Agencies and Medical Influence
In this section two questions were asked in respect of each guardianship client: 
(1) Was there medical influence? (2) If so, in which direction?
Tables 91 and 92 show the answers to these questions and the following two tables 
regroup the data, to demonstrate more medical influence in Westminster and a more 
favourable view of guardianship by medical colleagues in respect of guardianship clients. 
‘Definitely Yes’ was the answer in 45.9% Kensington and Chelsea cases compared with 
70.6% in Westminster.
Medical Influence in the Agencies: ‘Was There?’
Table No. 60
K & C W ’min Row
Totals
Definitely Yes 11 12 23
Other 13 5 18
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square 
Yates* Correction
Value =
Value =
2.47609
1.57295
p =  .1156
p =  .2098
Minimum Expected Frequency = 7.5
The following table shows ‘favoured’ to be the answer in 54.5% of Kensington & 
Chelsea cases and 75% of Westminster cases.
Medical Influences In the Agencies: ‘Which Wav?*
Table No. 61
Chi-Sauare 
Yates* Correction 
Fisher’s Exact Test
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Favoured 6 9 15
Other responses 5 3 8
Column Totals 11 12 23
Value =
Value =
1.059
0.349
p = .304 
p = .555
p = .400
Minimum Expected Frequency = 3.8
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SOCIAL WORKERS’ GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS:
(2) CASE EXAMPLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS
The following notes on guardianship clients are presented in an abbreviated format 
reflecting the often limited information available to the researcher from social workers 
or from case records.
Case A (Status Category V)
This 42-year-old woman suffers from schizophrenia, and had entered hospital annually 
since 1977, sometimes compulsorily. At the time of the suggestion for guardianship, the 
client was in hospital under a Section 3 order and the intention was to improve on 
previous after-care arrangements by ensuring a planned programme of rehabilitation in 
an appropriate residential unit.
The proposers wanted to prescribe where the client could reside, and how often her 
mother should visit, etc. There was also a day care activity plan which it was hoped 
guardianship would help to consolidate. The client lacked motivation to pursue her own 
rehabilitation plan and in particular to resist the over solicitous attentions of her mother. 
No social work action had previously been effective in either of these directions.
Management had not given any suggestion of support for the social workers’ submission 
and the case ‘lay on the files’ in a limbo/unresolved situation. The social worker 
expressed diffidence because he considered he was receiving conflicting messages about 
management support for guardianship.
Case B (Status Category V)
A 81-year-old woman, living alone, has shown evidence of psychotic behaviour but has 
so far managed to survive at home, albeit in a neglectful state, refusing to eat food, to 
clean herself or her flat, or to go out shopping. She now suffers from malnutrition.
The social worker had been trying for over a year to gain proper access to her and this 
only succeeded when client confused identity of social worker with that of her daughter, 
but the client would otherwise refuse all access.
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Social worker’s team leader had suggested guardianship as a means of providing structure 
for the care of the client at home and to enable her to stay physically healthy, by 
allowing home helps and district nurses to gain access.
The proposal had not proceeded beyond this stage because the social worker had 
understood that senior management "did not want guardianship orders". The client 
eventually required hospital admission and died in hospital.
Case C (Status Category V)
This 86-year-old woman suffers from dementia and has been ‘battered’ by her older sister 
who insists on holding her money and taking over her management without ensuring 
proper care. Client was not eating properly and suffered injuries. She was too 
frightened of her sister to agree to do anything to safeguard her welfare.
Social workers wanted her to move into a home for the elderly but she was too confused 
and over-influenced by her sister to be able to express an independent decision.
Guardianship could have been used to place her into Part in accommodation and to help 
to resist the overtures of the sister. In the event the sister was judged to be mentally ill 
and was compulsorily admitted to hospital, thereby removing the source of the difficulty 
on a temporary basis. The sister will soon be out of hospital and the whole problem 
could re-emerge. (Possibility of client entering home for the elderly while the sister is 
in hospital -apparently difficult because of the non-availability of places in homes for the 
elderly.)
Case D (Status Category V)
This client is 26, from a mixed Afro-Caribbean/Irish-American background, and has a 
long history of violent episodes (possibly psychotic) which have taken him in and out of 
hospital. However, between times he is manageable in the community provided he can 
be closely supervised and almost ‘bullied’ to take his medication.
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No family member or friend is in a position to do this because they have separated from 
him due to his violence. However, he does respond to persuasion from professionals 
provided they can get access to him and are persistent enough.
The object of guardianship therefore would be to get him to take his medication regularly 
and for him to attend a depot clinic. There have been indications that if social workers 
persist, they can always eventually get in to see him.
The social worker was very serious about the task of preventing this person yet again 
requiring hospital care but spoke in dismissive terms about the prospect of management 
agreeing a guardianship in this case. It is true that it would be a radical departure for 
most social services departments to take on management in the community of someone 
with such obviously high levels of disturbance and aggressive behaviour.
Its also noted that client has a very close relationship with his mother but the two of them 
cannot live together because of his violence. For similar reasons he has broken up with 
his girlfriend and no longer sees his daughter.
Case E (Status Category IV)
This 28-year-old Jewish woman has been placed in residential care in a hostel in Kent. 
The diagnostic picture is unclear but she has been labelled ‘mentally handicapped’ and 
also as having a ‘personality problem’.
The idea of guardianship came from the client’s father who thought that it would act as 
a reinforcement to the authority position of the head of care at the hostel. In the short 
run, this was aimed at reducing absconding (or more specifically to give the head of care 
authority to get her client returned to care after absconding). More generally it was 
hoped that this would stabilise the client’s situation at the hostel, as well as helping to 
make the relationship between her and family more manageable.
Previous rehabilitation plans from a mental handicap hospital into residential care had not 
worked out well.
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Case F (Status Category I)
This 72-year-old single woman was on guardianship at the time of the research. It 
commenced in October 1986 having first been proposed in July 1986. It is interesting 
to note that the Principal Officer (Mental Health) in the agency had recommended against 
guardianship and had written to the social worker discouraging her from pursuing it any 
further. However, the Mental Health Review Tribunal looked at the case and 
recommended guardianship in place of Section 3.
The client has suffered from manic depressive illness from the time she was 18 and has 
had at least 20 hospital admissions and relies on major tranquillisers. She is unable to 
cope with housework etc., and cannot support her common-law husband who is equally 
disabled.
There was common agreement that something additional was needed to enable this person 
to remain at home if she was not to continue to neglect herself severely. The client 
refused entry to all forms of home care and to the CPN.
Objective of guardianship was described as:
"to provide firm boundaries and a plan of care which the client was unable to 
provide for herself because of her lack of insight and inability to see or accept 
consequences of her action".
Guardianship has worked to enable access of services and to enable a suitable residential 
placement to be made. The client no longer cohabits but former common-law husband 
has also become more accommodating since the guardianship order.
Case G (Status Category II)
An 82-year-old single woman has been suffering from severe dementia for at least the last 
five years and has been on the receiving end of intense domiciliary care (14 home help 
visits per week) plus by-monthly ‘Network Meetings’. The Court of Protection are also 
involved.
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As dementia progressed the care task became harder and a decision was reached that the 
client needed to enter residential care. However, she was unable to express cooperation 
or otherwise.
Guardianship was used to place client in residential care where she settled well and the 
guardianship order was then allowed to lapse.
There is an interesting link between guardianship and Court of Protection, but no details 
are provided. Objective of guardianship was said to be:
"to ensure that the client is living in a safe secure environment where she will be 
cared for and the element of risk is reduced."
The reason for guardianship being allowed to lapse was stated thus:
"the client was settled and happy in residential care and was not considered to be 
likely to leave".
Medical opinion was said to be influential in suggesting that the client was at risk in the 
community and likely to deteriorate.
Case H (Case Status V)
A woman of 85, with no psychiatric history, is now suffering from dementia with ‘severe 
short-term memory loss’. Client’s mental health deteriorated rapidly following death of 
spouse in 1981. Client has substantial wealth and guardianship objective was to ‘give 
local authority the right to engage a full-time carer on client’s behalf - i.e. funded from 
proceeds of husband’s estate. Eventually the client was persuaded to accept help 
voluntarily and the case was not put to management.
There was a view expressed both by medical colleagues and social workers that 
guardianship should not be pursued because "client would be happier and more 
cooperative if she felt she had retained some remaining level of control over her life". 
By implication, the pursuit of guardianship would be seen as removing all control from 
client. No notion of quid pro quo or of a partial or limited approach here.
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Case I (Case Status II)
This is a single woman of 73, separated from her family, who had previously lived in 
Ireland and Canada. She has had a number of paranoid psychotic episodes since 1985 
and some physical health problems (admitted into general hospital because of 
hypothermia).
Eventually discharged from psychiatric hospital under guardianship in December 1986 
in order to be placed into a specialist residential unit (not clear in which sense this unit 
was specialist) because neither Part III accommodation nor sheltered accommodation was 
seen as appropriate. There was medical support for placement under guardianship.
Guardianship was lapsed once client was ‘settled in*.
Case J (Case Status II)
This single woman of 49 suffering from schizophrenia had been admitted to hospital at 
least every other year. Community care efforts were "unable to stabilise her for any 
length of time".
"Regular sustained social work involvement” did not begin until the commencement of 
the guardianship order. The guardianship brought about some cooperation and 
stabilisation.
Guardianship lasted four years. It had been judged successful: no more hospital
admissions since.
Case K (Case Status II)
A 37-year-old man living apart from family with a number of long hospital admissions. 
On discharge, drifted and experimented with drugs.
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He received statutory after-care after a Section 3 admission, and social worker tried to 
prevent reversal to his previous life-style.
It was felt that some structure and support would outweigh the curtailment of client’s 
liberties. Aim of guardianship was to "try to win over the confidence of the client and 
help him feel more relaxed about our motives". It was expected that guardianship would 
"give structure and boundaries that were clear to work on client".
Guardianship was accepted by the agency’s senior management but they did not positively 
endorse it. Neither did they provide any reason for allowing guardianship to lapse.
Case L (Case Status V)
This woman of 69, diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia, is married with children 
but separated from family for many years. She has regular in-patient care and her history 
of illness dates back to 1949.
Many attempts have been made to provide a stable care situation for her on discharge 
from hospital but all have failed:- nursing home, old peoples home etc. She rapidly 
becomes disenchanted with the placement and takes herself off.
Guardianship was seen as a means of securing a ‘package’ of after-care for client to 
include accommodation and day care, therapeutic occupation and psychiatric follow-up. 
But "no suitable community placement could be found" before she discharged herself 
from hospital. She was readmitted to another hospital before the guardianship application 
could be made.
Some enthusiasm for guardianship by medical colleagues is present but a view prevails 
that situation changes too rapidly for guardianship arrangements to be put in hand. Latest 
decision by medical team is to delay further action until client is placed in a new 
community facility which is just about to be opened.
306
Case M (Case Status V)
This 85-year-old unmarried woman lives alone with only occasional family contact and 
suffers from dementia.
Community care arrangements were working reasonably well with social worker dealing 
with client’s finances, visiting regularly in conjunction with a community care assistant, 
Meals on Wheels and DNO.
The social worker advised use of guardianship in order to be able to place the person in 
Part III accommodation, on the basis that the client was disorientated and "unable to give 
informed consent". By implication this applied also to the risky aspect of managing 
client’s finances.
The request for Part III accommodation was linked with the idea that the ‘power of 
return’ would be valuable to deal with absconding due to client’s mobile ‘life-style’. 
Management declined to support this recommendation saying that it was an "inappropriate 
use of guardianship". Consequently a formal proposal was not submitted.
Case N (Case Status V)
This widow of 85 has a daughter living close-by who appears to feel she has ‘failed’ in 
caring for mother as she becomes more uncommunicative and withdrawn.
Client refuses community services (home care etc.) and entry into Part III 
accommodation. The role of guardianship was to:
1. assume power to direct client to live in Part III accommodation;
2. remove responsibility from daughter, thus relieving guilt/stress, and to break 
dead-lock [referring to daughter’s inability to gain access to services for her 
mother].
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It is particularly notable that the agency’s homecare management "refused to enter [the 
client’s home] without express consent”. The guardianship application was declined on 
the grounds that residential care staff were strongly opposed to this use of guardianship. 
Social worker appears to think that there was a management ‘bottom line’ position that 
made residential care more acceptable under guardianship than home care. He appears 
therefore not to have pursued as far as he might the notion that home care could be 
‘imposed’ on client - though he may well also have had practical difficulties very much 
in mind. His view was simply that community care was not working, mainly because 
client refused to consent to anything. He also refers critically to the inflexibility of home 
care management and the situation of EMI clients ‘falling between NHS and local 
authority responsibilities’.
Case O (Case Status V)
This schizophrenic man of 59, with very little family contact, is described as a 
‘Bamardo’s boy’.
Some major psychotic episodes appear to have provided quite traumatic hospital 
experience in the two previous years and further hospital admissions were predicted. He 
relies on major tranquillisers, attending out-patient clinic for injections plus oral 
medication. Social worker feels that his social adjustment is precarious and that he 
requires occupation, social contact and day care.
Role of guardianship was to direct client into day care attendance but in the event this 
idea was merely ‘talked about’.
Also a practical matter intervened: the social worker identified a departmental policy 
affecting the decision not to pursue this case, namely the:
"Necessity of providing report for consideration by management before making 
application meant that social worker would not propose unless there is a high 
chance of success (because of extra work involved)."
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In other words, the management ‘advice’ on the case in response to a report was not seen 
as supportive but as an ‘extra chore’.
Case P (Case Status I)
A 55-year-old single woman has two sisters who offer some continued interest and 
concern but appear determined that main responsibility shall fall on social services, 
apparently to avoid assuming financial responsibility.
Client suffers from manic depressive psychosis and has been in and out of hospital many 
times since 1975. After discharge client tends to withdraw and refuse contact with 
medical and social services staff. Thus ‘community care’ has not been possible in a true 
sense.
Follow-up from hospital has become more of an issue since she has been subject to 
Section 117 as a Section 3 patient. At last discharge she was described as "clearly a very 
vulnerable client at risk of death through self neglect". These factors in combination 
appear to have encouraged management to accept the guardianship.
Management did not say on what grounds they accepted the guardianship but the 
following were listed:
- To prevent need for further admission by close monitoring and supervision;
- To accommodate client in supportive environment;
- Allowing a hostel to be stipulated as place of residence;
- By ordering attendance at day hospital and medical appointments;
- By allowing access to client against her expressed wish.
A good deal of medical support was expressed for guardianship as "the only measure 
left".
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Case O (Case Status V)
This is a 91-year-old widow of Polish origin, whose remaining family live in 
USA/Canada. She has no history of hospital care until admitted to an acute unit in a 
confused self-neglected state by Section 2 in 1987. Community services were becoming 
ineffective for at least a year beforehand when she began to refuse help and stopped 
eating properly. In other words, she was allowed to deteriorate to the point where 
hospital care was inevitable.
The diagnosis of senile dementia is supported by the fact that she has "little insight” and 
already believes she is in an old people’s home.
It was not thought appropriate for her to be discharged home (!) and a proposal for Part 
III was put forward. The social worker met resistance from the Part III panel because 
client was "not able to consent" and client went instead to a ‘long-stay NHS resource’.
In other words, guardianship was not used because the avenues open to a client in this 
situation were excluded in advance. She went to hospital unnecessarily and went into an 
NHS residential unit because social services management declined to have her in 
residential care unless consenting.
No clear idea of management thinking about this.
Case R (Case Status II)
An 84-year-old Swedish woman, widowed for many years with no known relatives in 
England suffers from ‘progressive dementia’. Community care arrangements have been 
operating since 1982 (initial referral), consisting of Home Care, Meals on Wheels, CPN. 
Court of Protection are also involved and the social worker has not been happy about the 
Court’s ability/intent to operate in the client’s best interests (unspecified).
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Guardianship is therefore seen as a means of:
1. reducing possible exploitation by others;
2. protecting rights of individual to remain in own home;
3. if necessary, assisting with long-term care needs - i.e. to place in
residential care if and when necessary.
Social worker saw guardianship as a means of acquiring additional authority which would 
give her some ‘clout’ in dealing with Court of Protection and in formulating a long-term 
care plan. Some interesting views on the use of guardianship here, especially regarding 
authority and the ability draw up care plans.
Case S (Case Status V)
This is a 78 year old woman, widowed, who lives with her daughter. The client has had 
a history of hospital admissions because of paranoid schizophrenia. She accepts 
community care relucantly being very much against ‘professionals’.
Motivation for guardianship seems to have come from her daughter. According to the 
social worker the daughter saw guardianship as a means of getting her mother out of her 
flat (? into residential care).
There are a number of unanswered questions in this case but it is interesting to record:
1. The idea was for the daughter to be the guardian and therefore to be given 
powers (to determine place of residence).
2. The arrangement would explicitly involve a person losing (i.e. being 
removed from) their own home in favour of a residential or hospital solution.
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3. Management considered (quite rightly) that the whole idea had not been 
properly thought out and were extremely wary of going along with the daughter’s 
view of the situation.
Case T (Case Status I)
This guardianship case is in force and concerns a man of 63 of Polish/Jewish origin, 
divorced, with a history of paranoid schizophrenia with a grandiose and violent aspect.
He has been in and out of hospital since 1972 and was discharged from a Section 3 order 
in 1986 - Section 117 - to after-care of day hospital but stopped attending, guardianship 
seen as a means of enforcing attendance and to ensure that continued care and attention 
does not gradually fade into the background (so that he does not ‘fall out’ of the system).
The social worker has indicated that management agree with his view, that guardianship 
is to provide "authority over client and an obligation to provide continuing community 
care". It is interesting that none of the discussion up to this point referred to priority 
access to care/services.
Case U (Case Status V)
This case is interesting in that two social workers were involved from both the research 
agencies. The original (Kensington and Chelsea) social worker moved (to Westminster) 
but was persuaded to come back to talk to the researcher about the case. Broadly 
speaking she was in favour of guardianship but the succeeding social worker was not.
The first social worker was working more as a self-styled ‘relationship therapist’, 
whereas the social work successor was more practical in approach.
Diagnosis is obsessional neurosis and client has had a leucotomy and much hospital 
treatment - still continuing.
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The guardianship idea was to impose some form of control over his hazardous life style. 
For example, he never throws anything away and his flat has become a health hazard. 
Guardianship may have enabled social services to have moved the client out, at least 
while the flat was cleaned up etc.
No plan was drawn up and eventually the matter was dropped.
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PART THREE: INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS
Introduction
The following discussion looks overall at social workers’ perspectives on guardianship, 
social work and guardianship clients, and seeks to explore connections within the findings 
between expressed views and recorded experience of work with the clients. The 
application of guardianship models (see Chapter IV) as a framework for analysis of social 
workers’ views of guardianship and social work is tested. The task of answering the 
research questions by reference to two key variables - the differences between the 
agencies and between Categories [1] and [2] clients - is deferred to Chapter VI 
(Conclusions).
The data and analyses upon which the results are based, presented in numbered bar charts 
and commentaries from page 244, are referenced below by result number and page 
number.
(1) SOCIAL WORKERS’ PERSPECTIVES ON GUARDIANSHIP AND SOCIAL 
WORK
Key guardianship concepts already defined include structure, continuity, surrogacy, 
enabling and advocacy. The assumption here is that these characteristics would be 
present to varying degrees in considering any particular guardianship model. Added to 
these were ‘authority’ and ‘protective care’ which the researcher had initially assumed 
to be essential elements rather than contingent attributes.
On this basis the researcher concluded that guardianship contains the notion of surrogacy 
and protective care exercised by someone in ‘authority’, and that whichever model of 
guardianship one examines, the elements of surrogacy, authority and protective care will 
be paramount. The influence of different models and different circumstances of client 
needs will effect the balance between these elements at any given point in time.
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Some comment is required on three findings related explicitly to authority elements in 
guardianship, the first two of which were somewhat obliquely worded. Wide 
endorsement of the use of guardianship to provide particular kinds of authority (89%) 
[Result No. 17, page 249] is interesting but begs the question of what kind of authority 
was envisaged, thereby possibly giving social workers undue scope for investing 
guardianship with whatever form of authority with which they could most readily 
sympathise or identify. On the other hand the notion that guardianship would serve to 
reinforce an existing authority base received luke-warm support (60%). [Result No.4, 
page 245].
Taking these two findings together, suggests that social workers might feel that 
guardianship is useful to the extent that it can impose its own form of authority rather 
than for use in parallel with social work (as itself a form of authority). A number of 
clues support this interpretation, in that social workers were less comfortable 
acknowledging the authority position of social work as, indeed, the authority of others - 
e.g. heads of residential units, where reinforcement of authority to detain was the 
example given for social workers to discuss. The third reference to authority (discussed 
below) considers possible risk of abuse or misuse within guardianship - a concern felt by 
59% of social workers. [Result No.41, page 258].
The level of support for these elements or concepts of structure, continuity [Findings 
Nos. 2/3, page 244] and surrogacy, [Result No.30, page 254], which ranged from 78% 
to 100% agreement, suggests a high level of recognition among social workers of the 
importance of these elements. It was perhaps disappointing that continuity achieved the 
least endorsement (78%), given the presumption that guardianship assists the client and 
those concerned with his or her needs by being offered in a continuous and persistent 
way. Some social workers might regard this as a difficult goal to achieve, a situation 
which may require particular attention in the future.
There was modest endorsement for enabling [Result No.28, page 253] as being part of 
guardianship compared with social work itself. The idea of guardian social work being 
less enabling than ordinary social work perhaps gives rise to some concern.
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Turning to the consequential effects of guardianship, the findings indicate substantial 
endorsement for the ideas that guardianship should contain a package of care (89%) and 
that statutory agencies should accept responsibility for resourcing guardianship (82%) 
[Results Nos. 46/7, page No 259], both of which seem essential if guardianship is to 
obtain a sympathetic and appropriate place within social services’ policies and objectives. 
Finally, the idea of individualised powers within guardianship, intended to touch both 
upon a possible way forward for developing guardianship sympathetically to clients’ 
needs, and a means of suggesting realistic changes in the way guardianship is organised 
and enacted, gave a moderately optimistic endorsement of 70% [Result No. 44, 
page 259].
Protective care had been seen by the researcher as an essential part of guardianship 
rather than a related concept. However this may have been shown to be misjudged in 
view of the fact that only three-quarters of social workers supported protective care as 
being part of guardianship [Result No. 1, page 244]. Conceivably, the protective element 
is the one which can convey an inappropriately paternalistic stance which marks 
guardianship out as being insufficiently adjusted to more recent thinking about the 
relationship between professionals and clients.
DESPITE THESE MISGIVINGS, CASES (BL (C), (R) AND (S) 
ILLUSTRATED FIRM INTENTION TO USE GUARDIANSHIP IN 
WAYS WHICH ARE CLEARLY PROTECTIVE OF THE CLIENT, 
i.e. PROTECTION FROM UNHELPFUL AUTHORITY, FROM 
RELATIVES AND FROM CLIENTS’ OWN SELF-DESTRUCTIVE 
BEHAVIOUR.
IN CASE (B): this old person was neglecting herself to the point of near starvation, and 
the authority of guardianship to provide protection could have been brought in to enable 
services to reach the client.
IN CASE (C): the sister of the client was said to be intruding on the client’s affairs in 
an aggressive and unhelpful way. Guardianship could have been used to resist the sister’s 
overtures.
IN CASE (R): the social worker felt the need to acquire additional authority in her 
dealings with the Court of Protection, and saw the protective aspect of guardianship in 
this light.
IN CASE (S): the position was that the intentions of the client’s daughter were equivocal 
and the authority of guardianship thus contained an ambiguity: whereas it could have been 
instrumental in pursuing the daughter’s apparent intent in removing her mother from her 
home, it could equally well have been used to protect the client from this very 
contingency. The case also illustrates the uncertainty in statutory guardianship about the 
role of relatives vis-a-vis the guardian.
Models Used as Basis for Further Interpretation of Findings
Substituted Judgement
The substituted judgement model of guardianship is seen primarily as the legal expression 
of surrogate advocacy. In this sense it is a ‘service-in-itself rather than being seen as 
access to, or the imposition of other services, and links to the idea of a person or agency 
speaking on behalf of the needs of the person. Some of the practical expressions of these 
concerns rest on the use of: Court of Protection; representation and agency; and (by 
implication) private guardians - particularly associated with the advocacy role - activities 
only indirectly related to functions of social services departments. Consequently 
relatively few questions in the empirical study were directed at testing views on these 
attributes and functions.
The basic concepts of protection, structure and continuity of care, together with the 
authority element, clearly apply to this model of guardianship and have been widely 
endorsed.
The issue of guardianship being seen as a means of recognising clients’ needs, reasonably 
ascribable to a substituted judgement notion, [Result No. 6, page 246] received support 
from less than half the social workers, for reasons to do with the fact that social workers 
see themselves as having already achieved the task of ascertaining clients needs and 
giving appropriate recognition to them. To then suggest considering use of guardianship 
for this purpose could be seen as questioning social workers’ effectiveness.
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Pre-emptive use of guardianship [Findings Nos. 9/10, Page 246] also relates to the 
substituted judgement model, since this pre-supposes a situation in which the needs of 
clients can be anticipated, derived from information about their past and their likely needs 
while they were suffering from mental illness as well as when recovered from mental 
illness. Again, however, this received relatively little support, from only one-third of 
social workers. Similarly with the pre-emptive use of guardianship where the onset of 
dementia could be predicted, where nearly half of social workers expressed views against 
this. It is likely that this line of questioning provoked anxieties from a civil liberties 
point of view.
The high level of support for an advocacy view of guardianship (85%) [Result No. 29, 
page 253] appears substantial though the specifically surrogate nature of advocacy was 
not specified. It is conceivable that advocacy is a term which social workers would like 
to associate with guardianship though not altogether realistically. Also, the view was 
placed alongside a comparative statement about the advocacy role in social work, which 
received 100% support. There is, therefore, a sizeable minority of social workers who 
would see advocacy within social work but not within guardianship and this 
differentiation would clearly need to be attended to if guardianship was further extended 
in the future.
There is some scope for seeing the substituted judgement model of guardianship linked 
with guardianship functions provided by persons other than ASWs and this was tested in 
relation to: current social services department employees other than social workers; 
guardians outside social services; and guardians as family members. [Results Nos. 
33/4/5, pages 255/6]. With reservations, these views were endorsed and linked with the 
advocacy question as regards the proposition that people outside social services could 
fulfil the guardians’ role, where a substantial minority (41%) thought that non social 
services department employees would find the advocacy role easier within guardianship 
than would social services social workers. Given the notion that the substituted 
judgement model of guardianship is about the enhancement of civil rights rather than their 
denial, it is interesting to see that social workers were evenly divided as to whether 
guardianship represents an unacceptable infringement of civil liberties.
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Conceivably, different attitudes to civil liberties and justifications for statutory 
intervention would have ‘coloured’ these responses - as distinct, for example, from direct 
experience of guardianship and its effect on clients.
The substituted judgement model of guardianship is also expressed in the services 
provided by the Court of Protection but guardianship of the estate was not a focus of this 
study. Other connections (i.e. representation, agency and appointees) go beyond a social 
services focus. Guardianship within the substituted judgement model is not seen as being 
subsumed within wider social work functions or other service provision aspects of the 
social services operation.
The Parent/Child Model of Guardianship - Surrogacy within Social Case Work
Within this model of guardianship, there is an analogy with parental functions and a 
comparison with quasi-parental functions within social work, concerned with basic care- 
taking and the enabling role.
The first area touching on the relevance of this model is the view of guardianship as a 
stabilising influence, clearly implying that the impact on the client is expected to be 
beneficial in reducing unpredictable and unhelpful actions by or towards the client in 
favour of greater equilibrium. A response of 82% social workers in favour of this 
guardianship characteristic may support these views [Result No. 7, page 245].
The main thrust of the model directs attention towards developmental aspects of 
facilitation and this gets some support from the findings with 60% of the social workers 
supporting the view that guardianship should facilitate change in growth in a general 
sense [Result No. 28, page 253]. When the nature of the change is more specific, results 
divided to show only modest support for emotional and psychological growth as an 
objective (from one third of social workers) while two-thirds of social workers thought 
that behavioural change was a reasonable expectation.
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Differential use between varieties of clients [Result Nos. 14/15, page 248] fits well within 
the parent/child model of guardianship but was not particularly well supported, possibly 
because of the examples chosen. The researcher had anticipated that social workers 
would feel comfortable with the notion that guardianship was appropriate to protect the 
interests of clients suffering from depression as such clients are often unable to ’speak 
out’ for themselves and fail to argue for their rights through lack of volition to do so.
Nevertheless, only one-third of social workers were sympathetic to this argument and 
only a similar proportion were prepared to support the idea that guardianship would serve 
the needs of people with ‘compliant personalities’. Obviously, there was potential for 
‘mixed messages’ in this question, as revealed during the actual interviews, where a 
number of social workers associated this with exploitation of people who were unlikely 
to question or resist having guardianship orders made out on them.
Some social workers nevertheless identified with the underlying view in the question that 
guardianship helped to protect people whose personalities predisposed them to 
exploitation by others. This model of guardianship lends itself to expressions of 
misgivings about adopting a surrogate role compared with much of social case work 
which might even actively avoid assuming this position. Consequently, it is appropriate 
here to link with findings indicating concern about guardianship as an abuse of authority, 
supported by 59% of social workers, and a view of 58% of social workers that 
guardianship gives rise to concern as an inappropriate assumption of responsibility for 
adults [Result Nos. 41/2, page 258].
CASE (S) PROVIDES A CLEAR, IF UNUSUAL, ILLUSTRATION OF 
POTENTIAL ABUSE OF AUTHORITY WITHIN GUARDIANSHIP. 
THIS CONTRASTS WITH CASES (A) AND (El WHICH INVOLVE 
LEGITIMATE USE OF AUTHORITY.
IN CASE (S): the potential for abuse had the daughter been made the guardian of her 
mother is clearly illustrated, as the daughter’s intentions were equivocal, and may have 
been directed towards removing her mother from the family home for reasons connected 
with the daughter’s needs rather than her mother’s.
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IN CASE (A): use of authority would seem to be legitimate and related to the client’s 
care needs in protecting the client from the intrusion of the mother and in prescribing an 
effective form of day care.
IN CASE (E): the head of the hostel already had de facto authority (as head of care) and 
it seemed reasonable on the face of it for this authority to be reinforced through 
guardianship in respect of an individual resident.
There are clear connections between social work values and objectives implicit in these 
results especially with those which justify the view that different standards of intervention 
and protection should apply towards children and adults, irrespective of their situations 
and capacities to look after themselves. Distinctive legislation and different priorities in 
organisation within social services, between child care services and adult services, 
reinforce the view that different values or objectives should apply. There is clearly no 
easy way of comparing the use of guardianship for children and guardianship for adults 
who suffer from mental illness.
The Therapeutic Welfare Model
This model of guardianship emphasises the imposition of services and is therefore 
particularly concerned with the effectiveness and enforceability of coercion towards the 
objective of removing the client from their problematic situation or making radical 
changes to the terms and conditions by which services are delivered.
The basic coercive element in guardianship could be seen to apply to ‘holding’ the client 
in a given situation long enough for therapeutic endeavours to be effective and this would 
logically lead to circumstances where occasionally physical containment of restraint of 
a client would be justified. The position in law is not completely clear on this but advice 
from the Department of Health tends to rule against such practical measures. 
Nevertheless, within the questionnaire, 60% of social workers were willing to see a role 
for containment and their own involvement in the physical restraint of a client under 
guardianship, which may indicate that social workers would be less sensitive to civil 
liberty concerns than with the prospect of making arrangements work, provided they 
think that these arrangements ultimately meet client’s need.
321
Many of the questions within this area dwelt on the known association of guardianship 
with facilitation of residential placements, probing some concerns in this area. Most 
(70%) social workers are reconciled to guardianship being used for this purpose but less 
than half would see this as justifying clients’ detention in residential care. Instead 
(perhaps) 78% of social workers looked to residential care situations to adapt their 
regimes to suit the requirements of people on guardianship [Results Nos. 24/5/6, 
page 252].
CASE (D ILLUSTRATES A PLACEMENT OF A CLIENT UNDER 
GUARDIANSHIP INTO RESIDENTIAL CARE FROM 
HOSPITAL, WHILE CASES (M) AND (N) SHOW ATTEMPTS 
TO PLACE CLIENTS FROM THE COMMUNITY INTO OLD 
PEOPLE’S HOMES THROUGH GUARDIANSHIP - IN EACH 
CASE WITHOUT MANAGEMENT SUPPORT.
IN CASE (IV. a person suffering from dementia required specialist care following a 
period in a psychiatric hospital. The progress of the case demonstrates that where clients 
lack volition, and specialist facilities are required, guardianship can legitimate the 
placement arrangements, provided the move is supported by management in social 
services and medical authority.
IN CASE (MV in contrast to Case I, there is a failure to gain management support for 
a residential care placement. Although social services management’s sanction for this 
move would seem to be less likely than for a corresponding move from hospital to 
residential care, it is less clear as to the reasoning behind this.
IN CASE (NV authority was required to deal with conflicting pressures relating to the 
client’s care needs. Conceivably the client could have been cared for at home but home 
care staff would not intervene without the client’s consent. Consequently, social workers 
saw the only alternative as being residential care and the guardianship order as necessary 
to facilitate this. Again, lack of clear management sanction in this situation confuses the 
issues.
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Use of guardianship to justify containment and physical restraint [Results Nos. 22/3, 
page 251] received moderate support from two thirds of social workers, perhaps 
surprising considering social workers’ professional commitment toward preserving clients 
self-determination.
Less than half of social workers (48%) thought that the demand on social services 
resources would be a reason for not using guardianship [Result No.37, page 257] and 
social workers frequently stated in discussion that one could not disassociate the provision 
of services within guardianship and the setting aside of some resources to make these 
facilities available.
Finally, on the ethical aspects of this model, most (78%) social workers acknowledged 
that use of coercion was an aspect of concern in guardianship [Result No. 38, page 257]. 
On the other hand, the majority (70%) of social workers thought that guardianship 
contained insufficient powers judged by its potential role as an alternative to hospital 
[Result No. 39, page 257].
Compulsory treatment in the community is not part of guardianship as arrangements stand 
at the moment, but the therapeutic model of guardianship clearly contains the prospect 
of imposed therapy and therefore has to acknowledge that these questions are still very 
much of general concern. Looking at the findings, shows that the majority (74%) of 
social workers believe that a power to provide compulsory treatment in the community 
is needed, and most social workers look to ‘special’ guardianship to accommodate this 
arrangement. Very few, (15 %), look to the possibility of providing compulsory treatment 
in the community outside the guardianship framework, which supports the notion that this 
model has direct relevance to many of the objectives which are of concern to social 
workers at the moment. [Result Nos.49/50, page 260].
The comparative and context definition of guardianship offered in Chapter II was 
intended to show that a wide range of statutory powers were available to social workers 
to facilitate care and service provision for clients with mental illness, and that it was 
assumed in this study that these powers would be known and available to social workers 
alongside the possibility of using statutory guardianship. No attempt was made in the
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empirical part of the study to test this assumption, but it is deduced from the case studies 
that, with the exception of section 117 and Court of Protection, very few social workers 
were considering the use of wider statutory powers either as an alternative to, or 
alongside, statutory guardianship.
This finding is hardly surprising since social workers working with this care group are 
not inclined to see the use of legal powers as a means of developing client autonomy. 
They are more likely to anticipate the opposite effect and, instead, to rely on their own 
skills and the help of others, together with whatever volition the client can bring to the 
situation, to achieve satisfactory results in therapeutic terms. No empirical evidence is 
available to confirm or otherwise whether this approach is successful.
(2) SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS ON GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS
This section discusses social workers’ views on guardianship clients, illustrated from the 
selection of individual case profiles, commencing on page 300.
Specific Client Characteristics
In summary the evidence points to a decision by social workers to apply for guardianship 
as being associated with the following characteristics of clients:
Diagnostic Distinctions
Contrary to the picture conveyed by other studies, people with schizophrenia featured 
most often in guardianship consideration, usually linked to the ‘downward spiral’ of the 
care problem referred to below, namely that in-patient treatment for this group of people 
often appears to have a deteriorating long term effect on community care prospects. 
Also, help with maintaining these clients on medication is valued even if there is no 
strictly legal power to enforce this; and community nurses, for instance, maintaining 
clients with depot injections, appear to be better supported when faced with client 
reluctance if a guardianship order is in place. Decisions about how far and in what way 
to pursue a client who is determined not to receive depot injections remains an unresolved 
problem.
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Clients with dementia pose particularly difficult problems and sometimes social workers 
are faced with a decision about guardianship which has been partly pre-empted by the 
involvement of the Court of Protection and/or particular family members seeking to 
ensure protection of family property. Decisions about the possibility of a guardianship 
working in tandem with the Court of Protection have been noted, and the ability of the 
social work guardian at least to pursue a meaningful dialogue with receivers, and involve 
family members, has often been influential.
IN CASE (G) ALL EVIDENCE POINTED TO A CONSTRUCTIVE LINK 
BETWEEN USE OF GUARDIANSHIP AND COURT OF PROTECTION 
TO PROVIDE A SAFE, SETTLED AND STABLE WAY OF LIFE FOR 
THIS WOMAN SUFFERING FROM DEMENTIA. ON THE OTHER 
HAND CASE (RS INTERESTINGLY SUGGESTS THAT SOCIAL 
SERVICES SHOULD ADOPT GUARDIANSHIP IN ORDER TO MAKE A 
STAND AGAINST THE COURT OF PROTECTION AND TO PROTECT 
A CLIENT FROM THE COURT.
Social Isolation
The absence of effective social support in the community was a frequently noted factor 
in influencing a guardianship decision, though instances where rare where the reasoning 
about guardianship involved a consideration of it providing a substitute family situation - 
either directly or indirectly - other than in a residential care placement. On the other 
hand, decisions to go ahead with intensive domiciliary care programmes, which required 
a level of access to a person’s home, not normally acceptable without guardianship, could 
be seen as a form of family care; understandings arrived at about direct assess to the 
home, resemble in some way the assumptions which family members make about each 
others’ willingness to receive guests with minimal formality.
Other Demographic Factors
The aggregated data on guardianship clients provided by social workers indicates that, 
overall, decisions towards guardianship are biased towards women,most of whom are 
single, living alone, and experiencing a minimum of social support from a family or 
others.
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Authority and Enhanced Care
Apart from decisions influenced by the need to place people in residential care, other 
decisions arose from a perceived need to impose authority or control, or to seek to 
achieve enhanced levels of care for a person.
A NUMBER OF CASES ILLUSTRATE GUARDIANSHIP BEING 
USED TO ACHIEVE AN ENHANCED LEVEL OF CARE, 
INCLUDING CASES IDL f f l  AND OD­
IN CASE (D): the enhanced level of care required involves much closer supervision than 
is commonly offered, linked with a more assertive approach than is usually seen as 
desirable towards people with mental health problems. The justification for this within 
guardianship relates to demonstrations from experience that firm intervention actually 
counters the client’s aggressive and anti-social actions, not least towards his own family.
IN CASE (T): the enhanced level of care refers specifically to a perceived obligation on 
the part of social services ‘to provide continuing community care’, an unusual concession 
given a general management resistance to accepting resource consequences of 
guardianship.
IN CASE 1U): a new social worker saw her client’s needs in more practical terms as 
requiring a degree of control over a hazardous lifestyle which, if continued, would 
immobilise the client entirely within his home, surrounded by the accumulation of every 
conceivable item and giving rise to a health hazard. Such clients require persistent 
monitoring and supervision which could be seen as generally intrusive for many clients 
but is possibly acceptable within a guardianship relationship.
Ethnicity
Clients from ethnic minority backgrounds are slightly more likely to have guardianship 
applications agreed by management, but not when their behaviour is as challenging as in 
Case D. (see overleaf)
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CASE (D) SUGGESTS THAT UNUSUALLY AGGRESSIVE 
BEHAVIOUR IN THE COMMUNITY MIGHT BE BETTER 
HANDLED WITHIN GUARDIANSHIP FOR A CLIENT FROM AN 
ETHNIC MINORITY BACKGROUND, WHERE THE GUARDIAN IS 
IN A POSITION TO ACT AS INTERMEDIARY AND CREATE AN 
ATMOSPHERE OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE CULTURAL 
ASPECTS OF THE CLIENT’S BEHAVIOUR.
Clients* Situations and Guardianship Use
A range of client situations prompted decisions by social workers to consider or apply 
for guardianship. The following were the most common patterns.
The Downward Spiral
For a number of clients the experience of hospital admission had left them progressively 
less well and less fitted to survive in the community on each occasion. Therefore, each 
discharge from hospital was more problematic and the risk that community care services 
would not be able to sustain the person and attempt to maintain or improve their lifestyle 
was greater. A number of social workers referred to the ‘downward spiral’ by which a 
client’s situation and lifestyle tended to deteriorate with each successive period in 
hospital. This has given rise to a need for more intensive forms of community care, 
which clients sometimes resented and could actually avoid. This was frequently followed 
by some kind of case discussion (formal or otherwise) between social worker and other 
professionals involved to decide strategy.
One of the reasons given for prompting serious consideration of use of guardianship was 
recognition that persuasion (encouragement, cajolement or whatever) was itself 
insufficient to ensure that clients would accept help. In other words, normal practice 
methods had ‘failed’.
Consequently decision-making in some instances was centred around the determination 
that future attempts at providing community care must not also ‘fail* - i.e. become a 
failure both for the client and for the care team - since an accumulation of failures in this 
sense would have a compounding effect on reducing clients’ prospects of survival. In
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some instances the idea of using guardianship to prevent further failures unfortunately 
associated guardianship itself with the idea of failure and, for some social workers, a 
guardianship order pursued had signified to them a failure in, or demeaning of, the 
relationship between social worker and client.
A NUMBER OF CASES ILLUSTRATE TO VARYING DEGREES 
THE PRESENCE OF THE ‘DOWNWARD SPIRAL’ ELEMENT. 
CASE (O), IN PARTICULAR, PROVIDES CLEAR EVIDENCE OF 
THIS WHILST INDICATING THAT MANAGEMENT COULD 
NOT BE PERSUADED OF THE VALUE OF GUARDIANSHIP TO 
HALT THE PATTERN OF DECLINE.
Placement and Containment Needs
For other clients there was a clear need for professionals to know whether they could 
and/or should continue to exercise persuasion in terms of a care arrangement, usually 
residential but sometimes day or domicilliary, to attempt to ensure that the care package 
was supported by continued professional encouragement and backed up as much as 
possible by legal sanction. This mainly applied, as do most guardianship orders anyway, 
to placement in residential care and/or to sustaining that placement, enabling residential 
care staff, for example, to know that they have some additional rights in discouraging a 
resident from leaving the place of care. Day care was less often subject to these sorts 
of arrangement, though the accommodation of day and residential care in combination 
was often an additional factor. Domicilliary care, on the other hand, frequently involved 
one or more of the care team needing to know whether they had additional rights to 
pursue care into the client’s home so that they could, for example, hold a front door key 
and thereby gain access on an as-and-when basis to pursue cleaning work or simply to 
supervise the client.
It should be added that all the above arrangements had, as far as possible, been 
negotiated with the client even though at the end of the day a client may have expressed 
a preference for some other form of surveillance. Enabling home care staff to enter a 
house to undertake cleaning work was frequently mentioned as an influential factor 
towards making a guardianship decision since continued neglect of person and/or home
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was one of the most commonly indicated problems, which often left care staff feeling 
unable to be effective in caring and, in some cases, in saving life, simply because they 
were unsure of whether they had sufficient legal sanction to pursue the client further.
CASE ILLUSTRATIONS OF PLACEMENT INTO RESIDENTIAL 
CARE HAVE ALREADY BEEN PROVIDED IN THE EXAMPLE 
OF CASE (E), GUARDIANSHIP WAS SEEN AS REINFORCING 
EXISTING AUTHORITY TO CONTAIN A CLIENT IN 
RESIDENTIAL CARE WHILE CASE (N) SUGGESTS THAT 
HOME CARE MANAGEMENT IN A SOCIAL SERVICES 
DEPARTMENT CAN BE AS RESISTANT AS THEIR COUNTER­
PARTS IN RESIDENTIAL CARE WHEN BEING ASKED TO 
AGREE TO IMPOSE SERVICES ON A CLIENT.
A minority situation faced some social workers in residential care arrangements which 
appeared to be on the verge of breakdown because the head of the residential unit felt 
insufficiently empowered to apply constraints to the client to prevent a pattern of 
absconding. This was the origin of the notion of guardianship to reinforce authority, 
where the assumption would be that a head of unit working in tandem with a legally 
appointed guardian could have his or her authority reinforced. This idea did not gain 
great favour but applied adequately in certain particular circumstances described to the 
researcher. More frequently, guardianship was decided upon as legitimisation for a 
residential care placement, sometimes against the wishes of the residential care staff. In 
these situations, social workers were having to decide not only in terms of the needs of 
the client but also in those of the ‘needs’ of residential care staff to avoid being seen as 
imposing what was, in their view, unacceptable levels of coercion or direction.
Need to Re-negotiate Terms of Service Delivery
A common denominator of influence affecting social workers’ decision-making, was a 
consensus emerging from discussion with other professionals that renegotiation of the 
terms on which a client should be cared for and treated in the community was necessary. 
Whether or not this arose from pressure from a particular source, such as an individual 
consultant psychiatrist, there was often the idea of consensus arrived at by common
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appreciation of the difficulties of sustaining the client in the community and an agreement 
that some drastic new thinking was necessary, even if this did of necessity have to put 
to one side the client’s expressed wishes. Sometimes clients’ wishes were in conflict with 
each other, and guardianship could be used to support what appeared to be the most 
cherished against a lesser wish.
IN AN EXAMPLE CONSIDERED DURING THE PILOT STUDY, 
THE CLIENT RESENTED HOME CARE STAFF ENTERING 
AND DOING WORK IN HER HOME. EVEN MORE SO SHE 
RESENTED THE IDEA OF HAVING TO BE REMOVED FROM 
HER (VERY NEGLECTED) HOUSE AND TO ENTER HOSPITAL 
TO DEAL WITH NECESSARY PHYSICAL HEALTH CHECKS 
AND MAINTENANCE. THE GUARDIANSHIP ARRANGEMENT 
EFFECTIVELY IMPOSED A HOME CARE SOLUTION ON THE 
CLIENT THEREBY PREVENTING HER NEED TO ENTER 
HOSPITAL, RELYING ON THE ORDER TO GAIN AND TO 
FACILITATE ACCESS TO THE CLIENT’S HOME ON A SEMI­
PERMANENT TWENTY-FOUR HOUR BASIS
Views of Management
A fairly passive, if not acquiescent, reaction by social workers to management views was 
notable since, for many social workers, the decision in favour of guardianship could not 
be sustained without management support while they, on the other hand, lacked the 
experience of guardianship to be able to justify their views to managers.
IN CASE (K): the difficulties of providing adequate supervision for people with drug 
problems and unsettled lifestyles are fairly obvious, and the social worker wanted positive 
sanction from management to use guardianship to create structure and boundaries for the 
client. This was not forthcoming.
IN CASE! A): the social worker felt that guardianship could be used to support more 
positive aspects of the client’s lifestyle and help provide occupation and social contact. 
However, management failed to support the social worker’s request for sanction and 
seemed (from the social worker’s view) to put departmental procedures forward as an 
obstruction.
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IN CASES (A), (B), (M) and (N): (discussed in previous sections): there were also 
varying degrees of management ambivalence towards supporting suggestions for 
guardianship.
Occasionally it was management who argued for guardianship to be considered and/or 
pursued when, for example, consultant psychiatrists exerted pressure on senior 
management in social services for some action to be taken and social services 
management translated this request for action into guardianship as a formal intervention.
IN CONTRAST TO CASE IK). CASES (P) AND (T) 
ILLUSTRATE THE WILLINGNESS OF MANAGEMENT TO 
INTERCONNECT GUARDIANSHIP WITH USE OF STATUTORY 
AFTERCARE (SECTION 117), WHILE CASE (FI SHOWS THE 
INFLUENCE OF AN OUTSIDE BODY, THE MENTAL HEALTH 
REVIEW TRIBUNAL, ON A PREVIOUS MANAGEMENT 
DECISION AGAINST THE USE OF GUARDIANSHIP.
IN CASE (K): the client’s manifestly heavy and demanding care needs were seen as 
justifying both the Section 117 after-care plan and the guardianship measure in tandem.
IN CASE (F): the Mental Health Review Tribunal intervened in this case to recommend 
that guardianship should be used ‘to provide some boundaries and a plan of care’ for a 
woman of unstable social circumstances who had also some responsibility for care of her 
husband. The reluctance of social services management to see this case as a prospect for 
after-care is notable and a long-term hospital treatment order had been sought by social 
services as an alternative. The guardianship arrangement appeared to be working well.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is divided into the following sections:
- RE-APPRAISAL OF, AND SYNOPSES OF ANSWERS TO:
- RESEARCH QUESTION 1: SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS
- RESEARCH QUESTION 2: WHICH CASES SOCIAL WORKERS CHOOSE
- OVERALL CONCLUSIONS:
- THE SITUATION FACED BY SOCIAL WORKERS
- MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AGENCIES
- SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS OF MANAGEMENT
- THE POSITION OF SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER
AGENCIES
- CIVIL RIGHTS AND CHOICE
- CONSENT TO TREATMENT
- QUANTITY OF GUARDIANSHIP USE
- RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND CARE MANAGEMENT
- ‘VERDICT’ ON GUARDIANSHIP.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Before looking again at the research questions in tum»some assessment is required as to 
whether the questions have been adequately addressed: has the data obtained from social 
workers through questionnaires and interviews given an accurate picture of social 
workers’ perspectives on guardianship and their decisions about individual cases; and, 
what were the main limitations in the survey methodology?
‘What are Social Workers’ Views of Guardianship?*
Material provided by social workers in answer to this question is judged to have given 
as full a picture as could have been obtained within the limits of the resources and the 
methods available. The limitation would seem to be that most of the questions were
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pitched at a general level and did not provide as many bridges with social workers’ own 
cases as had been hoped for. In other words, a gap existed between social workers’ 
views of guardianship in general and the way in which their thinking related to individual 
cases. The ‘Interpretation of Findings’ section at the conclusion of the previous chapter 
has attempted to make connections in an overall sense, necessitating some conjecture and 
surmise which cannot fully compensate for understanding the direct bearing of attitudes 
on decisions or actions taken.
Given these limitations, the research question is judged to have obtained the data sought, 
and the research question is now answered so far as this data will allow. In so doing, 
this provides us with a social workers’ perspective ‘definition* of guardianship, which is 
then compared with other definitions considered in Chapter II. This synopsis is drawn 
from data outlined in Part Two, Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 and the Interpretation of Findings 
sections of the previous chapter.
This question was addressed by considering: social workers’ perspectives on key
guardianship concepts; comparison of guardianship with social work; and identification 
of social workers’ main problem areas within guardianship and possibilities for further 
development.
The overall findings constituted an endorsement of the most important guardianship 
concepts - structure, continuity, consistency - and tended to confirm that other attributes - 
protective care, authority and, most important of all, surrogacy, especially expressed as 
advocacy, were best described as essential guardianship elements, rather than contingent 
aspects which might vary from situation to situation.
Social workers see the objective of guardianship ‘use’ as assisting in caring and providing 
services for clients. It is accepted as a means of achieving change in clients’ social 
situations. The three components of the ‘essential powers’ are endorsed but containment 
and physical restraint are also accepted as part of guardianship. Generally, placement 
in residential care through guardianship is not seen as problematic provided clients are 
not detained by physical force.
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Social workers see the similarities and differences between guardianship and social work 
along four selected indicators, as follows:
Basic Care-taking: as being more part of guardianship than social work;
Enabling: as being more within social work than guardianship;
Advocacy: as being more associated with social work than with guardianship;
Surrogacy: was associated with guardianship by all social workers, but was only
associated with social work by a third of social workers.
Incompatibility between social work and guardianship because of the surrogacy factor was 
felt by just over a half of social workers who see the clearest distinction between 
guardianship and social work as mainly revolving round this issue. A dislike of 
exercising surrogacy within social work may be one of the factors which limits the extent 
of the effectiveness of ‘informal guardianship’. On the other hand, social workers saw 
the need to legitimise the use of surrogacy and saw formal guardianship as effectively 
embodying this. This, however, did not make them more ready to use guardianship since 
they could not turn their backs on their social work principles whilst acting in this role. 
The real decision was not between guardianship and social work, but between ‘guardian 
social work* and ‘non-guardian social work’.
Social workers’ were not set against use of coercion per se, though this was seldom of 
the kind which envisaged physical force. Instead, social workers explained that 
guardianship has been used to ‘renegotiate’ the terms by which they made services 
available to clients, whether or not the client actively sought them or would have chosen 
them on his/her own volition. Short of physical force, some social workers were 
prepared to use restraint, for example to contain someone in residential care who would 
otherwise leave against there own best interests. On the other hand, social workers were 
unhappy about using guardianship pre-emptively, i.e., where circumstances might be 
expected to change, as with a client showing early signs of dementia.
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Social workers see guardianship as needing to change to fit into current concepts of care 
for certain groups of mentally ill people in the community. They considered that the 
power to arrange compulsory treatment in the community is necessary for some clients 
and that this should be provided within the guardianship framework rather than outside 
it. Alongside this they saw the need for guardianship to move towards a more 
individualised pattern where the particular needs of clients would be recognised at the 
assessment stage, thereby possibly leading to some form of limited guardianship which 
extended only to the specific powers needed for that client. In this way the extent of 
coercion would be limited to the client’s particular situation and would amount to a 
re-negotiation of the basis upon which services are provided to clients.
Social Workers’ Perspectives Compared with Other Definitions
Social workers clearly recognise guardianship as a social institution, and as a much wider 
concept than a term used to describe actions taken under Sections 7/8 of the Mental 
Health Act, 1983, i.e. the statutory definition. Implementation of these sections of the 
Act does not necessitate an appreciation of the range of core concepts or of different 
models of guardianship. In fact no theoretical or conceptual underpinning of the idea of 
guardianship has been found in the official literature and very little elsewhere, as applied 
to the situation in England and Wales. Most of the concepts examined during the 
empirical work were derived from making a series of assumptions,based on concepts 
discussed in the American literature, about ideas of good practice in meeting the needs 
of people with mental illness and about the historical view of guardianship.
Social workers seemed to have little information on the origins of guardianship or 
appreciation of a historical definition. Although historical knowledge was not sought 
from social workers in this research, it would seem that most social workers would date 
the origin of statutory guardianship from the 1959 Act, or even, possibly the 1983 Act. 
Social workers have tended to see the institution of guardianship for people with mental 
illness as having no historical roots beyond proposals put forward in the Royal 
Commission Report, whereas the historical chapter in this paper has hopefully established 
a connection between forms of guardianship evolved within the Patria Potesta ideology
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of Roman culture, and guardianship which has survived in various forms to the present 
day, linked by the idea of the Crown as ultimate trustee of people with mental illness - 
a ‘guardian of guardians’.
Generally, social workers’ experience supports the process definition point that changes 
in clients’ circumstances and attitudes arising from guardianship are likely to be gradual 
rather than immediate, linked with the time taken to undertake fundamental re­
negotiations in the basis for social worker-client relationships.
Most social workers seemed to have a limited appreciation of the service-providing 
context definition of guardianship as related to a range of statutory obligations of local 
authority social services departments towards people with mental illness.
Main Differences Between the Two Social Services Departments
Social workers’ attitudes to Guardianship differ between the agencies mainly as 
follows:
Main Guardianship Concepts
There was less support for continuity in Westminster.
Guardianship and Surrogacy
The link between guardianship and surrogacy as substituted judgement was less 
acceptable in Westminster while the pre-emptive implication of surrogacy received less 
backing in Kensington and Chelsea.
Guardianship Objectives
Kensington and Chelsea social workers found it more reasonable to view guardianship 
as a formalised relationship which would facilitate change in clients.
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Differential Use
Westminster social workers were less enthusiastic in seeing guardianship as applicable 
to socially vulnerable clients or as providing enforceable authority for particular purposes 
to do with meeting clients’ needs.
Essential Powers
The use of guardianship to gain access to a client at his/her home or to require a client’s 
attendance (e.g. at a day centre) was well accepted in Kensington and Chelsea but not so 
in Westminster.
Containment and Restraint
Westminster social workers said they would be much more ready to resort to physical 
restraint when necessary within guardianship than their Kensington and Chelsea 
counterparts.
Social Work and Guardianship
Westminster social workers were more ready to see an enabling role for guardianship but 
these social workers were also more disposed to see guardianship as incompatible with 
good professional social work practice, while yet being more inclined to describe some 
social work as akin to informal guardianship. Westminster social workers were also 
more disposed to accept non-ASWs (within the agency) as guardians.
Future Prospects/Problems
Kensington and Chelsea favoured more use of guardianship, seeing it as involving a 
package-of-care claim on the agency’s resources. However, they acknowledged a 
problem with guardianship and civil liberties, while declining to support the view that 
guardianship powers should remain unchanged. No Westminster social worker supported
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the view that residential powers should be curtailed, but these social workers were much 
more reluctant to define guardianship as implying a package-of-care commitment by the 
agency.
* Which clients do social workers select for Guardianship?’
This question was difficult to answer in a number of ways. Given the fact that Category 
[1] clients had been subject to applications by social workers as needing guardianship, 
the researcher initially viewed all cases as having been ‘chosen’ (i.e. selected) as suitably 
and appropriately placed on guardianship. However, experience showed that it was not 
clear in practice which Category [1] cases would have been chosen by social workers had 
they been able to decide and act autonomously. Although some undoubtedly would have 
done, it was concluded that other cases represented a management decision which had 
reached that stage because of other pressures (e.g. medical views) over and above those 
of social workers’ recommendations. However, to have eliminated these cases from the 
survey would have had the effect of losing the opportunity to compare these groups of 
cases as representing two sets of choices, i.e. Category [1] being managers’ choices and 
Category [2] cases as social workers’ choices. By the expediency of retaining these two 
groupings the data could therefore be compared and tests for association carried out.
Before proceeding to make this comparison, it was noted that there was an imbalance of 
the proportions of clients in Categories [1] and [2] between the two social services 
departments. Category [2] clients form 86.5 % of the total in Kensington and Chelsea 
but only 41.2% in Westminster, compared with an overall percentage of Category [2] 
clients of 68.3%.The null hypothesis would be that there was no significant difference 
between the agencies in the relationship between Category [1] and Category [2] clients. 
Table 147 on the next page shows that the difference is significant at the .01 level and 
the hypothesis can therefore be rejected. This result would appear to confirm a closer 
connection between social workers’ recommendations and management acceptance of 
recommendations in Westminster compared with Kensington and Chelsea and could 
indicate a different relationship between the two categories in terms of the decision­
making systems in the two social services departments.
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Category Status Groups and The Two Agencies 
Table No 149
K & C W’min Row
Totals
Category Group [1] Cases 3 10 13
Category Group [2] Cases 21 7 28
Column Totals 24 17 41
Chi-Square Value = 9.862
Yates* Correction Value = 7.838
p =  .002
p =  .005
Significant at the .01 level 
Minimum Expected Frequency =  5.4
Given these difficulties, the research question is answered in two ways: (1) by giving an 
overall synopsis of all cases; and (2) by focusing on Category [2] as distinguished from 
Category [1] cases. Had this latter distinction been unproblematic (i.e. having achieved 
parity of meaning between the two agencies) greater attention to Category [2] client data 
would have been justified - i.e. more statistical analyses comparing variables on all 
dimensions provided by the data on this smaller number of clients.
Overall Synopsis (All Cases)
Demographic Picture
Data on age of clients showed older groups, (i.e. 61 + , but particularly 81+), as 
predominant and as forming a larger proportion of the sample than in findings from 
research elsewhere which has compared all clients assessed under the Act.* The 
proportions of guardianship clients under 50 are much higher in Westminster, while 
proportions of clients over 80 are much higher in Kensington and Chelsea.
Other research on Guardianship has been identified in Chapter V and is summarised and referenced in 
Appendix A.
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The balance of gender differences overall were very similar, but the proportion of single 
clients was three times greater in this research than in comparable studies.
The ethnic make-up of guardianship clients is similar to that found in other studies. There 
are proportionately fewer guardianship clients from an ethnic minority background in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Living Arrangements and Family Support
Most guardianship clients live alone and only a half obtain other than a ‘negligible’ level 
of family support. For only one in ten is family support judged to be substantial. A 
higher proportion of Kensington and Chelsea clients live alone.
Medical Background
A half of guardianship clients suffer from schizophrenia and a third suffer from dementia. 
The proportions of guardianship clients suffering from schizophrenia is 2:1 in Westminster 
compared with 1:2 in Kensington and Chelsea. Those with dementia are mainly found in 
Kensington and Chelsea: proportionately 16:1 compared with 50:50 in Westminster.
Six out of ten guardianship clients have experienced one or more compulsory hospital 
admission and three out of ten have had one or more voluntary admission. Kensington and 
Chelsea show lower proportions of both groups - less than four out of ten compulsory and 
less than two out of ten voluntary admissions - mainly because of the number of dementia 
sufferers with no psychiatric history. Only one in seven Westminster clients have had no 
compulsory admissions; a half had had no voluntary admissions.
Medical opinion was an influential factor in determining whether or not guardianship 
was pursued in six out of every ten cases, and in two-thirds of these the medical 
opinion expressed favoured guardianship. In Kensington and Chelsea medical opinion was
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influential in half the cases and half of these favoured guardianship. In Westminster three 
out of four cases were medically influenced and the same proportion favoured 
Guardianship.
Social Work and Guardianship Objectives
Insufficiency of persuasion (to accept help) was the main reason prompting guardianship 
consideration. This was nearly three times as frequently reported in Kensington and 
Chelsea than in Westminster.
Regarding guardianship objectives defined in terms of client-focused needs, as between 
authority/control or enhanced care, these were evenly balanced in Kensington and Chelsea 
but the former predominated in Westminster. Overall, authority/control was a more 
frequent objective of guardianship than enhanced levels of care by about 5:4 and residential 
service provision was an objective in six out of ten cases. Day care attendance and 
arranging attendance for treatment was an issue for three or four clients.
In terms of service provision objectives, residential placement was the main purpose in 
Kensington and Chelsea, whereas regularisation of existing residential placements formed 
a significant proportion of objectives for Westminster clients.
There was marginally more optimism as to the achievability of guardianship objectives in 
Westminster.
Profile of Category T21 Clients Compared with Category Til Clients 
Demographic Picture
Comparing clients in Category [2] (n=28) with clients in Category [1] (n=13) shows that 
social workers choose proportionately three times more young (0-30) and old (80 plus) 
clients and three times fewer from the 31-40 age group. All of the nine 80+ clients come 
from Kensington and Chelsea and eight of these were suffering from dementia.
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Social workers choose larger proportions of married and widowed/widower clients; and 
slightly fewer clients from ethnic minority backgrounds. There was no notable gender 
difference.
Living Arrangements and Family Support
Social workers tend to choose more guardianship clients from those who live alone and 
fewer from those who are in residential care. Social workers choose more clients where 
family support is reasonably close and proportionately fewer clients experiencing a limited 
or negligible amount of family support.
Medical Background
Social workers choose more clients suffering from dementia, though the proportionately 
large numbers of such clients mainly represented the view of two specialist social workers 
in Kensington and Chelsea.
Social workers choose a much larger proportion of clients who have not experienced 
compulsory hospital admissions. No difference in the balance of clients who had voluntary 
admissions to hospital was noted.
Medical influence one way or the other had a bearing on a proposal to adopt guardianship 
in half of the cases social workers had selected, a much smaller proportion than those in 
Category [1]. For those cases in which a medical opinion was expressed there was a 7:5 
balance in favour of Guardianship for Category [2] cases, whereas for Category [1] clients, 
all medical opinion was in favour.
Social Work and Guardianship Objectives
The reason given for social work intervention alone not adequately meeting clients’ needs 
is that persuasion (e.g. to accept services) was insufficient. This applied in two out of 
three cases chosen by social workers, compared with one out of three Category [1] clients.
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Social workers choose guardianship clients who require both authority/control and 
enhanced care in equal measure while for clients chosen in Category [1], authority/control 
is the main factor.
Social workers are more inclined to seek guardianship as a means of facilitating the 
placement of clients into residential care where the client is unwilling or in no position to 
consent. There is also a slight tendency for social workers to seek guardianship as a 
means of enabling clients to be required to attend for medical treatment. Conversely, 
social workers are less likely to see guardianship as a means of regularising an existing 
residential care arrangement.
Social workers have a low expectation of the achievability or readability of guardianship 
objectives for individual clients. It is not clear whether their pessimism stems from the 
poor prognosis of their clients, or whether there is a link here between assessment of social 
workers’ clients’ needs and uncertain prospects of obtaining management endorsement.
Overview of Distinctive Characteristics of Clients Chosen for Guardianship bv Social 
Workers
The distinctive feature of social workers’ choice for guardianship is that they look mainly 
at the needs of a comparatively large group of elderly people, living on their own at home 
suffering from various stages of senile dementia. They look to guardianship to facilitate 
a residential placement where consent to enter residential care from the client cannot be 
obtained. This particularly fits the profile of social workers’ choice for guardianship in 
Kensington and Chelsea.
Of the remaining clients there are two main groups. Firstly there is a younger group, aged 
18 to 43, which comprise four from each agency. Six of this group suffer from 
schizophrenia and two from manic depressive psychosis.
The second group are older (57 - 80), and five suffer from schizophrenia and two from 
dementia. The schizophrenic clients comprise three from Kensington and Chelsea, and two 
from Westminster. Both clients with dementia come from Kensington and Chelsea.
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For the majority of clients, residential care is social workers’ first concern (mainly to 
instigate a placement rather than to regularise an existing placement) usually in the face 
of persuasion to enter or remain in care proving inadequate within normal social work 
strategies. However, there are four clients for whom continuing treatment is the main 
issue, e.g. attendance at out patient clinics, three of whom are suffering from 
schizophrenia and one from manic depression. After ‘Insufficiency of Persuasion’, the 
second most common problem in pursuing social work strategies was the excessive amount 
of supervision time which the client was requiring.
The overall findings about the level of family support probably relates to the fact that 
although most elderly clients with dementia experience very low levels of family support, 
other groups were (in some instances) experiencing too much family involvement of an 
unhelpful kind.
The explanation around the preference for clients who have not had many compulsory 
hospital admissions seems to be towards a view of guardianship as preventive - particularly 
for the younger people with schizophrenia or with manic depression - and it could also be 
said that social workers see guardianship here as a way of obtaining more formalised care,
i.e. the balance between authority/control and enhanced care, rather than being an 
alternative form of coercion. ‘Insufficiency of Persuasion’, seen as a ‘bottom line’ 
problem with existing social work strategies, might tend to support this view.
The above conclusions are consistent with a number of trends emerging from the review 
of individual cases from the preceding chapter, of which the principle are discussed below.
There was a need to renegotiate the basis of service delivery upon the failure of social 
work strategy. In other words, guardianship was seen as a watershed marking a change 
in the ‘ground rules’ from being a situation of prerequisite consent to one where the client 
can be confronted with formal requirements. For the most part this was not a 
confrontation arising from frustration but a recognition of the limitations both of the 
client’s capacity to engage with the social worker and of the social worker’s abilities to 
provide the right kind of service without such engagement.
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Conceivably, the ‘downward spiral’ of well-being of clients noted from earlier discussion 
may also be related to the assessment that persuasion (i.e. encouragement or exhortation) 
by social workers directed towards clients who have particular needs tends to fail as clients 
move away from the structured authority base of institutional care. For those who have 
not experienced institutional care, either as compulsory or voluntary patients, the 
‘downward spiral’ possibly relates more to the communication problems, reinforced by 
suspicion and uncertainty, on the part of older people living on their own, some of whom 
will become progressively less certain of the identities of those who try to make contact 
with them. This was the situation illustrated in the case of ‘Gladys Holmes’ discussed in 
Appendix C.
Not surprisingly, social workers were more likely to pursue guardianship (i.e. seek 
management endorsement) when under pressure to do so, and such pressures came from 
medical colleagues and to a much lesser extent their own management. Least likely to 
exercise pressure were the clients or the clients’ relatives, though some individual clients’ 
behaviour was interpreted by some social workers as tantamount to a request to be placed 
on guardianship.
There was a tendency for management to be more likely to adopt guardianships for clients 
from ethnic minority backgrounds, from those with the largest number of compulsory 
hospital admissions and where there was strong medical backing.
OVERVIEW OF SITUATION FACED BY SOCIAL WORKERS
Social workers have the task of caring for a group of mentally ill people in the community 
who pose very severe problems of behaviour, including self-neglect and unwillingness to 
accept services. This research has confirmed that social workers are faced with intractable 
care problems, and the clients they serve are often those with whom no other agency, 
including hospital services, have been able to achieve good results. It is therefore left to 
the community services to try to prevent a worse situation of deterioration and decline 
setting in and, if possible, to take preventive action. Reluctant as social workers are to use 
guardianship pre-emptively, they would seem to conclude eventually that some statutory 
intervention would at least convince other parties that there was determination to avoid
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continued crises and possibly eventual tragedy. Guardianship is sometimes seen as a ‘last 
resort’ option to ensure that some care services reach the client.
Clearly some social workers see the need for an enhanced level of care for certain clients 
and realise that this degree of prioritisation of care and possibly service provision, does 
not occur of its own accord given the way resources are allocated in social services 
departments. Even though the 1960 Memorandum of Guidance explicitly disclaims a 
connection between guardianship and entitlement to service, social workers see that 
guardianship does usually contain a message of the need for such prioritisation. The onus 
for the recognition of need then goes back onto management.
This study has clearly indicated that social workers are not free agents, nor even 
necessarily the key actors, in deciding for or against guardianship for individual clients. 
There are a number of other parties, including social services managers and health service 
colleagues, who carry substantial influence and can, in effect, veto social workers’ (pro 
or con) proposals. Social workers are therefore seen as not being fully ‘empowered’ to 
carry through the guardianship process from the initial phase (seeing the need) to the final 
phase (formally deciding), thereby allowing guardianship to come into force. Some social 
workers said that consultant psychiatrists are particularly unrealistic in their expectations 
that guardianship will help clients, but that they give way to these pressures in order to 
maintain good relationships and to avoid being seen as obstructive.
OVERALL SUMMARY OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE AGENCIES
A different culture and management attitude prevailed in the two authorities: social 
workers in Westminster see guardianship as a pragmatic measure for dealing with 
particular problems of schizophrenic and other socially vulnerable clients: whereas 
Kensington and Chelsea social workers are more traditionally minded in linking the 
guardianship idea with the needs of people suffering from dementia. Kensington and 
Chelsea social workers seem to be more idealistic about guardianship, e.g. in its ability to 
ensure continuity of care.
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Social workers’ attitudes to guardianship in general and their views of individual cases is 
linked to different expectations from management in the two authorities. There is greater 
pressure from medical sources in Westminster to support guardianship submissions.
Management in Westminster are much more likely to support their social workers 
when guardianship is sought. Reluctance of management to underwrite the resource 
consequences of guardianship in Kensington and Chelsea may explain why this agency’s 
social workers saw this as a key issue.
SOCIAL WORKERS’ VIEWS OF MANAGEMENT
Many social workers felt that their managers were poorly briefed on the nature of 
guardianship, and that both procedural and practice guidance documents made available 
to them from social services senior management were usually conspicuous either by their 
absence or by their generally unhelpful tone. Social workers thought that the procedures 
were unduly lengthy and would inevitably result in much work on their own part which 
would not be rewarded by social services management endorsement. There was also the 
anxiety from social workers as to whether their colleagues working with this care group 
in residential care would be ready to accept clients on guardianship, since some evidence 
pointed to serious misgivings among residential social workers as to the ethics of 
containing a person in residential care when they were not clearly consenting to being 
there.
Social workers detected a management attitude which, at best, could be described as 
ambivalent, and which on some occasions was plainly obstructive and intended to 
discourage social workers from seriously considering guardianship. This in turn reflected 
on social workers’ own concept of guardianship, tending to make them see it as an 
awkward anachronism which has not been properly integrated into current social services 
priorities and policies.
Social services management seem unclear about the nature of the responsibility they were 
assuming and as to whether the authority as a whole was endorsing the surrogate role for 
guardians. They were not clear whether a director of social services signing a
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guardianship application was in effect delegating surrogate powers to individual social 
workers. More importantly, it was not clear to social workers whether social services 
management were underwriting the wider implications of guardianship, including the 
resource aspects.
Although it was acknowledged that all clients with long-term mental illness problems in 
the community demand resources, it was felt that for guardianship to have credibility, there 
must be some acceptance of prioritised need for guardianship clients as against others, and 
it was therefore an implied obligation on behalf of management to make such services 
available. For the most part, social services management did not see themselves in this 
role and this undoubtedly confused social workers about the realistic expectations from 
guardianship.
THE POSITION OF SOCIAL SERVICES DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER 
AGENCIES
Inevitably, the focus of the survey tended to see social workers’ decision-making as central 
to guardianship usage, even allowing for some inhospitable elements in social workers’ 
work situations. However, enough has been said about the position of social services and 
social workers’ views of management to indicate that this is, at best, only part of the 
picture.
The position of social services in general and social services management in particular is 
seen as generally equivocal so far as guardianship is concerned. Directors of social 
services have few incentives, and a number of disincentives, for accepting social workers’ 
recommendations in favour of taking on the guardianship mantle. There are few reasons 
why directors of social services would wish to oversee the task of developing a level of 
understanding, awareness and practice skills within their agencies to be able to treat 
applications for guardianship entirely on their merits - though no doubt some directors of 
social services are conscientiously endeavouring to do this.
It is doubtful on this evidence whether local authority social services departments are the 
best organisational milieu for taking guardianship responsibilities - unless fundamental
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changes occur in the way responsibility for this care group is defined by statutory agencies. 
The present move towards reinforcing community care and its various component parts as 
the ‘all-purpose’ solution to the care of people with mental illness, alongside those with 
learning disability, and physical handicap as well as elderly people, may be insufficient to 
place guardianship high enough on the agenda of social services management to gain it 
sufficient attention, and thereby to develop the necessary resources and skills.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CHOICE
Social workers are influenced by concern to maintain civil liberties for people with mental 
illness and are clearly reluctant to give them a status of limited civil rights. Where civil 
rights have to be curtailed, some social workers acknowledge the quid pro quo argument 
that in exchange for loss of liberty, clients’ care needs will be better met. Clearly, 
however, this cannot happen unless social services underwrite the resource requirements 
of guardianship clients as part of an agreed policy.
Social workers do not see guardianship as a crude way of eliminating the possibility of 
clients making harmful or misguided choices but instead as a means to provide a basis for 
renegotiating the balance of choices and wishes between the client and those acting for 
him/her. None of the case studies outlined in the survey portray a situation of continued 
oppressive coercion on the part of social workers towards clients with mental illness. 
Social workers would seem to be much more concerned with what cannot be achieved to 
help their clients through guardianship than whether powers can effectively and 
continuously be imposed. Conversely, there is nothing inherently contradictory about 
clients wishing for guardianship to be imposed in much the same way as donors have to 
agree in advance to an Enduring Power of Attorney coming into force at such time as they 
become incapable of managing their own affairs. From a civil rights point of view, clients 
should arguably have some say at least in deciding for or against guardianship. Such 
implied rights are presently unavailable to clients since their wishes can only be taken into 
account if the eligibility criteria for guardianship apply in the first place - i.e. need for 
protection and welfare within the definition of mental disorder.
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Not only are clients’ rights to ‘opt-in’ to guardianship limited, but the rights of carers are 
even more restricted. Older parents of a mentally ill person, concerned about how care, 
supervision and support would be made available to their offspring when they are no 
longer able to provide it, find that no mechanisms exist for their wishes to be translated 
into an application for guardianship which could be considered on a contingency basis.
In short, this research has not supported a view of guardianship as inherently restrictive 
of client freedom or a denial of choice - though the possibilities of clients or clients’ 
families opting for guardianship are clearly limited.
CONSENT TO TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY
Endorsement from the survey for a power to provide compulsory treatment in the 
community could be regarded as one indicator of the need for wider powers, although 
social workers were not generally looking for additional powers for the clients which were 
included in the survey.
The debate as to whether the Royal Prerogative Powers can be reintroduced to supplement 
existing legislation for the care of people with mental illness, suggests that this is a 
conceivable possibility where the Mental Health Act, 1983, is silent on particular powers 
to meet the needs of clients. It is possible that guardianship, in tandem with Royal 
Prerogative Powers and use of committee, could extend the range of enforceable authority 
exercisable by social workers in pursuing their tasks.
By these means, it is arguable, the main limitations of guardianship could be overcome - 
especially as regards consent to treatment and powers to convey and to detain people in 
certain places when their care needs would suggest that this is appropriate. These issues 
will assume greater importance as hospital facilities able to fulfil this role diminish.
This researcher considers that compulsory measures within guardianship carry different 
meanings and justifications than when the protective individual care accountability 
and trust that Guardianship implies is absent. From this it would follow that concerns
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about net-widening and extension of social control may be unjustified where guardianship 
safe-guards are operating.
QUANTITY OF GUARDIANSHIP USE
Management culture in social services departments appears to be inhospitable to 
guardianship and suggestions of ‘under use’ would seem almost certainly to arise from 
this. Clients recommended by social workers but not accepted by managers 
(approximately two out of three in this research) are seen, in the absence of contrary 
evidence, to have been deprived of benefits. Because responsibility for determining the 
quantity of guardianship use is a matter for social services management, it is difficult to 
assess whether any given level is sufficient to meet clients’ needs. Gains from 
guardianship, which would have been available to some clients had guardianship been 
pursued by social workers or supported by management, appear to be substantial. On the 
other hand, given that much of what social workers do with this care group could be 
described as informal guardianship, some of the aims of guardianship could be achieved 
without resort to statutory measures, and therefore (usually) without the need for senior 
management endorsement.
The idea of guardianship providing an enhanced level of care and prioritisation of services 
for guardianship clients is by no means universally accepted among social services 
departments, and gains for guardianship clients cannot be assumed unless other conditions 
apply. For instance, guardianship clients could conditionally be expected to be placed in 
an advantageous position on two grounds:
1. There is an expectation of continuous individual care from a social worker, 
in contrast to inconsistencies and changes often experienced by people with mental 
illness on the receiving end of care from social services departments. However, 
even this ‘guarantee’ is of uncertain value if guardian social workers change at 
least as often as other social workers in their agencies, giving rise to exactly the 
level of discontinuity which guardianship would seek to avoid.
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2. Access to appropriate facilities at the right time could be an assured 
by-product of the implementation of a guardianship order, provided (a) the agency 
takes this responsibility seriously; and (b) that management accept that some of 
their other clients may, for the time being at least, be put under a disadvantage in 
gaining access to services through providing such assurances for guardianship 
clients.
The continuing trend of increasing numbers of guardianships for people with mental 
illness compared with other groups of clients (as evidenced by the statistics in 
Appendix B) of itself gives no indication of whether an optimum level is being achieved 
or how long it might take to reach that level.
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND CARE MANAGEMENT
Perhaps the most contentious area of the wider discussion - the resource consequences of 
guardianship - has been shown to be something of a ‘red herring’. All forms of care and 
treatment for people with mental illness are resource intensive, and one has therefore to 
ask whether guardianship is inherently excessive in this respect. If the alternative is long 
and frequent periods of hospital care, the answer may be ‘no’. On the other hand, all 
community support systems which seriously claim to provide an alternative to hospital 
care have been shown to be far more expensive than anticipated by the policy-makers. 
The issue therefore becomes which of these options is the most appropriate and 
cost-effective in meeting clients’ needs.
This dissertation has not fully explored the connection between case/care management and 
guardianship. However, the findings could be indicative, given certain assumptions about 
the models of case management under review. For example, one model of case 
management sees some case managers as budget holders, a view which received very little 
support from social workers. However, a number of versions of case management 
practice would not (necessarily) see the case manager him/herself as the budget holder. 
As against these concerns, there may be a realistic argument for aligning guardianship 
with care management, where the individual actual or de facto guardian carries a budget 
in order to help to prioritise the client's position and to give him/her a measure of
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‘independence’ over the claims of other clients and other parts of the social services 
operation. This would also address concern as to whether guardianship requires the 
assembly of packages of care for clients, and the idea that statutory agencies should fund 
the resource consequences of guardianship.
SOCIAL WORKERS’ VERDICT
Social work and guardianship have arisen from different origins and appear to share some 
different values which the examination of guardianship models in this dissertation has 
highlighted. However, the research has also found enough common ground for social 
workers to be able to embrace guardianship use, provided they receive sufficient backing 
from their peers, from social services management and from central government. The 
effectiveness of existing legislation and practice guidance in communicating how the 
guardianship operation should be carried out by statutory agencies and how its aims should 
be realised needs to be reconsidered.
The overall finding from this research is that social workers support guardianship as a 
much wider concept than intervention by statutory prescription and value the help it gives 
clients. Despite limitations and shortcomings, they show growing interest in 
guardianship’s potential. They see its future prospects bound up with necessary changes 
to make guardianship both more enforceable and more responsive to the needs of 
individuals. Social workers are therefore keen to learn when Government will introduce
more clear-cut and firmly-based statutory community powers within the guardianship
<
framework, while recognising the substantial social policy and legislative changes needed 
to bring this about.
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APPENDIX A
SUMMARY OF RESEARCH INFORMATION ON GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS
Information from the Social Services Research Group Survey
A source of data on numbers of guardianship cases is to be found in the monitoring
work of the Social Services Research Group (SSRG).(1)
The SSRG (1990) analysis, underpinned by a more indepth study by Fisher (1989),(2)
presents the following picture
1. Ratio of guardianships to compulsory hospital admissions is approximately 
1 : 100;
2. Variations between local authorities is within the range of nought 
(applicable in 18 authorities) to 10 + referrals in one authority.
3. The largest size age group being referred for guardianship is 65 + (47 %);
4. Dementia is the single most common diagnosis of those referred for 
guardianship (38% of referrals, compared with 11% of all referrals under the Act) 
followed by mental handicap (27% of referrals compared with 6% of all referrals) 
and schizophrenia (11% of referrals compared with 40% of all referrals);
5. Guardianship is not being used as an alternative to hospital and:-
a. the most frequent alternative to compulsory hospital admission,
i.e. a ‘diversion’, is voluntary admission to hospital - and guardianship 
rarely performs this role;
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b. it is more likely that a referral for guardianship would result in a 
hospital admission than visa versa.
c. Guardianship was used only twice as a ‘diversion’ in response to 
a request for detention under Section 2, 3 or 4 of the Act and once in 
response a request for informal admission.
d. A half of the requests for guardianship result in Guardianship being 
taken out.
Information from other studies
The following provides a synopsis of detail provided by six small scale locally based 
research projects, mainly produced by researchers operating within the social services 
departments concerned.*
Age o f Guardianship Clients
The Isle of Wight (1990) study confirms the SSRG picture of guardianship use for older 
clients, indicating 58% usage for clients over 60. The relationship between Age and 
Diagnosis is discussed below.
Gender
With the exception of the Cheshire (1988) study, there is a clear indication of women 
being in the majority of guardianship cases, with ratios ranging from 3 : 1 to 1 2 : 1 .
Dementia and Schizophrenia
The Isle of Wight study and the Leeds (1990) study present a picture of the differential 
use of guardianship as between people with schizophrenia and those with dementia, viz.:
* The studies to come from Cheshire(3), Isle of Wight***, Leeds (based)(5), Leicestershire(9)/H ereford(10). The
material also draws on the Dorset-based survey upon which the Brown study*8* was founded.
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dementia with 28% of cases compared with schizophrenia with 40% of referrals; and 
dementia with 65% of cases and only 8% from those suffering from schizophrenia.
Diagnosis and Age
The Cheshire study looked at 14 out of 31 guardianship clients in that county between 
1983 and 1989, of which seven suffered from dementia, six from schizophrenia and one 
from manic depression. Of the whole group (31) the age ranges were: age 20 to 59 - 
13 (42%); age 60 to 90+ - 18 (58%). Age and diagnosis are not connected directly in 
the Cheshire study but by implication in a discussion of purpose of placements 
(see below).
In the Isle of Wight study, the pattern of diagnosis among 18 guardianship clients 
between 1984 and 1989 showed: schizophrenia and personality disorder - seven (40%); 
dementia - five (28%). Nine of a total group of 18 were aged over 65.
The Leeds study covered a five year period and involved a total of 26 patients. Of these, 
three suffered from mental impairment and 23 with mental illness of various kinds. Of 
this 23, 12 suffered from senile dementia, three were diagnosed as alcohol dementia, two 
with paraphrenic illness and one with manic depression.
Of the younger group of clients (13) in this research the average age was 42 (range 35 
to 49) and divided by diagnosis as follows: two with chronic schizophrenia, one with 
manic depressive psychosis and one with an epileptic psychosis.
Purpose/Outcome
In terms of purpose, the majority of guardianship clients are placed on guardianship in 
order to obtain or sustain a residential placement, with a much smaller number (between 
a quarter and a third) being used to facilitate home care. There is an indirect relationship 
to age, as residential care placements mainly concern older people suffering from 
dementia.
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In the Cheshire study, most (i.e. eight out of 14) guardianships were used to place or 
sustain a placement in residential accommodation, the others being to maintain care at 
home.
In the Isle of Wight study, all but three of the 18 clients were placed in residential care 
through guardianship, excluding 1 person placed with relatives and another one boarded 
out. There are no recorded incidents of placement into day-care, though the authority 
approve of this use of guardianship.
In the Leeds study, a more complex pattern of usage is discussed. In general terms the 
older group were being placed in homes for the elderly while for the younger group, 
mostly people suffering from schizophrenia, the powers were being used to maintain the 
patient at home.Two studies comment on outcomes, both reporting a satisfactory 
transition from hospital to residential care or to maintenance/care at home.
Of the elderly group
"In one case the stated purpose was to stop the family discharging the patient 
from hospital. 12 patients were put on Guardianship to facilitate transfer to 
residential care, 3 to facilitate home care and in 2 cases Guardianship was applied 
after admission to prevent the patient leaving residential care."
Of the younger group
"Only 1 of the orders was primarily to require the patient to live in a hostel, the 
remainder were to require attendance or access to treatment.
The single use of a Guardianship order to prevent relatives discharging a patient 
from hospital was idiosyncratic but worked...."
The Cheshire study divided purposes by age: for the ‘over-60s’ guardianship was mainly 
to secure placements of an individual in a particular residential setting, notwithstanding 
resistances from "the local ‘culture’ of the caring services", while for the ‘under-60s’, 
"Guardianship was motivated more by a desire to provide some form of ‘structure’ of 
care, protection and authority with which intervention into the person’s life could be 
achieved so as to promote the person’s welfare". So far as outcomes could be clearly
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identified, three clients returned to hospital (presumably indicating a failure of 
guardianship) while guardianship was pursued in five cases (to maintain community or 
residential care), with another five living in the community or in residential care 
informally, i.e. presumably where guardianship was no longer required.
Turning to outcomes, the Leeds study says that:-
"overall 16 of the 18 [elderly] cases had good or satisfactory outcomes.... In the 
14 cases where the purpose was to keep the patient in residential care, 13 settled 
though 1 [continued to resist].... In the 3 cases where the purpose was to 
facilitate home-care, 1 succeeded, 1 had only been in force briefly and 1 
[returned to residential care because of illness].
Outcomes were satisfactory in all of the Isle of Wight cases, in the sense that the 
placements or arrangements set up were maintained; only one of the 18 cases is regarded 
as a failure, because the patient refused to co-operate.
Social Circumstances and Hospital Admission
Two studies refer to the circumstances of guardianship clients before hand, with typical 
reference to severe management problems in the community, such as risk to health, with 
the remainder being in hospital prior to guardianship.
The Leicester (1989) study of eight guardianship cases between 1983 and 1987 divided 
between 3 Section 37s and 5 Section 7s, indicates that only one general characteristic 
could be identified between clients: "severe management problems in the community, 
including self-neglect, criminal tendency and general anti-social behaviour".
In the Leeds study, of the 18 elderly people:
"8 patients were in hospital - 2 in residential care and 8 at home - when 
Guardianship was initiated. All but 1 of the patients lived alone and the husband 
of the remaining patient was seriously ill. In all cases there were problems with 
self-neglect and refusal of help. In 1 case fire risk and in another wandering were 
given as additional reasons for Guardianship."
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Of the younger group
"2 patients lived with family, 1 alone in a flat and 1 was required to live in a 
hostel."
The Leeds study also indicates that all but 6 of the 23 guardianship clients had been in 
and out of hospitals under compulsory sections of the Mental Health Act.
Reasons fo r  Non-Pursuance
The Hereford (1988) study refers explicitly to this question and identifies in particular 
that social workers found other ways of progressing care because (a) they managed to 
persuade the client without use of guardianship; and (b) because they approached use of 
guardianship as basically an infringement of civil liberties.
Looking in detail at reasons for non-pursuance of guardianship, concerning nine out of 
11 cases, (with only two of these being put forward for guardianship) this study identified 
likely reasons as:-
new definition of mental handicap excluded applicability;
persuasion proved sufficient, i.e. to place a person in residential care;
views of the social workers that guardianship would be an unwarranted 
infringement of civil liberties.
The implication of the latter is that other criteria for the use of guardianship were 
fulfilled but that social workers’ decisions based on professional values chose otherwise.
The Hereford researcher concludes that a number of ASWs regard the imposition of 
guardianship as "quasi-parental control” and ethically unacceptable for adults. Others see 
the issue mainly in terms of enforcement and therefore as, in the words of one ASW, 
risking "creating a rod for my own back".
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Pre-conditions for appropriate Guardianship use
The Isle of Wight study comments in some detail about:shared objectives; good practice 
and a need to work jointly as between health and social services; the idea of guardianship 
as a least restrictive alternative; and need for careful choice of guardianship clients.
These researchers regard local conditions as highly significant in answering the question: 
"What makes guardianship work in one authority and be virtually unused in others?"
In answering this aside from the circumstances of individuals, the team point to:-
A strong tradition of local co-operation between health and social services 
(cf Mental Health Act Commission suggestion);
Development of an appropriate range of residential alternatives for 
discharged hospital patients, and good relationships between the agencies 
providing these services;
shared assumptions about good practice, especially seeing guardianship as 
the least restrictive alternative and the "lesser of two evils" for the use of 
compulsion in the interests of the welfare of the patient;
arising from the three pre-conditions above, a careful and professional 
choice of clients for pursuance of guardianship and the exclusion of clients 
where it would not be reasonable to expect the client to see guardianship 
as in their best interests - particularly referring to young schizophrenic 
men.
The Leicestershire study indicates that such use of guardianship that has been achieved 
in that authority is due to "guidance to ASWs on the use of guardianship and on the 
proceedings involved, supported by training". By implication, the guidance appears to 
be cast in positive terms.
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ISSUES RAISED
Resources
None of the studies have indicated that the availability of resources is a main factor in 
limiting or precluding pro-guardianship decisions in any particular case. The 
Leicestershire study says that precisely because numbers remain small, their resource 
requirements can easily be met. The researcher suggests, however, that their claim on 
resources could become an issue at the renewal of guardianship: "renewal of guardianship 
may be sought.. .because the order is perceived as guaranteeing continuing social services 
support".
The Isle of Wight study argues the view by inference that resources have to be in place 
before guardianship would adequately work, but admits that the same argument could be 
applied for the implementation of community care strategies in the widest sense.
Value Conflict
The Cheshire study refers to the elusive and ambiguous nature of guardianship and, 
whilst admitting that it can be an effective tool in some instances, asserts that 
"Guardianship does change the clients’ right to self-determination" which has to be 
balanced against its role in providing protection against exploitation.
Reference has already been made to the Hereford criticism of guardianship as a "quasi- 
parental control" inappropriate for adults.
Additional Powers
The Hereford and Leeds studies recommend the inclusion of ‘power to convey’ within 
guardianship and ask for "the power of transfer to required place of residence under 
guardianship to be clarified". The latter study also considered "the use of guardianship 
to maintain mentally ill or old people in the community deserves further exploration".
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NUMBERS OF GUARDIANSHIPS
NOTE (4) - FIGURES FOR 1979 AND 1980
Statistics were not kept by DofH on Guardianship during this perio 
The graphs indicate the trend which may have been evidenced by ti 
figures had they been available.
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NOTE (5) - FIGURES FROM 1960 TO 1974
The Guardianship numbers for the period prior to the 
commencement of the graph were as follows:-
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- The Top Line charts the figures for Continuing Cases (ie all Guardianship cases in force as at 31/3 on 
the year in question.)
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270  - Guardianships for mentally ill people increased 
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- The Bottom Line charts the figures for New Cases (ie all Guardianship cases commencing during the 
year ending 31/3.)
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Guardianships for other care groups fell from 1088 
to 125 in 1974.240 - NOTE (3) - INCLUSION OF COURT MANDATED GUARDIANSHIPS
Because of the way statistics are collected by DofH, it proved necessary for the figures presented in these 
graphs to include Guardianship for offender patients, ie people for whom Guardianship has been arranged 
through the Courts under Section 60 of the 1959 Act or Section 37 of the 1983 Act. These figures are therefore 
combined with those for non-offender Guardianships which are the subject of this Research. As a rough guide, 
Guardianship for offender patients form less than 5% of the totals for people with mental illness and about 10% 
of the totals for other care groups
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APPENDIX C
CASE STUDIES
This appendix provides five case studies. The first two are attempts by this researcher 
to portray actions, thinking and decision-making narratives about clients into coherent 
accounts, indicating how clients and the professionals involved adjust their outlook around 
the idea of guardianship and its ramification for the respective parties.
More ambiguous and typical of the cases discussed with the researcher during empirical 
work in the research agencies are the three pen-pictures which follow, drawn from 
experience during the pilot exercise. Two of these (‘Geoff Baxter’ and ‘Audrey 
Cummings’) were actual clients whereas the third (‘Joan Humphries’) was a composite of 
three clients. These were used in the form of vignettes during the survey to gain social 
workers’ and managers’ responses on the appropriateness of use of guardianship in the 
formal interviews and data collection.
Client with Schizophrenia - ‘George Hancock’
George has had three admissions to psychiatric hospitals near London, each time 
with more severe psychotic episodes. At 30 he had been encouraged by his 
parents, who live in Lincoln, to leave his job as an insurance clerk and start a 
second career in architecture and had been doing well in his new studies until the 
break-up of a relationship with a girl friend. From then on his efforts to keep up 
with his studies had the effect of removing him from normal social life and 
eventually from the architect’s office where he had been functioning reasonably 
well. He spent long periods in his bed-sit accommodation, musing over his 
situation.
Each admission to hospital came during a time when he was preparing for exams. 
Following the third admission it became clear that he could not return to work or 
to studies as his grasp of the realities governing these had apparently slipped away. 
At the point of discharge he faced the prospect of being apparently as well as he 
ever will be but with no hopes of resuming his career.
His only expressed emotion was the fear and anxiety of parental disapproval, 
which effectively barred him from returning to them and to his home town.
From this point, Social Services took an active interest and endeavoured to arrange 
for George to attend a day centre to consolidate rehabilitative activity undertaken 
in the hospital. Initially this programme worked well but after a few weeks 
George began to spend much of the day hanging around his old place of work,
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trying to talk to staff about his chances of resuming his career and to begin 
studying again. He then found a pile of his old textbooks sent on from his 
previous lodgings and thought their arrival was a sign that he should resume study 
in his own right - i.e. without the support of his professional association. He 
stopped attending the Day Centre and could not be persuaded by social workers 
to return.
The social worker discussed the matter with the consultant psychiatrist involved. 
A case conference was convened which included a Community Psychiatric Nurse 
(CPN) who had been assigned to George but had failed to make contact with him. 
Day centre staff at the conference volunteered to pick him up from his lodgings 
and bring him to the centre on a rota basis. This worked well for four months 
until the day centre staff realised that his only interest during the day was in 
‘counting’, ie checking numbers of paving stones, people walking along, buses 
passing by, people attending the centre, numbers of knives and forks laid for 
meals, etc. Inevitably, he was re-admitted to hospital, and this seemed to coincide 
with George finally realising that no amount of rehabilitation and day centres 
would return him to his previous professional career and that he was now without 
prospects. This led him to avoid any attempt from ward staff and the occupational 
therapy department to engage him in any meaningful activity. Plans to launch a 
realistic discharge arrangement with a more robust support system built in, which 
would deal with his personal sense of crisis and rejection as well as his 
deteriorating social behaviour, were thus thwarted. Despite efforts from social 
workers, nurses, Occupational therapists (OTs), and doctors to confer and make 
best use of ward round opportunities, an administrative error on the part of a new 
registrar precipitated a discharge about which none of the key parties were fully 
informed.
On returning to his lodgings George found that the rooms had not been reserved 
for him and he was homeless. He tried telephoning his social worker, and 
eventually went round to the Social Services office, only to fmd that his visit 
coincided with the annual leave of the only social worker he had formed any 
relationship with. The duty social worker misunderstood his intentions and sent 
him to an accommodation bureau some miles away, which George eventually 
reached on foot as he had spent all his money. The accommodation bureau were 
particularly unhelpful and accused George of wasting their time at which point 
George withdrew, but not before smashing a window by pushing a chair through 
it. He returned to hospital under Section 136.
Shortly after his re-admission, a full case conference was convened involving all 
those previously involved in his care. They determined, among other things, that 
his stay in hospital should be as short as possible commensurate with attempts to 
provide a fully structured after-care programme. This should aim to demonstrate 
to George that he was improving, ie achieving something, rather than as had been 
the case in the day centre, being contained there. The day centre were encouraged 
to discuss George’s situation with a local College of Further Education with a view 
to setting up a course for George.
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The professionals involved came away from this meeting feeling that they had at 
least cracked the rehabilitation problem. They had not however allowed for 
George’s perception of his future life, and he whereupon made clear to all parties 
that he would refuse all attempts to engage him in anything other than his previous 
work in architecture. No amount of hospital care and treatment was able to alter 
his attitude and stalemate was reached. Medical staff reported a gradual 
deterioration towards ‘chronicity’ with less and less sign of activity or motivation 
on George’s part. There was pressure to move George onto a back ward, where 
staffing levels were lower and where active interest from the Occupational centre 
would cease.
George’s parents intervened at this point and persuaded the consultant psychiatrist 
to arrange a precipitate discharge. A further case conference was hurriedly 
convened and the upshot was that a rehabilitation programme was drawn up. 
Some of it might need to be imposed on George in order to break the ‘logjam’ - 
attendance at the centre was seen as a necessity by all concerned. Within a few 
weeks George had been reinstated in supported lodgings with a programme of 
regular visits from CPN and a social worker, with a clear understanding that he 
was to attend further ‘training’ at the centre. However no amount of persuasion 
could convince George that his future would be better served attending the day 
centre and he challenged their authority to enforce this. The social worker realised 
that the relationship with George had been based on a high level of mutual 
understanding and acceptance, while George had formed the view of social 
workers that they were anything other than authority figures. After thinking over 
the situation further, and discussing the matter with his senior social worker, the 
social worker realised that some form of authority would be needed to prompt 
George towards the rehabilitation programme. This view was supported by 
George’s parents, who were now staying in London to ensure that some proper 
arrangement was worked out.
In considering the use of guardianship, the social worker and senior social worker 
saw the attendance requirement as being the major power sought in order to fulfil 
a rehabilitation plan and eventually put this proposition to their managers to ‘test 
the water’. On receiving support in principle from management the social worker 
spelt out the intention to George, saying that if George was unable to accept the 
rehabilitation plan as it stood it was necessary for the authority to become 
George’s guardian which meant, in effect, that the social worker would assert the 
necessary authority to get the plan underway. Initially George was angered by this 
news but the next day returned to say to the social worker that if this authority 
could be demonstrated in some tangible form he would grudgingly go along with 
the requirements, at which point the social worker made the necessary application.
George was given further information about the guardianship which, it was 
stressed, was part of his rehabilitation programme, not something separate from 
it. George would be required to attend the day centre five days a week and would 
be expected to participate fully in the programme. The social worker said that the
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guardianship extended only to attendance and could not ensure that George did one 
or other particular activity while he was at the centre, this being a matter of trust 
between them, George was initially amused at this discrepancy but eventually said 
that if the social worker was invoking his authority to get George to the centre, he 
would comply with the programme.
The guardianship order was allowed to run for six months by which time George 
was a fully participating member. There were some failures to attend, at which 
point the social worker searched him out at home and encouraged him to come 
along. No period of absence longer than a day had gone by without an appropriate 
official response. Fortunately the tie-up arrangements between the centre and the 
college had worked reasonably well and George was encouraged to take a clerical 
course at the college which would equip him for another job. Without fully 
realising their change of stance, the professionals involved had been using the 
authority involved in the guardianship order to move from a position which tended 
to humour George’s wishes to resume his earlier career to a position where a 
change to a more realistic working prospect was seen to be part of the package. 
This was conveyed in turn to George and accepted over the six months in question. 
It was therefore initially assumed that guardianship would lapse at the end of the 
six months leaving George in an improved situation but still not at the point where 
he had started his new employment. A further discussion between social worker, 
senior social worker and social services manager decided that guardianship would 
be continued (for a further six months) hopefully to coincide with George 
becoming established in a new post with appropriate support around him.
This arrangement was agreed and George, accepting that the initial guardianship 
had given his life more shape and substance, agreed that he could be further helped 
into a new career. Subsequently George and his social worker spent some time 
talking about the various uses of authority in socially accepted and (usually) 
productive ways, namely in employment where the authority of the boss can be a 
force for good, and in family life where the assertion of parental responsibility can 
be highly beneficial.
Client with Dementia - * Gladys Holmes* - (Aged 78)
Gladys had lived all her life in the same house in an inner London suburb, and had 
seen her three children grow up, leave home and scatter across the world. Her 
husband died ten years ago and she faced the prospect of living alone with some 
anxiety. Eventually, however, a neighbour befriended her and encouraged her to 
have pets, which eventually resulted in three dogs, a budgerigar and two cats.
Two years ago, Gladys fell down stairs and broke her leg, requiring her to spend 
two months in hospital and a further three months in rehabilitation. The 
arrangements for dealing with her pets caused her great anxiety, but the neighbour 
took care of them without being very explicit about what she was undertaking 
to do. As Gladys’s anxiety about her animals increased it was noticed that she 
began to show some confusion over which animals were her own and which were
367
her neighbours. It eventually became a point of some amusement that her 
‘menagerie’ could vary from one mouse to a dozen snakes over a period of a day 
or two.
However no other signs of confusion appeared before she was discharged home. 
She then found that, in her view, her animals had been sadly neglected and this 
coincided with the death of one of her cats (from old age). From this point on, 
she seemed to associate all care from neighbours and other people as liable to lead 
to poor or disastrous outcomes and saw herself similarly at risk. A social worker 
assigned to visit her at home found that she (the social worker) was suspected of 
laying poison for the animals, and was even accused of taking one of the dogs 
away. The social worker set up a home care programme which included a home 
help, a welfare person from die RSPCA and a community nurse. There was 
concern about deteriorating hygiene in the home, related to the animals initially but 
also affecting how Gladys looked after herself. The care programme worked well 
for six months by which time it was realised that Gladys could not distinguish one 
person clearly from another and became quite suspicious each time one attempted 
to gain entry. Gladys mixed them up with a salesman from a local firm who had 
tried to sell her some furniture which she could not afford but had paid him a 
deposit consisting of all her social security money.
As conditions in the house deteriorated further and care personnel found access 
harder, Gladys had another fall as her eyesight, never very good, was letting her 
down more in her judgement of distances when negotiating the stairs and she had 
adamantly refused to wear appropriate glasses. At this point the care staff 
discussed the situation with the hospital staff who had recently treated Gladys and 
a further plan was made. The consultant psychiatrist who was asked to assess 
Gladys was not reassured by the initial statement from the care team that, provided 
Gladys was really well, she would again let them into the house regularly. He 
detected that her diet had been less satisfactory than care personnel had assumed 
and that she was generally under weight and under nourished. He wanted Meals 
on Wheels to be considered to prevent further deterioration.
The upshot of these discussions was that the medical consultant was not prepared 
to contemplate discharge unless care staff could gain regular access to provide 
appropriate care. This was not assisted by statements from Gladys indicating that 
she was, if anything, more confused about who she recognised as known people 
and who she associated with friends or allies of her neighbour. She remained 
convinced that this neighbour was trying to take away or kill her pets. The 
dilemma for care staff was that the only way for these pets to be properly fed was 
to rely on this same neighbour. All in all, it was regarded as essential that 
discharge should coincide with a formal arrangement for care staff to gain access 
to Gladys’s house as and when required. A suggestion that guardianship 
arrangements would formalise this was initially viewed with some scepticism. A 
full and open discussion with Gladys about who should have a key to her front 
door produced the view from Gladys that these other people needed to convince 
her that they had the authority to enter her house and had her welfare at heart.
368
It was then agreed that guardianship arrangements should be brought into force, 
despite some misgivings on the ethics of ‘intrusion’ into a person’s home without 
them necessarily agreeing to entry. It was decided that only the social worker and 
the home help should have additional front door keys and that only the social 
worker would normally sanction other people gaining access. In practice, this 
meant that the social worker agreed in advance to the home help lending her front 
door key to the animal welfare person, who subsequently helped Gladys cope with 
the deaths of a cat and dog over the next year. These events upset Gladys a great 
deal and seemed to mark further decline into confusion.
The effect of the home help and the social worker being able to enter the house 
with a key, as would a family member, seemed eventually to spell out that the 
relationship was based on both authority (to legitimate entry) and demonstrated 
care. The need to gain entry increased greatly after the second hospital admission, 
as Gladys was often so involved with her animals as not to notice the door bell 
ringing. She was occasionally seen at an upstairs bedroom window looking on as 
people came to her front door and rang, thinking they were the next door 
neighbour or the neighbour’s friends. The guardianship was renewed at six 
monthly intervals for two years and is still in force.
* Geoff Baxter* - First Vignette
Geoff Baxter is in his late sixties, a wealthy retired businessman who had been 
‘eased out* of his firm during a takeover bid. He lives with his wife in 
comfortable accommodation by the sea.
Always a heavy drinking man, he began to use alcohol as a means of combating 
the isolation of his social life compared with his previous active business interests. 
The couple have no close relatives and few friends. Geoff is prepared to admit to 
heavy drinking but when his alcohol level reaches beyond a certain point (1 + 
bottles of Scotch a day) he then totally denies his drink problem.
On two occasions his heavy drinking has brought him to a stuporous condition 
which has been followed by aggressive responses towards anyone who tries to 
intervene. His wife is increasingly scared of these episodes.
Both episodes have resulted in admission to hospital under Section 2 of the Mental 
Health Act, 1983, as the level of aggression or threatened aggression has reached 
beyond the limits containable at home. In each case the consultant psychiatrist 
viewed the behaviour as closely linked with depression and withdrawal. In each 
case also, Geoff Baxter eventually entered hospital without trauma, recognising the 
authority of those concerned and being particularly impressed by the 
documentation which accompanied the admission arrangements.
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During his periods in hospital he made a good relationship with Peter Durant, 
CPN, who has recently left the hospital to set up a private residential care home. 
Jean Thompson, Approved Social Worker, has been involved in both admissions, 
is aware of this and liaised with Peter Durant, as well as the Consultant 
Psychiatrist, at the time of Geoff Baxter’s second discharge.
Jean Thompson was assigned the aftercare work with Geoff Baxter and his wife 
during which she noticed evidence of depressive and angry behaviour from the 
client. She received some support from Mrs Baxter for some more structured 
form of aftercare to hopefully prevent further deterioration in her husband’s 
condition.
This suggestion was discussed at a case conference convened between the General 
Practitioner, Peter Durant, the Social Services Area Manager and Jean Thompson, 
and the following proposals were tabled:-
1. Peter Durant to visit Geoff Baxter at home in liaison with Jean Thompson 
to try to offer a tough but supportive relationship (the assumption here is 
that for this to happen, problems of entry and access will need to be dealt 
with in advance);
2. As and when appropriate, Peter Durant to arrange day care admission to 
his establishment, initially on a ‘collect-and-retum’ basis;
3. If and when necessary and appropriate, Geoff Baxter to be admitted into 
residential care.
‘Mrs Audrey Cummings, - Second Vignette
Mrs Cummings is 75 and has lived alone in a cul-de-sac of bungalows where she 
has been since she was widowed 10 years ago. She enjoys friendly relationships 
with neighbours who have helped her as she has become a little infirm.
However last year she showed increasing signs of disorientation, and there have 
been episodes of wandering and odd behaviour in public - eg she walked along the 
road naked one night and was brought back by neighbours who, according to her 
general practitioner (Dr Williams), felt that such episodes were tolerable as 
Mrs Cummings was generally able to look after herself.
As Winter approached she made it known that she was not heating her house 
properly, having been scared by a gas leak, seemingly, to lack of proper servicing 
of her gas central hearing which, in turn, had apparently arisen because 
Mrs Cummings was unsure of the identity of the Gas Board service engineers who 
had called on her and had sent them away. Soon after this, a cold snap occurred 
and Mrs Cummings was again found wandering naked along the street; she had 
fallen down a few times in the snow.
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As a result of this, neighbours made representations to Dr Williams who in turn 
contacted Social Services. The latter had been aware of the previous incident of 
wandering but had not continued to be involved. The up shot was a discussion 
between Dr Williams and the Approved Social Worker, Peter Crisp, regarding a 
proposal for Mrs Cummings to enter an old people’s home.
Peter Crisp argued that the uppermost care need was for Mrs Cummings to enter 
residential care immediately, i.e. on a short term basis until the hazards of the 
winter were left behind. Dr Williams felt that admission to a residential unit 
should not take place unless and until Mrs Cummings could be persuaded to 
go voluntarily. Peter Crisp persuaded Dr Williams Peter Crisp persuaded 
Dr Williams that admission into residential care was the first priority as he had, 
meanwhile, established that Mrs Cummings’ family were not accepting 
responsibility for her welfare as they were not in a position to provide her with 
accommodation, even on a short term respite basis, to see her through the winter. 
Mrs Cummings continued to express unwillingness to enter residential care, saying 
that she did not need to be looked after. She was not reassured when Peter Crisp 
told her that there would be no question of her losing her bungalow.
Eventually Mrs Cummings was admitted to the home under a guardianship order 
on the understanding that the case would be reviewed as soon as the spring 
weather came, or sooner if there was evidence of change of heart from relatives. 
As a result, Mrs Cummings expressed some anger and despair about her situation 
but agreed to accompany the ASW to the Home.
Scenario 1
Mrs Cummings settles in well at the home with an occasional protest at the threat 
to her independence but otherwise appearsg to benefit physically and emotionally 
from the comfort provided by the Home. Likewise, residential care staff feel 
more able to cope with Mrs Cummings’ complaints and protests that she would 
rather be in her own home.
Scenario 2
After a short period of initial resignation to being in residential care, 
Mrs Cummings fairly suddenly becomes anxious and aggressive, demands her 
personal belongings and appears to be looking for a chance to slip out of the 
building. Staff become concerned about the extent of their powers and the Head 
of home calls the ASW.
By the time Peter Crisp arrives at the home, staff are clearly distressed by the 
conflicting views and reactions they experience in response to Mrs Cummings’ 
apparent intention to leave. Some feel that as she is there under statutory care, 
staff have a right and a responsibility to ensure that that care is maintained whether 
or not Mrs Cummings can accept it at that point in time; they argue that there is 
a major difference between one incident of demanding to leave, as against a 
continuous unwillingness on Mrs Cummings’ part to stay in the home.
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So far, the indications are that this is an incident rather than a continuing 
phenomenon. Other care staff at the home feel equally strongly that no one should 
be forced to stay in the home against their will and that residents should be treated 
equally in this respect and not seen as different just because one is on a 
guardianship order.
‘Joan Humphries* - Third Vignette
Joan Humphries is in her late thirties, divorced, and her three children are living 
away from her and see her only occasionally. She lives in a surburban semi which 
has seen better days and shows obvious signs of neglect.
She is diagnosed as schizophrenic (though other diagnoses such as depression and 
psychopathy have occasionally been offered) and her behaviour is bizarre and 
unpredicatable insofar as neighbours and others are aware of it. Much of the 
time, however, she is alone and withdrawn, neglecting herself, not acknowledging 
the need for regular nutritious meals and often not opening the door, whoever the 
caller may be.
She has a history of five admissions to psychiatric hospital, three of which were 
compulsory, and each of which followed incidents of disturbed behaviour with 
neighbours. Neighbours feel threatened by her behaviour, though, as yet, she has 
done no physical harm to them.
Following each hospital discharge, unsuccessful attempts made by the hospital 
consultant, Dr Preston, and the General Practitioner, Dr Felix, to encourage her to 
take her medication. Attempts to provide social work support to Joan Humphries 
and to get her to attend a day centre also failed. She has recently been tried on 
a regime of long-term depot injections through the CPN, Helen Johnson and early 
signs were that this had a stabilising effect. Over the last few weeks, however, 
Helen Johnson has been in touch with Jenny Felgate, ASW, as she has been unable 
to gain access to her client. She made the unfortunate ‘mistake’ of asking 
neighbours whether they knew of Joan’s whereabouts and Joan saw one of these 
exchanges going on whilst peeping from behind the curtain in her front room.
Subsequently a case conference took place between Drs Preston and Felix, 
Helen Johnson and Jenny Felgate, the result of which was that all were agreed that 
the new treatment, having been apparently successfully commenced, should if at 
all possible be persisted with. Insofar as the problem turned on access, the view 
of medical colleagues was that Social Services should use a guardianship order to 
facilitate this. This would mean that the ASW, as de facto guardian, would have 
to provide access for the CPN for her fortnightly visits while the beneficial 
possibility of joint visiting had not been ruled out.
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Use of guardianship to gain access to Joan Humphries at home was ruled out as 
impracticable, and it was therefore proposed that she attends a combined day 
treatment/day care centre. The centre has close contacts with the CPN service and 
the hospital medical team.
Arrangements were made with the day centre to receive Joan Humphries and the 
ASW visited her to explain the proposal. Joan Humphries flatly declined to attend 
the Centre, as she perceived the unit as similarly restrictive to the regime in the 
hospital, and she did not accept the need for either form of care in any case. 
Joan Humphries’ view is that Helen Johnson has joined forces with the neighbours 
and that if it had not been for this, she would still have let Helen Johnson into the 
house. All rational discussion of the issue and the attitude of neighbours failed to 
shift Joan Humphries’ views.
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APPENDIX D
HISTORICAL TYPOLOGIES
GUARDIANSHIP ARRANGEMENTS REVIEWED BY THE ROYAL 
COMMISSION ON THE CARE OF THE FEEBLE MINDED, 1904/8
The Commission were considering revisions in the law for people with mental handicap 
but accepted that the care group was widely defined and not exclusive. They were keen 
that Britain should learn from practice elsewhere and looked for alternative models of 
Guardianship as follows:
1. COLLECTIVE GUARDIANSHIP OR ‘FAMILY COLONIES’
So-called family colonies, of which the most famous was (and is) at Gheel in Belgium, 
were intended to provide a mutally supportive environment for people with mental health 
difficulties who no longer needed hospital care. They might be referred to as a form 
of collective guardianship where the protective element is provided by ‘hosts’,
1.e. lay-persons deployed by a professional team to provide oversight. Such placements 
were described as suitable for "aged people certified as insane, but in whom the condition 
of dementia, incurable but tranquil, and senile enfeeblement of their faculties, hardly 
justify their detention in an asylum." Also to be found in such colonies are "many cases 
of delusional insanity, chronic mania and melancholia, and adolescent (sic) dementia".
Apart from commenting on developments on the continent, the Commission also referred 
to similar arrangements in parts of Scotland.
2. ‘FAMILY GUARDIANSHIP’ OR BOARDING OUT
The Commission reviewed traditional Scottish guardianship practice, usually associated 
with what would now be referred to as family placement schemes, ie arrangements by 
which:
"people [are] placed in private dwellings, either with relatives or unrelated 
persons, and either singly or in numbers not exceeding four [whether or not they
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have previously lived in an asylum, provided] the circumstances in which the 
patient will be placed are suitable or as efficient for his proper care and 
treatment."
Describing a development of one of these schemes, a Mr Motion, Inspector of Poor to the 
parish of Glasgow, referred to his efforts from 1885 onwards in St Andrews, Fyffe, to 
generate local enthusiasm for the scheme. In the chosen area, he comments:-
"...There are a number of little Hamlets or Villages where weaving have been 
practiced for ages past, and I went there personally and sent my assistant to elicit 
sympathy and good offices of the local medical gentleman. I was able to board 
out, roughly speaking, what has now risen to a very large proportion of our 
insane, at sums varying from 6s to 7s per week [a very considerable saving on the 
cost of them staying in an asylum]...After the first few we could then pick and 
choose the best type of Guardian.. .medical men in the district advocated and assist 
in the movement greatly, and care was taken in the selection of cases [chosen from 
people in asylums who] were working about the farm, and on the land, and were 
otherwise suitable for boarding out".
"Most of the selection of homes we take the houses as they are, and preferably 
with some aged couples whose family have gone off and left them with plenty of 
bed accommodation, and preferably in fruit-growing districts....The house is first 
inspected by the Inspector of Poor; if it passes him, application is made to the 
General Lunacy Board, and...the Deputy Commissioner in Lunacy and his 
colleague then visit, before we can put a patient in their it must receive their 
approval".
The Commission’s Report did not refer to the family care or boarding-out system already
well established in America by 1890.*
3. WARDSHIP
The Commission considered the relevance of wardship, at that time mainly used to afford 
protection to children, seeing the connection as follows:-
"Infancy, in cases in which the infant is the prospective possessor of property, is 
ground for Wardship; and the analogy between infancy and unsoundness of mind, 
or idiocy, and states of insufficient or defective discernment, is obvious, and has 
long been recognised...[Child Care legislation, eg the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act, 1904, has tended] to extend the field of Guardianship, and to use it 
as the instrument of a control, not merely educational, but social and personal".
H R Stedman, ’The Family or Boarding-Out System - Its Uses and Limits as a Provision for the Insane’ 
American Journal of Insanity, Vol.46, (January 1890, pp.327-338).
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The Commission then go on to draw their inspiration from the form of ‘guardianship of 
neglected children’ practiced in Germany, administered by the Court of Ward 
(Vormundschaftsgericht), providing for the ward:
"...to be placed in a suitable family [or institution, possibly including one for the 
‘insane’, having considered} the pecularities of each individual case...the nature 
of the degeneracy and the causes of it; and [the availability of] a curator to 
supervise the young person in the family."
Thus, though on the face of it more applicable to children and more geared to those with 
learning difficulties and behaviour problems, such a scheme could conceivably be regarded 
as a form as guardianship for adolescents with serious mental health problems up to age 
of twenty-one, a limit somewhat arbitrarily decided by the Commission in advance. 
Bateson*, whose comments on Royal Wardship are referred to below in the context of 
borough guardianship, was a contemporary observer of the Commission’s deliberations, 
She drew attention to similarities and differences between English and German 
guardianship, explaining the connection as follows
"The earliest Germanic Law had known a Guardianship exercised by the whole 
kin; later, a ‘tutela legitima’ in the person of the next of kin of the father’s side; 
and later still, a dative (court appointed) Guardianship. It is doubtful how and 
when the early Germanic folk-law first came to admit anything equivalent to the 
Roman ‘Jusdandi tutores’, an appointment by Public Authority of a ’mundoaldus’ 
for those who were without kindred to claim the ‘mund’... .As the protection of the 
orphan contain less of the ’mund’ and more of ‘Cura’, a doctrine of responsibility 
was forced upon the Guardian."
4. CURATELLE
The Commission reviewed guardianship practices on the Channel Islands, referring 
particularly to the Civil, Municipal, and Ecclesiastical Laws of the Island of Jersey, 1861, 
from which it was quoted
"It is to be observed by the Law of Retirement that recourse may be had to a 
Curatelle not only in cases of lunacy and mental incapacity, but whenever through 
drunkeness, prodigality, misconduct, or incapacity of any other kind may become 
necessary expedient to subject a person to control in the management of his 
property".
M Bateson, Borough Customs (Selden Society, London: Bernard Quaritch, 1904 p.CXXVII).
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In effect, however, the order provided both for the management of the person’s estate and 
person. Apparently this "compulsory process of appointing a curator was looked upon as 
a disgrace" and an alternative method of providing guardianship was for the person 
concerned to place themselves voluntarily under the control of a procurer, whose powers 
are very similar to those of a curator’s, including that of placing the person under 
restraint.
Evidence to the Commission then went on:
"If the Curator.. .could not keep the man under proper and sufficient constraint in 
is own home they might place him as a boarder in general hospital of the Island 
or some other Institution of that sort, or in a Private Asylum, or in Public Lunatic 
Asylum".
It was particularly stressed that curateurship "applies to rich and poor alike".
5. CONSELL DE FAMILLE
This is a French system of guardianship "in many respects similar to Curatelle" but the 
categories of persons for whom it is intended are more nearly those broadly described as 
mentally disordered, i.e. those suffering from "imbecility, dementia, or fureur".
Neither the Channel Islands or French system appealed to the Commission, who said that 
of ‘Norman Law’, that it "recognises the Unity and Obligations of a family as a whole in 
relation to property" whereas English law is more concerned with "the liberty of the 
individual so that ‘the restraint of the unfit’ would be affected, not with the family acting 
of itself as a controlling agency under the co-operative guardianship of a curator, but by 
the guardianship of a court whose protection is obtained by a procedure like that in force 
under Section 116 of the Lunacy Act".
6. CURATOR BONIS
The curator bonis is the Scottish system of guardianship of the estate. The curator is 
appointed by the court in circumstances in which a mentally ill person is found to be
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unable to manage his/her affairs. Petitions have to be supported by recommendations of 
two doctors.
The Commission seemed to have been under the impression that "while the Curator...is 
not given specific control over the person of the Ward, he has in effect such control...." 
They did not refer to the official position by which guardianship of the person was 
provided by tutors dative or tutors-at-law.
7. ‘LEGAL GUARDIANSHIP’
It is interesting to examine the perception of so-called legal guardianship by the 
Commission who seem to have assumed the absence of any pre-existing form of legal 
guardianship.
This proposal was brought to the Commission’s attention by one Sir James Crichton- 
Browne who suggested:
"....That the County Court Judge should, on the application of the Board of 
Guardians or Parish Council, having satisfied himself of the existence of idiocy or 
mental defect, appoint a Guardian who should have all the powers of the 
Committee of the person [i.e. who would have custody of the person, could decide 
his place of residence, would visit the person and to be generally] responsible of 
the safety and conduct of their wards...and stand in loco parentis".
The reference to committee of the person in this quotation suggests that the witness was 
proposing a form of legal guardianship for people with mental handicap comparable to the 
form of guardianship known as committee of the person applicable to mentally ill people 
and the lunacy legislation. Whether committee of the person under the 1890 Lunacy Act 
was, strictly speaking, a form of statutory guardianship remains uncertain, though it 
conceivable that the matter is one of semantics.
It is also unclear whether these discussions took into account the fact that precisely this 
form of guardianship was already available for people with mental illness within the terms 
of The Lunacy Act, 1845.
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HISTORICALLY SIGNIFICANT CATEGORIES OF GUARDIANSHIP
FEUDAL GUARDIANSHIP
This form of guardianship, which dominated up to 1660, was essentially an expression of 
obligations between the Crown and Royal Tenants, ie those whose lands belong to the 
Crown but were given over to individuals and families in return for services to the 
Crown. From the time of the Norman conquest, these services were essentially military, 
but as the need for military service diminished, other services were sought instead. If the 
land holders were not able to give military service or offer alternative services, obligations 
of socage arose, whereby services to the Crown were substituted by ‘fines’.
When a person was not in a position to honour his or her obligations to the Crown, the 
King assumed guardianship of the person as well as the property. This situation most 
commonly affected infants but to a lesser degree also people with mental illness who could 
not support themselves or honour their allegiance to the Crown. In the circumstances, as 
with infants, the Crown assumed the guardianship over the person with mental illness as 
‘pater posterias’, thereby protecting lands and properties as well as offering some 
protective care for an individual.
In practice, the degree of effective protective care varied. Kings frequently used 
guardianship as a useful form of gaining extra remuneration and sold the guardianship 
entitlements to others. Thus, whereas the Crown had basic responsibilities for the care 
of mentally ill people, guardians ‘once removed’ did not necessarily see their obligations 
in this light. Feudal guardianship was not sensitive or well adjusted to wards whose needs 
were particular and special, and the most common feature of this situation was of wards 
being prone to abuse by guardians who viewed the arrangement as an opportunity for 
financial gain.
How effective the Court of Wards and Liveries was in keeping guardians mindful of the 
particular needs of mentally ill wards is difficult to say. Nevertheless, the demise of the 
Court coincides with the effective demise of feudal guardianship following the passing of 
the Land Tenures Act, 1660, which finally dissolved the obligation to provide services to 
the Crown in lieu of obligations for holding land.
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CHANCERY (OR CIVIL LAW) GUARDIANSHIP
In Chancery or Civil Law, guardianship from 1660 onwards became linked to the 
delegated authority of the Lord Chancellor to administer those concerned with the 
protection of the property of people who are incapable of so doing themselves. Although 
the authority of the Lord Chancellor to appoint guardians for the care and protection of 
mentally ill people was not officially recorded until 1845, [8 and 9 Viet c 100] most 
authorities recognise a growing influence of the Chancellor and a corresponding 
willingness to accept responsibility for people incapable of managing their own affairs.
Chancery guardianship has survived as ‘guardianship of the estate’, within the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Protection whose current responsibilities are confined to the protection of 
the property of people with mental illness and mental impairment.
CANON LAW GUARDIANSHIP
Two authorities in particular (Neaman* and Helmholz**) trace a continuing influence of 
Roman law into ecclesiastical affairs and suggest that the church in England offered 
protective care for people - who could not seek this protection from any other institution. 
Canon law carried with it the two forms of Roman guardianship most commonly applied 
to people in this situation, namely tutela and curatora, but it was the latter, curatora, that 
was most commonly advanced as the way to provide guardianship for people with mental 
illness who required representation and protection. It is not clear whether this law only 
gained help for such people within the legal systems for which the church were 
responsible, or whether this in effect offered a parallel form of redress to courts 
administering common law principles. As most of the Canon law concerned with 
guardianship was eventually merged with Chancery law, this suggests that a parallel set 
of laws and legal systems operated.
J S Neaman, Suggestion of the Devil: The Origins of Madness (New York: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1975).
R H Helmholz, in ‘The Roman Law of Guardianship in England, 1300-1600’ (Tulane Law Review, 
52/2, 1978), (p. 225, refers to: "a general jurisdication in favour of ‘miserabiles personae’").
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Aside from the legal maxims of Canon law, was a humanitarian view that mentally ill 
people had sufficiently suffered by being mentally ill without the need for any further 
correction or punishment. Thus the basis for the Church offering protection was to 
remove such people from the possibility of recrimination and impoverishment. This 
applied whether or not the mentally ill person had behaved in a way which would 
otherwise have been regarded as criminal.
The position of mentally ill people subject to canon law and their need for guardians is 
the particular focus of a study by Sesto*, who summarises the position thus:-
"Historically, there appears very little canonical legislation concerning the subject 
of guardians, as the institute of guardianship was considered of particular concern 
to civil authorities. Moreover, the prescriptions of the Roman Law of 
Guardianship were considered adequate and were referred to consistently in 
canonical writing up to the publication of the [Canon Law Code in 1917]."
BOROUGH GUARDIANSHIP
Bateson** and Taylor*** see forms of guardianship applicable to the care of mentally ill 
people having been delegated through Royal recognition to mayors and officials of 
particular towns. The rationale may have arisen from patronage but whatever the basis 
of the delegation, local authorities, following local customs, were empowered to assist in 
the care of mentally ill people. Thus, by Bristol II, CAP 14, (14th Century):-
"and concerning the insane, the mayor shall take their goods and chattels and 
deliver them to the next of kin to be kept until they are restored to sanity. And 
the next of kin must provide a Guardian for the bodies of such insane persons, that 
no harm or mischief may happen to them and that they do no harm to others".
* Rev E J Sesto, Guardians of the Mentally 111 in Ecclesiastical Trials (Washington: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1956).
** M Bateson, Borough Customs (Selden Society, London: Bernard Quaritch, 1904), p.CXXVIII.
*** H B Taylor, Law of Guardian and Ward (Ph D Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1935),
pp. 13-14.
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Bateson notes from the above that Bristol was one of only two boroughs whose customs 
deal with the subject of insanity, i.e. where it was notable that "the King’s Wardship is 
excluded". She adds:-
"The subject of account is not treated, but there can be little doubt that account 
was required and that Wardship was not a profitable right of the next friends, for 
by this time, the boroughs had developed a Guardian’s account.... [Therefore 
there was clearly] a Wardship analogous to that provided for children who received 
bequests of land - namely a Wardship by Guardians appointed by the borough 
council [by whichj the lands...of a lunatic who did not recover seemed therefore 
to have been taken up in trust by the borough..."
COMMITTEE
Bell* points out that the procedure whereby mentally ill people were committed to the 
care of their relatives by the Court of Wards became associated with arranging custody, 
and it would appear that the origin of the term ‘committee’ (meaning an individual rather 
than a group) is the person made legally responsible for custody and care of mentally ill 
persons. It is not clear from the literature whether committee was in itself regarded as 
another name for guardianship or as an alternative form of guardianship in either a 
derivative or delegated sense.
Citing Fitzherbert, Bell refers to guardians being involved in the sale of wardships through 
the Court of Wards and says that:-
"Such transference of the guardian’s rights have been recognised from medieval 
times-for instance, the grantee, or as he has often termed committee, was entitled 
to the writ of Ravishment of the Ward in the same way as the original guardian."
No other reference to the term ‘grantee’ as an alternative to ’committee’ has been traced.
H E Bell, An Introduction to the History and Records of the Court of Wards and 
Liveries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953), pp. 128-131.
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Pope* says that the duties of the committee of the person:-
"relate to the personal care of the lunatic, and...imply the duties of fixing his 
residence, selecting his attendants, regulating his establishment, and making all 
other provisions for his maintenance, support, and comfort [and in pursuance of 
these tasks] to visit the lunatic at certain intervals,...and to have consideration for 
the health and comfort of the lunatic and, of course, where the possibility exists, 
his recovery. [Furthermore] the Committee is required, with the concurrence of 
the medical attendant, to make half-yearly an accurate report of the state of mind 
and bodily health of the lunatic, and, in particular, to report specially from time 
to time any important change occurring in either". (40)
The committee of the person was entitled to apply for reception of the mentally ill person 
"into an institution for lunatics or as a single patient". Pope also mentions particularly 
that "the Committee of the Person is not entitled to any remuneration for his care and 
trouble in protecting the lunatic" but could occasionally obtain recompense for particular 
expenditures. (41)
Theobold** summarises the above as follows:-
"The Committee of the Person has complete control over the person of the lunatic 
and it is his duty to make all necessary arrangements for his care and treatment. 
The lunatic may be received into an institution, or as a single patient, upon an 
Order signed by the Committee of the Person...[and] the choice of the lunatic’s 
residence is within the discretion of the Committee of the Person."
Wood Renton*** identifies the duties of the committee of the person as follows:-
1. Duties as to residence:
"The Committee may settle and change at pleasure the lunatic’s residence, which 
may be either with himself or with some other suitable person to whom he is 
responsible. He may also, if he thinks fit, place the lunatic in an institution for 
lunatics or under care as a single patient; and for this purpose an Order signed by 
the Committee will be sufficient authority for the lunatic’s reception."
* H M R Pope, Law and Practice of Lunacy (London: Sweet and Maxwell, ;1890), p. 372.
** Sir H S Theobold, The Law Relating to Lunacy (London: Stevens & Sons, 1924), p. 48.
*** Sir A Wood Renton, The Law of and Practice in Lunacy (Edinburgh: W Queen & Son, 1896).
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2. Duties as to treatment:
"...the Committee of the Person has a wide discretion on all matters of treatment. 
He is entitled and bound to secure for the lunatic all the comfort and enjoyment 
that his fortune will admit of, to provide him with medical attendants as necessary, 
to protect him from designing persons, and even from the access of relatives and 
friends if it is likely to increase his disorder...."
3. Duties as to visitation and reports:
"...[included making] half-yearly a report to the Board of Visitors [of Lunatics, 
Royal Courts of Justice, London] on the mental and bodily state of the lunatic."
Of committees generally, Wood Renton says:-
" Committees in England and Ireland correspond to the tutors and curators [ie 
Guardians] of the civil law. There is Committee both of the Person and of the 
Estate of the lunatic. Both offices may be united in the same individual or in two 
or more individuals jointly. But as a rule the Committeeship of the Person is now 
kept distinct from the Committeeship of the Estate."
Rules governing the appointment of committee of the person are summarised by 
Wood Renton as follows:-
1. Committee of the Person should be resident within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.
2. Committee of the Person should reside within easy access of the lunatic.
3. The relations of a lunatic are to be preferred to strangers in regard to 
Committeeship of the Estate" but in the case of Committee of the Person there is 
the view referred to by Blackstone (see above) that the heir of the lunatic should 
not generally exercise the function of Committee of the Person. This concern 
diminished over time and relatives gained preference for the task-though with some 
reservations to preclude ‘heirs-at-law’.
4. Consanguinity, although entitled to great regard, does not constitute any 
right to the Committeeship of the Person.
5. In the appointment of a Committee of the Person the wishes and 
inclinations of a lunatic will as far as possible be regarded, even if unreasonable.
6. A Committee of the same sex as the lunatic will be preferred".
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Pope adds to point (6) the exception that "Where a lunatic is married the personal custody 
will be granted to the husband or wife, as the case may be.”
The role of committee of the person in practice can be inferred by the agreements 
committees were expected to consent to when undertaking the task; in an example 
provided by Hey wood the following was stated
"I, Jane Smith, of Black Acre in the County of Essex, Spinster, do hereby consent 
to be appointed and to act as Committee of the Person of the above named 
Mary Smith, and I hereby undertake to visit her once at least every three months, 
and at such other times that may be required, and see that she is duly attended to 
and has all necessary enjoyments and comforts.”*
The Royal Commission on the Law Relating to Mental Illness and Mental Deficiency 
(1954-1957) considered the relationship between guardianship and committee in the 
following terms
"...the procedure of legal inquisition for determining the control of the property 
or of the person of the patient, or both, remains in existence and is still 
occasionally used....The question at issue in an inquisition is whether the person 
is ‘of unsound mind and incapable of managing himself or his affairs’. The 
exercise of the royal prerogative in relation to the care and commitment of the 
custody of persons found to be of unsound mind by inquisition and of their estates 
is now entrusted to the Lord Chancellor and the Judges of the Chancery Division 
of the High Court; the Court of Protection (the Judge and Master in Lunacy), 
which is responsible for the administration of the receivership procedures and for 
the general control of the management of patients’ estates for which receivers have 
been appointed, also deal with the now rare cases on inquisition. The person 
appointed as ‘Committee of the Person’ following an inquisition can determine the 
patient’s place of residence and can order his admission to and detention in 
hospital without using the certification or other admission procedures which are 
now used for other patients...."
* N A Hey wood and R C Romer, Lunacy Practice, 5th Edn., (London: Stevens & Sons, 1920)
APPENDIX E
SYNOPSIS OF * COMPULSORY TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY*: 
DISCUSSION PAPER PRODUCED BY THE MENTAL HEALTH ACT 
COMMISSION (1986)
Introduction
The paper was introduced by reference to the 1985 Biennial Report of the Commission 
as having reopened the debate "about the balance of good and ill" in enforcing community 
treatment on mentally ill people, and this is linked with a report on "The Long Leash" 
promised in the Draft Code of Practice.
Recent case law*, is discussed together with attempts to make provision for compulsory 
treatment in the community within the terms of the Disabled Persons Act, 1986. The 
Commission’s conclusion is that "Section 17 of the Mental Health Act, in its present form, 
cannot lawfully be pressed into service as a long term community treatment order".
The Commission admitted that they were not of one mind on the issue of compulsory 
community treatment and the paper is presented as a basis for wider discussion.
Past Community Treatment Order Proposals
Because the BASW 1977 Community Care Order proposals proved unacceptable, any new 
proposals along similar lines would need to take note of the reasons for these objections 
and produce "objective evidence...that such a power would reduce the incidence of 
relapses and decrease the need for in-patient care". Possibly a "different climate" of 
professional and inter-agency co-operation was evident compared with 1977.
Arguments Against Compulsory Treatment in the Community
Such powers threaten the principle of personal autonomy.
Regina v Hallstrom and Another, ex parte W and Regina v Gardner and Another, ex parte L, 20 
December 1985
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The phenomenon of ‘net-widening’: ie more people being brought within the 
ambit of legal powers and control than would otherwise be the case (or the same 
people for longer periods).
Philosophical/moral objections to the use of compulsion - i.e. should be used only 
as last resort.
Enforced medication "may have unpleasant and disabling side effects" as well as 
not being necessarily beneficial.
If to be well means to be symptom-free, those subjected to compulsory community 
treatment could have to contend with side effects which are more uncomfortable 
than residual effect of the illness.
Lack of sanction.
Arguments in favour of compulsory treatment in the community
As the extension of the use of ‘maintenance’ treatments reduces further the 
incidence of relapse and re-admissions to hospital, this process will begin to impact 
on those who not only lack insight and are unwilling to take medication but are 
"less amenable to professional authority than patients discharged in previous 
years". Compulsory community treatment will enable these people to live outside 
hospital provided their behaviour is socially acceptable.
Why should those outside hospital be seen to have less of a right to treatment 
and/or care than their counterparts in hospital? Or, are such rights only given to 
those (outside hospital) who are able to rationally appreciate the value of the 
treatment?
Those prone to relapse and to a downward spiral of deterioration, should be 
protected.
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The task of key workers in the management of mentally ill people in the 
community would be assisted with additional legal authority.
There should be alternatives to hospital facilities for containing and detaining 
people under mental health legislation.
An alternative to Section 17 arrangements needs to be found.
The Available Options
This section was introduced with comment to the effect that the Commission wanted to 
disturb the 1983 Act as little as possible and that they wished treatment to be seen in its 
widest sense: i.e. "care, support and supervision in the community" as well as
medication.
Options A: No New Power
No change.
Transfer the patient onto guardianship.
Options B: Legislative Amendments
An addition to existing guardianship of a statutory authority to physically convey 
the patient (as with admission to hospital) to out-patient treatment.
Extensions of Section 17 and 20 (to allow renewal).
A new Community Treatment Order (similar to BASW’s Community Care Order).
An expanded form of guardianship to be used in special cases. Implication: RMO 
has power to enforce treatment.
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Which Option?
Options A1 and A2 could be tested forthwith.
B1 would remove doubt about guardian’s powers to physically transport someone to a 
treatment situation but would not bring with it further powers to compel acceptance of 
medication.
B3 is too closely linked with the failure of the CCO, and associated with an increased 
authoritarian role for the social worker.
B4 - the favoured option.
Implementing this expanded form of guardianship would require various changes to the 
legislation, i.e. modifications to Section 8(l)(a), Section 25, Section 56, Section 61(b) and 
Sections 120/121.
Regulations would need to be introduced to define the conditions being provided for: 
i.e. that the mental illness is "of a long standing or severe psychotic type”; person refuses 
medication because of his acute illness apparently linked to failure to take medication.
Special guardianship is supported because the particular use envisaged for it can be closely 
defined and be seen to be in the "interests of the welfare of the patient" etc.
However in supporting the move the Commission say that they expect it to be "linked to 
a duty to provide other forms of care and supervision" in a more extensive attempt to 
combat relapses.
Would Special Guardianship work?
The existing reluctance of social services to use guardianship is seen as related to the 
resource question so the use of special guardianship would turn on growing awareness, 
presumably through assessment, of individual patients "who would have to remain 
detained in hospital if guardianship was not accepted".
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ASWs are expected to support the move because they see the results of re-admissions 
following relapse and the social problems that ensue.
The move should also be linked to the wider question of the "transfer of resources and 
responsibilities from hospital to community services", not as an extra imposition but as 
"an integral element of such a transfer".
Conclusion
"... Special Guardianship ... would provide the most compassionate and effective control: 
for particular individuals with the least infringement of personal liberty. Wide 
professional endorsement was anticipated.
The need for "additional resources" and a substantial contribution from both health and 
local authority personnel is seen as "obviously" necessary to bring about a meaningful 
shift from hospital to community care.
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APPENDIX F
STATISTICAL DATA ON SOCIAL WORKERS* VIEWS 
GUARDIANSHIP PROVIDES:
Protective Care 
Table No.93
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 12 (75%) 21 (77.8%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 3 (18.8%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Structured Care 
Table No.94
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 16 (100%) 26 (96.3%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 0 1 (3.7%)
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Continuity of Care 
Table No.95
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 11 (68.8%) 21 (77.8%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 0 4 (25%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Reinforcement of Authority
Table No.96
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 7 (63.6%) 9 (56.3%) 16 (59.3%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Con 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Priority Access to Services 
Table No.97
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 5 (31.3%) 8 (29.6%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 6 (37.5%) 10 (37.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Recognition of Need 
Table No.98
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 5 (45.5%) 8 (50%) 13 (48.1%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 4 (25%) 7 (25.9%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 4 (25%) 7 (25.9%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Stabilising Influence
Table No.99
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 13 (81.3%) 22 (81.5%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 3 (18.8%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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GUARDIANSHIP AS SURROGACY AND IMPLICATIONS
Substituted Judgement 
Tabie No. 100
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 13 (81.3%) 24 (88.9%)
Neutral 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Pre-emption: Anticipating Need 
Table No. 101
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 3 (27.3%) 7 (43.8%) 10 (37.0%)
Neutral 6 (54.5%) 2 (12.5%) 8 (29.6%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 7 (43.8%) 9 (33.3%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Pre-emption: Onset of Dementia 
Table No.102
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 3 (27.3%) 5 (31.3%) 8 (29.6%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 4 (25.0%) 6 (22.2%)
Con 6 (54.5%) 7 (43.8%) 13 (48.1%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVE
Facilitating Change: General Sense 
Table No.103
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 8 (50.0%) 16 (59.3%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 3 (18.8%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 5 (31.3%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Facilitating Change: Emotional and Psychological 
Table No. 104
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 3 (27.3%) 6 (37.5%) 9 (33.3%)
Neutral 6 (54.5%) 4 (25.0%) 10 (37.0%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 6 (37.5%) 8 (29.6%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Facilitating Change: Behaviour 
Table No.105
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 10 (62.5%) 18 (66.7%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (14.8%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 4 (25.0%) 5 (18.5%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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DIFFERENTIAL USE
For Depressed Clients 
Table No. 106
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 5 (31.3%) 8 (29.6%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 6 (37.5%) 10 (37.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Clients with ‘Compliant* Personalities 
Table No.107
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 4 (25.0%) 7 (25.9%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 7 (43.8%) 11 (40.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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CIRCUMSTANTIAL/CONTINGENT USE
Socially Vulnerable Clients 
Table No.108
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 10 (62.5%) 20 (74.1%)
Neutral 0 3 (18.8%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 3 (18.8%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Enforce SDeciffc Authority
Table No.109
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 13 (81.3%) 24 (88.9%)
Neutral 0 3 (18.8%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Firming Ud After Care
Table No. 110
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 12 (75.0%) 21 (77.8%)
Neutral 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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ESSENTIAL POWERS
Access 
Table N o .I l l
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 9 (56.3%) 20 (74.1%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 0 6 (37.5%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Attendance 
Table No.112
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 10 (62.5%) 20 (74.1%)
Neutral 0 5 (31.3%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (7.4%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Residence 
Table No 113
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 13 (81.3%) 23 (85.2%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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CONTAINMENT AND RESTRAINT
Physical Restraint 
Table No.114
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 5 (45.5%) 11 (68.8%) 16 (59.3%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 0 2 (7.4%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Containment 
Table No.115
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 7 (63.3%) 10 (62.5%) 17 (63.0%)
Neutral 1 (19.1%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 5 (31.3%) 8 (29.6%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENTS
Means of Facilitation 
Table No.116
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 10 (62.5%) 19 (70.4%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 4 (25.5%) 5 (18.5%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Detention Justified 
Table No. 117
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 5 (45.5%) 8 (50.0%) 13 (48.1%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 4 (25.0%) 8 (29.6%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 4 (25.0%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Adaptation of Regimes 
Table No.118
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 12 (75.0%) 21 (77.8%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (14.8%)
Con 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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ROLES OF SOCIAL WORKERS AND GUARDIANS COMPARED
Social W ork As Basic Care Taking 
Table No.119
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 13 (81.3%) 23 (85.2%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (11.1%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Guardianship As Basic Care Taking 
Table No. 120
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 15 (93.8%) 26 (96.3%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Social W ork As Enabling 
Table No. 121
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Neutral 0 0 0
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
401
Guardianship As Enabling
Table No.122
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 5 (45.5%) 13 (81.3%) 18 (66.7%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 2 (12.5%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 1 (6.3%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Social W ork As Advocacy 
Table No. 123
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Neutral 0 0 0
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Guardianship As Advocacy 
Table No 124
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 14 (87.5%) 23 (85.2%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 1 (6.3%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Social W ork As Surrogacy
Table No. 125
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 4 (36.4%) 6 (37.5%) 10 (37.0%)
Neutral 5 (45.5%) 2 (12.5%) 7 (25.9%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 8 (50.0%) 10 (37.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Guardianship As Surrogacy 
Table No.126
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Neutral 0 0 0
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Are There Guardianship Functions 
Incompatible With Social W ork?
Table No.127
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Yes 4 (36.4%) 10 (62.5%) 14 (51.9%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 3 (18.8%) 7 (26.9%)
No 3 (27.3%) 3 (18.8%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Social W ork As Informal Guardianship 
Table No.128
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 14 (87.5%) 22 (81.5%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (14.8%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 0 1 (3.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Other SSD Employees As Guardians 
Table No.129
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 7 (63.6%) 13 (81.3%) 20 (74.1%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 1 (6.3%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Guardians Outside Social Services 
Table No.130
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 10 (62.5%) 18 (66.7%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 3 (18.8%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 3 (18.8%) 4 (14.8%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Guardian As Family M ember 
Table No. 131
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 6 (54.5%) 9 (56.3%) 15 (55.6%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 2 (12.5%) 6 (22.2%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 5 (31.3%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEM AREAS
Extended Use 
Table No. 132
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Use more 9 (81.8%) 6 (37.5%) 15 (55.6%)
Same as now 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Less 2 (18.2%) 8 (50.0%) 10 (37.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Demand On Agencies* Resources 
Table No.133
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 7 (63.6%) 6 (37.5%) 13 (48.1%)
Neutral 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 8 (50.0%) 12 (44.4%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Concern Over Use Of Coercion 
Table No.134
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (81.8%) 12 (75.0%) 21 (77.8%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 3 (18.8%) 5 (18.5%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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‘Toothless Wonder* (Insufficient Powers)
Table No. 135
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.1%) 11 (68.8%) 19 (70.4%)
Neutral 2 (18.2%) 1 (6.3%) 3 (11.1%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 4 (25.0%) 5 (18.5%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Civil Rights Infringed 
Table No.136
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 2 (18.2%) 8 (50.0%) 10 (37.0%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 3 (18.8%) 7 (25.9%)
Con 5 (45.5%) 5 (31.3%) 10 (37.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Misuse/Abuse of Authority 
Table No.137
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 7 (63.6%) 9 (56.3%) 16 (59.3%)
Neutral 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Con 4 (36.4%) 5 (31.3%) 9 (33.3%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Inappropriate Responsibility for Adults
Table No.138
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 5 (33.3%) 13 (50.0%)
Neutral 0 2 (13.3%) 2 (7.7%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 8 (53.3%) 11 (42.3%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 15 (100%) 26 (100%)
Guardianship Needs to Change 
Table No. 139
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 6 (54.5%) 10 (62.5%) 16 (59.3%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 4 (25.0%) 8 (29.6%)
Con 1 (9.1%) 2 (12.5%) 3 (11.1%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Adjustment to  Individual 
Table No.140
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 9 (90.0%) 10 (76.9%) 19 (82.6%)
Neutral 0 2 (15.4%) 2 (8.7%)
Con 1 (10.0%) 1 (7.7%) 2 (8.7%)
Col Totals 10 (100%) 13 (100%) 23 (100%)
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Guardianship Powers: Should stay the same
Table No. 141
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 0 3 (18.8%) 3 (11.1%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 11 (100%) 12 (75.0%) 23 (85.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Detention Powers: ‘Outlaw Them ’ 
Table No.142
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 2 (18.2%) 0 2 (7.4%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 9 (81.8%) 15 (93.8%) 24 (88.9%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Package of Care 
Table No.143
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 11 (100%) 13 (81.3%) 24 (88.9%)
Neutral 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (3.7%)
Con 0 2 (12.5%) 2 (7.4%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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Resource Consequences
Table No. 144
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 10 (90.9%) 12 (75.0%) 22 (81.5%)
Neutral 1 (9.1%) 4 (25.0%) 5 (18.5%)
Con 0 0 0
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Budgets for Guardians 
Table No.145
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 0 1 (6.7%) 1 (3.8%)
Neutral 4 (36.4%) 8 (53.3%) 12 (46.2%)
Con 7 (63.6%) 6 (40.0%) 13 (50.0%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 15 (100%) 26 (100%)
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COMPULSORY TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY
Is This Power Required? 
Table No.146
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 8 (72.7%) 12 (75.0%) 20 (74.1%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 1 (6.3%) 4 (14.8%)
Con 0 3 (18.8%) 3 (11.1%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
- Within ‘Special Guardianship’? 
Table No.147
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 6 (54.5%) 8 (50.0%) 14 (51.9%)
Neutral 3 (27.3%) 4 (25.0%) 7 (25.9%)
Con 2 (18.2%) 4 (25.0%) 6 (22.2%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
Outside Guardianship Framework? 
Table No.148
Kensington 
and Chelsea
Westminster Row Total
Pro 2 (18.2%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (14.8%)
Neutral 6 (54.5%) 3 (18.8%) 9 (33.3%)
Con 3 (27.3%) 11 (68.8%) 14 (51.9%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 16 (100%) 27 (100%)
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APPENDIX G
STATISTICAL DATA ON GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS
DIAGNOSIS AND AGE
TABLE NO. 62
Schizophrenia Dementia Depression Other Row Totals
-21 1 (5.3%) 0 1 (14.3%) 0 2 (5%)
21-30 1 (5.3%) 0 1 (14.3%) 2 (66.7%) 4 (10%)
31-40 5 (26.3%) 0 0 1 (33.3%) 6 (15%)
41-50* 4 (21.2%) 0 0 0 4 (10%)
51-60* 2 (10.6%) 0 1 (14.3%) 0 3 (7.5%)
61-70 3 (15.8%) 0 2 (28.6%) 0 5 (12.5%)
71-80 2 (10.6%) 2 (18.2%) 1 (14.3%) 0 5 (12.5%)
804- 1 (5.3%) 9 (81.8%) 1 (14.3%) 0 11 (27.5%)
Col Totals 19 (100%) 11** (100%) 7 (100%) 3 (100%) 40 (100%)
Only one of the seven clients in these age ranges was aged between 44 and 54
Age of one client not known - total number of clients with dementia = 12
DIAGNOSIS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
TABLE NO. 63
Schizophrenia Dementia Depression Other Row Totals
Alone 14 (73.7%) 9 (75%) 5 (71.4%) 1 (33.3%) 29 (70.8%)
Nuclear
Family
3 (15.8%) 2 (16.7%) 2 (28.6%) 0 7 (17.1%)
Residential 2 (10.6%) 1 (8.3%) 0 2 (66.7%) 5 (12.2%)
Col Totals 19 (100%) 12 (100%) 7 (100%) 3 (100%) 41 (100%)
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DIAGNOSIS AND FAMILY SUPPORT
TABLE NO. 64
Schizophrenia Dementia Depression* Other Row Totals
Close 4 (21.1%) 0 1 (14.3%) 0 5 (12.2%)
Variable 
Limited 
or Negligible
15 (78.9%) 12 (100%) 6 (85.7%) 3 (100%) 36* (87.8%)
Col Totals 19 (100%) 12 (100%) 7 (100%) 3 (100%) 41 (100%)
20 of these clients were said to experience a negligible amount of support
DIAGNOSIS AND GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVES: 
ESSENTIAL POWERS AS SERVICES
TABLE NO. 65
Schizophrenia Dementia Depression* Mental
Handicap
Other Row Totals
Residence 10 (52.6%) 9 (75%) 6 (85.7%) 2 (100%) 1 (100%) 28 (68.3%)
Access 6 (31.6%) 3 (25%) 0 0 0 9 (21.9%)
Attendance 3 (15.8%) 0 1 (14.3%) 0 0 4 (9.8%)
Col Totals 19 (100%) 12 (100%) 7 (100%) 2 (100%) 1 (100%) 41 (100%)
* Depression refers also to Manic Depressive Psychosis
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND GENDER
TABLE NO. 66
Category [1] Category [2] Row Totals
Male 4 (30.8%) 10 (35.8%) 14 (34.1%)
Female 9 (69.2%) 18 (64.3%) 27 (65.9%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND MARITAL STATUS
TABLE NO. 67
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Married 0 2 (7.1%) 2 (4.9%)
Single 9 (69.2%) 18 (64.3%) 27 (65.9%)
Widow/Widower 2 (15.4%) 6 (21.4%) 8 (19.5%)
Cohabiting 1 (7.7%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (4.9%)
Separated 0 1 (3.6%) 1 (2.4%)
Not Known 1 (7.7%) 0 1 (2.4%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP OF GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS AND ETHNICITY
TABLE NO. 68
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
British 8 (61.5%) 23 (82.1%) 31 (75.7%)
Polish 1 (7.7%) 2 (7.1%) 3 (7.3%)
Jewish 0 2 (7.1%) 2 (4.9%)
West Indian 1 (7.7%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (4.9%)
Other 3 (23.1%) 0 3 (7.3%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
TABLE NO. 69
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Alone 9 (69.2%) 20 (71.4%) 29 (70.7%)
Nuclear Family 2 (15.4%) 5 (17.9%) 7 (17.1%)
Residential Care 2 (15.4%) 3 (10.7%) 5 (12.2%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
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STATUS GROUP AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
TABLE NO. 70
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Alone 9 (69.2%) 20 (71.4%) 29 (70.7%)
Family or Residential 4 (30.8%) 8 (28.6%) 12 (29.3%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
Chi-Square Value 0.021
Yates’ Correction Value 0.000
Fisher’s Exact Text
Minimum Expected Frequency = 3.8
p = .886 
p = 1.000
p = 1.000 d f = l
STATUS GROUP AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS
TABLE NO. 71
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Residential Care 2 (15.4%) 3 (10.7%) 5 (12.2%)
Alone or Family 11 (84.6%) 25 (89.3%) 36 (87.8%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
Fisher’s Exact Text p = .645 d f =  1
Minimum Expected Frequency = 1.6
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND FAMILY SUPPORT
TABLE NO. 72
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Close 1 (7.7%) 4 (14.3%) 5 (12.2%)
Variable 2 (15.4%) 4 (14.3%) 6 (14.6%)
Limited 4 (30.8%) 6 (21.4%) 10 (24.4%)
Negligible 6 (46.2%) 14 (50.0%) 20 (48.8%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
STATUS CATEGORY GROUPS AND DIAGNOSIS
TABLE NO. 73
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Schizophrenia 7 (53.8%) 12 (42.9%) 19 (46.3%)
Dementia 2 (15.4%) 10 (35.7%) 12 (29.3%)
Depression 3 (23.1%) 4 (14.3%) 7 (17.1%)
Mental Handicap 1 (7.7%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (4.9%)
Other 0 1 (3.6%) 1 (2.4%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND SCHIZOPHRENIA
TABLE NO. 74
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Schizophrenia 7 (53.8%) 12 (42.9%) 19 (46.3%)
Others 6 (46.2%) 16 (57.1%) 22 (53.7%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
Chi-Square Value .43115 
Yates* Correction Value . 10246
p = .5114
p = .7489 d f =  1
Minimum Expected Frequency = 6.0
STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND DEMENTIA 
TABLE NO. 75
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Dementia 2 (15.4%) 10 (35.7%) 12 (29.3%)
Others 11 (84.6%) 18 (64.3%) 29 (70.7%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
Chi-Square Value 1.77242 
Yates* Correction Value .92643 
Fisher’s Exact Text
p = .1841 
p = .3358
p = .276 d f = l
Minimum Expected Frequency = 3.8
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND HOSPITALIZATION - 
COMPULSORY ADMISSIONS
TABLE NO. 76
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
None 2 (20%) 11 (57.9%) 13 (44.9%)
One 2 (20%) 3 (15.8%) 5 (17.2%)
Two 1 (10%) 2 (10.5%) 3 (10.3%)
Three or more 5 (50%) 3 (15.8%) 8 (27.5%)
Col Totals 10 (100%) 19 (100%) 29 (100%)
STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND HOSPITALIZATION - 
VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS
TABLE NO. 77
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
None 7 (77.8%) 14 (70%) 21 (72.2%)
One 0 3 (15%) 3 (10.3%)
Two 2 (22.2%) 1 (5%) 3 (10.3%)
Three or more 0 2 (10%) 2 (6.9%)
Col Totals 9 (100%) 20 (100%) 29 (100%)
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVES - 
ESSENTIAL POWERS (AS SERVICE PROVISION)
TABLE NO. 78
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Residential Care^ 10 (76.9%) 18 (64.3%) 28 (68.3%)
Providing Access ♦♦ 3 (23.1%) 6 (21.4%) 9 (21.2%)
Ensuring Attendances^ 0 4 (14.3%) 4 (9.8%)
Col Totals 13 (100%) 28 (100%) 41 (100%)
♦Divided as follows
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Residential Placements 6 17 23
Regularising Residential 
Placements
4 1 5
Col Totals 10 18 28
♦♦Divided as follows
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Access to Social Worker 1 1 2
Access - Other Services 1 2 3
Access - Regularising 
Existing Arrangements
1 3 4
Col Totals 3 6 9
♦♦♦Divided as follows
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Attendance - Day Care 0 1 1
Attendance - Out Patient 
Treatment
0 3 3
Col Totals 0 4 4
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STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND MEDICAL INFLUENCE: ‘WAS THERE?’
TABLE NO. 79
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Yes 9 (75%) 13 (50%) 22 (57.9%)
Uncertain 1 (8.3%) 1 (3.8%) 2 (5.3%)
No 2 (16.7%) 12 (46.2%) 14 (36.8%)
Col Totals 12 (100%) 26 (100%) 38 (100%)
STATUS CATEGORY GROUP AND MEDICAL INFLUENCE: ‘WHICH WAY?’
TABLE NO. 80
Category Group [1] Category Group [2] Row Totals
Favourable 9 (100%) 5 (41.7%) 14 (66.7%)
Variable/Uncertain 0 2 (16.7%) 2 (9.5%)
Against 0 5 (41.7%) 5 (23.9%)
Col Totals 9 (100%) 12 (100%) 21 (100%)
421
AGES OF GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 81
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
40 or below 4 (17.4%) 8 (47.1%) 12 (30%)
41-50 1 (4.3%) 3 (17.6%) 4 (10%)
51-60 3 (13.0%) 0 3 (7.5%)
61-70 2 (8.6%) 3 (17.6%) 5 (12.5%)
71-80 3 (17.0%) 2 (11.8%) 5 (12.5%)
81 + 10 (43.5%) 1 (5.9%) 11 (28.4%)
Col Totals 23 (100%) 17 (100%) 40 (10%)
MARITAL STATUS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 82
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Married 1 (4.2%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (5.0%)
Single 16 (66.7%) 11 (68.8%) 27 (67.5%)
Widow/Widower 6 (25.0%) 2 (12.6%) 8 (20.0%)
Cohabiting 1 (4.2%) 1 (6.3%) 2 (5.0%)
Separated 0 1 (6.3%) 1 (2.5%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 16 (100%) 40 (100%)
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GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS AND ETHNICITY IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 83
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
British 21 (87.5%) 10 (58.8%) 31 (75.6%)
Polish 2 (8.3%) 1 (5.9%) 3 (7.3%)
Jewish 1 (4.2%) 1 (5.9%) 2 (4.9%)
West Indian 0 2 (11.8%) 2 (4.9%)
Other 0 3 (17.6%) 3 (7.3%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
DIAGNOSIS OF GUARDIANSHIP CLIENTS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 84
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Schizophrenia 8 (33.3%) 11 (64.7%) 19 (46.3%)
Dementia 11 (45.9%) 1 (5.9%) 12 (29.3%)
Depression
(& Manic Depression)
4 (16.7%) 3 (17.7%) 7 (17.1%)
Mental Handicap 0 2 (11.8%) 2 (4.8%)
Other 1 (4.2%) 0 1 (2.4%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
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LIVING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 85
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Alone 19 (79.2%) 10 (58.8%) 29 (70.7%)
Nuclear Family 3 (12.5%) 4 (23.5%) 7 (17.1%)
Residential Care 2 (8.3%) 3 (17.6%) 5 (12.2%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
FAMILY SUPPORT IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 86
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Close 3 (12.5%) 2 (11.8%) 5 (12.2%)
Variable 3 (12.5%) 3 (17.6%) 6 (14.6%)
Limited 6 (25%) 4 (23.5%) 10 (24.4%)
Negligible 12 (50%) 8 (47.1%) 20 (48.8%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
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HOSPITALIZATION - COMPULSORY ADMISSIONS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 87
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
0 11 (64.7%) 2 (14.3%) 13 (41.9%)
1 2 (11.8%) 3 (21.4%) 5 (16.1%)
2 2 (11.8%) 2 (14.3%) 4 (12.9%)
3 1 (5.9%) 2 (14.3%) 3 (9.7%)
4 0 2 (14.3%) 2 (6.5%)
5 or more 1 (5.9%) 3 (21.4%) 4 (12.9%)
Col Totals 17 (100%) 14 (100%) 31 (100%)
HOSPITALIZATION - VOLUNTARY ADMISSIONS IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 88
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
0 16 (84.2%) 5 (50%) 21 (72.4%)
1 2 (10.5%) 1 (10%) 3 (10.3%)
2 0 3 (30%) 3 (10.3%)
3 or more 1 (5.3%) 1 (10%) 2 (6.9%)
Col Totals 19 (100%) 10 (100%) 29 (100%)
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GUARDIANSHIP OBJECTIVES IN THE TWO AGENCIES - ESSENTIAL
POWERS AS SERVICES
TABLE NO. 89
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Residential Care* 16 (66.7%) 12 (70.6%) 28 (68.3%)
Providing Access** 5 (20.8%) 4 (23.5%) 9 (21.9%)
Ensuring Attendance*** 3 (12.5%) 1 (5.9%) 4 (9.8%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
* Divided as follows
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Residential Placement 16 7 23
Regularising Residential 
Placement
0 5 5
Col Totals 16 12 28
** Divided as follows:-
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Access to Social Worker 1 1 2
Access - Other Services 2 1 3
Access - Regularising 
Existing Arrangements
2 2 4
Col Totals 5 4 9
***Divided as follows:-
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Attendance - Day Care 1 0 1
Attendance - Out Patient 
Treatment
2 1 3
Col Totals 3 1 4
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GUARDIANSHIP PURPOSE REALIZABILITY IN THE TWO AGENCIES
TABLE NO. 90
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Achieved/ Achievable 10 (43.5%) 9 (52.9%) 19 (47.5%)
Not Clear 11 (47.9%) 5 (29.4%) 16 (40.0%)
Unlikely 2 (8.7%) 3 (17.6%) 5 (12.5%)
Col Totals 23 (100%) 17 (100%) 40 (100%)
MEDICAL INFLUENCE IN THE TWO AGENCIES: ‘WAS THERE?’
TABLE NO. 91
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Yes 11 (45.9%) 12 (70.6%) 23 (56.1%)
Uncertain/Variable 2 (8.3%) 2 (11.8%) 4 (9.8%)
No 11 (45.9%) 3 (17.6%) 14 (34.1%)
Col Totals 24 (100%) 17 (100%) 41 (100%)
MEDICAL INFLUENCE IN THE TWO AGENCIES: ‘WHICH W AY?’
TABLE NO. 92
Kensington & Chelsea Westminster Row Totals
Favoured 6 (54.5%) 9 (75.0%) 15 (65.2%)
Variable/Uncertain 1 (9.1%) 2 (16.7%) 3 (13.0%)
Against 4 (36.4%) 1 (8.3%) 5 (21.7%)
Col Totals 11 (100%) 12 (100%) 23 (100%)
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DOCUMENTATION
APPENDIX H
G U A R D I A N S H I P  R E S E A R C H  L W B C 2 5 4
S E C T I O N  A  Q U E S T I O N N A I R E
I .  S O C I A L  W O R K E R  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N
T h i s  f o r m  i s  f o r  c o m p l e t i o n  b y  t h e  S o c i a l  W o r k e r  i d e n t i f i e d  a s  f o l l o w s : -
I S o c i a l  W o r k e r  | 
I R e f e r e n c e  C o d e |
I I  G U A R D I A N S H I P  C A S E  C A S E  I D E N T I F I C A T I O N  A N D  B A S I C  D A T A
T h i s  f o r m  i s  f o r  c o m p l e t i o n  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a  G u a r d i a n s h i p  c l i e n t  i d e n t i f i e d  
a s  f o l l o w s : -
I N u m b e r  o f  c a s e s R e f e  r e n c e I S t a t u s I D a t e  f o r  |
I ( p e r  S W ) C o d e 1 ( E n c i r c l e 1 R e n e w a l /  I
1 1 a p p r o p r i a t e  N o . ) I L a p s e  |
1
1
1
1 I n  f o r c e  -  1
1 1 
1 1
1 I L a p s e d  -  2 1 1
1 I C o n s i d e r e d 1 1
1 1 - P r o p ' d / A c c ' d -  3 1 1
1 I - P r o p o s e d / 1 1
1 I N o t  a c c e p t e d - - -  4 1 1
1 1 - C o n s i d e r e d / 1 1
1
1
I n o t  p r o p o s e d -  5  
1
I 1 
1 1
I I i .  C A S E  D A T A :  T H E  I N F O R M A T I O N  R E Q U I R E D
1 .  What  i s  t h e  A g e  o f  y o u r  c l i e n t ?  I_______ I
( P l e a s e  e n t e r  a g e  i n  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  a d j o i n i n g  b o x )
2 .  P l e a s e  p u t  a t i c k  a g a i n s t  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  b o x  t o  i n d i c a t e  t h e  S e x  a n d
M a r i t a l  s t a t u s  o f  y o u r  c l i e n t .
M a l e  |  I F e m a l e  I___I
M a r r i e d  I  I S i n g l e  I I W i d o w / W i d o w e r  I I
C o h a b i t i n g  I  I
3 .  What  i 8 t h e  n a t i o n a l i t y / e t h n i c  o r i g i n  o f  y o u r  c l i e n t ?
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l e a s e  p r o v i d e  b r i e f  d a t a i l s  o f  c l i e n t  u n d e r  h e a d i n g s  ( A ) — ( 8 )
F a m i l y  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  r e l a t i o n s h i p  w i t h i n  f a m i l y .
D i a g n o s t i c  l a b e l  a n d / o r  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  m e n t a l  h e a l t h  p r o b l e m
B r i e f  h i s t o r y  o f  h o s p i t a l  c a r e  a n d  t r e a t m e n t
B r i e f  h i s t o r y  o f  c o m m u n i t y  c a r e  a n d  t r e a t m e n t
I. B r i e f  h i s t o r y  o f  S o c i a l  Work i n v o l v e m e n t :  how l o n g ,  why e t c .
How d i d  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  s u i t a b i l i t y  f o r  G u a r d i a n s h i p  f i r s t  a r i s e ?
1 0 .  When w a s  t h i s ?
I I .  Who f i r s t  m a d e  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n ?
1 2 .  Hov d i d  t h e s e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  r e l a t e  t o  t h e  m a i n  s o c i a l  w o r k  g o a l s  a n d  s o c i a l  
w o r k  c a r e  n e e d s  i n  t h i s  c a s e .
1 3 .  Wh s t  o t h e r  m e a n s  h a v e  b e e n  t r i e d  t o  a c h i e v e  t h e s e  e n d s ?
1 4 .  W h ic h  h a v e  t h e s e  h a v e  b e e n  t r i e d  a n d  f o u n d  w a n t i n g ?
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Why do you c o n s id e r  t h a t  t h e s e  o th e r  means d id  not succeed?
In summary, what is (or would have been) the objective of Guardianship in 
this case?
How would you expect (or how would you have expected) Guardianship to 
achieve this objective?
This question concerns your understanding of the views of SSD Management on 
this case, depending on its category, viz:-
If your case is in Category 1 (In force) - please indicate on what grounds 
Management agreed to Guardianship.
If your case is in Category 2 (Lapsed) - On what grounds did Management 
agree to this case lapsing?
If your case is in Category 3 (Proposed/Accepted) - On what grounds did 
Management accept the Guardianship proposal in this case?
If your case is in Category A (Proposed/Not Accepted) - On what grounds did 
Management decline to accept this proposal for Guardianship?
If your case is in Category 5 (Considered/not Proposed) - Why did you not 
put forward this as a Guardianship proposal to Management?
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9 .  I s  t h e r e  a n  a s p e c t  o f  D e p a r t m e n t a l  P o l i c y  o a  G u a r d i a n s h i p  w h i c h  b e a r s  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  o n  t h i s  c a s e ?  ( P l e a s e  t i c k  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e ) .
j Y e s  1 U n c e r t a i n |  No 1 
I I__________ I I
0 .  I f  y o u r  a n s w e r  i s  ' y e s ' ,  p l e a s e  i n d i c a t e  w h i c h  a s p e c t  o f  P o l i c y  a p p l i e s .
: l .  H av e  t h e  v i e w s *  o f  m e d i c a l  c o l l e a g u e s  I n f l u e n c e d  y o u r  d e c i s i o n  t o  p u r s u e
a G u a r d i a n s h i p  s u b m i s s i o n  t o  SSD M a n a g e m e n t ? _______________________ ________________
P l e a s e  t i c k  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e .  | Y e s  | Ho I
I 1 I
P l e a s e  e x p l a i n .
2 2 .  Have  t h e  v i e w s *  o f  m e d i c a l  c o l l e a g u e s  i n f l u e n c e d  y o u r  d e c i s i o n  n o t  t o  p u r s u e  
a G u a r d i a n s h i p  s u b m i s s i o n  t o  SSD M a n a g e m e n t ?  ________________
P l e a s e  t i c k  a s  a p p r o p r i a t e  1______ I________ I
P l e a s e  e x p l a i n .
* P l e a s e  n o t e  t h i s  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  v i e w s  o f  m e d i c a l  c o l l e a g u e s  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e i r  f o r m a l  w i l l i n g n e s s  o r  o t h e r w i s e  t o  s i g n  m e d i c a l
r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s ) .
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QUESTIONNAIRE ON SOCIAL WORKERS' VIEWS OF GUARDIANSHIP LWBC257
Introduction
Sectloos B,C and D of the Guardianship Questionnaire are for completion BY THE 
RESEARCHER. You are, however, welcome to rehearse your answers by writing in your 
reactions to the various items, as the Questionnaire document sent to you are for your 
retention.
Before the interview with the Researcher, it is hoped that you will have completed your 
Section A form(s) and considered the implications of your answers; looked at and tried to 
answer the questions raised by their vignettes; looked through Sections B, C and D of this 
Questionnaire to see how the subject is being covered In the Research.
I Social Worker 
IReference
J_______________
I
No of Section | Refs of Sec| 
A cases I A cases | 
Considered | considered |
SECTION B
OBJECTIVES AND USES OF GUARDIANSHIP
Consider whether you agree or disagree with the following statements describing the 
objectives or usage to which Guardianship can be made.
1. "Guardianship provides 'protective care'
1.e. reducing possibilities of harm or neglect 
to clients, or to protect them from 
exploitation from third parties."
2. "Guardianship provides a framework of 
structured care."
3. "Guardianship provides a basis for 
ensuring continuity of care."
4. "Guardianship can be used to reinforce 
the authority of other people (besides that of 
the Guardian) - e.g. parent etc."
5. "Guardianship can be used to provide 
clients with preferential priority access to 
services, e.g. to residential care of a 
particular kind and at a particular time."
6. "Guardianship is a way of ensuring that 
client's particular needs (over and above those 
revealed in normal social work assessment) are 
properly recognised and taken note of."
Strongly
Agree
Agree Uncer­
tain
Dis­
agree.
Strongly
Dlsagre
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7. "Guardianship can provide a stabilising 
Influence across the peaks and troughs of a 
person's Illness(es) and/or social difficulties 
(i.e. as against each crisis being seen as a 
separate cause for action)."
8. "Guardianship is particularly appropriate 
in dealing with those who can no longer sake 
decisions for themselves."
- "i.e. It should be used pre-emptively, i.e. 
anticipating clients future needs for 
protection etc.”
- "i.e. It should be used at the early stages 
of the onset of a client's dementia before 
his or her decision making powers are 
affected."
9. "The object of Guardianship to formalise 
a relationship in whiclrjclient is expected to 
change over a given period of time." - i.e -
a to develop emotionally
b to develop psychologically
c to develop behavlourally
10. "Guardianship is best suited to 
particular kinds of mentally ill people - 
e.g. particularly depressed people or people 
with particularly compliant personalities."
11. "The object of Guardianship is to meet 
.the particular needs of mentally ill people 
while specific circumstances pertain - e.g.
a) Social vulnerability, due to 
exploitation by other people.
b) Where the imposition of a particular 
kind of authority is needed to promote 
the client's welfare.
c) To firm up particular kinds of 
aftercare arrangements."
S tr o n g ly
Agree
Agree Uncer­
tain
Dis-
agree
S tr o n g ly
Disagree
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Strongly lAgree
Agree I_____
Oncer- |Dis- IStrongly
tain lagree {Disagree
1 2 .  W o u l d  y o u  c o n s i d e r  t h e  u s e  o f  I
G u a r d i a n s h i p  a s  a m e a n s  o f  e n f o r c i n g  I
o n e  o r  m o r e  o f  t h e  t h r e e  e s s e n t i a l  I
p o w e r s ,  i . e .  I
a )  To  o b t a i n  a c c e s s  t o  c l i e n t  I n  h i s  I
p l a c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e  I
b )  To  d e t e r m i n e  c l i e n t ' s  ' a t t e n d a n c e '  I
( e . g  a t  a  d a y  c e n t r e )  I
c )  To d e t e r m i n e  c l i e n t ' s  p l a c e  o f  I
r e s i d e n c e  I
1 3 .  W o u ld  y o u  r e g a r d  G u a r d i a n s h i p  a s  a  m e a n s  I
/^\ of actually containing or detaining a T
' p e r s o n  i n  t h e  p l a c e s  l i s t e d  a b o v e  \_
1 A.  How w o u l d  y o u  v i e w  y o u r  own i n v o l v e m e n t
i n  t h e  p h y s i c a l  h o l d i n g  o r  d e t a i n i n g  o f  a  
p e r s o n  u n d e r  G u a r d i a n s h i p ?
1 5 .  W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  R e s i d e n t i a l  C a r e : -
a )  Do y o u  s e e  G u a r d i a n s h i p  a s  a m e a n s  o f  
e n a b l i n g  p e o p l e  t o  b e  p l a c e d  i n  n o n  
h o s p i t a l  f a c i l i t i e s  w i t h o u t  t h e i r  
e x p r e s s  a g r e e m e n t .
*>) I s  d e  f a c t o  d e t e n t l orw o f  p e o p l e  u n d e r  
G u a r d i a n s h i p  i n  r e s i d e n t i a l  c a l e  
j u s t i f i e d .
c )  S h o u l d  r e s i d e n t i a l  c a r e  m a n a g e r s  a n d  
s t a f f  a d a p t  t h e  r e g i m e s  o f  
r e s i d e n t i a l  u n i t s  t o  m e e t  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  n e e d s  o f  t h o s e  o n  
G u a r d i a n s h i p ?
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SECTION C
THE ROLE OF SOCIAL VORRER COMPARED WITH TILL ROLE OF CUARDIAN
1. Co n a l de r  Che s i m i l a r i t i e s  sod d i f f e r e n c e s  between che r o l e  of  S o c i a l  Worker and Guard i an  In  Che f o l l o w in g  a r e a s .
SOCIAL WORR FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTIVE CATEGORIES OF FUNCTIONS CUARDIAN*S FUNCTIONS
S t r o n g l y ( A g r e e  | Un- I Dl a-  I S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  1 I C e r t a l n  l ag r ee  I Dlaagree
BASIC CAAETARINC ( S u p e r v l a l o n . 
S u r v e i l l a n c e  and p r o t e c t i v e  c a r e )
S t r o n g l y l A g r e e l  Un- IDla-  I S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  I I C e r t a l n l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
S t r o n g l y l A g r e e I  Uo- |D1«-  i S t r o o g l y  
a g r e e  1 | C e r t a l o l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
ENABLING (Caaework,  C o u n s e l l i n g  
and Development  Work}
S t r o n g l y l A g r e e |  Un- IDla-  I S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  | I C e r t a l n  l a g r e e I Dl a a g r e e
S t r o n g l y ( A g r e e  I Un- I Dl a-  I S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  1 | C « r t a l n l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
ADVOCACY (Making r e p r e a e o t a t l o n a  t o  have 
t he  p a r t i c u l a r  oeeda of  t he  c l i e n t  met )
S t ro n g l y ( A g r e e I  Uo- IDla-  ( S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  | I C e r t a l n l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
S t r o n g l y ( A g r e e  I Uo- I Dl a-  I S t r o o g l y  
a g r e e  1 I C e r t a l n l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
SURROCACY ( Dec i d i ng  or  a c t i n g  f o r  t h e  
c l i e n t  In t h e i r  be a t  l n t e r e a t a )
S t r o n g l y l A g r e e I  Un- IDla-  ( S t r o n g l y  
a g r e e  1 I C e r t a l n l a g r e e I D l a a g r e e
A r e  t h e r e  G u a r d i a n ' s  f u n c t i o n s  w h i c h  y o u  s e e  a s  d e f i n i t e l y  
c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h a t  o f  s o c i a l  w o r k  f u n c t i o n s ?
I f  ' y e s ' ,  s a y  w h i c h  t h e s e  a r e
A r e  t h e r e  G u a r d i a n ' s  f u n c t i o n s  w h i c h  y o u  s e e  a s  d e f i n i t e l y  
i n c o m p a t i b l e  w i t h  t h o s e  o f  s o c i a l  w o r k  f u n c t i o n s ?
I f  ' y e s ' ,  s a y  w h i c h  t h e s e  a r e .
D o e s  t h e  a u t h o r i t y  i n v e s t e d  i n  t h e  G u a r d i a n  make  t h e  
G u a r d i a n ' s  r o l e  w i t h  m e n t a l l y  i l l  p e o p l e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m  t h a t  
t h a t  o f  t h e  S o c i a l  W o r k e r ?
I f  y o u r  a n s w e r  i s  ’ y e s ’ , s a y  how
C o u l d  s o m e  k i n d s  o f  s o c i a l  w o r k  w i t h  m e n t a l l y  i l l  p e o p l e  b e  
d e s c r i b e d  a s  a  f o r m  o f  v o l u n t a r y  o r  i n f o r m a l  G u a r d i a n s h i p ?
I f  y e s ,  s p e c i f y
Y e s  I No
NoUn­
c e r t a i n
Y e s
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S h o u l d  o t h e r  s o c i a l  s e r v i c e s  d e p a r t m e n t  e m p l o y e e s  b e s i d e s  
ASWs b e  G u a r d i a n s ?
I f  y o u r  a n s w e r  i s  ' y e s ' ,  l i s t  t h e s e  i n  o r d e r  o f  
p r i o r i t y .
7 .  S h o u l d  p e o p l e  o t h e r  t h a n  SSD e m p l o y e e s  b e  G u a r d i a n s ?  
I f  ' y e s ’ , l i s t  t h e s e  i n  o r d e r  o f  p r i o r i t y .
Y e s Un­
c e r t a i n
No
8 .  V o u l d  n o n  SSD e m p l o y e e s  a s  G u a r d i a n s  f i n d  i t  e a s i e r  o r
h a r d e r  t o  a c t  a s  a d v o c a t e  f o r  t h e  c l i e n t  e . g .  i n  p r e s s i n g  
f o r  s e r v i c e s . ? l E a s i e r I H a r d e r
I
9 .  S h o u l d  t h e  G u a r d i a n  b e  o n e  o f  t h e  c l i e n t '6  f a m i l y ?
10  S h o u l d  t h e  G u a r d i a n  n o r m a l l y  b e  a  p e r s o n  w i t h  whom t h e  
c l i e n t  l i v e s  ( a s  i n  S c o t l a n d ) ?
Un­
c e r t a i n NoY e s
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SECTION D
P O S S I B I L I T I E S  FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
1 .  S h o u l d  G u a r d i a n s h i p  b e  u s e d
I I a b o u t  t h e  s a m e |  I
I Mo re  o f t e n  I a s  c u r r e n t l y  | l e s s  o f t e n  I
I_____________|________________ j_______________ I
2 .  How d o  y o u  a r r i v e  a t  t h i s  v i e w ?
3 .  H a v e  y o u  a n y  s u g g e s t i o n s  a s  t o  how t o  a r r i v e  a t  a n  o b j e c t i v e  m e a s u r e  f o r  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  a m o u n t  o f  G u a r d i a n s h i p  u s a g e ?
4 .  T h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e a s o n s  o r  c o n c e r n s  a r e  s o m e t i m e s  a d v a n c e d  t o  s u p p o r t  a n  
a r g u m e n t  t h a t  G u a r d i a n s h i p  i s  p r e s e n t l y  u n d e r - u s e d .
C o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  y o u  a g r e e  w i t h  t h e m  
o r  n o t .
1 .  " G u a r d i a n s h i p  m a k e s  d e m a n d s  on S o c i a l  
S e r v i c e s  r e s o u r c e s ,  i . e .  f o r  p r o v i s i o n  o f  
s u i t a b l e  s e t t i n g s  a n d  a p p r o p r i a t e  
p e r s o n n e l . "
i i .  “T h e r e  i s  c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  u s e  o f  
G u a r d i a n s h i p  t o  s a n c t i o n  t h e  U 6 e  o f  
c o e r c i o n  a n d  c o m p u l s i o n  o u t s i d e  t h e  
b o u n d a r i e s  o f  p s y c h i a t r i c  h o s p i t a l s . "
i l l .  " G u a r d l a n d s h i p  i s  a  ' t o o t h l e s s  
w o n d e r '  - i . e .  i t  i n c l u d e s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
p o w e r s  a n d  s a n c t i o n s  t o  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  
s e r i o u s  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t o  h o s p i t a l . "
i v .  " G u a r d i a n s h i p  e n t a i l s  a n  u n d u e  
I n f r i n g e m e n t  o f  c i v i l  l i b e r t i e s . "
v .  " G u a r d i a n s h i p  r a i s e s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
o f  a b u s e  a n d / o r  m i s u s e  o f  a u t h o r i t y . "
v l .  " G u a r d i a n s h i p  u n d e r  t h e  M e n t a l  H e a l t h  
l e g i s l a t i o n  i n v o l v e s  t a k i n g  o v e r  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  l i v e s  o f  a d u l t s . "
S t r o n g l y
a g r e e
A g r e e U n -
C e r t a i n
D i s ­
a g r e e
S t r o n g l y
D i s a g r e e
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5. Does Guardianship need to be changed to make it more effective in meeting
t h e  n e e d s  o f  c l i e n t s ?  __ __________
I Y e s  I U n c e r t a i n  I No | 
I_________ I___________ I I
6 .  S h o u l d  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  e s s e n t i a l  p o w e r s  b e 1 1 S t a y l U n -  I I n -  |
I R e d u c e d  | t h e I c e r t a i n 1 c r e a s e d |
I I s a m e 1 1
1 1 
1 1
I 1 
1 1
P l e a s e  a a y  w h i c h  p o w e r s  s h o u l d  b e  a d d e d  o r  t a k e n  a w a y .
7 .  G u a r d i a n s h i p  p o w e r s  s h o u l d  b e  t a i l o r e d  t o  
m e e t  t h e  a s s e s s e d  n e e d s  o f  c l i e n t s ,  i . e .  
i n d i v i d u a l l y  c o n t r a c t e d .
8 .  The  p o w e r s  t o  d e t a i n  p e o p l e  a g a i n s t  t h e i r  
e x p r e s ^ v w i s h e 6  u n d e r  G u a r d i a n s h i p  n e e d
t o  b e  ( a )  ma d e  e x p l i c i t
( b )  l e f t  a s  t h e y  a r e
( c )  o u t l a w e d
9 .  G u a r d i a n s h i p  s h o u l d  I n c l u d e  a  r e q u i r e m e n t  
o n  s t a t u t o r y  s e r v i c e s  t o  d e v e l o p  c o m m u n i t y  
b a s e d  ' p a c k a g e s  o f  c a r e '  d e s i g n e d  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t o  m e e t  t h e  a s s e s s e d  n e e d s  o f  
c l i e n t s  o n  G u a r d i a n s h i p  -  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  
t h e  SSD h a s  t h e s e  r e s o u r c e s  i m m e d i a t e l y  t o  
b a n d .
1 0 .  The r e s o u r c e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  G u a r d i a n s h i p  
n e e d  t o  b e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  f u n d e d  b y  
s t a t u t o r y  a g e n c i e s .
1 1 .  E a ch  G u a r d i a n  s h o u l d  b e  a c c o u n t a b l e  f o r  a n  
a l l o c a t e d  b u d g e t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  m e e t  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  n e e d s  o f  h i s  o r  h e r  c l i e n t .
S t r o n g l y
D i s a g r e e
D n -  | D i s -  
C e r t a l n l a g r e e
S t r o n g l y
a g r e e
A g r e e
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There needs to be a power to provide 
compulsory treatment in the community?
- This should be provided for within a 
"special" form of Guardianship (as 
proposed by the Mental Bealth Act 
Commission).
- This should be provided for outside the 
framework of Guardianship, (e.g. in the 
form of a Community Treatment Order, as 
suggested by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists).
S tr o n g ly
a g r e e
Agree Un-
Certain
Dis­
agree
Strong ly
D isagree
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